I won't argue it. You say that didn't convince you. to you that there might be something in what he said in the interview on the 5th of November when he occupied the slav part of Bohemia and Moravia and broke his own rule about keeping Germany for the Germans? Did it then occur to you that he might not then have been joking or talking froth in November?
year the important points were first, the defense of Germany from the outside and second, the remainder of Czechoslovakia in case it would adopt policies inimical to Germany. As to the negotiations with Hacha, and his decisions on that, to occupy Czechoslovakia, I had heard nothing, only that he wanted to go against Czechoslovakia on the basis of that directive in case it would adopt a policy inimical to Germany; and from the propaganda at that period one heard that that actually had occurred. With the occupation of Czechoslovakia, I had nothing to do; likewise with the occupation of the Sudeten area, because the only thing which we could have served for that case was our small Danube Flotilla which was subordinated to the Army. And so we had nothing to do with it. March, 1939, you still thought he had no aggressive intentions? Is that what you want the Tribunal to believe from you? He had by his political measures with Hacha actually brought it to that point, that no war broke out. Hacha that his Armed Forces would bomb Prague if he didn't agree. If that is not war, it is next door to it, isn't it?
A It is very close to it, yes; it is a menace, a threat.
Q Well, let's go further on. Two months later -- on the 23rd of May -when you came to the Reichschancellery there were six high ranking officers, of which you were one. And Hitler said that he would give you an indoctrination on the political situation. And his indoctrination was that, "We are left with a decision to attack Poland at the first opportunity." When you heard him say that on the 25th of May, did you still think that he had no aggressive intentions?
A I thought that much longer. Just like Colonel General Jodl said, after he had solved the Czech problem purely politically, it was to be hoped that he would also be able to solve the Polish question without bloodshed, and that, I believe, until the last moment, until the 22nd of August.
Q Just take on e glance -- I shan't keep you long -- at Document L-79, which is on page 74, I think it is, of Document Book 10.
I am sorry. Page 298 of the German Document Book. I beg your pardon. I am not going to ask you abou the document, because the Tribunal has had that. I want you to look at the peop who were there -
A I know the people who were there?
Q Let's look: Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt; he was afterwards General, and Hitler's principal adjutant, and killed on the 20th of July, 1944, isn't that right? Then the Defendant Goering, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. Yourself as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Colonel General von Brauchitsch, who was Commander-in-Chief of the Army. General Keitel, who was head of the OKW. General Milch, who was Goering's Deputy. Halder, who was Chief of Staff. Schniewiend, wl was your chief of staff.
And Jeschonick, who I think was chief of staff or a high -
Q Yes. And Colonel Warlimont, who was General Jodl's assistant. telling them, "We are left with a decision to attack Poland at the first opportunity," if he hadn't any aggressive intentions? What were these people there for if it wasn't to develop a war? be seen from the last part of it, was to give a sort of academic lecture on war, and on the basis of that lecture to create a special study staff against which until then the Chief of the Armed Forces Branches had objected. confused because I heard about these matters and that also with regard to those things he did not issue any directive but that the last sentences are: "The Armed Forces Branches determine what will be built. Nothing will be changed in the shipbuilding program. The armament program is to be delayed to 1943 to 1944. When he said that, he could certainly not intend to solve the Polish question by war in the near future.
Q Are you telling the Tribunal that when he said, "We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair; further successes cannot be obtained without the shedding of blood," you paidno attention to it at all? You are seriously tellin the Tribunal that you paid no attention to that?
A No, I haven't done that at all. Because by now I knew Hitler and knew the exaggerations in his speeches. in November 1938. You had had the directive on the 3rd of April for the Fall Weiss affair and you knew this whole matter was on train. Are you seriously, Defendant, telling the Tribunal that you had any doubt after the 23rd of May that Hitler intended war against Poland ans was quite prepared to fight England and France, if they carried out their guarantee?
I mean, seriously, I give you this chance before we adjourned: Do you say that you had any doubt at all?
A Of course; I have explained, haven't I, that as late as August I had my doubts? For instance, if you judge from this speech then I ought to mention the speech which Hitler has made a few weeks before at the time of the launching of the Bismark, where he spoke of only peace through justice. That speech was important for me. And especially from this present speech, which is so confused, I did not draw any conclusions and I proved that, because throughout the summer I did not mention anything about that to the Navy, that there would be a possibility of war in the Fall. That was confirmed here and everybody can confirm that. That was my judgment of Hitler. I judged his political ability very highly and was convinced as late as the 22nd of August when we were informed about the Pact with Russia that it would be possible to solve that problem in a peaceful manner. That was my definite conviction. One may accuse me of bad -or poor -- judgment, but I had the right impression of Hitler.
Q Now, I understand you to say that even on the 22nd of August you didn't think that Hitler had any aggressive intentions. Do you really mean that? chance of being allies with Russia, and Hitler backed up his case with many reasons - why England and France would not fight; and all of us who were there took from that the hope, the sincere hope, that he would be successful again, short of war, in solving that problem.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will this be a convenient time to adjourn, my Lord?
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 20 May 1946)
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I am most anxious not to take up unnecessary time. With regard to the meeting of the 22nd of August, Your Lordship may remember that Dr. Siemers raised a point as to the two accounts of the meeting, one in documents 1014-FS and 798-PS, and the other in the account by Admiral Boehm. I have had a comparison made out in English and German showing the points whichare similar to both, and I thought it would be more convenient just to put that in. Let Dr. Siemers see the German copy and make any suggestion at the appropriate time than spend any time in cross-examining the witness as to any differences in the accounts. My Lord, I will, with the permission of the Tribunal, put that in now and hand Dr. Siemers a copy so that he can draw the Tribunal's attention to any points at a convenient stage.
THE PRESIDENT: Did not Admiral Boehm make the accounts?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution's account is in two documents, 798-PS and 1014-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: There was another document which was mentioned by my friend Mr. Alderman but not put in. It was an account by a journalist which was the first account the prosecution had had but, when they got the two accounts from the OKW files, they did not u se their first one; so I had only taken the two accounts from the OKW files and Admiral Boehm's account.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. but does not that make three documents in all, apart from the one which has been left out?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, My Lord, and I have taken each of the two and compared it with Admiral Boehm's.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: So, on that I shall not pursue this interview. I thought that it would save time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Now, I'd like you, therefore, defendant, to look at document 789-PS, which is at page 261 of book 10 and pages 438 to 440 of the German book -- 438 to 440. This is the note, defendant, of a conference on the 23rd of November, 1939 with Hitler, to which all supreme commanders were ordered. Do you see that at the beginning, pages 438 to 440? Do you see what it says, "to which all supreme commanders are ordered?" Were you present?
A It's the conference in the middle of the war on the 23rd of November, 1939?
Q Yes. Were you present?
Q Who were the other supreme commanders who were present? able number of generals, army commanders that is.
Q Yes. Now, I want you to look at a passage. The paragraph begins: "One year later, Austria came. This step also was considered doubtful." Do you see that? Do you see that paragraph?
A Yes, I've got it.
Q Much obliged. Now, I just want you to look at the next few sentences.
"It was brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification has to be finished. It was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the east and then in the west or vice-versa. Moltke often made the same calculation in his time. Under pressure the decision came to fight with Poland first. One might accuse me of wanting to fight and fight again, In struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does not want to lose out. The increasing number of people requires a larger living space. My goal was to create a logical relation between the number of people and the space for them to live in."
then that Hitler himself had had a consistent and clear aim of aggression throughout these matters that I put to you this morning; did you not? looking at these things retrospectively. Also, he wanted to make it clear to the generals, with whom he had a conference at that time, that he with his considerable political reflections had always been right. That is the reason why he quotes all these detailed points.
the English document book, German document book pages 445-448. Have you got that
A Perhaps you would be good enough to read. I don't see it here.
Q "We have Achilles heel: The Ruhr."
(A court attendant indicated the passage in the document to the witness.)
Q Would you lock about halfway down that paragraph? you will see:
"England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the firs Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man."
And there is some more about Friedrich the Great and Bismarck, and: "My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorab and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaning less. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously." plans for fall Gelb had been issued for the attack on Holland and Belgium on 10 November? Do you remember that? and the attack against England and France at that stage was not up for discussi
Q I am sorry; I thought you had finished.
A Here it says, "If the French Army marches into Belgium to attack us, th it will be too late for us. We must be first."
not respect neutrality and that he also had news that certain preparations for the reception of French and British troops had been made. For that reason, he wanted to prevent their attack from Belgium against us, and, apart from that, in his speech of 22 August 1939, he had made a statement of exactly opposite contents.
He had said that Belgium and Holland would not break their neutrality.
Q Did you agree with what he said, that the "breach of neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won." Did you agree with that view? part to raise any objection against that statement of his at that moment. later with regard to U-boat warfare, was it not? Do you renumber on 30 December you had a meeting with Hitler at which Colonel General Keitel and Fregattenkapitaen Puttkammer were present? GB-463, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought not this document be identified?
SIR DAVID MAXELL FYFE: Your Lordship, of course, is right. We had perhaps better give them two numbers, one for each of the original PS documents. My Lord, the comparison -
THE PRESIDENT: 1014-PS has a number already, has it not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE: Yes, my Lord. That has a number.
THE PRESIDENT: thought perhaps the comparative document ought to have a number.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Certainly. Shall we call one comparison GB-464, the comparison of 798-PS, and the comparison of 1014-PS GB-464.
THE PRESIDENT: I have only got one here, as far as I can see.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I am going to get some more done. I have only passed up a limited number at the moment, but I will have soma more run off.
464, 798; and GB-465 will be 1014-PS. It will be the comparison of 798-PS with the Raeder document, and 464 will be the comparison of 1014-PS in the Raeder document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Now you are going to give us C-100?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: C-100, yes.
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: to where it comes to a report, the date of 30 December 1939 -- 30-12-39, and then after that there is an enclosure to the report to the Fuehrer of 30 December 1939.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Will you try to find it, SergeantMajor?
(A court attendant indicated the passage in the document to the witness). BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Would you look at paragraph IV, which says:
"With regard to the form and the moment for the commencement of further intensifications of the war at sea, the decision of the supreme war command to begin the general intensification of the war with an offensive in the west is of deciding importance."
Have you got that, paragraph IV?
A page?
A "Regarding the form --" yes.
"with regard to the form and the moment for the commencement of further intensifications of the war at sea, the decision of the supreme war command to begin the general intensification of the war with an offensive in the West is of deciding importance.
"1st Possibility:
"The decision of the Fuehrer is made in favour of a Western offensive, beginning very shortly, within the framework of the instructions issued for this to date while violating the neutrality of other states.
"In this case the intensified measures of the war at sea will in their political effect only represent a small part of the entire intensification of the war. The gradual change-over to the intensified form of waging the war at sea within the American restricted zones, with the ultimate aim of a ruthless employment of all means of warfare to interrupt all commerce with England is therefore proposed with the start of the offensive.
Immediate anticipation of individual intensificatory measures for the war at sea is not necessary. The start of the General intensi fication of the war will awaited. The benevolent neutrals -- Italy, Spain, Jap and Russia, as well as America, are to be spared as far as possible."
Isn't that right, that you contemplated that Hitler's violation of the neutrality of the Low Countries would cover, by being a more important matter, your adopting the most ruthless methods of war at sea? Isn't that right?
Q What does that mean if it does not mean that? What does that mean if it does not mean what I have put to you? a certain energetic pursuit of the war at sea. For that reason, he asked me that the intensification which I had considered ripe because of the attitude of the British forces -- he asked me to introduce them, but only at that stage The intensifications were very carefully considered in that memorandum, and they had been step by step following the corresponding steps taken by Britain.
Q I will deal with the memorandum. You need not be afraid that I will emit that, but what I am putting to you at the moment is this: That so far from disapproving of the violation of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium, you on behalf of the Navy were quite prepared to accompany it by the intensification of submarine warfare; isn't that right?
A That is twisting my words. I had nothing to do with the violation o neutrality. The only thing I was interested in was to carry out the submarine war step by step, intensifying it step by step so as to meet measures introduced by the British, which were also violations of international law. try to keep the compartments. That is only two more points on this aggressive war. I am now going to pass -- You can leave that document for the moment. I will come back to it; you need not be afraid, and I want you to help me on one not occupied, so long as you had protected channel up to Norwegian coast in neutral waters, is that right? That was an important point for you, to have a channel in neutral waters that not only your ships but also your submarines could go up and start out from neutral waters; is that right?
There was the danger that the British might occupy Norway, and information of all sorts confirmed that and proved that to us. Of course, if we were forced to occupy the Norwegian coast, then, apart from all the numerous disadvantages which turned out to be existent, we had the advantage that we would have this or that base for our Atlantic submarines.
the British were going to occupy Norway?
A But most certainly. We had so much information of that typo that I had no doubt whatever. I couldn't have any doubt, and that was confirmed later on. reports. We won't refer to the document again, but we will start from there, just to get the time. diary that the Fuehrer was still looking for justification; Do you remember that? You remember that, don't you? "justification" is wrongly translated. The right word is "reason", but that, then, is untrue, and please will you let me finish. Even that is incorrect, because the Fuehrer had an abundance of reasons himself, and a code of instructions appeared on the 1st of March. I have said that by a special reason he meant that he hadn't yet had a diplomatic note compiled. He hadn't told the Foreign Minister anything about that at that stage. I told you under oath the other day that that is so, and I will repeat it under oath today.
Q I see. That is the meaning that you have given to it. Well now, will you look at your own Exhibit, No. 81, in Raeder Document Book 5, page 72.
A May I have Document Book 5? English into Norwegian territorial waters, and it says:
"An examination of the question as to whether a mass encroachment by the English into the Norwegian territorial waters was so immediately imminent that it might represent a danger to present German shipping produces the opinion that this is not to be expected at the present time. The ore transports are to be continued, as no losses have yet occurred." territorial waters was to be expected on the 22nd of March?
A That wasn't at all my conception. It was the view of Captain Fricke, who was at that time the Chief of the Operations Department. He didn't quite agree with me as far as this particular question was concerned. He was of the opinion that one ought to allow the British to enter Norway, and then one ought to chuck then out through Sweden, a completely twisted idea which I couldn't approve of in any way. second half of March, that there was no doubt whatever that within a reasonable time the British would interfere in a solid and massive way.
Q You say that that was Admiral Fricke's view, and you didn't pay attention to it. Well, now, let me look -
A I didn't say that I didn't concern myself with it. historian, kept a headline diary, and on the next day he gives an account of a meeting between you and Hitler, and he says this. This is the same day. You may have read it, because he turned down your proposal to use U-boats off Halifax. It is the same day, the 23rd of February. Then, on that date, you are quoted as saying, "To ensure the supply of oil from Narvik, it would be best to preserve the neutrality of Norway." meeting between you and Hitler as follows. It is quite short:
"British landing in Norway not considered serious. Raedor suggests invasion by Germany, German forces, at the next now moon, to which Hitler agrees."
That is Admiral Assnann's report of the meeting between you and Hitler on the 26th of March:
"British landing in Norway not considered serious. Raeder suggests invasion by Germany, German forces, at the next now moon, the 7th of April, to which Hitler agrees."
Do you remember that?
A I haven't seen the document, but it is quite improbable. Captain Assmann compiled his notes from all sorts of war diaries and records, protocols. I most certainly never said that, because at that time I reported to Hitler again and again that our preparations would be complete, longterm preparations, at the end of January, and that that would be the time when the landings ought to be carried out.
A He wouldn't be intentionally dishonest, but he compiled the document from all sorts of papers and I can't imagine how he could have arrived at that statement, because I certainly never made it.
Q But the seoncd part of it, the second sentence, is right, isn't it:
"Raeder suggests invasion by German forces at the next new moon, the 7th of April."
That is right; that is when you did invade. That was when your armada started off to arrive there on the 9th, wasn't it?
A But yes, of course. I was in favor of Carrying out the landings in Norway at the earliest possible time, when ice conditions had improved, as we had previously decided and as had been ordered by Hitler. For that I assume responsibility. There was every reason for that.
Q Well. again I mustn't argue with you, but the point comes to this, that you are saying that Admiral Assmann, who is right in his second sentence, is not only wrong, but entirely wrong -- I mean, stating the opposite of the truth -- when he says British landing in Norway not considered serious." information available.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, what was that document of the 26th of March 1940?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: That was an extract from the Assmann Diary which I have used before, and I will have one made up and put in for identification. I haven't got it copied yer, my Lord, I'm sorry. I shall have it done.
THE WITNESS: I should be grateful if perhaps you could show me the document. You have showed me all the others, but not this one,the one I contest.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I beg your pardon. It is such a short extract I thought you would take it from me, but the last thing I want is not to show you any documents.
BY SIR DAVID MAXELL FYFE:
Q You see the entry for the 26th of March:
"British landing in Norway not considered serious. Raeder suggests invasion by German forces at next new moon, 7th of April, to which Hitler agrees. Further discussions about laying of mines at Scapa before German invasion of Norway. Hitler agrees with Raeder and will discuss with Luftwaffe Chief."
A May I come back to it now. Yes, the 26th of March, 1940.
"Occupation of Norway through British is imminent."
The war was imminent when the Russian-Finnish peace took place. That Russian-Finnish affair was making it particularly urgent for us to carry out landings, because it was questionable whether the British wouldn't, under the heading of supporting the Finns, carry out that occupation of Norway. by the British in Norway might be imminent. All that was dependent on the acual situation, and it was summarized by the fact that the Fuehrer wanted to know whether, because the peace had been signed, the situation in Europe had changed. But it hadn't, because we knew in reality that the landings by the British weren't to be carried out to help the Finns, but for other reason. treaty, the British landings might be particularly imminent, was answered by me with "No". Everything remained as before, but there was this question whether because of this peace treaty we ought to land at once, and I answered no. That is completely different from what you have been telling me.
Q You read out the entry for the 26th of March. What is the entry for the 26th of March. You read it out in German and we can translateit. treaty was signed -- apparently because of the treaty, was postponed. Your question whether at that moment the British landing was imminent -- and that was answered by no -- it wasn't therefore that we would ask because of that. The supreme commander of navy suggests action for "new moon". The reason for our landing regained in force as before. Only the business regarding Finland couldn't be used by the British any more. March, that was off the map at that time?
A I was not responsible any more. Our arguments and other reasons remained in force.
Q This will be GB-466. This is report from your diplomatic representative in Norway, dated the 29th of March, and at the end of the first paragraph you will see: "The British apparently did not want to take upon themselves the responsibility for openly violating Norwegian territory and Norwegian territorial waters without cause, and for carrying out warlike operations in them." That is quotation from the Norwegian Foreign Minister. Then your diplomatic representativ says: "The future will show whether Foreign Minister Koht sees things quite right. It definitely appears, however, -- as I have frequently pointed out -- that the British have no intentions of landing, but that they want to disturb shipping in Norwegian territorial waters, perhaps -- as Koht thinks -- in order to provoke Germany. Of course, it is also possible that the British behavious last week, which I have pointed out as well, will grow into more or less regular and increasing interference in territorial waters...." And then the paragraph three: "The firm intention of Norway to maintain her neutrality and to ensure that Norway's neutrality rules are respected can be accepted as a fact." Were you tol that your diplomatic representative in Oslo was reporting that the British had n intentions of landing?
A Yes. Dr. Brauer, the ambassador to Norway, had a completely wrong attitude. He believed Foreign Minister Koht, who assured him, regarding which our naval attache also reported,-- were perfectly reliable, and didn't realise where the work would lead -- at the same time, information had been received elsewhere, too, that the Norwegians were giving assurance on paper and then on the other hand, they said that they were doing that only as a subterfuge and that they would continue to cooperate with the British.
That is contained in the document which we have submitted.
Q Let us look at another document. Look at D-44. This is what your diplomatic representative in Sweden was saying at the same tine. That will be GB-467-GB-44. I gave the wrong number. That is from your representative in Sweden and you will notice that he quotes Foreign Minister Gunther of Sweden, as first of all -- about ten lines down, just after the none of "Weizacker," you w see "The Swedish government had no reason at all to believe in an impending acti by the Western powers against Scandinavia. On the contrary, on the strength of all official reports and other information, it considered the situation lately to be much calmer" and then he tells there is no prospect of a coup against Sweden, and then he goes on to deal with Norway. And if you look down two paragraphs, it says "In conclusion, Gunther requested re to report his statements to my government, and repeated that the Swedish government attached the greatest value to the German government not erroneously getting the impression of the existence of circumstances which might evoke the possibility -- he would not use the word necessity at all -- of special measures by Germany with regard to Scandinavia." And then he says in the last paragraph that the Swedish Foreign Minister had probably heard of the German preparations.
Now, would you Look at document D/845 which will be GB-468 -- that is the next day -- from your diplomatic representative in Stockholm: "Serious anxiety military "preventive measures in Scandinavia against the announced intensification of war measures by the Western Powers Swedish and Norwegian military government authorities consider it unlikely that military measures will be taken against Scandinavia by the Western Powers. Press reports on this subject by the Western Powers are attempting to provoke German," -- from your Naval Attache' in Stockholm. Were you told about these reports from Stockholm, were you told of that? assurances, because quite obviously Sweden had considerable interests in our not going to Norway because Sweden believed that by that we would come into a positio to exercise pressure upon Sweden. That was what the British wanted according to the information we received later. He was completely misinformed and the attache was misinformed, and as a result wasn't informed by us because he realised he was told by the Foreign Minister Koht.