Extracts from meetings with Hitler on the intensification of naval warfare, authorizing the sinking of British and French merchant ships without warning, and passenger ships in convoys, passenger ships carrying troops or supplies, and neutral ships carrying contraband, and the navy's request for authorization to take further steps as needed

TOP SECRET.
MID/24/T 7/45. '
"SINK AT SIGHT" POLICY
Throughout the latter part of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, the "sink at sight" policy was being evolved by the Germans. The following extracts from German documents all have some bearing on this subject.
I. Extracts from documents contained in "Kriegstagebuch 1 Ski.
C. Heft VII. Überlegungen des Chefs der Seekriegsleitung und Niederschriften ueber Besprechungen mit dem Fuehrer."
23.9.39.
From a report on a conference in Zoppot between the Chief of Naval War Staff (Raeder) and the Fuehrer, at which Generaloberst Keitel was present:
"(2) The strengthening of A/S activity (planes, armed merchant ships) eliminates the possibility of searching British merchant ships. The Fuehrer agrees to the proposal that action without warning be taken against any merchant ship, definitely established as enemy (not passenger ships), on the assumption that she will be armed. When possible, neutrals should be specially well-treated, in order to show that the system has not been radically altered."
(P.3 of "Unterredung Chef der Ski. mit dem Fuehrer am 23.9 in Zoppot. (In Gegenwart Generaloberst Keitel)")
16.10.39.
From a report, signed by Raeder (Ob.D.M.) Navy] on a meeting he had with the Fuehrer, present:
[C. in C. of the General Jodi was
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"(2) Report on the intensification of the war at sea, as an appendix to the memorandum sent to the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer has agreed to :
(a.) the torpedoing of French and British merchant ships without warning.
(b) the torpedoing of passenger ships in convoy, provided that some time elapses between the announcement of this intention and the torpedoing.
Ob.d.M. points out that passenger ships are already being torpedoed, if they sail without lights."
("Vortrag Ob.d.M. beim Fuehrer am 16.10.1939. Gegenwart General Jodi")
10.11.39.
From a report, signed by Raeder, on a meeting he had with the Fuehrer. Gen.Ob. Keitel and Korv. Kapt v. Puttkamer were present:
"(3) The U-boat war * * *
Query: Should a proclamation, concerning the intensification of the U-boat war, be made to neutral countries at the time of the commencement of a land offensive, so that any protests to it, by being made at the same time as other, possibly stronger protests, create less stir in the world? Ob.d.M. suggests a much more gradual intensification—step by step—without, for the time be- -ing, taking a proclamation into account. At the moment, a proclamation such as this is less necessary, as the Americans have themselves announced a prohibited area for thèir ships round Britain and France, whereby, encounters with the powerful neutrals are eliminated. (See appendix.)
Ob.d.M. suggests as the next step, the sinking without warning of enemy passenger ships, which are often heavily armed and used as troop transports, or for carrying contraband cargoes. It is known that these ships are armed ; it is even shown in pictures. The Fuehrer agrees to this, provided that the names of the large ships concerned are announced, and that it is established that they are being used as auxiliary cruisers or troop transports. Ob.d.M. suggests, as a later step, the sinking without warning of neutral ships, which we definitely know carry contraband goods, whose port and time of departure and whose route are known to us (i.e. Greek steamers). The suggestion will be put forward by Ob.d.M. for consideration as soon as the possibility of a change in attitude among neutral nations is established (i.e. in the case of an offensive). The immunity from attack of ships owned by friendly nations (Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain) should be continued. Setting
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up of a communications and control organization in neutral ports (appendix, section B, final sentence)."
("Vortrag beim Fuehrer am 10.XI.1939 (Gegenwart: Gen.Ob. Keitel und K.Kpt.v. Puttkamer).")
Appendix to the above:
"I. Proclamation
By the declaration of a prohibited zone, for American ships in the European area, a new situation has arisen in connection with the necessity of an announcement in the form of a proclamation. The possibility exists that the war at sea against Britain can be intensified to such an extent by war measures, that almost the identical goal is attained as that aimed at by the proclamation.
The intentions of the general war directorate must be considered when the necessity for the issue of a proclamation, or the appointing of its time of issue, is settled.
II. Measures for the intensification of the war on merchant shipping.
(A) Present position:
(1) The following are not yet affected by the intense form of war on merchant shipping (sinking without warning):
(a) all neutral merchant ships sailing alone, or under neutral escort;
(b) passenger ships sailing alone (even armed passenger ships), if they are built to accommodate a large number of passengers.
(2) The following are not, as yet, liable to capture:
(a) merchant ships of friendly neutral states: Italy, Spain, Japan, Russia;
(b) all neutral ships sailing alone towards an enemy port, provided that their manner is correct and their cargo does not include contraband goods;
(c) all neutral ships, without contraband goods on board sailing from enemy ports.
(B) Suggestion for further intensification: .
(as a measure to be put into force when the most intense form is required)
(a) freedom of action against all enemy ships, including passenger ships: (
Grounds: armament, use as troop transports.
(b) further methodical laying of mines in British harbours and approach points.
(c) concentrated attack by the operational air force on the main enemy import harbors.
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(d) support of these war measures by the setting up of a communications and control organisation in neutral ports, and by strong political and economic pressure on neutral countries for the purpose of terminating their merchant shipping traffic with Britain.
* * *****
(V) Further possibilities, which are, however, undesirable at the present time:
(1) merchant shipping warfare in accordance with the Prize Regulations against Italian, Spanish, Russian, and Japanese ships.
(2) the sinking without warning of all neutral ships which are known to be carrying contraband goods to Britain.
("Anlage zum Vortrage des Ob.D.M. v. 10.XI.39. Fuer Vortrag des Ob.d.M. beim Fuehrer" — in full.)
30.12.39.
From a report, unsigned, on a meeting between Ob.d.M. (Rae-der) and the Fuehrer, at which Gen.Ob.Keitel and Freg.Kapt. v. Puttkamer were present:
* * * * * * *
"(5) Intensification of the U-boat war. See appendix. The procedure, in force until now, of general intensification without any special announcement, has been successful. Should a proclamation of general intensification of the war be made (the Fuehrer has approved this), it is desired that it be merely a general intimation of intensification even of the war at sea, and that it contain no concrete definitions. Furthermore, it is requested that the Naval War Staff have full power to carry out any steps of intensification, which the general situation and the. preparedness of the means of war allows. The full consent of the Fuehrer, however, must in every case be gained beforehand. The same process must be carried out even if no proclamation be made. The Fuehrer, thus, gives his consent to :
(a) Merchant ships of nations which sell or charter ships to Britain—mainly Greek ships—may be fired on and sunk without warning within the American prohibited area. This may be done by one or more U-boats according to the. situation, and will possibly be limited to specific areas.
(b) In those sections of the American prohibited area, in which the fiction of danger of mines can be maintained i.e. the Bristol Channel, all or single U-Boats may fire
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on and sink any neutral merchant ships except those of "friendly" neutral countries.
(c) The Fuehrer is reserving the announcement of the law in reply to the order in council until the moment of the general intensification of the wai;; should the offensive be long delayed, then until such time as special measures will have to be carried out in place of an offensive.
The good treatment of friendly neutrals is to continue."
(p.r. of "Vortrag des Ob.d.M. beim Fuehrer am 30.XII.39. (Gegenwart Gen.Ob. Keitel und Freg.Kpt. v. Puttkamer.)")
Appendix to the above:
(signed by Fricke of the Naval War Staff, 1st Division (1 Ski.) ) "Intensification of the war on merchant shipping.
I. The position of the German war on merchant shipping at the end of December 1939.
(a-) Attacks by U-boats without warning:
(1) against all enemy merchant ships, with the exception of passenger ships sailing in convoy.
(2) against all neutral ships sailing in enemy convoys.
(3) against all ships sailing without lights in the area: 20° W, 62° N, 3° E, 44° N,
(4) against all ships which disobey when ordered to stop or to discontinue the use of their wireless,
(5) against all tankers within the American prohibited area west of 2° E, with the exception of Italian, Russian, Spanish, American and Japanese tankers."
(From "Anlage zu Vortrag beim Fuehrer am 30.12.1939")
23.240.
From a report, signed by Raeder, on a meeting he had with the Fuehrer. Gen.Ob. Keitel, Gen.Maj. Jodi and Freg. Kapt. v. Puttkamer were also present:
* * * * * * *
"(2) North Sea. * * *
(d) Intensification of the U-boat war.
Up to the present, all ships sailing without lights (including passenger ships sailing without lights) could be fired on and sunk within the American prohibited area. It has now been established that British ships sailing without lights have, of late, often been showing dim navigation lights. This is done, presumably, to avoid collisions. Besides flying their country's flag and showing the markings of their nationality, neutral ships are
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obliged to sail with lights so that they may be recognised beyond all doubt. Ob.d.M. proposes that even passenger ships sailing without lights, but showing navigation lights, be fired on and sunk (without warning) as this would signify that they were British. The British use passenger ships to a great extent for transporting troops and freight, owing to the shortage of freighters. The Fuehrer has agreed to this."
(P. 2. of "Vortrag des Ob.d.M. beim Fuehrer am 23.2.40-1030-Gegenwart: Gen. Ob. Keitel, Generalmajor Jodi, Freg.Kpt. v. Puttkamer".)
II. Extracts from documents contained in file: "1 Ski. Handakten, Korv. Kapt. Assamann."
From a memorandum entitled: "The position of the Naval War Staff to the question 'Reaction to the Order in Council,' concerning the seizing of German export goods."
"I. The 'order in council' was announced on the 28th November
1939. According to its text and also according to the intention of the British, its purpose is to stop Germany from exporting goods in neutral ships * * *
II. ' This British measure calls for a counter-measure from Germany, whether it actually has a great effect or whether its effect has merely been over-estimated by the British. The Reich Government has so far 'reserved further measures' * * *
III. * * * It is not necessary to reply merely by sea warfare. Retaliation in the political, economic and other spheres of war (i.e. the Luftwaffe) can also be given consideration * * *
V. * * * It would be possible to make the 'order in council' grounds for a general intensification of the war. Should however, the moment for this be long delayed, then a reply if indeed any such is intended, must be made earlier, i.e. soon.
VI. Naval measures for intensifying the war on merchant shipping have so far progressed that only the last step is required to exhaust all the possibilities. The suggestion of the Auswaertigen Amt, of replying to the Order by a pronouncement of blockade or with similar measures, does not meet with the approval of Ski. [Seekriegsleitung—Naval War Staff], This measure should be reserved for the general intensification of the war. A measure such as that sketched in the appendix might be considered as a reply to the 'order in council.' This outline for a law, proposed by Ski, has been approved by the Auswaertigen Amt, which re-
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linquishes its earlier, more extensive proposal, since Ski intends a further intensification of the war on merchant shipping in the near future.
VIII. The proposal of Ski is: should the political authorities wish to reply to the 'order in council' before the general intensification of the war, and if they consider that such an answer can be given only by intensifying the naval war, then the law should come into force about Dec. 15th."
("Stellungnahme der Seekriegsleitung zù der Frage 'Reaction auf die order in council', betreffend Exportbeschlagnahme deutscher Waren." [This document is near the beginning of the file and has many under linings in green pencil.])
Appendix to the above:
"A Special Law in retaliation to the enemy measures against German Export. '
ART. I.
Goods and materials, including fuel of all kinds, which are enemy property, or of enemy origin, or which have been loaded in an enemy port, are liable to be seized or taken into port, whatever the nationality of the ship carrying the cargo may be.
The terms of the Prize Regulations concerning contraband goods apply accordingly.
This law applies to goods and materials shipped after * * *
ART 2.
This law comes into force on its publication.
Grounds for the special law.
The grounds for the law are to be set out, in the preamble and in the notes given with its notification to neutrals, somewhat in the following way:
By the Order of 28.11, the British Government has subjected to attack export goods of German origin on neutral ships making for neutral ports, even when they are neutral property. It is immaterial where such export goods of German origin are encountered.
Threefold breaking of International Law by the British Government:
(1) by the attempt to carry out a permissible ban on merchant shipping in the form of an illegal 'paper' blockade (as the first step to a formally declared and effective blockade), without employing the corresponding blockade forces,
(2) by extending the application of this 'paper' blockade over all the seas; not limiting it to German waters.
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(3) by subjecting neutral countries thereby to the effects of a procedure, permissible neither in form nor in content."
(The above appendix is attached to document 'Stellungnahme' der Seekriegsleitung * * * Neither is signed nor dated).
From notes, undated and unsigned, on a memorandum on the intensification of the war at sea against Britain. (This does not seem to refer to any particular document contained in the file, none of which, however, contain any information on this subject which is not given in the extracts in Section I).
"The memorandum clearly shows that, for some time to come, we shall not be in a position to gain a decisive success in the economic war against Britain by war means, even if these are put into force in their most intense form. This fact leads to the logical conclusion that the economic war must be conducted so that, on the one hand, it should be operationally as successful as possible without, on the other hand, producing results which would unfavourably change the whole war situation. This latter would be the case if, as happened in the last war, our use of the most extreme form of naval economic warfare resulted in the entry of the USA into the war against us." (p. 2)
"* * * The American Neutrality Law is a shackle for the most war-loving of American Presidents, one which presumably cannot be shaken off so long as we do not provide him with the excuse to break this shackle and thus fulfill the dearest wish of the British! The terms of the neutrality law however, are such that, under them, we could conduct a very intense naval economic war against Britain without the fear of a conflict with the USA. The final stage of intensification, perhaps not yet to be employed because of the USA, would not outweigh the risk of war with the USA. This could be justified only when our general war position is so strong and our naval resources for the economic warfare so formidable (either by our own strength or with Italian or Russian aid), that, even by their most severe employment, we could easily deal with such a decisive result as American aid to the enemy.
"Even if we are convinced that, should the war be of long duration, the USA will enter it in any case, * * * it must be our object to delay this event so long that American help would come too late." (pp. 3 & 4)
("Bemerkung zu der Denkschrift ueber die Verschaerfung des Seekrieges gegen England.")
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III. Extracts from documents contained in file: tions-befehle, 1939/42".
'B.d.U. Opera-A."Teil I".
23.8,39.
From Operation Order No. 3 for Atlantic U-boats, (Operation order No. 3 for U-boats "Alarm practice North Sea") For U.26, U.53. The order is signed by Doenitz:
"VI. DUTIES OF U-BOATS AFTER THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES WITH BRITAIN-FRANCE.
(a) Until the declaration of Danger zones:
Merchant shipping warfare according to the "New Draft of the Prize Regulations."
As long as the war against Merchant shipping is to be conducted in accordance with the Prize Regulations, the following ships are the main ones to be attacked, and these, even under these regulations, may be sunk without warning:
(1) Troop transports i.e. any vessels on which troops or war materials can be seen, or which can be identified as such in other ways.
(2) Vessels escorted by enemy warships or planes.
(3) Vessels taking part in actions, or directly supporting hostile operations i.e. by sending signals. It should be assumed that a merchant ship is taking part in an action, as soon as ever it prepares to offer resistance, or takes steps calculated to endanger the U-boat.
(b) Should danger zones be declared by Germany, at the outbreak of, or during the war, limitless merchant shipping warfare, i.e. attack without warning on all vessels encountered, will be permitted within those areas. None of our own surface craft will be within the areas of such danger zones, therefore unrestricted action will be yours in these specific areas.
(c) Attacks on enemy warships from Flotilla leaders upwards and submarines; destroyers only if the opportunities of firing are favourable and sure.
(d) Opportunities for attacks against merchant vessels will present themselves in area T on the merchant shipping routes from North America (Canada) to the northern outlet of the Irish Sea and the Clyde Harbour, and in area M on the merchant shipping routes from South America-Cape Verde Island-West coast of Africa.
In area M, French troop transports may also be expected.
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(e) Open.
(/) Cooperation with neighbouring boats when important war targets are sighted (i.e. convoys, troop transports, steamships of importance). In such cases, boats in favourable positions may, and indeed must, leave their operational areas for the attack. Should only slight traffic be encountered in areas T, U, V, boats must cooperate even with less important targets.
(P. 4 of "Operationsbefehl Nr. 3 fuer U-boote Atlantik — Operations-befehl Nr. 3 fuer U-boote "Alarmuebung Nordsee". Fuer U.36,53. 23.8.39) .
24.8.39.
From Operation Order "North Sea No. 2" for the 3rd and 5th U-Flotillas, signed by Ibbeken (F.d.Ud West):
"(b) At the outbreak of hostilities with the Western Powers: * * *
Attacks on warships (destroyers and upwards, and submarines) will be permitted.
Merchant shipping warfare will be conducted according to the "New Draft of the Prize Regulations".
Ships which may be sunk without warning are:
(aa) Merchant vessels sailing in convoy.
(bb) Vessels on which troops or war material can be seen. Armament on merchant ships does not in itself justify sinking without warning. However, all resistance by merchant vessels is to be broken by every measure.
Action is to be taken only if the ship prepared to resist, or if the U-boat is considered to be in danger."
(P. 2. of "Operationsbefehl 'Nordsee Nr. 2' fuer 3. und 5. U-Flot-tille" dated 24 August 1939.)
10.9.39. ' :
From Operation Order "North Sea No. 8" for U.15, U.24 signed
by Doenitz:
"(b) Duties of XJ.1U, XJ.24-
(1) Attacks on British surface vessels (destroyers and upwards, and submarines).
(2) Attacks on those merchant vessels which may be sunk
without warning:" .
(a)
(b) (see extract from Operation order No. 3 for Atlantic U-(c) boats, sections a, b and c.)
"(d) No action to be taken against passenger ships.
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(3) No merchant shipping warfare according to the Prize Regulations.
(4) Only defensive action should be taken against French war and merchant-ships. Incidents with France are to be avoided."
(P. 3 of "Operationsbefehl 'Nordsee Nr. 8' fuer U.14, U.24", dated
10.9.39. )
B. "Teilll"
From various Operation Orders "North Sea". All orders are signed by Doenitz:
5.10.39.
"III. Orders for U.47.
Instructions: * * *
(3) On the return journey: attack warships and those merchant ships which may be sunk without warning. These include enemy merchant ships definitely seen to be armed. Vessels sailing without lights are to be sunk without warning if they be encountered West of 3° East." (P. 3).
("Operationsbefehl 'Nordsee Nr. 16' (U.47)").
9.10.39.
"HI. Orders for U.19, U.24: . .
(1) Instructions.
(b) On the outward journey (outside your operational area) and on the return journey, attack warships (destroyers only when opportunities for firing are sure) and those merchant ships which may be sunk without warning. (Off the coast of Britain, at night,.all ships sailing without lights may be sunk without warning up to 3° West." (P. 3))
("Operationsbefehl 'Nordsee Nr. 17' (U.19, U.24)")
19.10.39. ,
"III. Orders for U.60, U.61:
(4) The war on merchant shipping in accordance with the Prize Regulations is permitted only north of 61°." (p. 2)
("Operationsbefehl 'Nordsee Nr. 21' fuer U.60, U.61.")
19.10.39.
"III. Order for U.56, U.57, U.58, U.59: '
(4) The war on merchant shipping in accordance with the Prize Regulations is permitted west of the Fair-Island-Passage." (p. 2).
("Operationsbefehl 'Nordsee Nr. 20' fuer U.56, U.57, U.58, U.59.")
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2U.10.39.
"III. Orders for U.13:
(2) Instructions * * *
(b) Attack all ships which may be sunk without -warning (see St.K.Befehl [Staendige Kriegsbefehl — Standing War Orders] Nos. 1 & 11 Sections 3 & 5). These include all merchant ships definitely recognised as enemy (not passenger ships); at night, also all ships sailing without lights west of 3° East." (p. 2-3)
("Operationsbefehl 'Nordsee Nr. 22' fuer U.13".)
2U.11.39.
"IV. Orders for U.21, U.56:
(1) Instructions * * *
(6) Within the operational area, sink without warning all war and merchant-ships which are worth sinking.
(c) Outside the Operational area, attacks without warning are to be carried out in accordance with St.K.Befehl No.
18. This includes all armed enemy passenger ships also all tankers except those of Italy, Spain, America, Japan and Russia." (p. 3)
("Operationasbefehl 'Nordsee Nr. 30' fuer U.56, U.21")
29.li.U0.
"HI. Orders for U.9:
(1) Instructions * * *
(c) On the outward and the return journeys, attacks without warning are to be carried out in accordance with St. K.Befehl in accordance with verbal instructions." (p. 3)
("Operationsbefehl 'Nordsee Nr. 12' (Firth of Moray) fuer U.9.")
1U.2.U0.
"HI. Orders for U.13:
(1) Instructions * * *
(c) War to be conducted in accordance with St.K.Befehl 101-172, and in accordance with verbal instructions * * * (/) In certain cases, duties are to be carried out in accordance with Appendix 2 to the order in a sealed envelope, which may on no account fall into enemy hands." (p. 3). ("Operationsbefehl 'Nordsee Nr. 15'—Cross Sand—fuer U.13.")
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8440.
"III. Orders for U.9, U.7:
(1) Instructions * * *
(a) Until the issuing of the order "Execution of the War in , accordance with St.K.Befehl is permitted," only enemy warships and enemy troop transports are to be attacked.
(b) After the issue of the above order, the war is to be conducted in accordance with St. K. Befehl." (p. 2)
("Operationsbefehl 'Nordsee Nr. 19' (Sued) fuer U.9, U.7.")
VI. Extracts from the War Diary of Doenitz in his capacity as Befehlshaber (of Fuehrer) der Unterseeboote.
From the War Diary of F.d.U. (Ski) for the period 15.8.39-
15.9.39, signed by Doenitz, Kapitaen z. See und Kommodore:
24.8.39.
"1200. Telephone conversation between the duty Commander
F.d.U. and Kplt. Fresdorf * * * .*
F.d.U. also requires that, when 'Danger Zones' are declared, the areas occupied by U-boats up to the present are not reduced. The limits of the 'Danger Zones' used in the exercises of 1938/1939— 200 nautical miles west of Britain, are certainly not extensive enough.
1 Ski. (Fresdorf) replies at 1700 that the limits of the 'Danger Zones' have not yet been arranged and that the demands made by F.d.U. will be taken.into consideration as far as possible." (p. 5)
3.9.39. '
"Ski. sends a signal at 1400: 'War on merchant shipping to be carried out by U-boats in accordance with the Operation order.' Commanders can not doubt this, as, in the Operation order, it is expressly laid down that the war on merchant shipping be conducted in accordance with the Prize Regulations." (p. 16)
4.9.39.
"A further alteration of the dispositions is not yet being considered. So long as the convoy system is not fully in force and the war on merchant shipping is to be conducted in accordance with the Prize Regulations, the present dispositions are correct." (p. 17) .
"The sinking of the 'Athenia' gives grounds for looking over once more the orders issued to date. A simple error in interpretation is not conceivable. But, so that nothing may be neglected to make the matter clear, attention is once more drawn, in wireless
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telegram 1655—'In the case of warfare on merchantmen, Operation Order, section Via remain in force unaltered."—to the waging of warfare on merchantmen in accordance with prize regulations. (p. 18)
("Kriegstagebuch B.d.U. Op. 15.8—15.9.39" on cover. The above are from the second section of KTB, F.d.U. beginning 23.8.39.)
From the War Diary of F.d.U. for the period 16.9.-30.9.39, signed by Doenitz, Kapitaen z. See und Kommodore, Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote: '
18.9.39.
"Then Ob.d.M. goes on to speak of the conduct of the war in general. He says he intends, before the declaration of unlimited danger zones, to propose the declaration of danger zones against British ships only (not neutral ships) as the next step in the intensification of the war at sea against Britain. He wishes to hear the opinion of F.d.U. on this subject.
My reply is that the execution of the War on merchant shipping in danger zones applying only to specific nations would, in my opinion, not produce the desired results :
(1) as the U-boat must be submerged to lie in wait for a suspicious steamer, and in most cases cannot identify the nationality of the ship in time to attack her without warning
(2) as the enemy will presumably carry on its merchant shipping traffic under the protection of neutral markings and flags.
The results would be:
(a) either that many neutral ships, by being presumed enemy, would be sunk without warning; this is just what we wish to avoid, or
(b) that many enemy ships would avoid being sunk by being presumed neutral; this is even less desirable." (pp. 3 & 4).
21.9.39.
"Ski sends.the following order to F.d.U. by most secret teleprinter : that it is confirmed beyond all doubt that all attacks on French ships are avoided. This order excludes the possibility of employing U-boats in the Channel against troop transports. This disposition (U.35; see also War Diary of D.d.U. West) was the result of the order of Ski that attacks are permitted on convoys north of the latitude of-Brest, if the escort consists of French forces. It can be definitely understood that these transports sail by night. At night, however, thé U-boat has to be able to make sure that a ship, sailing without lights in convoy, is an enemy. By day, it is often impossible to ascertain the nationality of a
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ship sailing in convoy, even if she is not flying the flag of a different nation; by night, it is quite impossible. I have informed Ski that, if this order is to be obeyed, I cannot permit U-boats to operate in the channel. Ski is reserving the final decision concerning the attitude towards French ships and informed me by telephone through Kpt.z.S. Fricke that today's order is to be rescinded and the old order to remain in force; i.e. the risk is to be taken that French ships may be sunk without warning, if they sail in convoy north of the latitude of Brest." (p. 6)
23.9.39.
"It will be seen, from reports sent in by U-boats returned to base, that a great many steamships make use of their wireless after they are ordered to stop. As a result, aircraft appear over the position. In this way, steamships support the enemy action against the U-boat. I consider it necessary to operate by every means, and in this way to prevent steamships from taking part in the defensive action against the U-boat. I have asked Ski for a decision on this matter. The question of the attitude towards French ships is becoming more and more urgent in the present development of the war situation. (Troop transports, convoys)" (P- 8)
24-9.39.
"The most secret signal, 8027, gives the decision of the Naval War Staff on this matter: French ships are to be treated in the same way as are British ships. The order concerning passenger ships remains unchanged. Merchant ships, which make use of their wireless after they are ordered to stop, are to be fired on. They are to be brought back to port, or sunk." (p. 8) ("Kriegstagenbuch B.d.U. Op. 16.9.—30.9.1939" on cover.)
From the War Diary of B.d.U. for the period 1.10.-15.10.39, signed by Doenitz, Konteradmiral und Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote:
2.10.39.
"The Naval War Staff has declared an area around Britain, within which any ship sailing without lights may be attacked without warning. This order facilitates the work of U-boats to a great extent. The area, however, is narrow. The practical results of this order will, in all probability, be few. It has been announced, from the German side, that British merchant ships have several times attacked U-boats, which, in accordance with Prize Regulations, have ordered them to stop. It was added that, if
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this continues, German U-boats will have to employ counter measures. As a reply to this, the Admiralty sent orders to all British merchant ships to ram any German submarine sighted * * *
"A further order of the Naval War Staff reads: Ships to be considered as passenger ships are those which, in the opinion of the Commander, are built to accommodate, more than 120 passengers. Explanations will be found in M.D.V. 87. The following may be taken as clues: a great number of boats-—approx, more than 4 on each side of the ship:—length and number of promenade decks, port-holes.
"The boats have been informed of both these orders.
"The term 'passenger ship' is very loose and its interpretation is left to the individual commander. It must be made clear that, in practice, more scope to the individual is given by the issue of this order, especially as the opportunities for observation are very limited in a submerged U-boat." (pp. 4 & 5)
4..10.39.
"In connection with the conduct of the war on merchant shipping, the following orders have been issued by the Naval War Staff:
(1) The area, in which unrestricted use of armament is allowed against vessels sailing without lights, is enlarged westwards up to 15° longitude.
(2) U-boats are allowed unrestricted use of armaments against enemy merchant ships, on which the presence of armament is definitely established, or which, according to concrete instructions from the Naval War Staff, are known to be armed. As far as circumstances permit, steps are to be taken for rescuing the crews when there is no possibility of the U-boat being in danger. Passenger ships which are not troop transports are, as before, NOT to be attacked even if they are armed. Both orders constitute a considerable advance in the prosecution of the war. They effect the essence of the U-boat attacks and increase their prospects." (P. 6)
(Kriegstagebuch B.d.U. 1.—15.10.1939.)
From the War Diary of B.d.U. for the period 16.10.-31.10.39 signed by Doenitz, Konteradmiral und Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote:
23.10.39. . .
"As in the last war, losses of U-boats on the surface are, in most cases caused by: .
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(1) The dangers to which the U-boat is exposed when conducting the war on merchant shipping in accordance with the Prize Regulations.
(2) The dangerous position of the U-boat when carrying on an artillery battle with an armed merchant ship. A hit can render the U-boat incapable of diving and cause her to be a sure victim to destroyers * * *
(3) Unexpected encounters with enemy, especially in bad
weather * * * .
(4) Possible unpreparedness on the part of the boat.
While the causes given in 3) and 4) can and must be met by the crew, the taking of prizes constitutes an. extra danger and cause of losses which can be eradicated only:
(1) by the ceasing of prize-taking i.e. only those ships would be attacked which may be sunk without warning or
(2) by ordering limitless warfare,
In both cases, the U-boat would be forbidden the use of artillery
(a) to stop a steamship (or break her resistance)
(b) to sink a steamship." (p. 8-9)
"The channel as an operational area.
* * * The A/s defence is strongest in the Straits of Dover and north east of this line; better opportunities for attacks by U-boats are afforded in the more open section to the west. This presents a good operational area for U-boats, provided they can sink without warning. War on merchant shipping in accordance with the . Prize Regulations cannot be considered here owing to the surveillance and the proximity of enemy bases." (p. 11)
27.10.39.
"On the grounds of the conclusions entered in the War Diary on 23.10. I have decided on the following orders for the purpose of limiting the number of our losses:
1. The boarding of a steamship, in order to carry out a search is not permitted.
2. The steamship is to be sunk only by torpedo, even when this is required by reason of the search (which consists now only of an examination of the papers), or after the breaking of resistance with artillery." (p. 15)
29.10.39.
"The Naval War Staff has ordered the unrestricted'use of armament against passenger ships in enemy convoys." (p. 16) ("Kriegstagebuch B.d.U. 16.10.—30.10.1939.")
From the War Diary of B.d.U. for the period 16.11.-30.11.39
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signed by Doenitz, Konteradmiral und Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote.
17.11.39.
"The order has been issued by SKL, that unrestricted use of armament is to be permitted against enemy passenger ships which are seen to be armed or are known to be armed. As most passenger ships are already armed, this is a distinct step forward in the conduct of the war. In practice, however, this seldom concerns any but those passenger ships whose armament can be seen by the boats. Only in very exceptional cases can commanders identify armament from written instructions issued to them owing to the fact that usually the type of ship can be established only a short time before a favourable firing position is gained. If lifts have to be referred to, to find out whether the ship is armed, further time is wasted. Once the ship has passed, the boat has to renew the chase; she must therefore be capable of a greater speed than the ship and, with passenger ships, this is not usually the case." (p. 3) .
("Kriegstagebuch B.d.U. 16.11—30.11.1939.")
From the War Diary of B.d.U. for the period 1.—15.12.39, signed by Doenitz, Konteradmiral und Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote :
6.12.39.
"B.d.U. has requested of SKL. an extension of the areas in which ships sailing without, lights may be sunk without warning, The following is desired:
(1) With regard to a recent report from U.38, before and within the Westfjord. In all probability, British steamships sail without lights in this area. Almost all are painted grey, so that their visibility be limited, and are armed.
(2) For U-boat operations in the Mediterranean and off the Portuguese coast. Reports from boats, returning from operations, show that steamships sailing without lights have been sighted there. From this, the question arose, what was the correct procedure. Legal measures of prize-taking are difficult and dangerous to the U-boat, especially near Gibralter.
The decision of the Naval War Staff is negative. The zone for U-boats cannot be extended, since German steamships, breaking through or returning home, have to be considered both on the Norwegian and Spanish coasts." (p. 7)
("Kriegstagebuch B.d.U. 1.—15.12.39.")
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Appendix to German "Sink at Sight" Policy
Prize Regulations
This document deals mainly with procedure in the taking of prizes and in dealing with captured vessels.
The following extract is Article 18 of the Prize Regulations dated 28th August 1939, with amendments made on 12th September 1939. (A copy of the unamended Regulations is not available.) ,
"The decrees of the Vlth Agreement of the Hague Convention concerning the treatment of enemy merchant shipping on the outbreak of war remain intact.
Note 1. The Agreement governs in particular the treatment of merchant ships, which are in enemy ports on the outbreak of hostilities. It has not been put into eifect in the present war."