Concerning the study of the files the witnesses Gruenwald, Boden and the defendant Lautz, concerning the permission to communicate the witnesses Wergin, Gruenwald, Boden and the defendant Lautz have given testimony.
The witnesses Gruenwald and Boden also emphasized that the officials of the Reich Public Prosecution conducted themselves fair in every respect and were very generous in taking up suggestions to treat cases concerning the undermining of the morality of the Wehrmacht as cases of minor importance. In the same way as the defendant Lautz was anxious to obtain a solid and unbiased basis for the treatment of the individual cases by the measures just mentioned, he considered it his duty, on the other hand, to eliminate all unobjective influences from the preliminary proceedings. For this reason he had no relations whatsoever to any persons or offices outside the judiciary branch, from which such influences could be expected. For this reason in the case of Elias and Klapka he declared that he was in no position to lodge a hasty indictment; for this reason, although he did not deem it important, he did not quote the criminal code for Poles in indictments for high treason until there was a special order for it, because he did not want to create the impression, as if those facts, apart from the offense mentioned in the indictment, could play any part at all; and, therefore, he refused in the case of v. Brincken in Exhibit 160, to consider the matter as a less serious case, solely because the accused had been described as politically reliable by an influential SS-Fuehrer.
And nothing lay further from the Defendant Lautz than to conduct any criminal proceedings for political, racial or religious motives. To him the principle applied that in law all were equal. There is conclusive evidence for this.
He did not intervene only in the cases already mentioned of Both and Borngaesser, for the purpose of saving representatives of the Protestant Church from unjustified or non-objective severe prosecution, but he also brought the severe measures of the Gestapo against members of the Young Teutonic Order back to what he deemed to be just.
It was he who - as shown in my Exhibit 206 - after the successful Allied invasion, proposed to the minister of Justice, that a change should now be made in the punishment of certain criminal acts by French or Belgian workers in the Reich; because, in practice, a state of war now existed again with France and Belgium, and this circumstance brought a fundamental change in the position of these workers. Any work they now performed in the German armament industry, would in practice now operate against their native country. That meant for them a compulsory state of emergency, which could not be ignored. (Tr. 5810/11).
In the affidavit of my exhibit 206, the witness Spahr describes also the case of a Polish captain who, by the way, is identical with the officer mentioned in document NG-675 (III B 151), which the Prosecution has not introduced. Lautz successfully opposed for a long time the prosecution proceedings demanded from him in this case.
The same attitude, free from any fanaticism, proves finally - as shown in Exhibit 488 (NG-823, III SA 139) that when ordered by the Decree of the Minister of Justice of 18 May 1942 to be very cautious in transferring Austrian cases to lower Courts, Lautz replied immediately with the counter-proposal that the cases which had so far been transferred, should not be revoked under any circumstances. And so I could bring up many instances, which all show that Lautz let himself, in the execution of his duties, never be led by any thoughts of terror, oppression or extermination, but that he, on the contrary, acted with a sober mind and correctly and objectively. He never discriminated at all. I believe it will suffice, if I further only quote the case of the Catholic nun Rostituta in my Exhibit 258; the case of the physician Dr. Treuter, regarding which the defendants Lautz and Rothaug have testified as witnesses; the cases Hoeppner v. Bismarck, Lindemann, Woermann, etc. from the complex of 20 July 1944., on which Lautz also expressed his opinion (Tr. 5897, et sep) and the cases of the shorthand typist Ihde and the two teleprinters in my Exhibit 205 etc.
This entirely unprejudiced attitude of defendant Lautz did not only come to light during his dealing with the criminal cases entrusted to him. It also showed in other ways. For instance, the Alsatian lawyer Wiederkehr, who had become closer acquainted with Lautz, testified in the protocol of my Exhibit 207 (L 294, IV C 60) which has been kindly put at my disposal by the French Government, that Lautz had never made spiteful or unfavorable remarks about the Allied States, as was quite usual to do during the war even for Germans from good families. And the witness Spahr who has already been mentioned repeatedly, testified in the affidavit of my Exhibit 206, as to how the defendant Lautz had protected him, when he encountered difficulties by reason of Decrees of the German Government, on account of his marriage to a Swedish woman and his relationship to citizens of the United States of America.
It can hardly be said of a man of such conduct and attitude that in the execution of his official duties, and especially in the matter of prosecutions, he acted otherwise than impartially and as in duty bound.
Apart from a few cases in connection with the incidents of 20 July 1944, Lautz did not appear personally in the main trials. In so far as he did so, however, he always acted in a correct and sober-minded manner. This has been corroborated by all the witnesses. I need only bring to mind the depositions of the Lawyers Wergin, Gruenwald and Boden on pages 3857, 3895 and 6208/10 of the English protocol. Further also the affidavits of v. Bismarck and Reinecke in my Exhibits 187 and 240. The witness Wergin has added thereto that the other Public Prosecutors had in the sittings of the People's Court also acted with discretion and had refrained from making any insulting remarks concerning the defendants. Thiw was in accordance with the strict instructions of defendant Lautz who, by the way, also in the more difficult cases reserved the right to control the applications of the Reich Public Prosecutors intended for the main trial. He took his decisions without any contact with the Senates and - as far as he was not bound by the law and express instructions of the Minister - he never exceeded and demanded more than seemed just to him. All this is shown in his own interrogation. (Tr. 3843/45).
In order not to overlook this not unimportant point either: If Lautz had been a political intriguer, he would for instance, in the criminal case v. Witzleben and associates, hardly have intervened and detained the defendant Hoeppner from making statements which had nothing to do with the case and would have exposed his wife to the dangers of a criminal prosecution (Tr. 3877/78). And then the witness Suchomel would hardly, as he confirmed in the affidavit delivered to me in Exhibit 189, have referred the Austrian Lawyers to Lautz, when they sought assistance and advice in matters of treason and high treason.
Just as little as Lautz in preliminary proceedings or in the main trial urged strong measures, just as little did he put up with sentences with which he did not agree. In this connection, and to characterize his fundamental attitude in the clemency question, I beg to refer in the first place to my Exhibit 206, in which the former Chief Public Prosecutor Spahr says about Lautz that he had laid great stress on it that the clemency reports contained an exhaustive and objective representation of the position from the actual, the legal and the humane points of view. His attitude towards clemency pleas had in principle always been favorable, but especially towards small people and women he had taken a lenient attitude, and he had been entirely free from any fanaticism or hate against other nations. Moreover, the evidence has brought documentary proof of this conduct of Lautz' by a series of impressive examples. They show clearly how his heart went out to the individuals concerned, how he assisted petitioners who called to see him, by word and deed, and how he personally - very often in excess of his immediate official duties - endeavored to make the clemency pleas successful. It grieved him that he did not always succeed in this. Without repeating the details, I may restrict myself to quote once again the most important of the cases brought up here.
There was the case of the Austrian Stuergkh in my Exhibit 190, and the Alsatian case Weringer and associates in my Exhibits 207 and 208, of which Lautz also spoke during his interrogation (Tr. 3949/52), then the Austrian cases of the nun Rostituta in my Exhibit 258; Heintschel-Heinegg in my Exhibit 260; and Fischer-Ledenice in my Exhibit 261.
Only one thing I must point out, in this connection: In the case Whinger the Alsatian lawyer Wiederkehr testified in my Exhibit 207 that the 23 Alsatians sentenced to death - one of them, that is Weninger, himself, as is known director of the French legal control branch in the French zone of occupation, only escaped with his life because Lautz was successful in dissuading the Reichsstatthalter (Reich Governor) from his view point of rejecting every petition for pardon. Lautz has confirmed this point (Tr. 5952). He took this step risking that the Reichsstatthalter and the Minister would take this interference amias.
In Lautz' examination in connection with the extraordinary appeal (Tr. 5939), he explained that means other than requests for pardon he used in order to assist defendants, who in his opinion, had been unjustly sentenced. But, he also tried in such cases to have the judgment amended by applications for a reopening of the trial. An example of this is referred to in the affidavit of the Austrian attorney, Dr. Zitta in my exhibit 264. (VII 1).
In view of Lautz' subordinate position as a Public Prosecutor he had to content himself in all these measures with mere applications and suggestions. But at all times did he openly express his dissenting opinion. When submitting the files to the Minister, he clearly expressed his grave disapproval of the verdicts especially also in the cases of Stafanowicz and Myslinski-Ledwon. These are the cases, dealt with in Prosecution Exhibits 128 and 132, in which, contrary to the Prosecution and to applications by the Reich Public Prosecution even submitted during the case in chief, the Second Penal Senate sentenced Poles, accused of attempted escape in order to join tho legion, for damage to the welfare of the Reich by quitting their jobs on the basis of the Law against Poles.
Summarising the findings of my statement, the following picture presents itself.
Lautz has been charged under count I, II and III of the indictment. Due to the general decision, which in the meantime has been made with regard to the elements of offense of the conspiracy, I need not deal with the charge of conspiracy from a factual and legal point of view. But since count I contains beyond that the charge of illegal participation in the planning and carrying out of war crimes and crimes against humanity, I shall deal with these points in my statement concerning counts II and III. In Count ii No. 10, 16 and 17 and on count II No. 22 26 and 29, the Prosecution raised no charge against Lautz either in the bill of indictment or in its opening statement. Up to date, the Prosecution has also not submitted any evidence to incriminate him.
However, in the bill of indictment the Prosecution has declared the defendant Lautz, guilty of joint responsibility in connection with Count II No, 15 and 16, and Count III No. 27 and No. 30. These arc cases of Euthanasia, of sterilisation and of the killings of Allied aviators. But in its opening statement, it has in no way substantiated this charge of responsibility and it has presented no evidence against Lautz, in the hearing of the witnesses. I, on the other hand, have clearly proved that Lautz was in no way connected with the incidents referred to.
The charges under count II No. 12 or count III No. 24 of the indictment , that is participation in the drawing up of the legislation for the incorporated or occupied territories, have been refuted by me.
Concerning Czechoslovakia, this legislation dates from a period when Lautz was still General Public Prosecutor at Karlsruhe. He, like any other German Public Prosecutor or judge, was informed of the laws in question through the usual channels, that it is by the Reich Legal Gazette.
The charges contained in count II No. 14 and count III No. 26 of the bill of indictment do not incriminate the defendant Lautz either. The hearing of witnesses had proved that he was not concerned with penal institutions and thus could not be connected in any way with alleged illegal incidents in these institutions. Moreover, his letter of protest on the occasion of mass executions in Ploetzensee proves that he strictly opposed these incidents.
Count II, Paragraph 13 and Cont III, Paragraph 25 of the Bill of Indictment arc concerned with the NN (Nacht und Nobel) program. Even though Lautz is, on this score, not considered to be among those responsible, during the presentation of evidence I pointed out clearly that within the scope of this program, he took part in the administration of justice only, that this was carried out correctly, and that Lautz did not collaborate in the other measures, much less sanction them, as is clearly shown by his conduct.
I shall therefore confine myself to a few short remarks about the charges against the administration of justice at the People's Courts. They are contained in Count II, Paragraphs 9 and 11, and in Count III, paragraphs 21 and 23 of the Bill of Indictment.
Within the scope of the administration of justice, at the People's Court the defendant Lautz had become active, partly by his own work and partly through his deputies, in preparing and lodging the indictment, in representing the indictment at the trial, and in the measures taken immediately after the judgment. In connection with this, I must first make a few general statements.
The Prosecution Authority asserts that the administration of justice at certain German Courts constituted a war crime and a crime against humanity, because it promoted the conduct of an aggressive war which was contrary to international law, and also promoted National Socialist despotim. This argumentation is in gross contradiction to the opinion of the IMT and of Law No. 10 of the Control Council.
Even though the judgment of the IMT is based upon the premise that the 2nd World War was, on Germany's part, a war in violation of international law, and even though it constitutes a complete condemnation of the National Socialist State, it does not proceed from the principle, for example, that for that reason, the activity of the German soldier was basically criminal; the IMT merely condemns the killing or wounding of the enemy, which took place contrary to the rules of warfare. (Tr. of the IMT 16880). The IMt assumes the same attitude towards the civilian sector. Its decision in the Fritzsche Case, for example, proves this; the INT a.s is known, acquitted Fritzsche of the charges of conspiracy, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, even though in its judgment, it stated clearly that in his function as head of the radio department of the Propaganda Ministry, he had pursued the aim "of arousing rational enthusiasm on behalf of Hitler and of the German war effort." (INT Transcript 17070). In this connection, the following statement in the judgment is characteristic; "Fritzsche definitely made violent statements of a propagandistic nature now and then in his radio addresses. But the Tribunal does not assume that these statements were to incite the German people to commit atrocities against defeated peoples, and one can therefore not state that he took part in the crimes of which he has been accused."
In the Fritzsche case as well, therefore, the decision of the IMT is based merely upon the question of whether or not he participated in illegal acts. Law No. 10 of the Control Council agrees with this decision: for example, it is not the fact that the end result of an official's activity was support of the conduct of the war and of National Socialist sovereignty, that is characterized as a war crime or a crime against humanity, but the fact that he committed acts of violence or crimes.
The fact that through its activity the Reich Prosecution (Reichsanwaltschaft) and the People's Court, exactly as did the other German authorities in the administration of justice, contributed to the security of the state and to the maintenance of war morale, can thus not be a subject of discussion at this trial. The penal proceedings carried out by the People's Court can therefore not be a subject of discussion at this trial, even if they resulted in acts of violence or in crimes. In this connection, an additional limitation is at once evident: the element of an act that makes it a war crime or a crime against humanity necessarily presupposes an attack upon a person's life, liberty, property, etc. An indictment raised by Lautz therefore, can, as such, not contain the elements which constitutes such a crime.
1.) if and when the execution of a verdict of the People's Court may constitute an offense or a crime as defined by Law No. 10 and
2.) if Lautz shares a criminal responsibility for the execution of this sentence if he had caused the indictment to be served.
It is known that Law No. 10 does not create new law but constitutes only the codification of these legal principles existing already among all civilized nations with regard to the facts constituting War Crimes or Crimes against Humanity and criminal responsibility in this connection. An act can only be an offense or a crime as defined by Law Ho. 10, if it is criminal according to the legal conception of all civilized nations. Facts or relations not criminal or punishable according to the legal principles of even one civilized nation, particularly, of course, according to the legal principles of one the signatory powers of this law, do not fall under this law, therefore, are not unlawful in the meaning of this law. This being true I want to consider individual charges made by the Prosecution with regard to the jurisdiction of the People's Court.
The administration of Justice on the part of the People's Court has been called a War Crime and a Crime against Humanity by the Prosecution, as the law to be applied had been unlawful for reason of their sphere of application, the facts covered by them or their measure of punishment.
With regard to the prosecution's charge that the sphere of application of German law had been extended unlawfully I have shown elsewhere that the application of German law to acts committed abroad was in agreement with the practice of other civilized nations. In addition, I want to state that the USSR especially, i.e. one of the signatory powers of the Moscow declaration of 30 October 1943. the London Four Power Agreement of 8 August 1945 and law No. 10 has always professed its adherence to the "real" principle and has extended the sphere of application of its criminal law to their Polish incorporated territories.
The statement of the prosecution that the jurisdiction of the People's Court has been criminal, because the laws applied were overextended with regard to the facts covered by them and their measure of punishment is not less irrelevant. I do not want to deal with the problem whether or not even to-day it is the exclusive right of a state to make its own decision which facts it wants to punish and how it wants to punish them. In any case this charge of the prosecution is without fundation by reason of its premise of the objective illegality of German criminal statutes, i.e. that they were contrary to the legal principles of all civilized nations. In reality uniform principles have never existed with regard to the question which facts are punishable and which penalty is adequate in view of the fact that the conception of the purpose of the state, of the attitude of the individual towards the state, of the purpose of punishment, etc. vary too much. I only have to recall the difference of opinion, downright diametrical in many points, between the so-called socialist States on the one side and the capitalist states on the other. This, as shown in my Exhibits 94, 271 - 248 and 252 - 254 goes that far that e.g. proposals concerning human rights made by one side to the UN Committee for Human Rights were called contrary to international law by the other.
Even to-day many offenses punishable by death in one state are only punishable by prison terms in others and the thought has not even occurred to the latter to designate as criminal the legal practice of the former.
The charges of the prosecution against the German laws fail to carry weight in this case the more so as those facts with which the People's Court had to deal, primarily high treason and treason are considered to be among the most serious crimes, not only in all civilized countries. It will not be possible either to establish the criminal character of the measure of punishment for undermining the morale of the people. In this case its annulment would have, no doubt, been suggested in the report of the Allied Commission for Special Criminal Law (Exh. 251, Pro 2251) for this reason and for the reason alone that it was apt to strengthen German morale in time of war.
But Lautz would not be criminally responsible even if the laws to be applied by him had been illegal, because their sphere of application, the facts covered by them and their measure of punishment failed to agree with legal principles of all other nations. Under the law of all civilized nations a person cannot be punished unless he knows that he acted illegally. In point II and III of the prosecution has, therefore, rightfully started their arguments by discussing the wilful and knowingly committing of crimes. But in this case the defendant Lautz has testified plausibly that he considered the application of German laws as legal. Also Roemer, at present Ministerial Councillor in the Bavarian Ministry of Justice as witness for the prosecution has e.g. thought the verdicts of the People's Court to have been in accordance with international law in NN cases.
At that it must not be overlooked: It has been corroborated by the testimony of the legal expert Jahreiss and my Exhibits 87 - 109 that no German official, even the President of the Reich, was ever authorized or obliged to examine the political, military or other considerations on which laws were based or whether they were contrary to international law, to the principles of natural law or moral. He did not have this authority in spite of the provision in Article 4 of the Weimar Constitution according to which generally recognized principles international law were considered to be essential parts of German Reich law. This is shown clearly by Anschuetz's statements, contained in my Exhibits 87 - 90, I have to point this out after the prosecution has cited this article. The defendant Lautz therefore, not having been authorized or obliged to examine whether the laws to be him were in agreement with international law, natural law etc., cannot be reproached for filing, in the execution of these laws, to drew a comparison with the legal principle of the other states, all this, of course, under the promist that a uniform standard of comparison could have been found at all in the law of these states, And if Lautz, just as any other official, was not authorized to examine the political, military and other considerations, which were the basis of the individual laws, he cannot be charged amont other things with basing his indictments on laws e.g., the promulgation of which was not justified by military necessity. Here he is even less at fault as he had to understand from the note of the Allied Governments of 29 July 1919, already mentioned in my Exh. 226 that the Allied occupation powers also did not consider it illegal to apply their own National law (Heimabrecht) in the occupied German Rhineland, although, at that time, the peach treaty of Versailles had been signed, thus military necessity could no longer have prevailed.
This question has nothing to do with the fact, that Lautz, as I have mentioned before, was convinced in this particular case that the criminal prosecution of the resistance movements in the protectorate and in the incorporated Eastern territories was justified by military necessity. The prosecution further believes that the jurisdiction of the people's court is to be considered a crime against humanity, as it constituted a "persecution for political, racial or political reasons", as defined by Art. II Par. 1 (b) of law No. 10. We do not think this opinion to be tenable. The provision of law No. 10 or which the prosecutions view is based cannot be reasonably interpreted to mean e.g. that laws establishing the criminality of political crimes and the prosecution of these crimes should constitute persecution for political reasons. Such an interpretation would no doubt, be contrary to the legal conception of all civilized nations; even today every state claims the right to establish the criminality of acts and to punish acts directed against its existence. "Persecution for political, racial and religious grounds" as defined by law No. 10 can only be interpreted to mean, that nobody may be persecuted for the sole reason of his adhering to a certain political or religious conviction or his belonging to a certain race. Lautz is undoubtedly not guilty of such a crime. He never accused anybody on account of his political or religious opinion or because he belonged to a certain race. If he lodged the indictment against someone then he only did so in such cases where there was the suspicion that the accused had committed a criminal action. And in these cases, too, - that has been clearly shown by the evidence - Lautz never differentiated between the persons of the accused according to their citizenship, race, etc.
This means that there would only remain the assertion, that the defendant Lautz Lodged the indictment in the knowledge and with the purpose to achieve a criminal result by means of a court verdict, which was the result of improper application of the law. From the oral indictment it seems to follow that the Prosecution really wants to maintain this.
I want to state in advance that, as the evidence has proved, the position of the Reich Public Prosecutors in the proceedings of the People's Court was in no way different from that of any other Public Prosecutor. That the German Public Prosecutor only played a minor part in the main proceedings and had no influence either on the evidence or on the reaching of the verdict, my exhibits No. 36 to 82 and 110 to 122 may have clarified unequivocally. If it is being maintained that the Defendant Lautz and with him practically every other Public Prosecutor would be co-responsible for the executed verdicts, then, on the other hand, it should not be overlooked that the causative connection between the lodging of the indictment in Court and the execution of a verdict on the other hand, is not being oroken less than three time, namely by the decision of the-
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Pardon the interruption. Dr. Grube. It is apparent that you will finish your argument in a few minutes, and I therefore suggest that the next Counsel, if he is not here, be called so that we may proceed with the next argument. Are you ready, Dr. Doetzer?
DR. DOETZER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; go ahead.
DR. GRUBE: May I repeat my last sentence. If it is being maintained that the Defendant Lautz and with him practically every other Public Prosecutor would be co-responsible for the executed verdicts, then, on the other hand, it should not be overlooked that tne causative connection between the lodging of the indictment in Court and tne execution of a verdict on the other hand, is not being broken less than three times, namely by the decision of the President, of the court on account of the files and the meantime received objections by the defendant on the point, whether or not the defendant is sufficiently suspicious and thus the main proceedings are to be opened - in this respect I may refer to my exhibits 57 - 59 - then by the verdict itself, and finally by the decision concerning the question of clemency, three decisions which are being made quite independently of the statements the Public Prosecutor made in the indictment.
The German legislation took both these points into consideration. As was being shown by my exhibits 123 - 124 only the judges' violation of their official duty could constitute a reason to have the case reopened again, but not if the Public Prosecutor committed any violation of his official duty, however, severe this may have been. Therefore, even from a technical point of view it was impossible to speak of a participation as far as the activity of the Reich Public Prosecutors are concerned, which would have been causative for the verdicts of the People's Court.
Neither can the activity of the defendant Lautz and of his Public Prosecutors be grouped under any of the other forms of participation as in Art. I paragraph 2 of law No. 10. Already before I have mentioned that actual facts or forms of participation, which according to the legal principles of only one of the civilized nations, and especially according to the legal principles of one of the signatory powers of law No. 10 are not criminal and not to be punished, are not being covered by this law. I can save myself the trouble to state my point of view whether possibly in the Anglo-Saxon or in the Russian conception the Defendant Lautz would be co-responsible for the verdicts, though I could even not imagine this, Anyhow, according to the French legal conception, that is according to the legal conception of at least one of the signatory powers of law No. 10, the German Public Prosecutor is not responsible as far as criminal law is concerned for the verdicts; this is shown by the already mentioned decision of the French Military Tribunal, dated 3 May 1946, in my exhibit 166.
And thus it is established that the German Public Prosecutor - and Lautz did not differ in anything from any other Public Prosecutor - even according to law No. 10 could not be held responsible for the verdicts.
This being promised, we now come to the accusation that the Defendant Lautz had leged indictments with the knowledge and purpose to achieve criminal results through court verdicts which were the results of improper application of the law.
That the Senates of the People's Court found their decisions in a completely orderly proceedings results from part I of my written final statements concerning the People's Court, in which I summarized the evidence on this and have throughly appreciated it; I may refer to it.
The accusation made against the Defendant Lautz actually comes to it, that the motive for him to lodge an indictment was the wish, the people indicted by him should lose their life or their freedom. Can that really be assumed from a man who here, in these proceedings, has never been called an intriguer either in documents or in statements by witnesses, on the contrary he was called moderate by everyone, whether they were witnesses of the Prosecution or witnesses of the defense, who had most critically examined any denouncement, who refrained from all attempts to influence the Senates and did not allow his Public Prosecutors to do so, either who also in the main trial appeared moderate and reserved and who asked his official to do the same?
If Lautz lodged any indictments, then he did not do it with any murderous intentions but only, because he was obliged by law to do so and was compelled by the Ministry to induce the court to decide whether or not the accused was liable to punishment - and if this was the case - what punishment would be deemed applicable. He could not have intended to reach any more with his indictments. Of course, at the time when he lodged the indictment he must have thought it impossible that the accused would be found innocent; for otherwise he would not have been allowed to lodge an indictment. But in no way was he sure what would be the actual consequences of this indictment, especially what would be the results of the evidence, how the court would appreciate this result, that is, whether and how the accused would be sentenced, and finally, what would be the result of the decision concerning the pardon. It would have been different if the office of the Reich Public Prosecutor and the People's Court would have co-operated in general and in the individual case, especially if the verdicts would have been found by reason of agreements made cy the two agencies. The Prosecution has not in the least proven that this was actually the fact. However, Lautz has stated when being examined, that there did not exist any such co-operation between the office of the Reich Public Prosecutors and the Senates concerning the verdict to be given, The documents of the Prosecution prove the truth of that statement. I need only remind you of the case Kolinski and others in exhibit 125 in which 3 of the defendants were acquitted on account of theresult of the evidence.
Further I may remind you of the statements made by the witness Gruenwald concerning the case Chalupa in exhibit 513. Then Bruenwald stated that the representative of the Reich Public Prosecutor asked for 10 years penitentiary, the Senate, however, only pronounced a sentence of 5 years in the penitentiary. Furthermore, I may refer to the case Zelezny in exhibit 512 in which the representative of the Reich Public prosecutor even in his final statement assumed preparation for high treason and aiding the enemy, whereas the Senate took the point of view that only an offense against passport regulations was involved, and therefore, Zelezny was only sentenced to imprisonment. Further I may remind you of the case Gogler in exhibit 135 where one of the defendants was acquitted for lack of evidence. And thus I could enumerate a large number of the Prosecution's own documents, which all prove that there could not have existed any co-operation between the Senate and the office of Reich Public Prosecution, that the verdicts depended solely on the result of the evidence, the consequences which the indictment would have were, therefore, not to be foreseen at the time the indictment was lodged.
Even from a human point of view, however, Lautz is free from guilt, He had not solicited the office of "Chief Reich Public Prosecutor; he was appointed to it. Non-Party circles had suggested him; Guertner had assigned him to this position, because he - I take the liberty of referring to my exhibit 221, - had confidence in him and wanted to prevent the office from falling into the hands of a completely devoted Party man. Lautz never disappointed this confidence. To the end, he was the objective and correct official, devoted to duty, who as stated by Professor Lange, formulator of the new penal code for the Russian Zone of Occupation, in my exhibit 237, attempted to ward off the brutalization and deterioration of the legal system, by adhering strictly to formal law.