Everyone exchanged information about their particular groups; nobody asked where that information came from, nobody mentioned any names, except when it was ascertained in the case of any such information that it must originate from that source. Then one communicated only by using a formula, very seldom was the real name used. Telephones had to be disconnected and it was necessary to look outside the window to ascertain if anyone was on the street. We found out through a member of our organization in what manner a hidden microphone could be built into the wall, the flat was searched carefully, and this is the way we worked.
Q. What did Sievers do in order to further the activities of your organization?
A. For instance, he took care of supplying all information which was of importance. He told us what troops of the Waffen SS were in Germany during the war. He gave us fake official trips and he worked out a plan for an assassination, which was to be carried through by our group in case the generals plan did not come off. We all thought it was not safe to rely on the generals. In March of 1944 Werner Haften told me by order of Stauffenberg that one would have to take into account the fact that the generals would have to be moved into action by a certain assassination and everyone was to make his own preparations, in case he had any, in such a manner as if he was the only one active. That was the situation in March of 1944. We worked out a substantial plan to remove, if possible, Himmler and Hitler simultaneously, but in case of doubt Himmler himself. We were of a completely different opinion there than the other groups.
Q. What concrete preliminary work was done for the assassination in your group?
A. Sievers was the only one in our group who came into question regarding that assassination because he was the only one so close to Himmler. He was therefore assigned this task and we worked out this matter as far as the detailed plan was concerned; all that was necessary now was to press the button.
Q. And for what period of time was this assassination intended?
A. We started our preparations in the year of 1943 and at the earliest at the end of 1943 could we have started. Then we finally thought of the middle of 1944 because Schulenburg and Luening told me that the generals would be ready at around that period of time.
Q. Well, an assassination is a matter for quick decision. Is it not true, therefore, that all these long preparations are rather surprising that you are telling us about?
A. The following would have to be taken into consideration. Around Himmler and Hitler there was a strong guard, a strong ring of guards, though which none could get unless he was carefully searched and checked. Secondly, and that I already emphasized, one did not have to be quite sure that the generals would carry out that assassination but one had to be sure that a sufficient number of generals were ready to remove the N.S. system immediately after the assassination, for a elimination of just these two people themselves would have no political purpose whatsoever. We did not intend to carry out a Putsch but we intended to remove a political system, a political order, and for that reason we had to wait until the situation became right and the generals were ready.
Q. Now, the question crops up whether these plans for the assassination of Hitler and Himmler were only in your fantasy, or the fantasy of your collaborators, or was there any real basis or concrete preparation for such assassination?
A. I already said that the preparations had been worked out to the detailed technical point insofar as the assembly location, the shooting, etc. were concerned.
Q. And who would have assassinated Himmler and Hitler?
A. Sievers was to do that and a few young men belonging to my organization.
Q. And why was it in effect not carried out?
A. After the Stauffenberg assassination had failed, the Wehrmacht circles that came into question were eliminated by Himmler and therefore it was no longer possible to remove that system.
The only consequence of any attempted assassination would have been - since the foreign political situation would not have changed, the only consequence would have been here that the people would have said again. "This is the stab in the hack for the victorious front-line."
Q What did Sievers do to further your activity in addition to what you have already said?
A He, for instance, supported my representative, Arnold Deutelmoser when he was put on the list of those who were to be removed under the pretext of the assasination which took place in Munich at the Buergerbraue. He also protected Bomas who was working in the Netherlands. He protected Dr. Schuettelkopf whom we had sent into the RSHA and it was possible for him in turn to send me to Sweden. He saved Niels Bor, Professor Seyb of Oslo University, and he saved a number of Norwegian students, etc.
Q Do you know that Sievers informed you about Himmler's doubleplay in the case of the minister, Popitz, and that as a consequence he saved that entire group against measures by Himmler?
A Yes. The following thing happened. One day Sievers approached me and said that I had just heard Himmler say in a close circle how he ridiculed an attempt on the part of Popitz. He said that Minister Popitz with the mediation of the lawyer Lampe had approached Himmler and tried to persuade him to bring about a change of the National Socialist system, perhaps by removing Hitler. He said Himmler thought it was very funny that these men had so little sense as to think of him in that connection. Thank God one could enter negotiations with them because it was sure that nobody was behind these people in the country, but it did seem that these gentlemen had many foreign political relationships and it would be advisable to find out what in effect was behind it all, and it would, therefore, be advisable to enter into negotiations with them. We were quite surprised about the naive attitude shown by Himmler, and I sent Deutelmoser to Reichwein with whom I knew he had connections with Popitz.
In that way Popitz was warned. Reichwein was so surprised and hardly wanted to believe that situation.
I was asked to participate in a conference, and Reichwein after having convinced himself that all of this was true, promised to warn all of the gentlemen concerned in Berlin and then asked Deutelmoser, who was to go to Norway shortly thereafter to notify Reichwein's friend, Stelzer, the present Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein, in order to see that he, too, took the necessary precautionary measures. In this way we hoped that a number of these people had actually been saved. Popitz, however, himself was careless and was captured.
Q This conspiracy could not have been carried out unless you had the necessary financial means at your disposal. How did you get these means?
A Everyone of our people, be it man or woman, had agreed to give up ten percent of their monthly income for that legal work. Many gave a substantially larger sum.
Q How about Sievers?
A Sievers gave more than he had to.
Q Do you know the case of the three hundred Norwegian students who on the basis of Sievers' intervention were released from the concentration camp Buchenwald?
A Yes. Terboven, or some other official in Norway disliked some demonstration which occurred there, and as a result arrested three hundred students. Through some dark channels they were brought into the concentration at Buchenwald.
Sievers found out about that, and if I remember correctly, he was in a position to see to it that these students be released from the concentration camp using Himmler's Nordic ideas.
Q In that case you think that Sievers' activity was substantially important for your resistance movement?
A Yes. That was true of my organization, for he protected and covered me as its chief, and, secondly, as far as I know, he was the only man belonging to any resistance movement who went as close as he to the ReichsFuehrer-SS. If any other group would have brought any such information as he did, I would have noticed it that it could have only come from the same source.
Q Witness, I shall have a document handed to you which was submitted by the Prosecution. This is Document NO-975, Prosecution Exhibit 479. It is a letter sent by Sievers to Dr. Hirt. Would you please look at that letter?
A Yes.
Q This letter contains a tone of voice which seems to indicate that he tried to cover Dr. Hirt's activity. Dr. Hirt was working in the Anatomical Institute of the Strassburg University. I assume that for reasons which we shall mention later that you know Hirt's name. How do you explain that tone in this letter?
A I think that this is very proper and praiseworthy. I would have thought it very foolish of Sievers if he adopted any other tone in any of his official correspondence. It was his task to say "yes" but act in a negative way. There couldn't have appeared any pretense of any disapproval on his part. The more active one had to be in an anti-National Socialist way, the more he had to speak for National Socialism.
Q I shall now turn to another complex of questions. Sievers is indicted in this trial to have participated in a number of crimes. Did Sievers at any time tell you about the so-called research assignments of Dr. Rascher and Dr. Hirt, who was just mentioned? These more experiments carried out in the concentration camps.
A Sievers, as far as I remember, came to me in the year 1942 and told me very excitedly that Himmler in his desire to extend the Ahnenerbe Society had embarked on the thought of placing experiments on human beings under the work of the Ahnenerbe Society. He said that he did not succeed in frustrating that. He said that he had no desire whatsoever to participate in these horrible acts and asked me what to do. At that time we considered this horrible situation very thoroughly and thought of what we could do. It was quite clear to us what the SS intended here, and it was questionable whether responsibility could be assumed for any such acts, whether it would be advisable to be the instrument of Himmler if he embarked on any such acts, measures where human beings were degraded to the level of insects.
The following considerations proved to be decisive for us: if Sievers would leave, not one person, not one object of these experiments would be saved. In case Sievers stayed there as a technical secretary, he could throw sand into that machinery and could, perhaps, be in a position to save somebody. In addition, the entire plan and the entire overthrow of the Party stood or fell with Sievers' staying at his post. The experiments on human beings were only part of this horrible Party system, and one had to concentrate on the decisive points in order to finally remove everything, and, as I have said before, there was no other way into the staff of the ReichsfuehrerSS.
We, therefore, summarized in case Sievers resigned because of that case, it was sure that he would be eliminated and probably that would also be true of all the people he had ever entrusted with a research assignment, and everything that we had done so far would be lost in case he left, and if anyone was to be saved at all, he could only be saved by Sievers remaining at his post.
Q. If I have understood you correctly, Sievers at first wanted to resign from his position as Reich business manager of the Ahnenerbe?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Did Sievers approve of these arguments which you and your friends put forward in favor of his staying with the Reich Fuehrer SS as the Reich business manager of the Ahnenerbe? Did he do it immediately or only after trying to persuade him for some time?
A. This took a number of days, because Sievers, according to his nature, was softer than many of us and did not want to agree with us. We finally had to appeal to his sense of duty and persuade him that he had to do it and that was the only way out.
Q. Among other matters, it was considered that by Sievers remaining at his post, there would be a possibility of mitigating these horrible experiments.
A. The chance wasn't very great but we were convinced that his world be the only way possible, if at all. Then it could only be done in that manner. If I may say so, this was such a horrible situation that we always had to come back to it and we were damned lucky at least to have the hope to save a number of people. Other opponents of SS system have told me about similar dilemmas which were just as difficult, and where the alternative was yet more horrible, and where persons, according to my belief and knowledge, acted correctly, and if the Tribunal would permit me I could relate a few almost incredible situations which were even worse.
THE PRESIDENT: In what connection, witness, are these narrations, witness?
WITNESS: In the connection as to the question whether it was morally justifiable to arrive at the result of Sievers remaining at his post.
THE PRESIDENT: Such matters as that would not be material in this inquiry.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q. Did Sievers report to you that it was possible for him to alleviate that situation at all.
A. Yes, I know of the following cases. He told me about high altitude experiments which he frustrated. He told about his sabotage of the low pressure chamber. He told about his interference in the malaria experiments; how he placed Ploetner against Schilling. He told me that he succeeded in getting a group of thirty inmates for experimental purposes from Dachau to some other place at Hodensee, and, furthermore, that he finally succeeded in subordinating these experimental series simultaneously to the Reich Research Council, so that the additional amount of paper and red tape which resulted in delays to a considerable extent.
Q. Is it correct Sievers made it possible for you to go to the ghetto at Litzmannstadt and save persons there?
A. That is correct. At that time I went there in order to save the parents of a Jewish lady from being gassed, a lady whom I could get to Stockholm with the help of Sievers. I was unfortunately too late in the case of the parents.
Q. Hence it is beyond all doubt for you that Sievers rejected the participation in those experiments which were ordered by Himmler?
A. Yes.
Q. For you there is neither any doubt that the entire activity of Sievers from 1933 up to 1945, no matter with what situation he came into contact, was only moved and dictated by his opposition to the national socialist regime.
A. That is beyond any doubt.
DR. SEISGERBER: Mr. President: I have no further questions of this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any further questions of this witness by the defense counsel?
DR. STEINBAUER (Counsel for the defendant, Professor Beiglboeck:)
Q. Witness, I am an Austrian, and I, therefore, do not like to interfere in German matters. I am only putting these questions because it is my duty to do so as defense counsel. Do you remember that the first German woman who was sent to America after the war, and that was Frau Dr. Strecker, was severely attacked for saying there was no German resistance movement?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know that she defended herself against that accusation and she said that by saying that she only wanted to express that every fight against this powerful Nazi system was almost without any hope?
A. Yes, I know that.
Q. You have already indicated that the resistance work was made difficult by the enormous Gestapo organization, SD, and you could have added the Peoples' Court, and the Concentration Camps. My question is: In addition to that police pressure, wasn't there yet another pressure, a psychological pressure, which differed itself in the case of a Gorman resistance movement, as compared to the French resistance movement. In order to understand me I want to tell you that a man named Gesavius appeared here as a witness against Goering et al, who was a man of the resistance movement, and also a leader in the Gestapo. This was called the Gesavius complex. My question is: Considering the enormous pressure of Himmler's police machine, was there yet an added psychological pressure, that one would oppose the Fatherland when opposing this enormous might?
A. In this case one has to differentiate. There were a large number of people who from the very beginning, felt that the entire national socialist regime was an alien body that had come up and with it's elimination one would do great service to one's country. In other words, there were many people in the resistance movement, who from the very beginning, just as in the case of the Frenchmen, Dutchmen and Norwegians, considered this national socialist group as an alien body and which was something like a black plague.
On the other hand, I agree with you that all of these people who had no proper judgment about national socialism from the very beginning, were inclined at first and moved by a political naive feeling, as it is so frequent in this country, to consider this regime as German.
Q. Now, let's revert to this trial. Do you believe, witness, that if my subordinate officer had received an order behind which Himmler personally was standing, that he could fail to obey this order easily?
A. It depends on what an order is. It depends to what extent he had the possibility to say yes and act no.
Q. Well, I shall ask you a more specific question. Do you believe that if this man concerned had failed to obey that order to carry out experiments on human beings, about which he already had convinced himself that they would not constitute a danger to the human being, don't you think he would have been placed immediately before a military court?
A. Naturally, a refusal to obey an order was suicide. That is clear. It only depends on whether there was a possibility to prevent the execution of that order in any way.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any further questions of the witness by defense counsel?
There being none, the Prosecution may cross examine.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. HARDY:
Q. Witness, you have stated here in direct examination that it was you who influenced Sievers to join the Nazi Party, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. You have stated that it was you who influenced Sievers to become a member of the Ahnenerbe Society, is that correct?
A. If you ask about the responsibility, yes. As far as the technical details are concerned, no. I had left Sievers a free hand as to how he wanted to work. When he said, "This is a good position," he took it, and I said he did the right thing.
A. Now, what information did Sievers gather to further your purpose?
A. I said before that, for example, he told me what Himmler reported about Popitz. I said that he currently kept me and all the other resistance groups informed of the strength of the Waffen-SS within Germany. I said that he reported whenever Himmler made an attempt to pursue some particular political tendency. For instance, the fight against other party groups, Rosenborg for instance, could be exploited, etc.
A. Well, now, were troop movements, number of men in the Waffen-SS capable of fighting for the Nazi purpose, matters which concerned the Ahnenerbe Society?
A. No. As far as I know, Sievers knew through certain requests for newspapers or propaganda or delivery of some sort of document, or something regarding that, or Christmas celebration, or for the Party celebration, that he could suggest certain figures from the Waffen-SS to find out how many pamphlets, etc. the Ahnenerbe had to distribute. I have no idea.
A. Did you ever hear of an order put out by the Fuehrer concerning secrecy wherein no man could divulge what information he had obtained in his particular position to another man, regardless of his rank? Did you ever hear of that order - the Fuehrer's order regarding secrecy?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. Then a man who was the Reich manager of a cultural society would be able to receive information of a secret nature from another member of the SS despite this secrecy order of the Fuehrer?
A. One has to make a distinction there. I have already said that he got these figures indirectly. He simply said, "I have to know how many copies of such and such a thing I have to deliver for the Waffen-SS." He concluded the approximate strength of the SS, other information from the Wehrmacht which had espionage through Canaris could be used to check it, and afterwards had confidence in the figures and used them. And, because you asked the question, it was spoken differently in the group around Himmler in Himmler's presence and thank goodness there was a lot of drinking there and one could get information.
Q. Well, now after you received this information, Mr. Hielscher, What did you do with it?
A. Since I regularly saw the leaders or important members of other resistance groups, I exchanged this information with them because these other people also got certain information. We could exchange what they found out with what we got so there was a constant stream of information, intelligence, political secret data within our field.
Q. Now, would you kindly give me the names and addresses of the contacts that your resistance movement had with people in France, England, United States, and Russia.
A. It was probably not quite correct procedure, that we did not before 1933 think of establishing such contacts abroad. If the Nazis should come back again, I know that I have to establish contacts before hand. Unfortunately we did not do so before 1933 and after 1933 it was too late. But with the help of Sievers and Schuettekopf I made an attempt and I got to Sweden at least. I can mention Dr. Bomas, who was a Dutchman, and as far as I an informed I believe there is an affidavit on the subject. There were more people with him.
Q. Now, when did you first hear of the experiments on human beings in the concentration camps?
A. 1942, if I remember correctly.
Q. Well, now, did you understand from Sievers that --. You heard about it from Sievers, I presume?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you understand from Sievers that subjects to be used in the course of these experiments were inmates in concentration camps but that said inmates had volunteered to be used for the experiments?
A. Yes. Of course, they were called volunteers. Of course, that was part of the lieing system. Since we knew the system and since we knew the concentration camps, it was a matter, of course, if we go and say you will either be gassed or volunteer. Of course, persons volunteered, That was actually no free will for anyone who knew concentration camps.
BY JUDGE SEBRING:
Q. Doctor, did you understand that these volunteers were all German nationals who were professional criminals who had been sentenced to death with the understanding that if they survived the experiments they would be granted leniency or did you understand something else about the matter?
A. I don't know what you mean by understand. There was an order which Sievers told me about that they were supposed to be criminals and people condemned to death. On the other hand, we knew the "avalanche" reaction. We knew that Himmler liked political people to disappear and that if the order read differently there was still the danger, the great probability, that the people in charge of the concentration camps who had something to do with the experiments would use political people aimlessly or even intentionally. This was very probable; besides, our group was convinced anyhow that even in the case of people condemned to death for crimes, it does not correspond to dignity of human beings to be used formally as a volunteer but really under compulsion as guinea pigs.
Q. Well, then you considered any experimentation upon human beings incarcerated in concentration camps a criminal act?
A. We were convinced that this was in principle criminal action.
Q. Well, now, Sievers, as you say, first told you of these experi ments in 1942, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Never told you about any negotiations for experimentation in the year 1938?
A. No. I do not remember any such thing.
Q. In the year 1939?
A. I should like to ask you something. Do you mean negotiations which lead to experiments or any discussions?
Q. Let's say, further experiments, but these experiments took place in 1939. Did you ever hear of any?
A. That experiments took place in 1939 that Sievers told me, I don't know.
Q. Never heard of him having anything to do with experiments in 1940?
A. No.
Q. 1941?
A. No.
Q. And you confirm that the first time he told you about experiments was in the year 1942?
A. Not exactly the month, but I can say approximately 1942.
Q. Now, you have told this Tribunal that you had agreed among your colleagues prior to 1933 that the Nazis could not be allowed to continue any longer. What were you doing between 1933 and 1945?
A. An agreement between my friends and myself that the Nazis had to be removed existed since 1933. In 1943 - but my group....
Q. (Interrupting) I said 1933. 1933 is the date I stated.
A. Oh, I beg your pardon, I understood 1943.
Q. How many guns did you purchase in 1933 in this resistance movement?
A. I might say, unfortunately, that the question rather by-pass the real methods of resistance. In the year 1933, when nine-tenths of the population considered this swindler a decent German, we would not shoot him, although, technically, that would, of course, have been possible at that time. We would not have succeeded in destroying the National Socialist system which did not consist of him alone, but of a whole group. We would not have changed the political situation. We were not a Putsch society that wanted to shoot him.
Q. Well then, your major interest was ridding yourselves of the two leaders, the big leaders, that is, Himmler and Hitler. Is that correct?
A. Yes. If you shoot at a whole group of birds one doesn't hit any of them. You have to shoot at an individual.
Q. I see. Then your major interest was in getting rid of Himmler and Hitler and let the rest of the Nazis continue?
A. The other way around. Repeatedly, since 1940, we waited because it would have been possible to kill Himmler and Hitler or one of them, but it was necessary, at the same time, to have a large enough part of the armed forces on our side so that immediately after the assassination we could eradicate the whole system.
Otherwise, we would not have needed to wait. That is what I said before.
Q. Well now, how close actually was Sievers to Himmler?
A. I have already said - Reich Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe and a member of the Circle of Friends.
Q. He was a member of the Circle of Friends, was he not?
A. Yes.
Q. Sievers quite frequently had talks with Himmler only in Himmler's presence. That is, no other people there. Isn't that right?
A. I don't understand. I just heard the English.
Q. Himmler and Sievers quire frequently talked alone, did they not?
A. I really don't know, but I assume so. I really don't know. I wasn't there.
Q. How many times have you seen Reinrich Himmler?
A. Not at all.
Q. Did you ever see him passing by in a parade or any such thing. I would be very careful not to be out in public. One had to say "Heil Hitler" often enough not to go out of one's way to look for the occasion.
Q. Wasn't Sievers actually physically larger than Himmler? A bigger man? More robust than Himmler?
A. I don't know. I never thought about that.
Q. Well then, why didn't you think about that and instruct Sievers to do away with Himmler when he had one of these meetings with him alone. Ample opportunity to accomplish your objective without going up to kill a whiteheaded hawk in some mountain.
A. The practical question was this. If some one met Himmler and had weapons with him that was very noticeable, if one were just going to a conference, and in the second place, it wouldn't do any more than if one of the generals who was willing - for example, Witzleben since 1938 - would suddenly draw out his pistol.
I should repeatedly like to emphasize that would merely be an assassination. The decisive thing which was so terrible for all of us - we had to see to it that the system as a whole was destroyed.
Q. Well then, you would say that the July 20th plot was poor strategy? That was an obvious assassination. That was poor strategy in your way of thinking?
A. You have to make a distinction between strategy and tactics. I am convinced that the political preparation was good as far as I know. In the second place I am convinced, from all the information which I got in personal conversation, that the preparation for the military action after the execution of the assassination proper after the coup d'etat proper - was also well prepared. The generals had been learning that for centuries, they knew how to do that, but what they did not know how to do was the technique of the coup d'etat itself because the regulations of 1780 didn't contain that. The technique of the coup d'etat itself, they did not know how to do that. They had never studied it. That was the unfortunate thing. I repeat - politically, good; for later strategic execution good; for the technique of the coup d'etat proper, that was bad.
Q. And now, what did Sievers ever tell you about the SieversHirt skeleton collection? Did he ever tell you about that?
A. Yes, he told me that Himmler had ordered, as far as I know, they were Jewish commissars who were under this terrible execution order which was valid in the East - that some of them were to be selected and used for the skeleton collection. The order was from Himmler as Sievers reported to me.
Q. And did you know what they were going to do with these people?
A. Yes, it was the same as in the experiments. There a danger of death was a possibility, here it was certain.
Q. You knew, of course, that they were going to stand these people up, pick them out, select them according to size, take their anatomical measurements, then ship them to Natzweiler and at Natzweiler kill than, then deflesh them, then send the skeletons to the Strasbourg University for collection? And you knew that?
A. Yes.
Q. A fine thing for a resistance man to be involved in, isn't it?
A. The situation, as I have said repeatedly, was as follows: We made no distinction in the real evaluation of the skeleton collection and other experiments in which there was this so-called "volunteering" and in which the result was the same - in our eyes, they were the same thing. I should like to emphasize one more thing. Does one have the moral right to tolerate a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater evil?
Q. Just a moment. Now in connection with the skeleton collection, do you further know that they dispensed with the idea of taking Jewish commissars but selected Jewish inmates of concentration camps?
A. Yes, what particular persons were selected I do not know, of course, but I knew that a number of Jews were to be gassed and were selected for this anthropological collection. That was the same case as on the Ghetto of Litzmannstadt.