Court No. III, Case No. III.
THE PRESIDENT: The Secretary-General, by his deputy, Mr. Willsie, will continue with the reading of the opinion in connection with the case against the defendant Lautz.
MR. WILLSIE: "The Defendant Lautz.
"The defendant Lautz from 20 September 1939 until the end of the war served as Chief Public Prosecutor at the People's Court in Berlin. He joined the NSDAP in May 1933. During the period of his service the "higher officials" under his supervision increased from 25 to about 70. The office originally consisted of four departments which were later increased to five to correspond with the number of Senates of the People's Court. After the enlargement of the department there were five public prosecutors and one senior public prosecutor in each department. The defendants Barnickel and Rothaug were among the senior public prosecutors under the general supervision of the defendant Lautz. The crimes with which his office dealt were those over which the People's Court had jurisdiction. Of particular interest here were the prosecutions for undermining the German defensive strength, high treason and treason, cases of attempted escape from the Reich by Poles, and other foreigners, and NN cases.
A great number of prosecutions were brought under the decree of 17 August 1938 which provides that "Whoever * * * openly seeks to paralyze or undermine the will of the German people or an allied nation to self-assertion by bearing arms" should be punished by death. This was the law which effectively destroyed the right of free speech in Germany. The prosecutor's office was required to handle approximately 1,500 cases a month involving charges of this type. Under supervision of the defendant Lautz all of these charges had to be examined and assigned for trial to the People's Court in serious cases, or to other courts. In the cases which were assigned to the People's Court for trial "there was always the possibility that the death sentence would be pronounced".The defendant Lautz instructed his subordinates that only those cases were to be retained for trial before the People's Court in which it was "possible to assume full responsibility if the People's Court Senate pronounces the death sentence".Lautz did not whirk responsibility for the acts of his deputies.
He testified that the signature of his deputy "meant of course, that I assumed responsibility for that matter."
In connection with the work of his department it was the duty of the defendant Lautz to sign all indictments, all suspensions of proceedings, and all reports to his superior, the Minister of Justice. This work assumed such proportions that it became necessary to delegate parts thereof to his subordinates, but the defendant Lautz required that important matters be reported directly to him. In partial explanation of his activities and motives in connection with his enforcement of the law against undermining the defensive strength of the nation, Lautz stated:
"just as I think that it is a good thing that no one today can claim that this war was lost only through treason, I must also say that I regret that because of this war and through these death sentences many people, who were otherwise all right, had to lose their lives."
As an illustration of the type of case which was prosecuted under this law, we cite the case of the defendant who said to a woman: "Don't you know that a woman who takes on work sends another German soldier to his death?" This offense was described by Lautz and Rothaug as a serious case of undermining the defensive strength of the nation. The office of the Chief Public Prosecutor of the People's Court was vested with a wide discretion in connection with the assignment of cases to the various courts for trial. It will be recalled that the Malicious Acts Law of 20 December 1934 provided for A Dec 47-M-BJ-1C-3-Gaylord.
punishment of persons who made false or treacherous statements "fit to injure the welfare or prestige of the government and of the Reich", etc. Under this law moderate punishments by imprisonment were authorized, whereas, under the law against undermining the defensive strength of the nation, the death penalty was mandatory. If the prosecutor sent the case for trial to the People's Court on the charge of undermining, instead of sending it to a lower court for trial under the Malicious Acts Law, he determined for all practical purposes the character of the punishment to be inflicted, and yet the evidence satisfies us that there was no rule by which the cases were classified and that the fate of the victims depended merely on the opinion of the prosecutor as to the seriousness of the words spoken.
The connection of the defendant Lautz with the illegal Nacht and Nebel procedure is established beyond question. The People's Court acquired jurisdiction of NN cases under the decree of the Reich Minister of Justice of 14 October 1942. Lautz estimated that the total number of NN cases examined by his department was approximately one thousand, of which about two hundred were assigned to the People's Court for trial, but he added that each case could concern several defendants. No good purpose will be served by a second review of the testimony concerning the Nacht und Nebel decree. In harmony with the decision in the case of the United States vs. Goering, et al., this Tribunal finds that the secret procedure which was instituted and enforced through the Ministry of Justice constituted a war crime and a crime against humanity. The Chief Public Prosecutor of the People's Court zealously enforced the provisions of this decree, and his conduct in so doing violated the laws and customs of war and the provisions of C.C. Law 10.
Treason Cases Involving Border Crossings by Poles Lautz estimated that from 150 to 200 persons were prosecuted for leaving their places of work and attempting to escape from Germany by crossing the border into Switzerland.
These cases were prosecuted under the provisions of penal code concerning treason and high treason.
On 24 February 1942 an indictment against the Pole Ledwon was filed by Parrisius as deputy for the defendant Lautz. The indictment was marked "Secret Treason Case", and bore the stamp of the Chief Public Prosecutor at the People's Court. A letter signed by Lautz bearing the same date was addressed to the Presidents of the Second Senate of the People's Court and advises them that he is sending to the Court the indictment in the case Ledwon. The indictment alleges that on 28 July 1941 the accused left his place of work in Bavaria and attempted to escape by crossing the Reich border, and that he was stopped by a customs official whom he struck with his fist while evading the arrest. The indictment states that the reason given by the defendant Ledwon for his attempt to escape from Germany "does not deserve credence; it may rather be assumed that he intended to join the Polish Legion organized on the side of the hostile powers". The indictment states that the defendant knew that the aim of the Polish Legion was to restore a Polish State. On the basis of the foregoing specific allegations, the indictment charges that the defendant prepared within Germany: "(1) the highly treasonable enterprise to separate from the Reich by force a territory belonging to the Reich; (2) to have aided and abetted the enemy inside Germany during a war against the Reich, and thus, as a Pole, not to have behaved according to the German laws and to the directives of the German authorities; and (3) to have committed a violent attempt on a German official. * * *." The indictment was brought under the provisions of Sections 80, 83, and 91b of the Penal Code, and under the provisions of the law against Poles and Jews.
Section 80 provides for the imposition of the death penalty upon anyone attempting by violence or threat of violence to detach from the Reich territory belonging to the Reich. Section 83 provides for the punishment of any person who solicits and incites an undertaking of high treason. Section 91 (b) provides for imprisonment or death for any person who undertakes acts in favor of the enemy powers or causes a detriment against the armed forces of the Reich. On 10 August 1942 the case was tried. The court found the following facts: Defendant was a Pole who lived in Poland on 1 September 1959. (See: Law Against Poles and Jews). After the Polish campaign the defendant reported "voluntarily" for work in Germany and then tried to leave the country. The court states further that "the prosecution charges the defendant with the intention of going to Switzerland in order to join the Polish Legion there." It adds that the Polish Legion was interned in Switzerland and that many Poles had been caught at the frontier, some of whom could be convicted of planning to join the Polish Legion in Switzerland. The court, with unwonted candor, states that "the trial did not show any concrete evidence that the defendant * * * had any knowledge of a Polish Legion in Switzerland". It held that due to lack of evidence "the defendant could not be convicted of the crime of preparation for treason and of treasonably aiding the enemy". The opinion of the People's Court continues:
"The defendant is, however guilty according to the result of the trial, of an of offense against penal law ordinance relating to Poles, of 4 December 1941. The general conditions of this ordinance are and fulfilled, as the defendant is, by origin, education, and sentiment, a racial Pole and was on 1 September 1939 resident in the former Polish State. In leaving his place of work as an agricultural laborer, of his own accord, at the end of July, i.e., during the harvest, he disturbed the orderly procedure of the harvest work of his employer to the detriment of the harvest. His action, moreover, was detrimental to the whole of the German people for, in leaving his place of work in order to go abroad, he deprived the German people forever of his labor.
Germany, in order to cover her war needs and to ensure food supplies for the front as well as for home, however, needs all persons employed, including foreigners. Every worker who by escape deprives the German war economy for good of his labor,- reduces the number of the badly needed manpower and thus endangers the interest of the German people."
The court held that it was irrelevant whether the Pole knocked the customs official down because in any event he used force sufficient to prevent his arrest at the time. It observed that under the law against Poles and Jews "only the death sentence on the defendant can be meted out, unless a less serious case can be realized in his favor. The Senate was not able to recognize such case."
The opinion concludes as follows:
"But by using violence against the customs officer who was going to arrest him, and thus resisting the legal German authority, has proved himself such a fanatical and violent Pole that he has forfeited any right for leniency. After the grave bloody guilt which the Polish nation has carried since the weeks of August and September 1939, it is the duty of every member of this nation to obey willingly the rules of the German authorities. A Pole who, on the contrary, uses violence against a German official can only be punished sufficiently by the highest degree of punishment. Accordingly, this has been applied to the defendant."
The Pole was sentenced to death.
We are not here to retry the case. We may, therefore, ignore the ridiculour charge that the defendant desired to join an interned Legion and the allegation that he came to the Reich "voluntarily" after the invasion of Poland. We have already discussed the essential evil in the practice of prosecutors whereby they charged that Poles were guilty of high treason by attempting to separate from the Reich territory which had never been legally annexed to the Reich. In the Ledwon case the sinister subtlety of the Nazi procedure is laid bare. If the case had been brought only under the law against Poles and Jews, the People's Court would not have had jurisdiction, so the defendant was charged with high treason for attempting to separate from the Reich, territory which did not belong to it.
The proof of high treason failed. There remained only the charge that in attempting to escape from Germany and from forced labor there, the defendant assaulted a customs officer with his fist and that what he did was done as a Pole in violation of the law against Poles and Jews. It was under that discriminatory law that ledwon was sentenced to death and executed. The defendant Lautz is guilty of participating in the national program of racial extermination of Poles by means of the perversion of the law of high treason.
In a similar case, upon an indictment signed by Parrisius and filed by authority of the defendant Lautz, the People's Court sentenced three Poles to death upon a charge of preparation of high treason "because they, as Poles, harmed the welfare of the German people, and because in a treasonable way they helped the enemy and also prepared for high treason". The specific facts found by the court were that the defendant Mazur and others attempted to cross the border into Switzerland for the purpose of joining the Polish Legion.
By such conduct and by depriving the German Reich of the benefit of their labor, it was held that the efforts of the defendants aimed "at forcibly detaching the Eastern regions incorporated in the Reich * * * from the German Reich." The opinion contains an illuminating passage concerning treason committed by attempting to join an interned Legion. We quote:
"After the defeat of France in the present war, as is known to the Senate (Court) from other proceedings, detachments of the Polish Legion crossed the border into Switzerland and were interned in camps. The Legion continues under the command of the Polish officers and kept in readiness for military action against the Reich on the side of the enemy in the event of German troops invading Switzerland."
The evidence of intent to join the interned Legion is paltry but, as before, we will not attempt to retry the case on the facts. The court held that according to the law against Poles, the death sentence must be imposed. We quote:
"They wanted to deprive the German nation forever of their labor. Thus they have damaged the welfare of the German nation. This is the offense against the regulation on penal law for Poles. * * * .
"The precept of the Regulation of Penal Law against Poles applies to the defendants' offense, although it was committed before the regulation came into force for, according to Article I of the Supplementary Regulation of 31 January 1942, the Regulation of Penal Law against the Poles can be applied to offenses committed before the regulation was in force with the approval of the prosecutor.
This approval has been given by the Reich Chief Prosecutor."
In another, the Kalicki case, the record of which is marked "Secret", three Poles were sentenced to death for preparation of high treason upon the same grounds as in the previous case. The court held that "the sentence to be pronounced has to be taken from the decree concerning the criminal law for Poles, since this decree provides the heaviest penalty of all laws applicable to the case." The evidence does not disclose that the defendant Lautz personally signed the indictment, but it was certainly filed under his authority. The question of clemency in the Kalicki case was presented to the defendant Rothenberger. On 28 July 1943 he wrote:
" * * * I have decided upon authorization by the Fuehrer not to exercise my right of pardon but to let justice take its course."
The defendant Lautz filed an indictment against the Pole Bratek. The specific charge was leaving his work in Germany and attempting to cross the border into Switzerland to join the Polish Legion. The general charge was the treasonable attempt to separate from the Reich an area belonging to the Reich and the violation of the law against Poles and Jews.
The court said:
"At the same time he has made himself guilty of a crime according to article I, paragraph 3, last half sentence, of the penal decree for Poles, issued 4 December 1941.
Because, being a Pole, has intentionally inflicted damage to the interests of the German people by malevolently leaving his important agricultural job, above all during harvest time, in September 1942, and through meaning to rob forever the German people of his own labor by escaping abroad. * * * "According to Article 73, Penal Code, the penalty can be drawn from the penal decree concerning Poles which loc.
cit. demands exclusively the death penalty as a rule, this being taken from the most severe penal law applicable here."
A secret communication by the defendant Lautz to the Reich Minister of Justice is of especial interest. The proposal under consideration was for the prosecution of certain Poles upon the charge of high treason on account of acts done in Poland before the war. In his discussion Lautz quotes from Himmler, the Foreign Office, and the President of the People's Court. The facts on the basis of which opinions were expressed may be illustrated-thus: Within Poland and before the war, a Pole institutes proceedings against a Polish citizen of German blood, charging the racial German with Fifth Column activities directed against Poland. During the war the Pole who instituted the prosecution against the racial German is captured. The question was: Can the Pole be prosecuted in a German court on a charge of high treason against the Reich, basing the charge on the fact that he had prosecuted the racial German in Poland?
The German penal statute involved was Section 91, paragraph 2, which provides that "whoever with the intention of causing a serious detriment to a national of the Reich, enters into relations as described in paragraph I shall be punished", in especially serious cases by death. Himmler, as-quoted by Lautz, discusses the basis for punishment by German courts of "an offender who has caused racial Germans to be punished or otherwise prosecuted by Polish authorities". Himmler asserts that foreign police used methods against racial Germans which were contrary to international law and "the laws of minorities" and that such offenders deserve heavy punishment, but he also states that as far as racial Germans are concerned, Section 91, paragraph 2, of the German Penal Code "is not directly applicable as racial Germans, according to formal national law were not German, but Polish, citizens. I can only express my opinion in the form of a suggestion, that in case of the betrayal of a racial German by the foreign Poles * * * Section 91, paragraph 2, of the German Penal Code is to be applied * * *." (Citing decisions of the People's Court). Himmler directly states that the provisions of Section 91, paragraph 2, are "non-applicable". We emphasize the fact that the question under discussion related to the proposed prosecution of a Pole for acts committed before the war while Poland was in the exercise of its sovereign powers throughout its territory The question could not well have related to acts done after Poland has been overrun and part of it purportedly annexed, for, at that time Polish authorities would have been in no position to prosecute racial Germans. Furthermore, in discussing the problem, Lautz mentions a case against the Pole Golek which had recently come into his hands on preliminary proceedings.
He states that Golek in the year 1938 and 1939 in Poland had turned over to the police authorities a racial German of Polish nationality and had accused him of high treason committed in favor of the Reich.
Himmler, as quoted by Lautz, expressed the view that considerations of foreign policy would be opposed to the enactment of any German statute under which a Pole could be prosecuted by German authorities on account of acts of the kind indicated, but he added:
"I see here a task for the courts, an opportunity to fill a gap in the law, a gap caused by State political reasons, by creating a law in the appropriate cases."
Himmler quoted from an opinion by the People's Court in which it was said that the National Socialist State "feels it incumbent on itself, even in case of a conspiracy by a foreign government against one single Reich citizen, to give the threatened person its protection in accordance with penal law as far as this is possible from the home country." It will be observed that this quotation relates to the protection of Reich citizens, not Polish citizens, who are only racial Germans. Himmler continued, however:
"The Reich made no secret of the fact that with regard to the protection of Germans, it does not only claim the right to protect Reich Germans but also racial Germans living on its borders."
The defendant Lautz frankly expressed the view that the German statute defining treason did not cover the case under discussion. In this he was clearly correct. The German statute on treason had been extended to provide that "whoever with the intention of causing * * * any other serious detriment to the Reich, establishes relations with a foreign government, shall be punished by death."
This section was not applicable to the case under discussion because the charge to be preferred against the Pole was one of treason against an individual and not against the Reich. By the law of 24 April 1934 the concept of treason was also expanded to cover certain cases of causing serious detriment to a German national, but that law also was inapplicable to the case under discussion because the serious detriment had not been caused to a German national but only to a racial German. In so far as the German statutes required punishment of acts done with the intention of causing serious detriment to a national of the Reich, they extended the concept of treason in a manner unknown to the criminal law of any civilized State, and this law was made applicable in occupied and purportedly annexed territory. Notwithstanding the extremes to which the German laws of treason were extended, the defendant Lautz stated that he agreed with the Reich Fuehrer-SS and the President of the People's Court that a direct application of the German law of treason protects only German nationals and does not apply to racial Germans. He then stated:
"Furthermore, I concur with the conception that the general political development which has meanwhile come about, particularly during the las't years, which has enabled the Reich largely to protect its racial members of foreign nationality to a greater extent than it has been possible hitherto, must be borne in mind in this particular instance. Therefore, I find it necessary, on principle, to protect by means of the German penal code those racial Germans who have seriously suffered through action such as mentioned in paragraph 92, subparagraph 2, of the Penal Code, provided that action deserves punishment in accordance with sound German sentiment, but where such punishment, considering the elements of wrong doing of that particular case, cannot be brought home on the strength of any other directly applicable penal regulation."
In conclusion the defendant Lautz stated that in the majority of cases which have been committed by foreign nationals abroad against racial Germans he would "have to report in each individual case".
Stated in plain language, Lautz proposed that the courts should try and convict Poles for acts which violated no statute of any kind, if they deserved punishment according to sound German sentiment. This proposal violates every concept of justice and fair play wherever enforced, but when applied against a Pole for an act done in his own country in time of peace, the proposition becomes a monument to Nazi arrogance and criminality. Such a Pole owed no duty of loyalty to any State except Poland and was subject to the criminal jurisdiction of no State but Poland. The prosecution of the Pole Golek would constitute a palpable violation of the laws of war (see: citations to The Hague Convention, supra), and any official participating in such a proceeding would be guilty of a war crime under C.C. Law 10. The document discloses that cases similar to that of Golek had been tried by the People's Court and that more prosecutions were expected in the future. As a witness, the defendant Lautz testified that "in several individual cases a decision had to be obtained from the Minister."
We are justified in believing that Lautz' expectations were fulfilled and that he participated in the prosecution of Golek and in similar cases.
We have cited a few cases which are typical of the activities of the prosecution before the People's Court in innumerable cases. The captured documents which are in evidence establish that the defendant Lautz was criminally implicated in enforcing the law against Poles and Jews which we deem to be a part of the established governmental plan for the extermination of those races. He was an acces sory to and took a consenting part in the crime of genocide He is likewise guilty of a violation of the laws and customs of war in connection with prosecutions under the Nacht and Nebel decree, and he participated in the perversion of the laws relating to treason and high treason under which Poles guilty of petty offenses were executed.
The proof of his guilt is not, however, dependent solely on captured documents or the testimony of prosecution witnesses. He is convicted on the basis of his own sworn statements. Defendant is entitled to respect for his honesty, but we cannot disregard his incriminating admissions merely because we respect him for making them.
There is much to be said in mitigation of punishment. Lautz was not active in Party matters. He resisted all efforts of Party officials to influence his conduct but yielded to influence and guidance from Hitler through the Reich Ministry of Justice, believing that to be required under German law. He was a stern man and a relentless prosecutor, but it may be said in his favor that if German law were a defense, which it is not, many of his acts would be excusable.
We find the defendant Lautz guilty as charged upon Counts two and three of the indictment.
JUDGE BLAIR: (Continuing reading the opinion of the Tribunal.)
The Defendant Mettgenberg By his own sworn statement the defendant Wolfgang Mettgenberg frankly and fully admits his connection with the Hitler Night and Fog decree.
His statements show that he exercised wide discretion and had extensive authority over the entire plan from the time the Night and Fog prisoner was arrested in occupied territory and continuously after his transfer to Germany, his trial, and execution or imprisonment.
We will not reiterate the statements made by him in his sworn statement and here in above quoted. Suffice it to say that Mettgenberg held the position of Ministerialdirigent in Divisions III and IV of the Reich Ministry of Justice. In Division III, for penal legislation, he dealt with international law, formulating secret, general and circular directives. He was regarded as an eminent authority on international law. He handed Night and Fog cases and knew the purpose and procedure in such cases. He knew that the decree was based upon the fuehrer's order of 7 December 1941 to the OKW. He knew that an agreement existed between the Gestapo, the Reich Ministry of Justice, the Party Chancellery, and the OKW with respect to the purposes of the Night and Fog decree and the manner in which such matters were to be handled.
The defendant von Ammon was Ministerial Councillor in Mettgenoerg's subdivision and acted as head of the Night and Fog section an shown in this judgment. The two acted together on doubtful matters and referred difficult questions to competent officials in the Reich Ministry of Justice and the Party Chancellory, since both of these offices had to give their "agreement" in cases of malicious attacks upon the Reich or Nazi Party or in the Night and Fog cases. The NN cases came from the Wehrmacht but in some cases directly from the Gestapo. These cases were assigned to Special Courts at several places in Germany and to the People's Court at Berlin by defendant von Ammon. Mettgenberg and von Ammon were sent to the Netherlands occupied terri tory because some German courts set up there were receiving Night and Fog cases in violation of the decree that they should be transferred to Germany.
They held a conference at The Hague with the highest military justice authority and the heads of the German courts in the Netherlands, which resulted in a reference of the matter to the OKW at Berlin which agreed with Mettgenberg and von Ammon that "the same procedure should be used in the Netherlands as in other occupied territories, that is, that all Night and Fog matters should be transferred to Germany."
In Division IV for penal administration, Mettgenberg's work consisted of inspecting execution equipment. He witnessed one execution in 1944. He was entrusted with speeding up clemency applications because prisoners were escaping during air raids. Reich Minister Thierack called the defendant, Rothenberger, Under-Secretary of State, by telephone at Berlin and instructed him to make decisions concerning the clemency in death sentence cases presented by defendant Mettgenberg who made "reports lasting hours", and then Rothenberger made the decisions.
The evidence does not positively show that clemency cases presented by Mettgenberg and passed upon by Rothenberger were NN cases. We think, however, that the only conclusion that can be reached from Mettgenberg's testimony during the trial is that Rothenberger passed upon all clemency matters presented to him by Mettgenberg which included NN cases. Mettgenberg stated that he was appointed to speed up clemency matters due to air raids and that he took the matter up with the Reich Minister of Justice, Thierack, who at the time called Rothenberger on the telephone and told him to receive and pass upon the clemency submitted. Mettgenberg testified that he did present clemency matters to Rothenberger by telephone conversations which lasted for several hours and that Rothenberger then made the decisions.
The defendant Mettgenberg assumed the burden of defending the legality of the Night and Fog proceedings under the Ministry of Justice not only for himself but for all defendants connected therewith. He prefaced this defense with the following statement:
"Today I am still of the view which I expressed in my affidavit. My view is that it was regrettable because the courts, in these matters, could not completely do justice to their foremost task, the finding of the truth. How that I believe I have he and everything and believe myself to be able to survey the whole matter, I have to say that as concerns the various evils between which one had to choose, a transfer of the NN cases to the Administration of Justice was, after all, the lesser evil, so that this emergency solution which was made was probably the only possible solution."
With respect to the legal foundation for the NN cases, three laws or decrees are presented as justifying the proceedings. The first is Article 161 of the Military Penal Code which dates back to the 1870's and which, as amended, provides:
"A foreigner or a German who, in a foreign territory occupied by German troops, acts against German troops or their members or against an authority established by order of the Fuehrer and thereby commits an act which is punishable according to the laws of the Reich, is to be punished, just as if that act would have been committed by him within the territory of the Reich."
Whether this law violates international law of war need not be determined here because the defendants did not act under it in the execution and enforcement of the Hitler Night and Fog decree. Nor does this law authorize the execution and enforcement of any such decree.
The second legal ground presented is Article 3, Section 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure of 17 August, 1938 which provides for the punishment of criminal acts committed in the areas of military opera tions in occupied territory by foreigners or Germans and further provides that:
"If a requirement of warfare demands it, * * * they nay turn over the prosecution to the ordinary courts in the rear army area."
There can be no criticism of this law. It was not applied in any respect in the Night and Fog cases; hence it constitutes no defense for the manner in which the Night and Fog decree was carried out.
The third legal foundation for the proceeding is based upon the claim that the Hitler decree of 7 December 1941 was a legal regulation for the handling of offenses against the Reich or against the occupation forces of the German army in occupied areas. With respect to this decree we are convinced that it has no legal basis either under the international law of warfare or under the international common law as recognized by all civilized nations as heretofore set out in this judgment.
The defendant Mettgenberg referred to and approved the testimony of the defendant Schlegelberger which states "that the NN prisoners were expected, and were, to be tried materially according to the same regulations which would have applied to them by the courts martial in the occupied territories" and that, accordingly, "the rules of procedure had been curtailed to the utmost extent." This court martial procedure was shown to have been used in the prosecution of NN prisoners who had been charged with high treason or preparation of treason against the Reich.
Mettgenberg testified as to the troubles the department had with the Gestapo because the Gestapo insisted that they had already investigated the facts as to each NN prisoner and that these facts should be accepted without further trial. This practice was not acceptable to the Ministry of Justice. As to other difficulties in securing proper evidence, Mettgenberg testified:
"Even though investigations were first of all carried out in the occupied territories before the NN prisoners were transferred to Germany, yet it was a matter of course that that evidence was not always without gaps."