A It's a perfectly erroneous judgment. I have explained that, as long as there were no negotiations with Great Britain regarding the pending Treaty, we only gave such things abroad as were necessary preparations. Those were-
Q We'll take it in this order, and don't get cross about it. You answer my question, and then you can make your explanation. Now answer my question first. Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong in saying in that first sentence: "It is probably just in the sphere of submarine construction that Germany adhered the least to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty"? Is Admiral Assmann wrong when he says that, and is that what you're telling t Tribunal?
A He is wrong. I have said that. I've already said so.
DR. SIEMERS (Counsel for defendant Raeder):Mr. President, I object. The are not questions relating to facts. They are questions regarding legal decisions. It is a legal argument as to just how Article 191 of the Versailles Tr ty is to be interpreted.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the question is proper. In his explanation, of course, he can explain that in his view it was not a breach o the Treaty and he has already explained that. He can give us his opinion about it. He was the head of the German Navy. BY SIR DAVID "---" FYFE.
A But, if I may, can't I finish? I desire to make a statement. All these things were preparations which were made outside Germany. This is menti ing that in the case of the Finnish submarine there was support through German designers, something which is not prohibited. It was permissible that German designers and constructors might assist finished engineers to make plans for submarines. It is also true -
Q I don't want to interrupt you, but this isn't dealing with the ear period. This is dealing with the period after the Anglo-German Treaty in 1935 and that's what I want you to answer me about. That Finnish matter was long before that.
A I must give the period before the conclusion. There we are being accused of manufacturing U-boat parts abroad and -
Q Yes, but don't you see that -
A I haven't denounced that yet.
Q I am not asking you about that. I want you to answer the right question. I'm not asking you about the question of Versailles any longer. I'm asking you about Admiral Assmann's statement that you did not adhere the least to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty in 1935, and what you did in Finland in the 20's has nothing to do with that. Now, that's all. You can give your explanation later.
A It's perfectly wrong, particularly as far as construction of submari nes was concerned.
We kept back quite a lot and, in 1938, we still didn't have the forty-five per cent which we could have built. So that at that time we were making an application that we could go to the one hundred per cent expressed. According to the wording of the English Treaty, this was done after a friendly discussion with the British Admiralty in the last days of 1938; it was agreed and it was carried out. At the beginning of the war we still didn't have one hundred per cent. We were always behind with the construction of submarines. It is a completely erroneous quotation of Admiral Assmann, who probably didn't pursue this matter well enough. I can certify to that.
Q Just look at the next sentences. This is dealing -
A Which page are you on?
Q Page 156. I will read it very slowly again:
"Considering the quantity of U-boats which had already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to 1938. In reality 118 were ready or ordered."
Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong when he states that?
A I am awfully sorry; I still have not got the passage where you are reading Which line?
(Court attendant indicates passage to witness.)
Q Have you got the sentence, Defendant?
Q Do you see what Admiral Assman says that "Considering the quantity of Uboats whaich had already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to 1938."
"In reality 118 were ready or ordered."
Are you saying that Admiral Assman is wrong in giving these figures? is either a misprint or a quite incredible figure. We started the war with, as you know, I think 26 U-boats capable of sailing into the Atlantic, and there was some smaller boats over and above that. What happened at the beginning of the war I caanot tell you for certain now, but there was no intention of this kind. That is just what I have been accused of--that I did not have sufficient U-boats ready in good tine. I deny this entire sentence.
Q Yuo agree, then defendant, that Admiral Assman's figures are quite incompatible with what yo have told the Tribunal about the number of U-boats with whi you started the war?
Yes, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: Dr President, I should be grateful to Sir David if he would read the entire sentence. This refers to Note 6, where the 118 could have been ordered. There is a note six and I just see that this is not contained in the English translation, and it is worded as follows:
"Chief of the Budget Department of the Navy. B, No. E.311/42, from November 1942."
The figure, Mr. President, refers to a much later period, not 1938 at all. I could in the future have not only the German document but also the English fro Sir David. I should be very grateful to Sir David if he could have this done.
DR. SIEMERS: Could you not have the passage you want translated from the German into English by the time you want to re-examine? As I understand it, you are referring to some note which is an addition to what has been translated into English. Will you read it again, the passage again?
DR. SIEMERS: Sir David has been reading the following words:
"In reality 118 were ready or ordered to be built."
That is as far as Sir David has read. After the word "ordered" there is a figure (6). This refers to a note at the bottom, Number 6, and that note is worded as follows;
"Chief of the Navy Budget Department, B. No.E.3111/42. G-KDOS. Dated 19 November 1942. (Page 19)." number 118 must have been mentioned. a letter addressed to the Budget Department. The figure therefore does not refer to the year 1938 but a much later time.
THE WITNESS: I can add another explanation to that which is quite plausible
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: My Lord, I will look into that, but the text says --and there is no difference in the German text--exactly what I read--that" about 55 could have been provided up to 1938 and that in reality 118 were ready or ordered." That is Admiral Assman's text.
DR. SIEMERS: But not 1938.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: I think that my friend, Dr. Siemers, will have ample opportunity. If there is any point, I shall consider it, but this is the text, and the text includes that. What the footnote says Dr. Siemers can be put in re-examination.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr Biddle) Sir David, will you lock at the note and see if the report was made in 1942 rather than the construction? I suggest that you ask him whether or not the note could not show that the report was made in 1942 rather than the construction.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: My translation of this note is "Chief of the Navy Budget Department." Then it gives the reference to his note, dated 19 November 1942. It seems entirely to bear out the suggestion of the learned American Judge that this is the reference to the report, nothing more. It is only suggesting that the date of construction was 1942, and I think it really would be a matter of convenience that, unless Dr. Siemers has got something to say on the text that I am putting, if he reserved these argumentative points to re-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you can raise it all in re-examination. You can have a translation of this note before us by that time.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I am perfectly agreeable. I have merely stated the request that one copy of the Mr. President, you will admit, I hope, that it is a considerable burden on me that during the cross examination I should now have to ascertain where translations are incomplete and translate everything that is missing myself, although the British Delegation have an English translation in their hand.
I think that Sir David might, if he would be good enough, let me have an English
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you will be able to let him have an English translation of any new document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. The Tribunal has ordered that. That is prepared. Surely you got the English Translation? Certainly, My Lord. An I put each document, a translation will be given to Dr. Siemers.
THE PRESIDENT: There may have been some mistake.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will certainly get it. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
Q Now, we will pass to another gentleman of your staff. You have told us a good deal about the naval budgets. Do you remember a Flottenintendant in your department, Secretary Flottenintendant Thiele, of the OKM Department E, the Budget Department, of the German Admiralty? Do you remember?
A Yes. Mr. Prosecutor, may I just say one more thing about the 118 business? I have just remembered the connection regarding this number 6 note of the Budget Department. This is perfectly possible -- that in this case Assman has summarized two matters. Every ship was, of course, passed through the Budget. That is to say, it was sanctioned. At the end of the year the budget was published with reference to the year for which it would apply. Since this large figure appears now in this document, it is perfectlypossible that the figure 118 originates on the basis of the British agreement made on 30 or 31 December 1938. It is perfectly natural that we should include in the budget all the other U-boats which we were allowed to build with reference to the 100 per cent. This, by no means, means that we started the construction of the U-boats in 1938, and I think I should show this. It also means that in a certain year, you would only have so-and-so many completed submarines. word "Budget Department" is perfectly probable.
Q The Tribunal has the wording; that is, "up to 1938", and I am not going to argue the point with you. The words speak for themselves.
I would now like you to look at document D/855, which becomes GB 416,and it is an extract from a lecture by the gentleman I have just mentioned, Herr Thiele, which was given at the German Naval Training Centre for Administrative Officers in Prague on 12 July 1944. The extract I want to put to you is on Page 22, and it is headed "Ship Construction Plan". Have you got that -- Page 22, and the heading is "Ship Construction Plan"? You see the paragraph beginning, "The era of the very large development of the Navy had therefore come at the moment of the seizure of power. Already in the first year after this, in March 1935, the construction of battle cruisers with a displacement of 27,600 tons was proceeded to. Such a vessel was ordered to be constructed. Thus one of the classes of the Treaty of Versailles which were the most important for us --"
"The clauses" that should be. I am so sorry. It is a misprint.
"Thus one of the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which were the most important for us was at once violated in the naval sphere in a manner which in a short time could no longer be camouflaged."
Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right when he says that in his lecture? this was not the construction of battle cruisers but that it was important that the two armored ships which had been permitted us should be utilized, and I said that in 1934 Hitler had only given me permission to enlarge somewhat the plans for these ships so that the armor could be stronger. This shows that as late as March 1935 when the conclusion of the treaty was a certainty, that a few months later England would allow us to build such ships through this treaty, that at that time already plans for the 20,500 ton ships had been passed by the Fuehrer, and the offensive weapons could be included.
Q Let me see. This gentleman seems to agree with you more than the other. Just look at what he says about U-boats two sentences further on.
"The U-boats were completed in separate parts, as their construction was under no circumstances to be apparent to the outside. These parts were stored in sheds for the time being and only needed to be assembled after the declaration of freedom to rearm."
Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that point?
A Yes, he is right. We have admitted that.
Q Do try to keep it as short as you can. I don't want to cut you out, but keep it as short as you can. we bring then in and put them together. That was at the time when the Treaty was a certainty.
Q I see. You say you were anticipating the treaty. Just look at what he says after that:
"The third one also of those clauses of the Treaty of Versailles that were the most disadvantageous for us, the limiation of personnel to 15,000 men was immediately ignored after the seizure of power. The total personnel of the Navy was already 25,000 in 1934 and in 1935, the year of the London Naval Agreement, 34,000 men."
Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that? Is that right?
A Yes. It was clear that we had to train personnel in good time so that the increased ships could be manned.
which is on page 3 of Document Book 10, which you did refer to in your examination-in-chief. That is Document C-23, about the displacement of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau and the Tirpitz and the Bismarck and the other ships.
Now, you are familiar with that document; we have discussed it.
Q Well now, that is dated the 18th of February 1938. Germany didn't denounce the Anglo-German Naval Treaty until after the British guarantee to Poland in April 1939, which is 14 months later. Why didn't you simply send a notification to Great Britain that the displacements had come out 20percent bigger because of defensive matters in construction? Why didn't you do it?
A I can't tell you that today. I explained the other day how it was that the displacements increased through some change and through no fault of our own.
Q Yes, Mr. Defendant, I have got that well in mind. We have got the reason why the displacements came out bigger, and I don't think you are prejudicing yourself if you don't repeat it, but just look at the bottom of that page, won't you, because I think you will find there the reason which you can't remember:
"In the opinion of AMT IV, it would under no circumstances be right to report a larger tonnage that that, for instance, England, Russia or "Japan will probably publish shortly, in order that we may not put upon ourselves the blame for a race in armaments."
Isn't that the reason?
A Yes. It was planning for the future because we didn't want to lose the defensive power of our ships. to put quite shortly and bluntly, as you will appreciate, the point the Prosecution puts to you, that for 20 years, from 1918 to 1938, you and the German Navy had been involved in a course of complete, cold, and deliberate deception of your treaty obligations. That is what I am putting to you. Do you understand?
After these documents, do you deny that that is so?
A Of course, It wasn't a cold-blooded affair. In all the cases of violations of the Versailles Treaty it was our aim that we should be able to defend our country more efficiently than we had been allowed to. I have proved that in the Versailles regulations only those points were restricted which were unfavourable for the defense of our country, and which, on attack from the outside, were favorable. complete a small number of ships, and consequently we wanted the ability of these ships increased as far as possible. At no time did we increase the offensive power above what it was submitted to be. questions are directed to. I don't want there to be any misapprehension. I am now going to suggest to you that these breaches of treaty and your naval plans were directed towards the possibility, and then the probability of war. I would just like you to take the same document that I have been dealing with, C-23. We will use that to pass from one to the other. that there is a memorandum, I think of the Planning Committee to the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, Admiral Karls. We have heard your view of Admiral Karls, that you thought he was a very good officer, and in fact he was your first choice for your successor. strategic study of naval warfare against England, and you see "a" says:
"There is full agreement with the main theme of the study."
Now,look at paragraph 1:
"If,according to the Fuehrer"s decision, Germany is to acquire a position as a world power, she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions, but also secure naval communications and secure access to the oceans."
Do you agree with that, Defendant?
A Yes, that is correct. I know the whole document.
Q Now, look at "2":
"Those requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to Anglo-French interests, and would limit their opposition as world powers.
It is unlikely that this can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power, therefore, forces upon us the necessity of making corresponding preparations for war."
Do you agree with that?
Q Now, let's take "3":
"War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, aga France, probably against Russia as well, and a large number of countries overseas -- in fact, against half to two-thirds of the whole world."
I needn't ask you about that, because the facts have shown it.
Now, look at the next:
"It can only be justified" -
A (Interposing): Yes, but I have to say something to that. I must be allowed to do that.
Q Oh certainly. We got on so quickly I thought we were not going to have any explanation.
A In 1938, as has been expressed quite often here, the Fuehrer's att tude towards Great Britain became more difficult in spite of all the efforts of Blomberg and myself to tell him what the situation was, and England was nothing to be worried about. part, never contemplated an aggressive war against Great Britain, and we in the Navy thought of it even less, and it has been proved that I did nothing but try to turn him from these ideas. studies of war -- which was a duty of the Command Staff -- we should also occupy ourselves with making a study of how a war with England might arise a what we needed for that purpose. Such a study was prepared, and I reported to the Fuehrer that we could never get to the top with our forces to such an extent that a war against England might be started with any promise of success. That would have been crazy. I told him repeatecly that until '44 or '45 we mistrat naval war against England and perhaps a little communication overseas, but again we would never be in a position really to win against England with that force. by me to Admiral Karls who had very clear judgment in all such questions. He considered in his duty that in the introduction to his reply, which tallied with our opinion, he should explain what consequences such a war against Great Britain would have against us, namely, that this would once more cause a world war, which, however, neither we in the Navy nor anyone else in the armed force:
desired. first of all access to the oceans, and secondly we must attack the communications of Great Britain. It wasn't that we, for our part, planned that. He was only concerned with such thoughts in the event that such a war might break out very much against our will.
Q You say that, "The war against it" -- that is the war against Engla --"can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as politically and military."
Then you go on to say "waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean,"
A That is clear. It is quite right what he says.
Q Let's just look how you had begun to prepare economically. Let's take that first, as you put it first.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, hadn't we better break off now before going into this?
(A recess was taken) BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
question about document C-29, which is on page 8 of the English document book 10 and on pages 13 and 14 of the German document book. You will remember this document gives general directions for export given by the German navy to the German armament industry -you wanted your service not to be small-minded about matters of a not very high secrecy but in addition to that, your general policy was that the German armament firms should develop a foreign trade so that they would have the capacity to deal with the increased demands of the German navy as soon as possible. Is that right, is that a fair summary, or shall I repeat it? two places that at that time we hoped that the Treaty of Versailles would be loosened, because at that time it was a favorable period concerning the negotiations for disarmament and the government department and von Schleicher showed great understanding for the needs of the armed forces and therefore at the occasion of the disarmament conference, for it, so it was a definitely legal development which we could expect and on the other side, our entire industry was in a very small measure able to produce armament; therefore, it had to be increased. I point out and I emphasize again, that it had nothing to do with the Hitler regime but that decree came out by coincidence on the 31st of January; that decree came out by coincidence on the 31st of January.
Q I don't think you are really disagreeing with me that your policy, your broad economic policy for the German armament industry was to develop its export trade so as to be able to deal with increased home requirements in future years; that is what you advocated, isn't it, that the German armament industry should at once increase its export trade so as to be able to deal with increased home requirements when these requirements arose? Isn't that right?
A Yes, that Is right, but I don't know, I didn't hear that expression. Did you mean "eigenhandel" or "eisenhandel" -- internal trade or sea trade? I didn't understand your expression -- No, "aussenhandel", foreign trade? nations, so that the industry itself would getthe advantage of being strengthened. 20 of the English document book and page 73 of the German document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Book ten.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Book ten, my Lord, yes. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELLFYFE:
Q Now, you remember that document, you dealt with it? the dates which I put to you a moment ago and you said to the Tribunal, in giving your evidence, that it was mere chance that the year 1938 was mentioned; that that was the same period as has been dealt with. repeatedly.
Q Has it been mentioned in some Weimar Republic document? Will you just look at the second paragraph; that will be on your page 74, page 21 of the English document. It is in the middle paragraph of paragraph three : "However, Reichschancellor Adolf Hitler had made a clear political request to build up for him in five years, that is, by the first of April, 1938, armed forces which he could place in the balance as an instrument of political power." Is that ture, that Hitler had made a clear political request? five year plan and now for that year 1938, by coincidence, with the date of 1938, which was from our previous plans and that directive he had given apparently for the entire armed forces because for the navy already in the year 1935, the naval treaty was the basis where we could only go according to the proportion "one to three" and not according to any other plan.
Q The point that I want to deal with is this: Did Hitler tell you that he wanted these forces to place in the balance as an instrument of political power, did he tell you that? an expression which was in common usage, that one wants to use one's armed forces as an instrument which could be put to the balance in political negotiations, not in the manner as we had to do it untilthat time, to be kicked around by the various nations.
That is my explanation for that expression.
Q To put it bluntly, Hitler was telling you "by 1938 I want armed forces that I can use in war, if war should become necessary." That is what it means, doesn't it, and that is what you understood it to mean, isn't that right?
A No, no. There was no word about the case of war, only about the fact that we had to stand among the other nations in such a manner that we couldn't be pushed over as it had been the case then.
Q If anyone tried to push you over, you could fight; that was it, wasn't it?
A That is clear, of course, if we would be attacked; that is the main thing. If we would be attacked, then we would be able to fight back and untilthen we could not do that. fighting. Will you look at document book 10-A, C-140, page 104 of the English translation and page 157 of the German version. You remember that is the directive of Fieldmarshal von Blomberg on Germany leaving the disarmament conference and League of Nations and there these is a pretty full general directive as to what military measures you would take if the members of the League of Nations applied sanctions against you; in other words you were quite prepared -
Q ----- for a war depending on that peace policy; what is so, isn't it, and that is what it says, it gives all preparations for fighting?
days after we had quit the League of Nations and it was quite clear that as a matter of course the Fuehrer believed that asa consequence of leaving the League of Nations, which as such was quite a peaceful undertaking, that it was possible that warlike measures or sanctions would be applied against us and that we had to fight against that, that we had to defend ourselves against it and if such attack was probable then we had to take these preparatory steps. of Hitler's foreign policy might have brought about an immediate war, did you not?
A No, I never expected that. I never did expect that such a measure as the secession from the League of Nations, where we had always been treated unjustly because we had no power backing us up, I had never expected that the consequence would be war with any other power. However, it was right, it was correct that one had to expect such eventuality?
Q I see. That is good enough for me. the English version and page 164 to 167 of the German version. That is, you will remember, your armament plan for the third armament phase and I would just like you first of all to look at paragraph 3.
In (a) and (b) of paragraph 3 you give the general basis for your arrangements:
(a) for the military Leaders a sound basis for their operations and (b) for the political leaders a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military means available at a given time. armed forces you had available for war, if necessary. That was what you were contemplating then, was it not?
A Yes, that is a matter of course. I reported to the Fuehrer that the military forces which I could muster during that year was so and so much. The Chief of State had to know that in order to know what he could count on. That hasnothing to do with warlike preparations. That is the case in every nation. On the other hand, I cannot influence the political leader as to what he wants to have.
I can only tellhim what I can muster for him. That has nothing to do with political things. I only did what wasnecessary and what is being done in every state. politics on things other than war but that is another argument.
"All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert period." then for an immediate war footing, have the Navy on an immediate war footing, isn't that right?
A No, no. This is concerned with the sequence of the actions which were to be taken. The armament plan contained what would be the most important for the Navy to acquire and there I said as far as weapons were concerned which could be acquired without preparation, that is to say in German "die Schwimmende Aktive Flotte", the floating active fleet, that had to be in a state of extreme readiness and had to get that which it needed. Then only all other matters, such as quartering and anything that had nothing to do with immediate fighting -and ready for war. However, you have given your account of it. page 285 of the German document book, C-189, My Lord.
SIR DAVID MAXWELLFYFE: No My Lord, I think it is page 66 in book 10, the other one. Yes, page 66 -- I am sorry I said 68 but it is 285 of the German document book. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: your examination and which I must challenge. You say in paragraph 2 of the English:
"C in C, Navy expresses the opinion that later on--" and I ask you to note words "later on" -- "the fleet must anyhow be developed against England and that therefore from 1936 onwards the large ships must be armed with a 35 centimeter gun".Now, are you telling the Tribunal that "gegen England" doesnot mean in antagonism or directed against England, are you?
planning according to other navies. We were planning up to that time according to the French Navy. Now England went beyond in taking 35.6 centimete: guns on her ships and then, asI said before, France went beyond England in putting 38 centimeter guns on her ships. Thus, I said to the Fuehrer that with our 28 centimeter guns, which we believed we could use against the Dunkirk class of France, I said that would not be sufficient but we had to take the next higher calibre, that is 35.6 such ason English ships. It did not come to it because the French took 38 centimeter guns and with our Bismarck type we followed the French. common usage. one; that this document in the original German when you say "gegen England" is exactly the same as in your song "Wir fahren gegen England". It means against, in antagonism and directed against and not in comparison. That is what I am putting to you and it is a perfectly short point.
Are you telling this Tribunal that "gegen England" means in comparison with England?
A To that I will say yes because it is defensively "gegen England" and at that moment we had not even signed the naval agreement. At that time I could not think of promoting a policy which was against England. book, page 284 of the German document book. That is your conversation with Hitler on the 2nd of November, 1934, when you are discussing bigger naval estimates and the availability of more money. I want you to look at the end of the first paragraph which gives Hitler's reasons.
"He considered it vital the the Navy be increased asplanned --" now look-"asno war could be carried on if the Navy wasnot able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia."
contemplating war? If so why does Hitler say that? That is one of the most vital points of German naval strategy.
"No war could be carried on if the Navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from Sweden."
Were you not contemplating war in November?
A Hitler said that. A navy is built so that in case a war becomes necessary the Navy can be used to defend the country with her weapons. There is no other purpose to establish a navy and that was one of the general reasons for the existence of a navy for Germany. There were many people in Germany who believed that the navy was not at all necessary.
Q You see, what I am putting to you is this. You told the Tribunal that the navy was purely defensive, all your preparations were purely defensive. I am suggesting to you that Hitler there is contemplating a war and contemplating the task of a navy during a war a few months before he intended to denounce the military clauses of Versaille. Was that not the position?