Q. Did you join any definite political party with the intention of combatting the NSDAP?
A. No. I considered it impossible for any of the 33 German parties, with their bureaucratic methods, to be able to prevent a fascist dictatorsnip, or if it had come into existence, to overthrow it.
Q. What methods did you thing were the right ones?
A. The fascist dictatorsnip is a mass machine in a technical age. Therefore it seemed to us to be out of the question, when confronting such a mass body, to act openly. It seemed impossible to carry out propaganda publicly. We were convinced that the only thing possible was to form very small cadres which would not be recognizable to an outsider and which at the proper time could be imployed for a coupd'etat, that is, for an armed overthrow.
Q. Then that was more or less the method of the Trojan Horse?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you, in your ideas and in your efforts to combat this movement, were you alone or did you have associates?
A. First a selected group of my students were willing to collaborate in this illegal work; second, I knew quite a number of personages of various political backgrounds with whom I agreed that this regime would not last.
Q. That was before 1933?
A. That was around 1933--1932/33.
Q. Now came the 30th of January 1933, the so-called seizure of power, and now your real work began. How and when did you apply your method of the Trojan Horse?
A. This group of my students, who were willing to collaborate, I made into an illegal organization, with dues, secrecy, and other necessary conditions, and I appointed people who were willing and suitable to get into important party positions.
Q. When and how did you meet the Defendant, Wolfram Sievers?
A. As far as I can recall, I met Sievers about 1929, at one of my historical-philosophical lecture trips. He was a boy scout at that time. He spoke up during the discussion and we took a liking to each other.
Q. Did sievers show at that time that he was opposed to the NSDAP?
A. That was a matter of course with the people with whom I had anything to do at all.
Q. And did you consider him suitable to work in your circle?
A. Yes.
Q. In 1929 Sievers joined the SNDAP. Was that done with your knowledge?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you advise him to do so or how did it come about? There had to be some special reason, since you were both opponents of this political party.
A. That was the first time, aside from 1923, when the NSDAP was talked about, and it was useful to know what was going on in this growing machine -- were there any people of good will within the machine, what were the leaders doing, what plans were being made, what organization was being set up.
Q. Then first of all you wanted to find out what intentions the NSDAP had?
A. Yes, and specifically in the youth work, because that had to be the most important in the long-run.
Q. Now, in 1931 Sievers resigned from the NSDAP again; did he do that with your knowledge?
A. Yes.
Q. On your orders?
A. Yes, one might say. We discussed it, and I considered it the thing to do.
Q. Now, why should he suddenly leave the Party since he had been sent into the Party with the definite purpose of getting information?
A. He had found out what he was to find out, the nature and the make-up, especially of the youth organization. It was just as inferior as we had thought, and even at that time it was so corrupt that without any further plan -- and we had no plan at the time -- without any further plan it was not necessary to have him continue.
Q. Now, in the year 1933, and Sievers, as the Tribunal has already been told, again joined the NSDAP; was this also done on your behalf?
A. Yes, at that time we were already a thoroughly organized organization. We were already asking for volunteers, who were willing and who were capable of working up in the sense of the Trojan Horse. Sievers seemed suitable, and he was willing.
Q. Were you able to get him any position within the Party?
A. No, I was not able to help him to obtain any position, and in the second place I had no intention of telling the individual person whom I trusted, in detail, what they were to do.
Q. Then it was up to the skill of the individual to get into a position from which he would be able to carry out the assignment which you gave him?
A. Yes.
Q. And how did Sievers obtain this position?
A. He got into this with Hermann Wirth in the Ahnenerbe.
Q. Who was Hermann Wirth?
A. Hermann Wirth was a rather crazy student of pre-history, who had excellent material and terrible concepts.
Q. Was Wirth already in contact with the Ahnenerbe at that time?
A. As far as I know he was one of the founders.
Q. Then as you say Sievers got in contact with Wirth, and through Wirth he got into the Ahnenerbe?
A. Yes. He was there from 1935 on as Reich Business Manager.
Q. Now, did you give Sievers any specific assignment in the spirit of your movement?
A. As soon as it was clear that there was a possibility of exploiting Himmler's racial romancing and half education, the assignment developed to gain Himmler's confidence with the aid of the Ahnenerbe, and to get as close to him as possible.
We, that is my group, were among the people who very early recognized the special personal danger of Himmler, and in the second place from the beginning we had been determined that one day we would have to overthrow the Party regime by force, and for that purpose one has to get as close as possible to the most dangerous man.
Q. And what were the duties which Sievers had about the time when he first belonged to the NSDAP, you said he was to get information about the intentions of the youth movement of the NSDAP?
A. This time, of course, he had to get as many details as he could from the office of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, and transmit them to us. We had to protect people. We had to build up camoflauge positions. We had to help the other people and in turn to remain unrecognized.
Q. And how did Sievers carry out these duties?
A. Well, it will be best if I begin with myself. I myself was known and considered undesirable by the Party leadership.
Q. You mean the NSDAP?
A. Yes, yes, of course. The party leaders knew me and considered me undesirable. I had already been under arrest, and had had my house searched. I was watched by the Gestapo, and in order to build up my organization I needed to be able to travel anywhere without arousing suspicion. Consequently, Sievers gave me a fake research assignment, which was to study indo-Germanic culture, customs of the annual festivals.
Q. Sievers said during direct examination that he himself could not issue any research assignments; you said that you received a fake research assignment from him; wasn't this research assignment actually issued by the Curater, Professor Wuest?
A. Yes. If things were going well, and Wuest was in a good mood, or had been drinking with Sievers, it was possible to persuade him to do something, and so he succeeded in persuading Wuest that I was efficient for this research assignment, and so I was given this assignment. And what concerned indo-Germanic customs could be found anywhere.
I was given a false pass as a section chief, though I was not a section chief, and was not a member of the SS nor the Ahnenerbe.
Q. And with this pass you were able easily to get visas to go abroad?
A. Not necessarily. I needed a little more for that purpose, but it was easier.
Q. Then the actual purpose of the assignment of this fake research assignment was that you, who were a suspect might appear in a more harmless light, and would be able to move rather freely and without supervision?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, did it become necessary for Sievers to protect you personally; I speak of this, since you said before that Sievers work --- you wanted to explain first how he helped and protected members of your organization, and first of all yourself.
A He protected me when on the 2d of September 1944 I was suspected of participating in the events of the 20th of July. I was arrested and was to be hanged. Sievers used his position with Himmler, risking his own life, because Obersturmbannfuehrer Neuhaus wanted to hang me, and was convinced that Sievers and I had been in conspiracy with Stauffenberg. Sievers, through his skill, managed to have me released for lack of evidence.
Q How long were you under arrest at that time?
A The 2d of September 1944 to the 19th of December, the same year.
Q Is it true that you were once in the next cell to the wellknown Dr. Goerdeler?
A I cannot say. I was in the Lehrter Prison in Berlin. That is near the Lehrter Station. I had Cell No. 225.
DR. WEISGERBER: Mr. President, in this connection I offer from Document Book 2, Sievers Exhibit No. 49 -- beg pardon, Sievers Document No. 49, as Exhibit 30, Document Book 2, page 23-24, 25-26 in the English. This is a statement by Theodor Baensch about the incarceration of Dr. Hielscher after the 20th of July 1944. Baensch was a prisoner himself in the prison in Lehrterstrasse in Berlin, and he testified to the fact that Dr. Hielscher was also under arrest there.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now be in recess until 1:30.
(Thereupon a recess was taken until 1:30 P.M.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 15 April 1947.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. FRIEDRICH HIELSCHER - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. WEISGERBER (Counsel for the Defendant Sievers):
Q Witness, it seems to me to be desirable for you to give to the Tribunal a very short description of the political phenomenon which we described as the German resistance movement. Could you clarify this phenomenon in a few short sentences?
A In order to understand it one has to imagine the situation in which everybody in the country found himself whenever he wanted to be active in any way. One has to imagine that parents couldn't speak to their children because the child did not know how to lie in such a manner that the attitude of the parents did not become apparent to their teachers. One must imagine that every neighbor was in a position to observe every errand, everyone who spoke out of place was sure to find an enemy who would denounce him. One must imagine that over since 1939 we knew that prisoners in order to make them testify were thrown into a bath of water wit 80 degrees heat and the skin was pooled off their bodies. One must imagine that none of us could be sure that he would be able to keep quiet and what he would testify under torture, or under the pressure of any which was introduced to him. That is to say, it was quite out of the question to get together in large meetings. It was impossible to carry on any open propaganda. In Stockholm I was asked, "Why don't you speak publicly?" Well, it just wasn't possible, it was absurd. Only when one considers that situation one can imagine how one could work against the Party. There were little cells, very tiny groups, where the rank and file man didn't know what the other one was doing, where one group was not allowed to know what the other group was doing.
If one would be discovered it could betray the other. A system of buckheads was necessary, if one buckhead was full the other one had to be water-tight. And this is the only way in which it was possible for a few people, who knew one another before 1935, to get together under avery calculated circumstances. One always had to know under what pretext one had met and what one would say if somebody was suddenly to interrupt. How much could the wife know? What would the wife have to testify in case she was asked had she met a certain number of these men before? If so, how long had she known them? Under what position did she know them? After leaving one would have to arrange what the subject of conversation had been. I think that this is a picture of the atmosphere in which we had to work. At the beginning of the Nazi regime a large part of the circles and groups upon which one relied were eliminated, they had been put into concentration camps, some of them had been killed, one didn't know how these people in the concentration camps were guarded, and it took years before one could once more establish who really was left, who kept quiet, and upon whom one could therefore rely. Only after years one could put his head out of one's camouflaged position, and could find out what one could do and how one could meet one's friends. The next difficulty was that none of the political groups could act unless there was a cooperation of parts of the Armed Forces. Himmler certainly wouldn't have left if one just talked to him, and upon that depended the slowness of the entire work.
Q. Now, I think it would he desirable that you describe to the Tribunal how you cooperated with circles that were of your opinion, how you established contact with them, and to what extent your collaboration was possible with other groups?
A. Our group maintained contact and cooperated with Socialists; I mention Dr. Reichwein, Dr. Topf, who was here before, and Dr. Haubach. Then there was the young conservative group of Graf Friedrich von der Schulenburg, the Catholic circles around the Freiherr Friedrich von Luening, who was one of the most courageous and noble men I ever got to know. There was the group around August Wenig, the military group around Count Stauffenberg, and a number of clergymen.
Q. Was there cooperation between you and these groups which you just mentioned?
A. It would be best to describe how we actually met. I met Freiherr Luening and became acquainted with him in 1940 because he was the commander of a reserve battalion ER-9. He was supposed to help me to recruit a Jewish friend under a false name into this battalion. At that time I was currently active in the questions of what was to be done later, and in that connection I was in contact with August Wenig. It was in the Spring of 1940 when Luening told me, "You know Fritz Schulenburg!" I vaguely remembered having seen him in 1932, 1928. A few hours later August Wenig told me the same thing and both told me that Schulenburg would come at night when darkness had fallen. He told me, "You know who recommended me; well how do we kill the pig?" Thereupon I said, "That is a reasonable basis for conversation; how about the Generals?" Then opinions were exchanged as to what military opinions I saw, what military opinions he saw, and the next question was if the morale of the country was ripe enough. Schulenburg, as a vice president or whatever he was, could not travel around the country very easily, that is, apart from his official trips, while I was getting around the country, and the question came up, "What does the mass of the population think?"
That is just one example. I don't want to tell many such examples and this is how conversations were carried out with a number of these people.
Everyone exchanged information about their particular groups; nobody asked where that information came from, nobody mentioned any names, except when it was ascertained in the case of any such information that it must originate from that source. Then one communicated only by using a formula, very seldom was the real name used. Telephones had to be disconnected and it was necessary to look outside the window to ascertain if anyone was on the street. We found out through a member of our organization in what manner a hidden microphone could be built into the wall, the flat was searched carefully, and this is the way we worked.
Q. What did Sievers do in order to further the activities of your organization?
A. For instance, he took care of supplying all information which was of importance. He told us what troops of the Waffen SS were in Germany during the war. He gave us fake official trips and he worked out a plan for an assassination, which was to be carried through by our group in case the generals plan did not come off. We all thought it was not safe to rely on the generals. In March of 1944 Werner Haften told me by order of Stauffenberg that one would have to take into account the fact that the generals would have to be moved into action by a certain assassination and everyone was to make his own preparations, in case he had any, in such a manner as if he was the only one active. That was the situation in March of 1944. We worked out a substantial plan to remove, if possible, Himmler and Hitler simultaneously, but in case of doubt Himmler himself. We were of a completely different opinion there than the other groups.
Q. What concrete preliminary work was done for the assassination in your group?
A. Sievers was the only one in our group who came into question regarding that assassination because he was the only one so close to Himmler. He was therefore assigned this task and we worked out this matter as far as the detailed plan was concerned; all that was necessary now was to press the button.
Q. And for what period of time was this assassination intended?
A. We started our preparations in the year of 1943 and at the earliest at the end of 1943 could we have started. Then we finally thought of the middle of 1944 because Schulenburg and Luening told me that the generals would be ready at around that period of time.
Q. Well, an assassination is a matter for quick decision. Is it not true, therefore, that all these long preparations are rather surprising that you are telling us about?
A. The following would have to be taken into consideration. Around Himmler and Hitler there was a strong guard, a strong ring of guards, though which none could get unless he was carefully searched and checked. Secondly, and that I already emphasized, one did not have to be quite sure that the generals would carry out that assassination but one had to be sure that a sufficient number of generals were ready to remove the N.S. system immediately after the assassination, for a elimination of just these two people themselves would have no political purpose whatsoever. We did not intend to carry out a Putsch but we intended to remove a political system, a political order, and for that reason we had to wait until the situation became right and the generals were ready.
Q. Now, the question crops up whether these plans for the assassination of Hitler and Himmler were only in your fantasy, or the fantasy of your collaborators, or was there any real basis or concrete preparation for such assassination?
A. I already said that the preparations had been worked out to the detailed technical point insofar as the assembly location, the shooting, etc. were concerned.
Q. And who would have assassinated Himmler and Hitler?
A. Sievers was to do that and a few young men belonging to my organization.
Q. And why was it in effect not carried out?
A. After the Stauffenberg assassination had failed, the Wehrmacht circles that came into question were eliminated by Himmler and therefore it was no longer possible to remove that system.
The only consequence of any attempted assassination would have been - since the foreign political situation would not have changed, the only consequence would have been here that the people would have said again. "This is the stab in the hack for the victorious front-line."
Q What did Sievers do to further your activity in addition to what you have already said?
A He, for instance, supported my representative, Arnold Deutelmoser when he was put on the list of those who were to be removed under the pretext of the assasination which took place in Munich at the Buergerbraue. He also protected Bomas who was working in the Netherlands. He protected Dr. Schuettelkopf whom we had sent into the RSHA and it was possible for him in turn to send me to Sweden. He saved Niels Bor, Professor Seyb of Oslo University, and he saved a number of Norwegian students, etc.
Q Do you know that Sievers informed you about Himmler's doubleplay in the case of the minister, Popitz, and that as a consequence he saved that entire group against measures by Himmler?
A Yes. The following thing happened. One day Sievers approached me and said that I had just heard Himmler say in a close circle how he ridiculed an attempt on the part of Popitz. He said that Minister Popitz with the mediation of the lawyer Lampe had approached Himmler and tried to persuade him to bring about a change of the National Socialist system, perhaps by removing Hitler. He said Himmler thought it was very funny that these men had so little sense as to think of him in that connection. Thank God one could enter negotiations with them because it was sure that nobody was behind these people in the country, but it did seem that these gentlemen had many foreign political relationships and it would be advisable to find out what in effect was behind it all, and it would, therefore, be advisable to enter into negotiations with them. We were quite surprised about the naive attitude shown by Himmler, and I sent Deutelmoser to Reichwein with whom I knew he had connections with Popitz.
In that way Popitz was warned. Reichwein was so surprised and hardly wanted to believe that situation.
I was asked to participate in a conference, and Reichwein after having convinced himself that all of this was true, promised to warn all of the gentlemen concerned in Berlin and then asked Deutelmoser, who was to go to Norway shortly thereafter to notify Reichwein's friend, Stelzer, the present Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein, in order to see that he, too, took the necessary precautionary measures. In this way we hoped that a number of these people had actually been saved. Popitz, however, himself was careless and was captured.
Q This conspiracy could not have been carried out unless you had the necessary financial means at your disposal. How did you get these means?
A Everyone of our people, be it man or woman, had agreed to give up ten percent of their monthly income for that legal work. Many gave a substantially larger sum.
Q How about Sievers?
A Sievers gave more than he had to.
Q Do you know the case of the three hundred Norwegian students who on the basis of Sievers' intervention were released from the concentration camp Buchenwald?
A Yes. Terboven, or some other official in Norway disliked some demonstration which occurred there, and as a result arrested three hundred students. Through some dark channels they were brought into the concentration at Buchenwald.
Sievers found out about that, and if I remember correctly, he was in a position to see to it that these students be released from the concentration camp using Himmler's Nordic ideas.
Q In that case you think that Sievers' activity was substantially important for your resistance movement?
A Yes. That was true of my organization, for he protected and covered me as its chief, and, secondly, as far as I know, he was the only man belonging to any resistance movement who went as close as he to the ReichsFuehrer-SS. If any other group would have brought any such information as he did, I would have noticed it that it could have only come from the same source.
Q Witness, I shall have a document handed to you which was submitted by the Prosecution. This is Document NO-975, Prosecution Exhibit 479. It is a letter sent by Sievers to Dr. Hirt. Would you please look at that letter?
A Yes.
Q This letter contains a tone of voice which seems to indicate that he tried to cover Dr. Hirt's activity. Dr. Hirt was working in the Anatomical Institute of the Strassburg University. I assume that for reasons which we shall mention later that you know Hirt's name. How do you explain that tone in this letter?
A I think that this is very proper and praiseworthy. I would have thought it very foolish of Sievers if he adopted any other tone in any of his official correspondence. It was his task to say "yes" but act in a negative way. There couldn't have appeared any pretense of any disapproval on his part. The more active one had to be in an anti-National Socialist way, the more he had to speak for National Socialism.
Q I shall now turn to another complex of questions. Sievers is indicted in this trial to have participated in a number of crimes. Did Sievers at any time tell you about the so-called research assignments of Dr. Rascher and Dr. Hirt, who was just mentioned? These more experiments carried out in the concentration camps.
A Sievers, as far as I remember, came to me in the year 1942 and told me very excitedly that Himmler in his desire to extend the Ahnenerbe Society had embarked on the thought of placing experiments on human beings under the work of the Ahnenerbe Society. He said that he did not succeed in frustrating that. He said that he had no desire whatsoever to participate in these horrible acts and asked me what to do. At that time we considered this horrible situation very thoroughly and thought of what we could do. It was quite clear to us what the SS intended here, and it was questionable whether responsibility could be assumed for any such acts, whether it would be advisable to be the instrument of Himmler if he embarked on any such acts, measures where human beings were degraded to the level of insects.
The following considerations proved to be decisive for us: if Sievers would leave, not one person, not one object of these experiments would be saved. In case Sievers stayed there as a technical secretary, he could throw sand into that machinery and could, perhaps, be in a position to save somebody. In addition, the entire plan and the entire overthrow of the Party stood or fell with Sievers' staying at his post. The experiments on human beings were only part of this horrible Party system, and one had to concentrate on the decisive points in order to finally remove everything, and, as I have said before, there was no other way into the staff of the ReichsfuehrerSS.
We, therefore, summarized in case Sievers resigned because of that case, it was sure that he would be eliminated and probably that would also be true of all the people he had ever entrusted with a research assignment, and everything that we had done so far would be lost in case he left, and if anyone was to be saved at all, he could only be saved by Sievers remaining at his post.
Q. If I have understood you correctly, Sievers at first wanted to resign from his position as Reich business manager of the Ahnenerbe?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Did Sievers approve of these arguments which you and your friends put forward in favor of his staying with the Reich Fuehrer SS as the Reich business manager of the Ahnenerbe? Did he do it immediately or only after trying to persuade him for some time?
A. This took a number of days, because Sievers, according to his nature, was softer than many of us and did not want to agree with us. We finally had to appeal to his sense of duty and persuade him that he had to do it and that was the only way out.
Q. Among other matters, it was considered that by Sievers remaining at his post, there would be a possibility of mitigating these horrible experiments.
A. The chance wasn't very great but we were convinced that his world be the only way possible, if at all. Then it could only be done in that manner. If I may say so, this was such a horrible situation that we always had to come back to it and we were damned lucky at least to have the hope to save a number of people. Other opponents of SS system have told me about similar dilemmas which were just as difficult, and where the alternative was yet more horrible, and where persons, according to my belief and knowledge, acted correctly, and if the Tribunal would permit me I could relate a few almost incredible situations which were even worse.
THE PRESIDENT: In what connection, witness, are these narrations, witness?
WITNESS: In the connection as to the question whether it was morally justifiable to arrive at the result of Sievers remaining at his post.
THE PRESIDENT: Such matters as that would not be material in this inquiry.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q. Did Sievers report to you that it was possible for him to alleviate that situation at all.
A. Yes, I know of the following cases. He told me about high altitude experiments which he frustrated. He told about his sabotage of the low pressure chamber. He told about his interference in the malaria experiments; how he placed Ploetner against Schilling. He told me that he succeeded in getting a group of thirty inmates for experimental purposes from Dachau to some other place at Hodensee, and, furthermore, that he finally succeeded in subordinating these experimental series simultaneously to the Reich Research Council, so that the additional amount of paper and red tape which resulted in delays to a considerable extent.
Q. Is it correct Sievers made it possible for you to go to the ghetto at Litzmannstadt and save persons there?
A. That is correct. At that time I went there in order to save the parents of a Jewish lady from being gassed, a lady whom I could get to Stockholm with the help of Sievers. I was unfortunately too late in the case of the parents.
Q. Hence it is beyond all doubt for you that Sievers rejected the participation in those experiments which were ordered by Himmler?
A. Yes.
Q. For you there is neither any doubt that the entire activity of Sievers from 1933 up to 1945, no matter with what situation he came into contact, was only moved and dictated by his opposition to the national socialist regime.
A. That is beyond any doubt.
DR. SEISGERBER: Mr. President: I have no further questions of this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any further questions of this witness by the defense counsel?
DR. STEINBAUER (Counsel for the defendant, Professor Beiglboeck:)