A- That is an aboslute distortion of facts. Of course it is necessary during peacetime to contemplate what cases could occur where thearmed forces would have to be called upon for the defense. At that time nobody thought of aggressive war, and one has to consider the individual tasks. One task of the Navy was, beyond doubt, in case of war to protect t he ore imports fromSweden and Norway. That had to be considered.
Q Would you just look at the next sentence in paragraph 2: "Then I mentioned that it would be desirable to have U-boats assembled at the time of the critical political situation in the first quarter of 1945."
Q Let's look at what you were doing in 1936. Would you give the defendant and Dr. Siemers, Document D/806. dealing with the U-boat construction program, and after the first paragraph you say in the second paragraph:
"The military and political situation urgently demands that the extension of our U-boat fleet should be taken in hand immediately and completed with the greatest energy and dispatch, as it is a particularly valuable part of our armament at sea and possesses special striking powers." sive and had no idea of the special striking powers that would be needed in a war? I don't remember it exactly -- I must have believed it necessary at that time to put the construction of submarines in the foreground. But I never expected or never counted on it that we would start a war. enterprises, and that no doubt could lead us into a war if the other powers were stadning against these political enterprises. I have been reproached that I did not stress the construction of submarines sufficiently.
Q You are stressing it sufficiently there, aren't you? "The military and political situation" -- you were kept fully informed of the political situation and were adjusting your naval armament accordingly; isn't that so?
which were to happen. I only knew that we had occupied the Rhineland during that year, and that Hitler after that, on account of the clouds he saw on the horizon after the occupation of the Rhineland, took a very careful attitude and told me that we had to expect complications sooner or later. There was a special directive that had come out at that time in 1936, and on the basis of these considerations I was particularly cautious. It was my main duty that I should take care, and after the consequences which I took from the political situation, I did my job. to me, wasin the same sense where I asked whether in the case of political tension at the beginning of 1939; at a time when we hadnot yet completed the Naval Treaty -- that came only in June -- whether at that time we should already establish U-boats. That was also for the eventuality of a conflict, and I knew at that time that in 1935 the Declaration of Freedom of the defense of the Rhineland was intended.
Q Well, now, you have told us what you knew in 1936. Now, let's pass on to 1937. I want to know exactly what you say. That of course, as you remember, turns to the Haszbach document, 386-PS,which is at page 81 of Document Book 10, page 314 of the German document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, did you give the number of that last document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:I am very grateful, my Lord. It is GB-462. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: German document book?
A Can you please tell me the paragraph? I could find it easier then. paragraph, the last sentence, where Hitler is recorded as saying:
"The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need forliving space." two pages to 316. My Lord, it is page 83 of the English document book.
That is repeated. My Lord, it is about seven lines down. There Hitler says:
"The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space."
And then he says: "The history of all times has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance."
And then in a separate paragraph; he says:
"The question for Germany is where possible conquest could be made at the lowest cost."
Do you see that, on page 316?
A May I begin with the last one, because it was wrongly translated? that that was the general problem, "the greatest possible conquest to be made at the lowest cost." ?
A No. In the English document it says "conquest", but that is not included in the German document. It says in the German text:, "the highest possible gain with the smallest risk."
That is a phraseology of playing a game. It has nothing to do with conquest. quite some detail, because I don't want to select anything out of the intext. Did you appreciate that Hitler there was saying, "The only possibility for Germany is to get extra living space.", and that had to be got at the expense of othernations? He said that, didn't he? be understood. He spoke mainly of Austria and Czechoslovakia, that is, the Sudeten area, and we were all of the opinion that a change of that policy was not expected, and it did not take place. There was neither war against Austria nor against Czechoslovakia. same way as all other political questions, in a peaceful way. That I have explained in detail.
Q Well, now, that is what I was going to ask you about. You have taken my second point yourself. The rest of the document deals with action agai nst Austria and Czechoslovakia.
Would you look at page 86? and General von Fritsch rather poured cold water on Hitler's ideas. Isn't that a fair way of putting it? They rather showed a certain antipathy? would we dare to start a war with England and France, and he always agreed. But I explained that that entire speech had a definite purpose. It was made for a definite purpose, and therefore he exaggerated greatly. He withdrew that exaggeration at once when a hint wasgiven to him about the danger of a war with France and England.
Q That was what I was going to ask you. That was in November. By January, Fieldmarshl von Blomberg had made his unfortunate carriage, hadn't he?
A I believe it was in January. I don't remember.
Q And you took the view, didn't you, that he had been encouraged to do that by the defendant Goering?
Q Oh, didn't you?
A No, not that I knew about. I wasn't convinced of that at all.
Q You remember making a statement in Noscow on this point? Let me read it to you.
A To whom, please?
"The year 1938 had at its beginning experiences of a personal nature, which though not concerning the Navy, directly caused me to lose confidence not only in Goering but also in the sincerity of the Fuehrer. The unfortunate matrimonial situation of Fieldmarshal von Blomberg made his position as commander-in-chief of the armed forces impossible. Belatedly I came to the conclusion that Goering with all his might strove for the post of commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht in place of Blomberg.
He favored the marriage, inasmuch as it made Blomberg ineligible for this post, while Blomberg believed and even expressed himself to this effect, that such a marriage was possible under the present system. Goering had him shadowed in the past, as I learned from later remarks."
Didn't you say that?
experiences about the causes for that collapse. I wrote these documents under the conditions of that time with the treatment that these was very chivalrous and that I had no objection to make these things know to the Commissar.
Q All I want to know,is, is that true, what you said?
A Yes. I wrote these notes, and it is also true that afterwards I had the thought that Goering may have severed that marriage. I believe that he himself stated that here, that he helped Blomberg, because I believe that he did not know all the details of how bad the case was. encouraging the marriage because he knew that it would put Blomberg off the map as commander-in-chief, because he, Goering, wanted the position. Was that the view that you held last summer?
A I believed that last summer, yes. And it is also true that Goering doubtless had a desire to become commande-in-chief of the armed forces, but the Fuehrer himself prevented that.
Q Now, that was von Blomberg. We know what happened to him. Your second choice, after von Blomberg, was von Fritsch, was it not? You thought that von Fritsch would have been the best commander-in-chief if von Blomberg went, did you not?
Q You mentioned that to Hitler? at the time he asked me. But then the Fuehrer told me that that could not be done.
Q Yes. But there were some of them bringing a charge of homosexuality against von Fritsch; isn't that right? That was why it could not be done?
A Yes. Generally, he said that there was a sexual crime of some kind. you not? Goering , as president, you, and General von Brauchitsch?
against von Fritsch was a frame-up by the Gestapo, did you not? Do you know what I mean? I am afraid "frame-up" is rather difficult to translate.
A Yes. The whole thing gave me that impression, indeed. character who you thought was a "hang-around" of the Gestapo; and at the trial, the cooperation of the Gestapo with the accuser was brought to light; that is right, is it not?
You were satisfied,from sitting at the trial? that the guilty party was a calvary captain, Rittmeister von Fritsch, and not this general at all; isn't that right?
A Yes, I agree. We acquitted Baron von Fritsch because his innocence was proven. There was no suspision of any kind that remained.
Q You acquitted him, but his reinstatement did not follow? His reinstatement in command did not follow?
A No. I went to him, since I was close to him, and asked him whether he would agree that I should go to Hitler and suggest to Hitler to reinstate him, Baron von Fritsch. But von Fritsch replied that he considered that quite impossible. He was of the opinion that his authority was so far impaired that he could not remain in the position as commander-in-chief of the army, and I could not do anything about that. The Fuehrer only in a large meeting of generals and admirals confirmed the absolute innocence of Baron von Fritsch.
Q And did you say this with regard to the von Fritsch incident: "I became convinced that Goering had a hand in this well prepared situation, since in order to attain his goal it was necessary to eliminate any possible successor to von Blomberg?" Do you remember saying that?
A I do not remember it now, but I believe that I was of that opinion. E I have to say, to be quite just, that the acquittal of Baron von Fritsh first of all was due to the fact of Goering's chairmanship during the proceedings. The wi ness who was brought up lied so much and changed his statements to such an exten every ten Minutes, that only Goering could take care of him. After I had experie ced that, I was grateful that I had not been the chairman, as the Minister of Ju tice had suggested. I could not handle the people. And it was only thanks to Goe ring that I concluded that the acquittal could take place. the authority of von Frirsch in the German army was in his own view destroyed by the fact that this charge had been brought against him. That was the result of i was it not?
A Baron von Fritsch was of that opinion. I would have insisted to be reinstated after I had been acquitted in that manner. November had tried to head Hitler off from a course that night have meant war were both disgraced in two months? Didn't it strike you as curious?
A That did not strike me as curious in any way; and there is certainly no connection. If Hitler was of the opinion that non in high position who contradieted him in such a matter had to be removed, then he would have had to have me removed a long time ago. But he never said anything like that to me, and I have never felt that simply because I contradicted him on that question of England and France, and also pointed out that no war should be started there, I never felt th he held that against me.
Q Now, just let us take it very shortly. Within six weeks of the disgrad of von Blomberg and the removal of von Fritsch, the anschluss with Austria took place. military preparations for the anschluss with Austria, the ones described by Gene ral Jodl in his diary and also by Fieldmarshal Keitel?
Did you know that these threats of military action would have been made? the anschluss of Austria, because I had nothing to do with it. But once and for all, I should like to emphasize that such enterprises, as for instance the annexation of Austria I found out by a decree which was issued by the Fuehrer, and no sooner, because one copy of these decrees, regardless of whether the Navy had anything to do with it, was sent to me as commander-in-chief of the navy. So, of course, in that case also a decree must have come to my knowledge Unfortunately without having the file, I cannot tell you the date. But I think that a decree came, to my knowledge. time on it -- is this: That on the 5th of November Hitler said that he was goint to get Austria, in 1943 to 1945 at the latest, and earlier if an opportunity arose. Four months later, in March 1938, he took Austria, after having got rid of the people who threw cold water on his plans. But if you did not know about it, we shall not waste the time, but shall look at Czechoslavakia, becaus there you did get the decree. German Document Book. That is the distribution of the directive for operations against Czechoslavakia. It is bringing up to date the one of the 24th of June, and you will see that it said its execution must be assured as of the 1st of Oc tober 1938, at the latest, and Copy No. 2 goes to you as C-in-C of the Navy. English Document Book, 277 to 278, you see the first sentence of Paragraph 1, "Political Pre-requisites":
"It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslavakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically or military suitable moment.
A May I ask where it is? I can't seem to find it. -- sentence 1: "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslaovakia by military action in the near future."
Q I am sorry. Page 277, 278.
A Yes. Now I have found it. Of what date was that? which you had attended at which Hitler had said he would attack Czechoslovakia at the earliest opportunity he could. Didn't that make you think that Hitler's speech in November was not merely froth but was stating his plans?
A No, because all through the summer he changed his decisions. Every month there was a different decision. That can be Seen in the document, 388-PS. And it was so, I believe, on the 10th of September. Certain troops were concentrated and on the same day the negotiations, and on the 1st of October the peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland took place, after the other powers had agreed to that in Munich.
Q We all know that. The point is perfectly clear -speeches: That it was his determination at the end of May to smash Czechoslovakia by military action. Are you telling the Tribunal that you read that directive and still took the view that Hitler had not got aggressive intentions? That is the question.
Q What more proof could you want than his own determination to sm sh it? What clearer proof could you want?
A He said frequently that he would like to smash something. That question was solved later, after the 30th of May, and I should like to add that that was a date just after the mobilization had taken place in Czechoslovakia, and for that reason he used these words, and I believe he was justified in doing so, because that mobilization of Czechoslovakia could only be directed against Germany, and as I said, his opinion, in the course of the summer, changed at least three or four times, where he said again that he would reserve the decision or he would not like to do it with war-like means.
I won't argue it. You say that didn't convince you. to you that there might be something in what he said in the interview on the 5th of November when he occupied the slav part of Bohemia and Moravia and broke his own rule about keeping Germany for the Germans? Did it then occur to you that he might not then have been joking or talking froth in November?
year the important points were first, the defense of Germany from the outside and second, the remainder of Czechoslovakia in case it would adopt policies inimical to Germany. As to the negotiations with Hacha, and his decisions on that, to occupy Czechoslovakia, I had heard nothing, only that he wanted to go against Czechoslovakia on the basis of that directive in case it would adopt a policy inimical to Germany; and from the propaganda at that period one heard that that actually had occurred. With the occupation of Czechoslovakia, I had nothing to do; likewise with the occupation of the Sudeten area, because the only thing which we could have served for that case was our small Danube Flotilla which was subordinated to the Army. And so we had nothing to do with it. March, 1939, you still thought he had no aggressive intentions? Is that what you want the Tribunal to believe from you? He had by his political measures with Hacha actually brought it to that point, that no war broke out. Hacha that his Armed Forces would bomb Prague if he didn't agree. If that is not war, it is next door to it, isn't it?
A It is very close to it, yes; it is a menace, a threat.
Q Well, let's go further on. Two months later -- on the 23rd of May -when you came to the Reichschancellery there were six high ranking officers, of which you were one. And Hitler said that he would give you an indoctrination on the political situation. And his indoctrination was that, "We are left with a decision to attack Poland at the first opportunity." When you heard him say that on the 25th of May, did you still think that he had no aggressive intentions?
A I thought that much longer. Just like Colonel General Jodl said, after he had solved the Czech problem purely politically, it was to be hoped that he would also be able to solve the Polish question without bloodshed, and that, I believe, until the last moment, until the 22nd of August.
Q Just take on e glance -- I shan't keep you long -- at Document L-79, which is on page 74, I think it is, of Document Book 10.
I am sorry. Page 298 of the German Document Book. I beg your pardon. I am not going to ask you abou the document, because the Tribunal has had that. I want you to look at the peop who were there -
A I know the people who were there?
Q Let's look: Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt; he was afterwards General, and Hitler's principal adjutant, and killed on the 20th of July, 1944, isn't that right? Then the Defendant Goering, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. Yourself as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Colonel General von Brauchitsch, who was Commander-in-Chief of the Army. General Keitel, who was head of the OKW. General Milch, who was Goering's Deputy. Halder, who was Chief of Staff. Schniewiend, wl was your chief of staff.
And Jeschonick, who I think was chief of staff or a high -
Q Yes. And Colonel Warlimont, who was General Jodl's assistant. telling them, "We are left with a decision to attack Poland at the first opportunity," if he hadn't any aggressive intentions? What were these people there for if it wasn't to develop a war? be seen from the last part of it, was to give a sort of academic lecture on war, and on the basis of that lecture to create a special study staff against which until then the Chief of the Armed Forces Branches had objected. confused because I heard about these matters and that also with regard to those things he did not issue any directive but that the last sentences are: "The Armed Forces Branches determine what will be built. Nothing will be changed in the shipbuilding program. The armament program is to be delayed to 1943 to 1944. When he said that, he could certainly not intend to solve the Polish question by war in the near future.
Q Are you telling the Tribunal that when he said, "We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair; further successes cannot be obtained without the shedding of blood," you paidno attention to it at all? You are seriously tellin the Tribunal that you paid no attention to that?
A No, I haven't done that at all. Because by now I knew Hitler and knew the exaggerations in his speeches. in November 1938. You had had the directive on the 3rd of April for the Fall Weiss affair and you knew this whole matter was on train. Are you seriously, Defendant, telling the Tribunal that you had any doubt after the 23rd of May that Hitler intended war against Poland ans was quite prepared to fight England and France, if they carried out their guarantee?
I mean, seriously, I give you this chance before we adjourned: Do you say that you had any doubt at all?
A Of course; I have explained, haven't I, that as late as August I had my doubts? For instance, if you judge from this speech then I ought to mention the speech which Hitler has made a few weeks before at the time of the launching of the Bismark, where he spoke of only peace through justice. That speech was important for me. And especially from this present speech, which is so confused, I did not draw any conclusions and I proved that, because throughout the summer I did not mention anything about that to the Navy, that there would be a possibility of war in the Fall. That was confirmed here and everybody can confirm that. That was my judgment of Hitler. I judged his political ability very highly and was convinced as late as the 22nd of August when we were informed about the Pact with Russia that it would be possible to solve that problem in a peaceful manner. That was my definite conviction. One may accuse me of bad -or poor -- judgment, but I had the right impression of Hitler.
Q Now, I understand you to say that even on the 22nd of August you didn't think that Hitler had any aggressive intentions. Do you really mean that? chance of being allies with Russia, and Hitler backed up his case with many reasons - why England and France would not fight; and all of us who were there took from that the hope, the sincere hope, that he would be successful again, short of war, in solving that problem.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will this be a convenient time to adjourn, my Lord?
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 20 May 1946)
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I am most anxious not to take up unnecessary time. With regard to the meeting of the 22nd of August, Your Lordship may remember that Dr. Siemers raised a point as to the two accounts of the meeting, one in documents 1014-FS and 798-PS, and the other in the account by Admiral Boehm. I have had a comparison made out in English and German showing the points whichare similar to both, and I thought it would be more convenient just to put that in. Let Dr. Siemers see the German copy and make any suggestion at the appropriate time than spend any time in cross-examining the witness as to any differences in the accounts. My Lord, I will, with the permission of the Tribunal, put that in now and hand Dr. Siemers a copy so that he can draw the Tribunal's attention to any points at a convenient stage.
THE PRESIDENT: Did not Admiral Boehm make the accounts?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution's account is in two documents, 798-PS and 1014-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: There was another document which was mentioned by my friend Mr. Alderman but not put in. It was an account by a journalist which was the first account the prosecution had had but, when they got the two accounts from the OKW files, they did not u se their first one; so I had only taken the two accounts from the OKW files and Admiral Boehm's account.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. but does not that make three documents in all, apart from the one which has been left out?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, My Lord, and I have taken each of the two and compared it with Admiral Boehm's.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: So, on that I shall not pursue this interview. I thought that it would save time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Now, I'd like you, therefore, defendant, to look at document 789-PS, which is at page 261 of book 10 and pages 438 to 440 of the German book -- 438 to 440. This is the note, defendant, of a conference on the 23rd of November, 1939 with Hitler, to which all supreme commanders were ordered. Do you see that at the beginning, pages 438 to 440? Do you see what it says, "to which all supreme commanders are ordered?" Were you present?
A It's the conference in the middle of the war on the 23rd of November, 1939?
Q Yes. Were you present?
Q Who were the other supreme commanders who were present? able number of generals, army commanders that is.
Q Yes. Now, I want you to look at a passage. The paragraph begins: "One year later, Austria came. This step also was considered doubtful." Do you see that? Do you see that paragraph?
A Yes, I've got it.
Q Much obliged. Now, I just want you to look at the next few sentences.
"It was brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification has to be finished. It was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the east and then in the west or vice-versa. Moltke often made the same calculation in his time. Under pressure the decision came to fight with Poland first. One might accuse me of wanting to fight and fight again, In struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does not want to lose out. The increasing number of people requires a larger living space. My goal was to create a logical relation between the number of people and the space for them to live in."
then that Hitler himself had had a consistent and clear aim of aggression throughout these matters that I put to you this morning; did you not? looking at these things retrospectively. Also, he wanted to make it clear to the generals, with whom he had a conference at that time, that he with his considerable political reflections had always been right. That is the reason why he quotes all these detailed points.
the English document book, German document book pages 445-448. Have you got that
A Perhaps you would be good enough to read. I don't see it here.
Q "We have Achilles heel: The Ruhr."
(A court attendant indicated the passage in the document to the witness.)
Q Would you lock about halfway down that paragraph? you will see:
"England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the firs Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man."
And there is some more about Friedrich the Great and Bismarck, and: "My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorab and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaning less. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously." plans for fall Gelb had been issued for the attack on Holland and Belgium on 10 November? Do you remember that? and the attack against England and France at that stage was not up for discussi
Q I am sorry; I thought you had finished.
A Here it says, "If the French Army marches into Belgium to attack us, th it will be too late for us. We must be first."
not respect neutrality and that he also had news that certain preparations for the reception of French and British troops had been made. For that reason, he wanted to prevent their attack from Belgium against us, and, apart from that, in his speech of 22 August 1939, he had made a statement of exactly opposite contents.
He had said that Belgium and Holland would not break their neutrality.
Q Did you agree with what he said, that the "breach of neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won." Did you agree with that view? part to raise any objection against that statement of his at that moment. later with regard to U-boat warfare, was it not? Do you renumber on 30 December you had a meeting with Hitler at which Colonel General Keitel and Fregattenkapitaen Puttkammer were present? GB-463, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought not this document be identified?
SIR DAVID MAXELL FYFE: Your Lordship, of course, is right. We had perhaps better give them two numbers, one for each of the original PS documents. My Lord, the comparison -
THE PRESIDENT: 1014-PS has a number already, has it not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE: Yes, my Lord. That has a number.
THE PRESIDENT: thought perhaps the comparative document ought to have a number.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Certainly. Shall we call one comparison GB-464, the comparison of 798-PS, and the comparison of 1014-PS GB-464.
THE PRESIDENT: I have only got one here, as far as I can see.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I am going to get some more done. I have only passed up a limited number at the moment, but I will have soma more run off.
464, 798; and GB-465 will be 1014-PS. It will be the comparison of 798-PS with the Raeder document, and 464 will be the comparison of 1014-PS in the Raeder document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Now you are going to give us C-100?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: C-100, yes.