The German penal statute involved was Section 91, paragraph 2, which provides that "whoever with the intention of causing a serious detriment to a national of the Reich, enters into relations as described in paragraph I shall be punished", in especially serious cases by death. Himmler, as-quoted by Lautz, discusses the basis for punishment by German courts of "an offender who has caused racial Germans to be punished or otherwise prosecuted by Polish authorities". Himmler asserts that foreign police used methods against racial Germans which were contrary to international law and "the laws of minorities" and that such offenders deserve heavy punishment, but he also states that as far as racial Germans are concerned, Section 91, paragraph 2, of the German Penal Code "is not directly applicable as racial Germans, according to formal national law were not German, but Polish, citizens. I can only express my opinion in the form of a suggestion, that in case of the betrayal of a racial German by the foreign Poles * * * Section 91, paragraph 2, of the German Penal Code is to be applied * * *." (Citing decisions of the People's Court). Himmler directly states that the provisions of Section 91, paragraph 2, are "non-applicable". We emphasize the fact that the question under discussion related to the proposed prosecution of a Pole for acts committed before the war while Poland was in the exercise of its sovereign powers throughout its territory The question could not well have related to acts done after Poland has been overrun and part of it purportedly annexed, for, at that time Polish authorities would have been in no position to prosecute racial Germans. Furthermore, in discussing the problem, Lautz mentions a case against the Pole Golek which had recently come into his hands on preliminary proceedings.
He states that Golek in the year 1938 and 1939 in Poland had turned over to the police authorities a racial German of Polish nationality and had accused him of high treason committed in favor of the Reich.
Himmler, as quoted by Lautz, expressed the view that considerations of foreign policy would be opposed to the enactment of any German statute under which a Pole could be prosecuted by German authorities on account of acts of the kind indicated, but he added:
"I see here a task for the courts, an opportunity to fill a gap in the law, a gap caused by State political reasons, by creating a law in the appropriate cases."
Himmler quoted from an opinion by the People's Court in which it was said that the National Socialist State "feels it incumbent on itself, even in case of a conspiracy by a foreign government against one single Reich citizen, to give the threatened person its protection in accordance with penal law as far as this is possible from the home country." It will be observed that this quotation relates to the protection of Reich citizens, not Polish citizens, who are only racial Germans. Himmler continued, however:
"The Reich made no secret of the fact that with regard to the protection of Germans, it does not only claim the right to protect Reich Germans but also racial Germans living on its borders."
The defendant Lautz frankly expressed the view that the German statute defining treason did not cover the case under discussion. In this he was clearly correct. The German statute on treason had been extended to provide that "whoever with the intention of causing * * * any other serious detriment to the Reich, establishes relations with a foreign government, shall be punished by death."
This section was not applicable to the case under discussion because the charge to be preferred against the Pole was one of treason against an individual and not against the Reich. By the law of 24 April 1934 the concept of treason was also expanded to cover certain cases of causing serious detriment to a German national, but that law also was inapplicable to the case under discussion because the serious detriment had not been caused to a German national but only to a racial German. In so far as the German statutes required punishment of acts done with the intention of causing serious detriment to a national of the Reich, they extended the concept of treason in a manner unknown to the criminal law of any civilized State, and this law was made applicable in occupied and purportedly annexed territory. Notwithstanding the extremes to which the German laws of treason were extended, the defendant Lautz stated that he agreed with the Reich Fuehrer-SS and the President of the People's Court that a direct application of the German law of treason protects only German nationals and does not apply to racial Germans. He then stated:
"Furthermore, I concur with the conception that the general political development which has meanwhile come about, particularly during the las't years, which has enabled the Reich largely to protect its racial members of foreign nationality to a greater extent than it has been possible hitherto, must be borne in mind in this particular instance. Therefore, I find it necessary, on principle, to protect by means of the German penal code those racial Germans who have seriously suffered through action such as mentioned in paragraph 92, subparagraph 2, of the Penal Code, provided that action deserves punishment in accordance with sound German sentiment, but where such punishment, considering the elements of wrong doing of that particular case, cannot be brought home on the strength of any other directly applicable penal regulation."
In conclusion the defendant Lautz stated that in the majority of cases which have been committed by foreign nationals abroad against racial Germans he would "have to report in each individual case".
Stated in plain language, Lautz proposed that the courts should try and convict Poles for acts which violated no statute of any kind, if they deserved punishment according to sound German sentiment. This proposal violates every concept of justice and fair play wherever enforced, but when applied against a Pole for an act done in his own country in time of peace, the proposition becomes a monument to Nazi arrogance and criminality. Such a Pole owed no duty of loyalty to any State except Poland and was subject to the criminal jurisdiction of no State but Poland. The prosecution of the Pole Golek would constitute a palpable violation of the laws of war (see: citations to The Hague Convention, supra), and any official participating in such a proceeding would be guilty of a war crime under C.C. Law 10. The document discloses that cases similar to that of Golek had been tried by the People's Court and that more prosecutions were expected in the future. As a witness, the defendant Lautz testified that "in several individual cases a decision had to be obtained from the Minister."
We are justified in believing that Lautz' expectations were fulfilled and that he participated in the prosecution of Golek and in similar cases.
We have cited a few cases which are typical of the activities of the prosecution before the People's Court in innumerable cases. The captured documents which are in evidence establish that the defendant Lautz was criminally implicated in enforcing the law against Poles and Jews which we deem to be a part of the established governmental plan for the extermination of those races. He was an acces sory to and took a consenting part in the crime of genocide He is likewise guilty of a violation of the laws and customs of war in connection with prosecutions under the Nacht and Nebel decree, and he participated in the perversion of the laws relating to treason and high treason under which Poles guilty of petty offenses were executed.
The proof of his guilt is not, however, dependent solely on captured documents or the testimony of prosecution witnesses. He is convicted on the basis of his own sworn statements. Defendant is entitled to respect for his honesty, but we cannot disregard his incriminating admissions merely because we respect him for making them.
There is much to be said in mitigation of punishment. Lautz was not active in Party matters. He resisted all efforts of Party officials to influence his conduct but yielded to influence and guidance from Hitler through the Reich Ministry of Justice, believing that to be required under German law. He was a stern man and a relentless prosecutor, but it may be said in his favor that if German law were a defense, which it is not, many of his acts would be excusable.
We find the defendant Lautz guilty as charged upon Counts two and three of the indictment.
JUDGE BLAIR: (Continuing reading the opinion of the Tribunal.)
The Defendant Mettgenberg By his own sworn statement the defendant Wolfgang Mettgenberg frankly and fully admits his connection with the Hitler Night and Fog decree.
His statements show that he exercised wide discretion and had extensive authority over the entire plan from the time the Night and Fog prisoner was arrested in occupied territory and continuously after his transfer to Germany, his trial, and execution or imprisonment.
We will not reiterate the statements made by him in his sworn statement and here in above quoted. Suffice it to say that Mettgenberg held the position of Ministerialdirigent in Divisions III and IV of the Reich Ministry of Justice. In Division III, for penal legislation, he dealt with international law, formulating secret, general and circular directives. He was regarded as an eminent authority on international law. He handed Night and Fog cases and knew the purpose and procedure in such cases. He knew that the decree was based upon the fuehrer's order of 7 December 1941 to the OKW. He knew that an agreement existed between the Gestapo, the Reich Ministry of Justice, the Party Chancellery, and the OKW with respect to the purposes of the Night and Fog decree and the manner in which such matters were to be handled.
The defendant von Ammon was Ministerial Councillor in Mettgenoerg's subdivision and acted as head of the Night and Fog section an shown in this judgment. The two acted together on doubtful matters and referred difficult questions to competent officials in the Reich Ministry of Justice and the Party Chancellory, since both of these offices had to give their "agreement" in cases of malicious attacks upon the Reich or Nazi Party or in the Night and Fog cases. The NN cases came from the Wehrmacht but in some cases directly from the Gestapo. These cases were assigned to Special Courts at several places in Germany and to the People's Court at Berlin by defendant von Ammon. Mettgenberg and von Ammon were sent to the Netherlands occupied terri tory because some German courts set up there were receiving Night and Fog cases in violation of the decree that they should be transferred to Germany.
They held a conference at The Hague with the highest military justice authority and the heads of the German courts in the Netherlands, which resulted in a reference of the matter to the OKW at Berlin which agreed with Mettgenberg and von Ammon that "the same procedure should be used in the Netherlands as in other occupied territories, that is, that all Night and Fog matters should be transferred to Germany."
In Division IV for penal administration, Mettgenberg's work consisted of inspecting execution equipment. He witnessed one execution in 1944. He was entrusted with speeding up clemency applications because prisoners were escaping during air raids. Reich Minister Thierack called the defendant, Rothenberger, Under-Secretary of State, by telephone at Berlin and instructed him to make decisions concerning the clemency in death sentence cases presented by defendant Mettgenberg who made "reports lasting hours", and then Rothenberger made the decisions.
The evidence does not positively show that clemency cases presented by Mettgenberg and passed upon by Rothenberger were NN cases. We think, however, that the only conclusion that can be reached from Mettgenberg's testimony during the trial is that Rothenberger passed upon all clemency matters presented to him by Mettgenberg which included NN cases. Mettgenberg stated that he was appointed to speed up clemency matters due to air raids and that he took the matter up with the Reich Minister of Justice, Thierack, who at the time called Rothenberger on the telephone and told him to receive and pass upon the clemency submitted. Mettgenberg testified that he did present clemency matters to Rothenberger by telephone conversations which lasted for several hours and that Rothenberger then made the decisions.
The defendant Mettgenberg assumed the burden of defending the legality of the Night and Fog proceedings under the Ministry of Justice not only for himself but for all defendants connected therewith. He prefaced this defense with the following statement:
"Today I am still of the view which I expressed in my affidavit. My view is that it was regrettable because the courts, in these matters, could not completely do justice to their foremost task, the finding of the truth. How that I believe I have he and everything and believe myself to be able to survey the whole matter, I have to say that as concerns the various evils between which one had to choose, a transfer of the NN cases to the Administration of Justice was, after all, the lesser evil, so that this emergency solution which was made was probably the only possible solution."
With respect to the legal foundation for the NN cases, three laws or decrees are presented as justifying the proceedings. The first is Article 161 of the Military Penal Code which dates back to the 1870's and which, as amended, provides:
"A foreigner or a German who, in a foreign territory occupied by German troops, acts against German troops or their members or against an authority established by order of the Fuehrer and thereby commits an act which is punishable according to the laws of the Reich, is to be punished, just as if that act would have been committed by him within the territory of the Reich."
Whether this law violates international law of war need not be determined here because the defendants did not act under it in the execution and enforcement of the Hitler Night and Fog decree. Nor does this law authorize the execution and enforcement of any such decree.
The second legal ground presented is Article 3, Section 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure of 17 August, 1938 which provides for the punishment of criminal acts committed in the areas of military opera tions in occupied territory by foreigners or Germans and further provides that:
"If a requirement of warfare demands it, * * * they nay turn over the prosecution to the ordinary courts in the rear army area."
There can be no criticism of this law. It was not applied in any respect in the Night and Fog cases; hence it constitutes no defense for the manner in which the Night and Fog decree was carried out.
The third legal foundation for the proceeding is based upon the claim that the Hitler decree of 7 December 1941 was a legal regulation for the handling of offenses against the Reich or against the occupation forces of the German army in occupied areas. With respect to this decree we are convinced that it has no legal basis either under the international law of warfare or under the international common law as recognized by all civilized nations as heretofore set out in this judgment.
The defendant Mettgenberg referred to and approved the testimony of the defendant Schlegelberger which states "that the NN prisoners were expected, and were, to be tried materially according to the same regulations which would have applied to them by the courts martial in the occupied territories" and that, accordingly, "the rules of procedure had been curtailed to the utmost extent." This court martial procedure was shown to have been used in the prosecution of NN prisoners who had been charged with high treason or preparation of treason against the Reich.
Mettgenberg testified as to the troubles the department had with the Gestapo because the Gestapo insisted that they had already investigated the facts as to each NN prisoner and that these facts should be accepted without further trial. This practice was not acceptable to the Ministry of Justice. As to other difficulties in securing proper evidence, Mettgenberg testified:
"Even though investigations were first of all carried out in the occupied territories before the NN prisoners were transferred to Germany, yet it was a matter of course that that evidence was not always without gaps."
These "gaps" in the evidence were shown by Prosecution Exhibits 334 and 335 in which the Public Prosecutor at Kattowice complained of the difficulty of securing sufficient proof due to the utter secrecy of the proceedings. The Gestapo alone presented the evidence by "rather dubious police transcripts" and "such police records occasionally had been obtained by inadmissible means". Mettgenberg testified that defendant von Ammon made an official trip to Upper Silesia to discuss these matters with the Chief Judge in Belgium and Northern France, "to remedy that state of affairs". This action did not take place until 30 June 1944, which was only a few months before the Night and Fog matters were taken out of the hands of the Ministry of Justice, and all prisoners then held by the Ministry of Justice were transferred to the Gestapo to be placed in concentration camps.
Mettgenberg also testified to the difficulties experienced with the Gestapo arising out of the fact that the Gestapo transferred many of these prisoners directly to concentration camps and thereby retained control over them. Nothing was done about the fact that the police took the NN prisoners into police custody and retained them in police custody.
We find defendant Mettgenberg to be guilty under Counts two and three of the indictment. The evidences show beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted as a principal, aided, abetted, and was connected with the execution and carrying out of the Hitler Night and Fog decree in violation of numerous principles of international law, as has been heretofore pointed out in this judgment.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess until one--thirty this afternoon.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1530 hours, 4 December 1947).
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal announced last evening that certain corrections would be made today. In that connection an order has been signed, the result of which will be that certain pages on which errors have occurred will be removed and clean pages with the correction thereon inserted in place of the page removed.
In order, however, that all concerned may understand the nature of these minor changes and clerical corrections, the Tribunal will read at this time its order which will disclose the nature of these changes.
ORDER The text of the opinion as filed with the SecretaryGeneral is the official text.
Occasional errors in the reading of the official text, particularly with reference to the dates on which certain events occurred, were made in the reading of the official text. In such case the wording of the official text, as filed, controls.
The following corrections are made in the official text of the opinion:
On Page 79, Line 6, omit the sentence beginning with the word "To" and ending with the word "Belonged."
On Page 81, last line, the word "chartered" should read "charted."
On Page 95, line 2 should read: "The letter of the same Dr. Freisler to Minister."
On Page 98, line 14, insert the word "when" between the words "and" and "they."
On Page 98, line 29, strike the word "Chancellor" and insert the word "Counsellor."
On Page 98, line 30, strike the words, "and acted as head of" and insert in lieu thereof the words "in charge of". Strike the word "Section" and insert in lieu thereof the word "matters".
On Page 98, line 36, following the word "and" and preceding the word "which" insert the words "jurisdiction of".
On Page 99, last line, strike the words "defendants Schlegelberger and insert in lieu thereof the words "the Minister of Justice and the defendant".
On Page 100, line 4, strike the word "pending" and insert in lieu thereof the words "turned over".
On Page 101, line 15, strike the words "to the Special Court at Hamm".
On Page 104, lines 15 and 16, strike the words "as Vice President of one division of the People is Court".
On Page 105, line 1, strike the word "usually" and insert in lieu thereof the word "occasionally".
On Page 105, Line 5, following the word "no" and preceding the word "record" insert the word "public".
On Page 105, line 18. strike the word "Hamm" and insert in lieu thereof the word "Essen".
On Page 107, line 18, strike the letter "s" from the word "defendants", insert a closing parenthesis following the word "Mettgenberg", and strike the words "and von Ammon".
On Page 107, line 19, strike the word "Engert" and insert in lieu thereof the word "Marx".
On Page 107, line 23, strike the number "8" at the beginning of the line and insert in lieu thereof the number "6".
On Page 110, line 9, strike the period following the word "Courts" and add the words "at Oppeln and Kattowice."
On Page 110, line 11, following the word "Ministerial" and preceding the word "defendant" strike the word "Director" and insert in lieu thereof the word "Counsellor."
On line 19 of Page 110, following the word "in" and preceding the word "Breslau" insert the words "Cologne and".
On Page 111, line 29, strike the words "Ministerial Director" and insert in lieu thereof the word "Doctor".
On Page 113, line 20, add the letter "a" to the word "document".
On Page 113, line 29, following the word "reports" and preceding the word "are" Insert the words "as to time".
On Page 115, line 30, strike the word "Hamm".
On Page 114 strike the last line on the page reading: "As Under-Secretary, defendant Rothenberger also passed upon".
On Page 115, lines 1 to 12 inclusive, strike the first two paragraphs beginning with the word "clemency" on line 1, to and including the word "decisions" on line 12.
On Page 115, line 34, following the word "crimes" and preceding the word "against" insert the words "and crimes".
On Page 154, line 51, following the word "witness" and preceding the word "who" strike the name "Eiffe" and insert in lieu thereof the name "Schulz".
On pane 135, line 1, following the word, "witness" and preceding the word "also" strike the word "Eiffe" and insert in lieu thereof the name "Schulz".
On pane 206, line 23, strike the words, "and acted as head of", and insert in lieu thereof the words "and was in charge of".
The order is sipped by the three members of the Tribunal.
Judge brand will continue with the reading of the Opinion.
The Defendant von Ammon From his own sworn statements we gain the following information concerning the defendant von Ammon.
He joined, the SA in December 1933, in which organization he held the rank of Scharfuehrer. He joined the NSDAP in May, 1937. He was called to the Reich Ministry of Justice as of 1 January 1935, became a Landesgerichtsrat on 1 February 1935, and Landesgerichtsdirektor on 1 July 1937. His main activity in the Ministry during that period concerned "questions of international level usage in penal matters".
After the Austrian Anschluss he was employed as liaison officer of Department III (penal matters) in connection with Department VIII (Austria) , in the Reich Ministry of Justice. He was consultant in the department for the administration of penal law under Ministerialdirektor Crohne. He was transferred to the Munich Court of Appeals as Oberlandesgerichtsrat, where he served until June, 1940, at which time he was recalled to the Reich Ministry of Justice. As of 1 March 1943 he was appointed Ministerial Counsellor in the Ministry of Justice. He states:
"From 1942 onwards I dealt mainly with Nacht und Nobel cases in the occupied territories. In my capacity as consultant for Nacht und Nebel cases I made several duty trips to the occupied territories and took part in discussions in Paris and Holland which dealt with questions of Nacht und Rebel proceedings."
The broad scope and the variety of the official activities of von Ammon may be illustrated by reference to reports which he made to officials of the Ministry of Justice during the year 1944.
On 14 January 1944 he reported at the Ministry upon "Jurisdiction of Denmark". On 10 February he reported to the Minister on "Competence of Prosecution of IT Cases". On 31 May, under the heading "Submissions to the State Secretary" (Klemm), he reported on "Action against Stateless Jews, Admission of legal Procedure?". Under the heading "Reports to the State Secretary" for 21 June 1944, he reported on "Pastoral Service for NN Prisoners", after which in handwriting appears the word "Rejection". Under the heading "Submissions to the Minister" for 26 July, he reported on "Proceedings of State Felice in Lower Styria". Under the heading "Reports to the Minister" of 3 October, he reported on "Taking Over of Criminal Proceedings from the Eastern Districts". Under the heading "Formal Verbal Reports to the Minister" of 3 November 1944, he reported on "Liquidation of Offenses from the Eastern Territories". On 10 January 1945 it appears that he made a verbal report on the "Taking Over Administration of Penal Justice of the Minister for the East."
The prosecution introduced in evidence a captured document of 1942 pages in length, containing lists of many hundreds of death sentences which were submitted to the Minister of Justice and at times to State Secretary Klemm for final disposition. The cases were classified as "clear" or as "doubtful". The former - "clear" outnumbered the latter. An examination of the document discloses that between 14 January 1944 and 16 November of the same year the defendant von Ammon made twenty-four reports on cases in which persons from the occupied territories had been sentenced to death under the Nacht und Nebel procedure. The death sentences averaged more than one for every three days of the entire period.
In a notice addressed to Under-Secretary Rothenberger, and to Minister Thierack, von Ammon reported that on 1 September 1942, in Kiel, Essen, and Cologne cases were pending against 1,456 persons charged under the Night and Fog decrees.
In view of the fact that von Ammon was in charge of Nacht und Nebel procedure from 1942 until the end of the war, it is clear that we have in evidence only incomplete records of the activities of this defendant in connection with the Eight and Fog decree. The fragmentary character of the captured documents which have been submitted renders it impossible to give a complete picture of this criminal activity. The illustrations which we have given and which cover only a portion of the tine involved will, however, serve as an indication of the scope of the activities which were under the direction of the defendants Mettgenberg and von Ammon. Von Ammon also participated in a lengthy secret correspondence concerning the transfer of NW cases to the Special Court at Oppein and the necessity of allocating additional judges and public prosecutors to that court in view of the resultant increase in the volume of work.
The defendant von Ammon held an executive position of responsibility involving the exercise of personal discretion. Within the Ministry he was in charge of the section which handled Eight and Fog cases. The defendant Mettgenberg stated that the Night and Fog section within his subdivision was headed by von Ammon and that whenever von Ammon had doubts concerning the handling of individual cases joint discussions were held. We quote:
"When he had no doubts he could decide on matters himself." We have already set forth at length the statement of von Ammon concerning his knowledge and activities and his misgivings concerning the entire procedure. The defendants von Ammon and Mettgenberg were the representatives of the Reich Ministry of Justice at a conference at The Hague on 2 November 1943 concerning "New Regulations for Dealing with Eight and Fog Cases from The Netherlands." Von Ammon staled that assurance was given by Mettgenberg and himself that close connection would be maintained between the judicial authorities at Essen and the German authorities in the Netherlands in the handling of NN cases.
We have already quoted a note signed by von Ammon wherein he remarked that it was "rather awkward" that the defendants should learn the details of their charges only during the trial and commented on the insufficiency of the translation facilities in the trial of French NN prisoners. Von Ammon is chargeable with actual knowledge concerning the systematic abuse of the judicial process in these cases.
In respect to his other activities we refer to our general discussion under the heading "Night and Fog". We find the defendant von Ammon guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity under Counts 2 and 3 of the indictment.
JUDGE BLAIR: Judge Blair continuing to read the Opinion of the Tribunal.
The Defendant Joel The professional career of the defendant Guenther Joel in the Third Reich proceeded at the same pace as his career as a Party man; in fact, even before the war years his professional career merged with his career in Nazi organizations, and to be more precise, in the SS and the SB - the organization which the IMT Judgment has declared to be criminal.
He became a member of the NSDAP on 1 May 1933 and entered the Ministry of Justice as a junior public prosecutor (Gerichtsassesor) on 7 August 1933. In quick succession he became assistant public prosecutor (l September 1933), public prosecutor (1 January 1934), senior public prosecutor (l February 1935, and chief public prosecutor (1 November 1936.
Between August 1933 and October 1937, Joel was the chief of a newly created sub-department of the Reich Ministry of Justice, the Central Public Prosecution (Zentralstaatsanwaltschaft). In October 1937 this sub-department was dissolved, but the Reich Minister of Justice, Guertner, reserved the right to assign Joel as "referent" for special cases and subsequently made use of this right. After the dissolution of the Central Public Prosecution, Joel worked as "referent" in the Ministry's Penal Department No. III (later renumbered IV).
By a formal letter of appointment, dated 19 December 1937 and signed by Minister Guertner, Joel was, in addition to his other duties, appointed liaison officer between the Reich Ministry of Justice and the SS, including the SD, as well as the Gestapo. A few months later, namely, in a letter of 2 May 1938, signed by Heydrich, Joel was, effective 30 January 1938, admitted to the SS and, effective the same day, promoted to the rank of SS Untersturmfuehrer and given the position of Leader (Fuehrer) in the SD Main Office (Security Service Main Office).
His SS personnel record shows how quickly he climbed to high positions in the SS and the SD: on 11 September 1938 he became SS Ober sturmfuehrer; on 30 January 1939, SS Hpuptsturmfuehrer:
on 26 September 1940, SS Sturmbannfuehrer - holding all these ranks as Leader in the SD Main Office.
The record shows that in his capacity as SS officer Joel was, between 2 and 3 May 1939, sent on an official mission for the Security Office (SD). An official letter from the Reich Fuehrer of SS, Chief of the Security Service Main Office, dated 28 April 1939, so notified the Reich Minister of Justice. Again on 4 July 1940, the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service informed the Reich Ministry of Justice that Joel had been "put on the list of indispensable persons on behalf of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police", thereby reserving to the Security Police and the Security Service the indispensable service of Joel and freeing him from military service.
But in his answer, dated 11 July 1940, to this request, Freisler, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Justice, asked:
"To refrain from calling upon SS Captain Joel, Senior Public Prosecutor, for taking over duties for the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, Dr. Joel, as you know, is entrusted with extremely important reports at my Ministry."
The nature of these reports will be later discussed.
On 1 May 1941 Joel was promoted to Ministerial Counselor. He remained with the Reich Ministry of Justice until 12 May 1943.
The reason for his leaving the Ministry was that on 7 May 1943 he was appointed Attorney General to Supreme Provincial Court of Appeals in Hamm (Westphalia). By letter dated Fuehrer Headquarters, 12 May, 1943, Bormann, Chief of the Party Chancellery (sentenced to death in absentia by the IMT) personally confirmed his appointment. It should be added that a few weeks earlier, by letter of 13 March 1943 to Reich Minister of Justice, Thierack, the Gauleiter of Westphalia, Alfred Mayer, also formally endorsed Joel's appointment for Attorney General at Hamm, in his own name and in the name of Deputy Gauleiter Hoffmann, in charge of the administration of the Gau Westphalia-South.