The administration of Justice on the part of the People's Court has been called a War Crime and a Crime against Humanity by the Prosecution, as the law to be applied had been unlawful for reason of their sphere of application, the facts covered by them or their measure of punishment.
With regard to the prosecution's charge that the sphere of application of German law had been extended unlawfully I have shown elsewhere that the application of German law to acts committed abroad was in agreement with the practice of other civilized nations. In addition, I want to state that the USSR especially, i.e. one of the signatory powers of the Moscow declaration of 30 October 1943. the London Four Power Agreement of 8 August 1945 and law No. 10 has always professed its adherence to the "real" principle and has extended the sphere of application of its criminal law to their Polish incorporated territories.
The statement of the prosecution that the jurisdiction of the People's Court has been criminal, because the laws applied were overextended with regard to the facts covered by them and their measure of punishment is not less irrelevant. I do not want to deal with the problem whether or not even to-day it is the exclusive right of a state to make its own decision which facts it wants to punish and how it wants to punish them. In any case this charge of the prosecution is without fundation by reason of its premise of the objective illegality of German criminal statutes, i.e. that they were contrary to the legal principles of all civilized nations. In reality uniform principles have never existed with regard to the question which facts are punishable and which penalty is adequate in view of the fact that the conception of the purpose of the state, of the attitude of the individual towards the state, of the purpose of punishment, etc. vary too much. I only have to recall the difference of opinion, downright diametrical in many points, between the so-called socialist States on the one side and the capitalist states on the other. This, as shown in my Exhibits 94, 271 - 248 and 252 - 254 goes that far that e.g. proposals concerning human rights made by one side to the UN Committee for Human Rights were called contrary to international law by the other.
Even to-day many offenses punishable by death in one state are only punishable by prison terms in others and the thought has not even occurred to the latter to designate as criminal the legal practice of the former.
The charges of the prosecution against the German laws fail to carry weight in this case the more so as those facts with which the People's Court had to deal, primarily high treason and treason are considered to be among the most serious crimes, not only in all civilized countries. It will not be possible either to establish the criminal character of the measure of punishment for undermining the morale of the people. In this case its annulment would have, no doubt, been suggested in the report of the Allied Commission for Special Criminal Law (Exh. 251, Pro 2251) for this reason and for the reason alone that it was apt to strengthen German morale in time of war.
But Lautz would not be criminally responsible even if the laws to be applied by him had been illegal, because their sphere of application, the facts covered by them and their measure of punishment failed to agree with legal principles of all other nations. Under the law of all civilized nations a person cannot be punished unless he knows that he acted illegally. In point II and III of the prosecution has, therefore, rightfully started their arguments by discussing the wilful and knowingly committing of crimes. But in this case the defendant Lautz has testified plausibly that he considered the application of German laws as legal. Also Roemer, at present Ministerial Councillor in the Bavarian Ministry of Justice as witness for the prosecution has e.g. thought the verdicts of the People's Court to have been in accordance with international law in NN cases.
At that it must not be overlooked: It has been corroborated by the testimony of the legal expert Jahreiss and my Exhibits 87 - 109 that no German official, even the President of the Reich, was ever authorized or obliged to examine the political, military or other considerations on which laws were based or whether they were contrary to international law, to the principles of natural law or moral. He did not have this authority in spite of the provision in Article 4 of the Weimar Constitution according to which generally recognized principles international law were considered to be essential parts of German Reich law. This is shown clearly by Anschuetz's statements, contained in my Exhibits 87 - 90, I have to point this out after the prosecution has cited this article. The defendant Lautz therefore, not having been authorized or obliged to examine whether the laws to be him were in agreement with international law, natural law etc., cannot be reproached for filing, in the execution of these laws, to drew a comparison with the legal principle of the other states, all this, of course, under the promist that a uniform standard of comparison could have been found at all in the law of these states, And if Lautz, just as any other official, was not authorized to examine the political, military and other considerations, which were the basis of the individual laws, he cannot be charged amont other things with basing his indictments on laws e.g., the promulgation of which was not justified by military necessity. Here he is even less at fault as he had to understand from the note of the Allied Governments of 29 July 1919, already mentioned in my Exh. 226 that the Allied occupation powers also did not consider it illegal to apply their own National law (Heimabrecht) in the occupied German Rhineland, although, at that time, the peach treaty of Versailles had been signed, thus military necessity could no longer have prevailed.
This question has nothing to do with the fact, that Lautz, as I have mentioned before, was convinced in this particular case that the criminal prosecution of the resistance movements in the protectorate and in the incorporated Eastern territories was justified by military necessity. The prosecution further believes that the jurisdiction of the people's court is to be considered a crime against humanity, as it constituted a "persecution for political, racial or political reasons", as defined by Art. II Par. 1 (b) of law No. 10. We do not think this opinion to be tenable. The provision of law No. 10 or which the prosecutions view is based cannot be reasonably interpreted to mean e.g. that laws establishing the criminality of political crimes and the prosecution of these crimes should constitute persecution for political reasons. Such an interpretation would no doubt, be contrary to the legal conception of all civilized nations; even today every state claims the right to establish the criminality of acts and to punish acts directed against its existence. "Persecution for political, racial and religious grounds" as defined by law No. 10 can only be interpreted to mean, that nobody may be persecuted for the sole reason of his adhering to a certain political or religious conviction or his belonging to a certain race. Lautz is undoubtedly not guilty of such a crime. He never accused anybody on account of his political or religious opinion or because he belonged to a certain race. If he lodged the indictment against someone then he only did so in such cases where there was the suspicion that the accused had committed a criminal action. And in these cases, too, - that has been clearly shown by the evidence - Lautz never differentiated between the persons of the accused according to their citizenship, race, etc.
This means that there would only remain the assertion, that the defendant Lautz Lodged the indictment in the knowledge and with the purpose to achieve a criminal result by means of a court verdict, which was the result of improper application of the law. From the oral indictment it seems to follow that the Prosecution really wants to maintain this.
I want to state in advance that, as the evidence has proved, the position of the Reich Public Prosecutors in the proceedings of the People's Court was in no way different from that of any other Public Prosecutor. That the German Public Prosecutor only played a minor part in the main proceedings and had no influence either on the evidence or on the reaching of the verdict, my exhibits No. 36 to 82 and 110 to 122 may have clarified unequivocally. If it is being maintained that the Defendant Lautz and with him practically every other Public Prosecutor would be co-responsible for the executed verdicts, then, on the other hand, it should not be overlooked that the causative connection between the lodging of the indictment in Court and the execution of a verdict on the other hand, is not being oroken less than three time, namely by the decision of the-
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Pardon the interruption. Dr. Grube. It is apparent that you will finish your argument in a few minutes, and I therefore suggest that the next Counsel, if he is not here, be called so that we may proceed with the next argument. Are you ready, Dr. Doetzer?
DR. DOETZER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; go ahead.
DR. GRUBE: May I repeat my last sentence. If it is being maintained that the Defendant Lautz and with him practically every other Public Prosecutor would be co-responsible for the executed verdicts, then, on the other hand, it should not be overlooked that tne causative connection between the lodging of the indictment in Court and tne execution of a verdict on the other hand, is not being broken less than three times, namely by the decision of the President, of the court on account of the files and the meantime received objections by the defendant on the point, whether or not the defendant is sufficiently suspicious and thus the main proceedings are to be opened - in this respect I may refer to my exhibits 57 - 59 - then by the verdict itself, and finally by the decision concerning the question of clemency, three decisions which are being made quite independently of the statements the Public Prosecutor made in the indictment.
The German legislation took both these points into consideration. As was being shown by my exhibits 123 - 124 only the judges' violation of their official duty could constitute a reason to have the case reopened again, but not if the Public Prosecutor committed any violation of his official duty, however, severe this may have been. Therefore, even from a technical point of view it was impossible to speak of a participation as far as the activity of the Reich Public Prosecutors are concerned, which would have been causative for the verdicts of the People's Court.
Neither can the activity of the defendant Lautz and of his Public Prosecutors be grouped under any of the other forms of participation as in Art. I paragraph 2 of law No. 10. Already before I have mentioned that actual facts or forms of participation, which according to the legal principles of only one of the civilized nations, and especially according to the legal principles of one of the signatory powers of law No. 10 are not criminal and not to be punished, are not being covered by this law. I can save myself the trouble to state my point of view whether possibly in the Anglo-Saxon or in the Russian conception the Defendant Lautz would be co-responsible for the verdicts, though I could even not imagine this, Anyhow, according to the French legal conception, that is according to the legal conception of at least one of the signatory powers of law No. 10, the German Public Prosecutor is not responsible as far as criminal law is concerned for the verdicts; this is shown by the already mentioned decision of the French Military Tribunal, dated 3 May 1946, in my exhibit 166.
And thus it is established that the German Public Prosecutor - and Lautz did not differ in anything from any other Public Prosecutor - even according to law No. 10 could not be held responsible for the verdicts.
This being promised, we now come to the accusation that the Defendant Lautz had leged indictments with the knowledge and purpose to achieve criminal results through court verdicts which were the results of improper application of the law.
That the Senates of the People's Court found their decisions in a completely orderly proceedings results from part I of my written final statements concerning the People's Court, in which I summarized the evidence on this and have throughly appreciated it; I may refer to it.
The accusation made against the Defendant Lautz actually comes to it, that the motive for him to lodge an indictment was the wish, the people indicted by him should lose their life or their freedom. Can that really be assumed from a man who here, in these proceedings, has never been called an intriguer either in documents or in statements by witnesses, on the contrary he was called moderate by everyone, whether they were witnesses of the Prosecution or witnesses of the defense, who had most critically examined any denouncement, who refrained from all attempts to influence the Senates and did not allow his Public Prosecutors to do so, either who also in the main trial appeared moderate and reserved and who asked his official to do the same?
If Lautz lodged any indictments, then he did not do it with any murderous intentions but only, because he was obliged by law to do so and was compelled by the Ministry to induce the court to decide whether or not the accused was liable to punishment - and if this was the case - what punishment would be deemed applicable. He could not have intended to reach any more with his indictments. Of course, at the time when he lodged the indictment he must have thought it impossible that the accused would be found innocent; for otherwise he would not have been allowed to lodge an indictment. But in no way was he sure what would be the actual consequences of this indictment, especially what would be the results of the evidence, how the court would appreciate this result, that is, whether and how the accused would be sentenced, and finally, what would be the result of the decision concerning the pardon. It would have been different if the office of the Reich Public Prosecutor and the People's Court would have co-operated in general and in the individual case, especially if the verdicts would have been found by reason of agreements made cy the two agencies. The Prosecution has not in the least proven that this was actually the fact. However, Lautz has stated when being examined, that there did not exist any such co-operation between the office of the Reich Public Prosecutors and the Senates concerning the verdict to be given, The documents of the Prosecution prove the truth of that statement. I need only remind you of the case Kolinski and others in exhibit 125 in which 3 of the defendants were acquitted on account of theresult of the evidence.
Further I may remind you of the statements made by the witness Gruenwald concerning the case Chalupa in exhibit 513. Then Bruenwald stated that the representative of the Reich Public Prosecutor asked for 10 years penitentiary, the Senate, however, only pronounced a sentence of 5 years in the penitentiary. Furthermore, I may refer to the case Zelezny in exhibit 512 in which the representative of the Reich Public prosecutor even in his final statement assumed preparation for high treason and aiding the enemy, whereas the Senate took the point of view that only an offense against passport regulations was involved, and therefore, Zelezny was only sentenced to imprisonment. Further I may remind you of the case Gogler in exhibit 135 where one of the defendants was acquitted for lack of evidence. And thus I could enumerate a large number of the Prosecution's own documents, which all prove that there could not have existed any co-operation between the Senate and the office of Reich Public Prosecution, that the verdicts depended solely on the result of the evidence, the consequences which the indictment would have were, therefore, not to be foreseen at the time the indictment was lodged.
Even from a human point of view, however, Lautz is free from guilt, He had not solicited the office of "Chief Reich Public Prosecutor; he was appointed to it. Non-Party circles had suggested him; Guertner had assigned him to this position, because he - I take the liberty of referring to my exhibit 221, - had confidence in him and wanted to prevent the office from falling into the hands of a completely devoted Party man. Lautz never disappointed this confidence. To the end, he was the objective and correct official, devoted to duty, who as stated by Professor Lange, formulator of the new penal code for the Russian Zone of Occupation, in my exhibit 237, attempted to ward off the brutalization and deterioration of the legal system, by adhering strictly to formal law.
To the end, however, he was also the sympathetic man, who tried to help wherever he could. This is shown by the many affidavits which have been submitted here, some of them having been sent unsolicited, when it became known that he had been indicted here.
The very fact, however, that Lautz was not merely an official, not merely a Public Prosecutor, but also a man with a feeling heart, constitutes the great tragedy of his life. During the course of the war, the tendency of harsher legislation and administration of justice to become even harsher resulted in his growing inner conflict. He is one of the many German jurists to whom the statement of Professor Radbruch, made in 1925, and quoted in my exhibit 94, applies in full; and I quote:
"To sacrifice one's own sense of justice to the authoritative legal order; to ask only what the law is and not if it is also just; to serve, under given circumstances, the cause of injustice in a profession which cannot be conducted with satisfaction without a love for justice; that is the task and the tragedy of the jurist."
May I interpolate. It is cheap to say today that he could have escaped this conflict between duty and feeling by resigning from his office. He could not do so however strong the attempts were he made. In September 1941, in connection with the Elias case, he tried to do so. Acting Minister of Justice of that time did not allow him to do so. The defendant Schlegelberger, as a witness, confirmed that here. Later on Lautz believed that particularly during the hardest hour of his nation's history he should not desert his people, but on no account is Lautz guilty.
Thank you.
DR. HAENSEL (Attorney for the Defendant Joel) I should like to say that I am in a position to refrain from reading out my final plea.
Last week I handed in my final plea in German, and it has since been translated and it is now at the disposal of the Tribunal. Yesterday 196 notes were added, and this morning these notes were distributed in English.
My final brief and these notes I would ask you to take into consideration, to give them due consideration without my reading them out here, and I would, ask for them to be incorporated into the record.
I should like to add this. The Defense Counsel have asked me to deal with the forms of participation under Control Council Law 10, Article II/2 and concerning the knowledge, under Article II/ld. I would refer to my written statements in which I have dealt with these matters, and as concerns the Prosecution, I would like to tell them that the extracts Warton which have been submitted, here certainly speak of respect for that well known lawyer, but that those extracts cannot be applied, to our case. It has been my basic tendency always to assume that our case here comes under international law, and should not be viewed from the aspect of the law of one individual nation.
I have said a great deal about that point, and I do not think there is any need for me to repeat myself now. I only refer to my opinion as I have stated it in writing before. I think that the Tribunal possibly shares my views in some respects because otherwise at my suggestion it would not have dropped the charge of conspiracy for the commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity under AngloSaxon law and would not have decided that it is not decisive for this case. That decision shows that a legal institution belonging only to such a sphere of law does not have legal force for this trial here.
THE PRESIDENT: The request of Counsel will be granted. Your argument will be incorporated in the transcript in accordance with your request.
It will receive the study of the Tribunal and your client will suffer no disadvantage by reason of your waiver of the right of reading your argument.
We have already given consideration to the brief which you furnished us before, and we will do so.
DR. DOETZER (Attorney for the Defendant Nebelung) May it please the Court, at the beginning of my final plea I compiled all the evidence submitted by the Prosecution and the Defense concerning my client Nebelung.
I would like to refer to it without actually reading it out and likewise I ask to be permitted not to read out the quotations. Before I start on my plea I should like to say something about the final plea of the Prosecution. Firstly, the Prosecution has quoted Exhibit 340 and has stated that the Fourth Senate in 1944 had to deal with the following cases: High treason in favor of any country in the world with the exception of the Soviet Union and Poland; undermining of defensive morale, criminal offenses committed by Germans from Lorrain; and offenses committed in Lorrain; offenses committed by foreigners from Moravia if they were committed before the establishment of the Protectorate and did not constitute high treason in favor of Soviet Russia or Poland. According to Exhibit 340, which as I have said I have before me, those statements are incorrect. The Fourth Senate did not deal with high treason, but with treason in favor of all countries of the world with the exception of the Soviet Union and Poland, and it was not undermining of military morale but damage done to military property and installations(Wehrmittelbeschaedigung), i.e. sabotage. And in the last sentence instead of high treason it should say treason.
Furthermore, when introducing that document the Prosecution on the 22nd of April 1947, German transcript page 2501, English transcript page 2507, did not introduce this against Nebelung, probably because it was dated the 1st of April, 1944, a time when Nebelung did not yet work at the People's Court. The introductory passage to this Prosecu tion exhibit, and the testimony of the witnesses Barnickel and Lautz have shown us that the distribution of work at the People's Court changed frequently.
Nebelung himself in Prosecution Exhibit 177 has given an outline of the theoretical competency of his senate, and the Prosecution has not doubted its Correctness.
Secondly, furthermore, the Prosecution without producing any evidence, has asserted that the work of the Fourth Senate in the second half of 1944 had increased. The Prosecution failed to examine the various compositions of the senate, the various presiding judges that sat during the second half of 1944; nor, has the Prosecution made any statement as to whether Nebelung during his work at the People's Court was always in office, although it would have been easy to discover the contrary.
Thirdly, the Prosecution further more has asserted that the Freisler film shows the defendant Nebelung sitting next to Freisler; and the film shows that Nebelung had done nothing to support the defendants; and had in no way opposed Freisler's shameful way of conducting proceedings. This was an optical illusion on the part of the Prosecution. The film does not show Nebelung sitting next to Freisler. Nebelung was never an associate judge with Freisler. He never sat on the same bench with him. In Germany it was never the custom at a session of a senate for another senate president, as an associate judge, to sit next to the presiding judge. In my view the evidence has revealed the following:
The defendant, who is 51 years old and father of 6 children, was President of the Chamber and in this capacity he occupied the position of a Chairman of the 4th Chamber of the People's Court from 1 July 1944 until the capitulation of the German Army.
After having participated in the 1st World War from 1914 until 1919 and alfter having finished his professional training he was admitted as Attorney-at-Law in the small town of Eschershausen within the jurisdiction of the Braunschweig District Court of Appeal in 1924, and on 25 November 193O he was appointed Notary by the Braunschweig State Ministry at the same place, after approximately 5 months previously, namely on the 12.
8.1939. the Braunschweig-Minister of Justice had written him to the effect that, as an opponent of the democratic parliamentarian republic, he was unsuited for this office.
From 1931 to 1934 the defendant was Attorney-at-Law and Notary in the county seat Seesen in the Court of Appeals District Braunschweig.
With the courts, among his professional colleagues and the population, he enjoyed the reputation of an efficient, distinguished, and absolutely reliable lawyer and notary. As an expert in rural law, and because he was a National Socialist, he was - without any of his own doing, and urged by the Braunschweig Minister of Justice appointed president of the hereditary farm court (Erbhofgericht) and, at the same time, President of the Chamber of the Court of Appeals Braunschweig on 1.7.1934. From 1.1. 1935 to 30.6.1944 the defendant was Chief President of that court and thereby Chief of the Justice Administration of the District.
At the beginning of World War II he was drafted into the army in August 1939. After taking part in the campaigns in Poland and France, he was released from the Wehrmacht, owing to rheumatism, at tho end of 1940. When his health was restored again he rejoined on 1.8.1940, until, in February 1943, seriously ill with malaria., he returned to Braunschweig. There he remained until his reassignment as President of the Chamber at the People's Court. On the 30.11.1943 he wrote the situational report submitted as Prosecution Exhibit 566.
As President of the District Court of Appeal, in spite of his comparative youth, the defendant earned the unreserved confidence of his judges, officials and employees as well as of all his clients, a confidence which has not even been shaken by the indictment to this date. In his sphere he did not tolerate any inter ference on the part of non-juridical agencies, and he assured the independence of his judges.
As regards his activity as judge, the 72 year old. Oberlandesgerichtsrat von Schmidt-Phiseldek states anong others: "I have come to know him as an objective and just judge, who did not allow political considerations, especially those pertaining to race, religion, and nationality, to influence him." His constant readiness to aid everyone, as well as his hunble, humane and conciliatory Manner, were born of his conviction, that humans erred more frommistakes and weaknesses than from malice.
He was a bitter opponent of radicalism in any form, particularly of political radicalism. No judge suffered professional disadvantages from him, if he retired from the NSDAP or its organizations, or if he was excluded from them. He openly rejected the agitation against the Jews, he defended Jews before the court inspite of all prohibitions of the Party to the contrary, he protected the Jewish hybrids among the judges from all hostilities, and he objected strongly to the actions instigated by Goebbels around the 9 November 1938. How deep his indignation about these deeds was, can best be seen from the fact, that, still during the war, he discussed these things with his battery comrades at the front equally frankly and so pointedly, that they have not forgotten it to this day.
He was not afraid of attacking the Gestapo and he did not hesitate even in 1944, to order them out of the court room. Justice and the independence of jurisprudence were the greatest values to him, and he defended them openly and vigorously and not merely by tactical maneuvers. For all these reasons, there were conflicts generally known in the Braunschweig judicial circles between him and the offices of the Gestapo, the SS, the NSDAP, and the inner administration already from 1935 on. Many files substatiate this.
These conflicts were the reason for his removal from Braunschweig. Thus he, the highest judge of his district, and although he was neither an officer nor had modern training, and although he was 43 years old, was drafted as a front-line soldier on the first day of the war. On the 1.8.1941, scarcely having recuperated from a severe illness, he was to his surprise drafted again, and the Ministry of Justice did not even reply to his inquiry of 15.7.1941 (compare page 8 of the prosecution exhibit 409) concerning a position in the justice administration in the occupied Russian territories. When, seriously ill with malaria, he had returned to Braunschweig in Febraury 1943, Thierack, in the course of his scrutiny of the presiding judges of the district courts of appeal informed him, that in view of his strained relations with the Gestapo,SS, and Party, his transfer as presiding judge to the Reich Court was absolutely necessary in the interest of the judiciary.
Thereupon the defendant wrote the letter dated 7.2.1944 (Nebelung exh. 27). The notation written on this letter by Ministerialrat Grussendorf shows the correctness of the presentation. - Instead of this, Nebelung was transferred back to the office of president of the chamber at the people's court. That this constituted a demation, emerges sufficiently from the testimony of the witness Doebig (compare German record p. 1772, 1818-1819, English record p. 1752, 1796-1797) and of the witness Klemm (German record p. 4997, English record p. 5085). It is also undisputed, that Thierack would legally have been able to effect the transfer of the defendant to another position. That the transfer to the people's court is a forced one, follows alone from the fact, that it was a demotion.
Above all, this is evident to any objective person from the context of the letter of 7.2.1944, Nebelung exhibit 27, and is confirmed by the fact, that the defendant, in his farewell speech before the Braunschweig judges, flatly answered the question as to whether he liked to go to the people's court in the negative, pointing out, that the activity there did not suit him because of his principles. He could not foretell whether it would turn out all right. He looked upon his transfer to the people's court during the war as a military order, which he simply had to obey, whether he liked it or not (compare for instance Nebelung exh. 13).
The remaining doubt, however, is dispelled by the notation on the files by Ministerialdirektor Letz, dated 17.11.1945 (Nebelung exh. 28). There it says: "Herr Minister considers it out of the question for N. to return to Braunschweig."
b) Nebelung joined the NSDAP in 1928 and belonged to it without interruption from that time on. Just as before the accession to power he was Ortsgruppenleiter of the NSDAP in the small town of Eschershausen, so he was in Seesen from 1934 until May 1939, until, being allocated an official residence, he moved to Braunschweig on 15.5.1939.- Those findings follow from the prosecution exhibit No. 13 and the Nebelung exhibits No. 4, 5, 25, and 26.
The first page of the prosecution exhibit No. 409 does not contradict this either. This personnel record from the Ministerial files is antiquated and not kept up to date by the Reich Ministry of Justice. Neither the current number nor the year is filled in, that is to say, it has not been completed. This conorns a filled-in form No. 188, personnel sheet - (circular dated 28.3.1936 / I a 9303). A comparison with the completed personnel sheets of the defendants Altstoetter, Cuhorst, Engert, Oeschey, and Joel (prosecution exh. 405, 406, 407, 408 and 410) shows the difference in the personnel sheets clearly and distinctly. It follows also from the fact, that for instance, under No. 10, the number of Nebelung's children is given as 5, while in 1938, he became father of a sixth child; that, under No. 12b, the note of the SA to the effect that it did not consider Nebelung a member of the SA, since they did not have his SA card, was not contained; and that, under No. 13b, there is no mention concerning his service in the Wehrmacht since the beginning of the war.
Anyway, there exists a completed personnel sheet in the Ministerial files of the defendant, which the prosecution did not present. In this Nebelung is described as former Ortsgruppenleiter.
As Ortsgruppenleiter of the NSDAP in Eschershausen, he also appeared in a calm and unpretentious manner. "Hw was the exact opposite of the Ortsgruppenleiters who succeeded him; frictions between National Socialists and other parties did not occur at all" , states the witness Pastor prim. Spangenberg of Eschershausen (Nebelung exh. 2). Concerning his activity as Ortsgruppenleiter in Seesen, the witness Pastor Teichmann (Nebelung exh. 4) testifies that the defendant had earned the respect of everyone by his impartial attitude toward all men. The same is described by witness Ruehe (Nebelung exh. 5), who also cites individual cases, as for instance, Nebelung's intervention on behalf of the Jews in an Ortsgruppen meeting and his rejection of the dictum "Right is what the Fuehrer considers right."
The defendant saw in the NSDAP the party, which wanted to unit the already then conflicting worlds of the West and East in a form acceptable to his fatherland situated in the heart of Europe.
In this he was convinced, that this synthesis vfould meet obstacles, but could only be achieved when eternal justice and the preservation justice for everyone prevailed.
Thus he carried on his fight tenaciously and silently, in hopes and despairs, openly and manfully against radicals and opportunists, agitators and the roused mob, against violence, lies and error, always animated by the love for his people and by his faith in law and justice. What is better suited to characterize him than his words spoken at the time of the German victories: "If we old members of the Party had known how the situation would develop, many of us would not have joined the Party. I do not want to live in a Germany ruled by injustice." (Nebelung Exh. 1).
c) In early July 1944 the defendant Nebelung took over the office of Presiding Judge of the 4th senate of the People's Court.
I gratefully acknowledge that the prosecution carried out extensive investigations concerning his activity as President of the Senate, but of its examinations and findings it submitted only the affidavit of the attorney at law Gruenwald, Pros. Exh. 283, and Pros. Exh. 567, which concerns the national of the Protectorate, Nohawicka.
In his cross-examination Gruenwald described the main trial versus Ingelhorn et al. under the presidency of the defendant (German record p. 3864-3867, English record p. 3906 - 3909). His statements tally with the description by the witness Poden (German record p. 6038-6044, English record p. 6214-6219). According to this, Nebelung, as was his nature, did not permit himself to be influenced against the perpetrators of the 20 July 1944 by the stirred up and particularly excited public opinion, much loss by Freissler. He conducted the hearing with extraordinary fairness, calm and simplicity and granted a full hearing to each of the defendants and defense counsels. At the end of the proceedings, the senate acquitted the defendant von Ramin and suspended the case against the others.