(The Defendant Raeder resumed the witness-stand.)
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask questions? BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: October, concerning possibilities for more severe actions in the war against merchant shipping. That is in the book of the British Prosecution, No. 10, on page 96 and 97 of the British text. Admiral Wagner has already testified about it here. Can you add anything to that statement concerning the task and the meaning of that memorandum? had not up to then dealt with detailed questions of submarine warfare. Among other things we had not discussed the question of the so-called unrestricted submarine warfare which in the previous war played such an important part. And from that fact it developed that on the third of September the officer who has recently been mentioned here was sent to the Foreign Office with the few points to be discussed concerning that question of unrestricted submarine warfare, so that we should clarify with the Foreign Office just how far we ought to go. And that is the document which recently was discussed here, D-851, GB-451, of the 3rd of November -Office and in the OKM -- the High Command of the Navy -- that submarine memorandum was drafted which you have mentioned and which was issued under the date-line of the 15th of October. I believe on the 15th of October I presented it to the Fuehrer who principally agreed with its text. But just that fact, that a memorandum about submarine warfare mentioning possibilities of increasing the severity of submarine warfare, was issued only on the 15th of October, shows how little we were prepared for that eventuality. Prosecution concerning our position with respect to international law, where it is said, ". . . highest morals, ethical standards in the fight, according to international law and supporting of all military measures by reference to international law.
But if it should be possible by a deviation to get decisive results and if we can take the responsibility to deviate, then eventually one has to deviate from international law. That means that a new form of international law would have to be developed." search for possibilities, involving the least damage to neutrals and the greatest possible adherence to international law, to conduct submarine warfare in such a manner that it would become a decisive factor in the outcome of the war. Cases are discussed as to how it would be possible to use severer measures, but it always deals with the fact that one should seek counter-measures against enemy measures, such measures as blockades or the new concept -- seige of England by submarine warfare. These are examined in all directions but the draft always comes to the conclusion that in view of the number of submarines and other conditions it was not yet possible to conduct such operations. that document can be found on the two last pages. Unfortunately I have only the German copy in front of me, where under D, Conclusion -- that is the last paragraph, D, Conclusion, the following sentences are significant, which I should like to quote -
THE PRESIDENT: That is the 15th of October, 1939?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That is page 28, 10A?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That is in the document book of the Prosecution on page 96 and 97 -
THE PRESIDENT: Which one, 10?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Ten.
THE PRESIDENT: Those aren't right, these numbers. That reference isn't right.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: 99 and 100, I am just told. The witness has the whole document in front of him.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the extract?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: On page 99 and 100 in the document book 10 of the Prosecution. The number is GB-22.
Mr. President, another excerpt from thes ame document has already been mentioned and that is in the document book Doenitz 3, on page 199 until 203; but I do not believe that it is necessary to refer to it because the witness will only read one or two sentences.
A (Continuing) Well, the last paragraph "final solution" of the entire discussion under Figure 1, I quote:
"The manner in which warfare against merchant men has been conducted, according to prize regulations, so far is not according to military necessity. A major part of enemy merchant vessels among others, the entire support going through neutral ships, cannot be caught. The legal political demand to stop neutral merchant ships and to examine them, in viewof the strong protection by air and submarine defense in front of the enemy coast, can no more be done. War against merchant men, according to prize regulations, therefore, has to be limited and, as far as the North Sea and the Baltic are concerned, has to be left to surface vessels. In the Atlantic the submarines have to limit themselves off the enemy shores, to attack without warning on convoys, troop transports, armed ships, and all enemy merchant ships, and they conduct war against merchant shipping according to prize regulations only in particular cases.
"The use of operational air force in war against merchant men is not possible. War against merchant men is conducted according to International Law. The possibility for a conflict with neutrals does not exist."
Then one more sentence:
"If the Supreme War Command for political reasons could not decide more more severe forms of merchant shipping at the present moment, then by maintaining the forms heret fore used in war against merchant shipping by increased and more ruthless use of mines and aerial attack on enemy port installations, an increase of the effectiveness of measures against enemy trade can be obtained. A decisive effect, however, cannot be expected by war against merchant shipping such as it is conducted now."
report to the Fuehrer was the order of the 17th of Octobe r? be torpedoed and, secondly, that passenger ships also in convoy could be torpedoed a short time after a proclamation to that effect had been made; that, therefore, was within an increase of severity of measures, step by stop, such as we had answered up to then to enemy measures.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, that long passage that the defendant has just read, if it has not been put in evidence yet, it must be offered in evidence by you. I understand it is not inevidence as present
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I can help, I shall be using this document and I shall put it in.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it been offered in evidence?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Only part of it, not the part that the defendant has referred to. But, in viewof that, I shall refer to it later
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. BY DR. KRANZBUEHIER: were taken for the reconstruction of German submarine weapons. Did Admiral Doenitz participate in these preparations?
A In no way whatsoever. As it was said before, he was abroad; but, even before that, he had nothing to do with it. of the Navy. Would you like to tell me how it cam that Admiral Doenitz became your successor? successors. I suggested in writing -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, how does this arise? I mean, what relevancy hasit to anything we have to decide as to how Admiral Doenitz became head of the Navy?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That has importance, Mr. President, because the Prosecution asserts that Admiral Doenitz, on the basis of political relations, had become the successor of Admiral Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
A I'll be very brief. I suggested, first, Admiral Karls, who was the senior and had a background concerning naval warfare; and in case the Fuehrer wanted it manifest that he wanted to put the U-boat warfare into the foreground, I suggested Doenitz, who had the requisite of authority and competence in that field. Any political considerations of any kind did not play any part; so that it was purely a technical suggestion, depending on the experience.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I have no more questions.
DR. NELTE (Counsel for defendant Keitel): Mr. President, the Tribunal, by letter of 26 March, has permitted that an affidavit for the defendant Keitel by the co-defendant Raeder could be submitted if the Prosecution has an opportunity to question Admiral Raeder in cross examination concerning his statements. raised no objection. I ask to be permitted to submit this affidavit, which is concerned with the function and position of Keitel as Chief of the OKW, as Exhibit K-19, after Admiral Raeder had confirmed that he signed this affidavit and that he agrees with its being submitted. BY DR. NEITE: after a conference with your Counsel, you answered and signed, on 19 March?
A That is about the position of Field Marshal Keitel in the OKW?
DR. NELTE: Then, may I submit this affidavit? The Prosecution has a copy of it.
I have a few more questions to Admiral Raeder. The answers, however, can be Much simplified with the permission of the Court. We are confronted here with the same question which, on 9 May -- that is a week ago -- I put to Admiral Doenitz and which refer to the assertion made by the witness Dr. Gisevius about the tremendous influence of Keitel and about the ring of silence which Keitel had erected ground Hitler. I merely want to ask the witness Admiral Raeder, with the permission of the Tribunal, whether he has heard the answers which Doenitz gave in his presence to my questions and whether he considers them right also for the time before 1943; that is, for the period during which Raeder was commander in chief of the navy, and Whether he can confirm the answers given by Admiral Doenitz. I ask for the decision of the Tribunal whether I should be permitted to put these general questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
BY DR. NELTE: confirm the answers given by Admiral Doenitz to my question on 9 May also for the period before 1943?
Q Now, I have one final question. During your testimony Document L-79, the small Schmundt file, was treated. probative value?
Q Yes. Dr. Siemers then quoted a part of that document which the Prosecution, at the time when it submitted the document, had not read. In that part of the document we hear about a study staff with the OKW. I ask you now to tell me whether such a staff with the OKW was ever formed.
A Not to my knowledge. The work was done in the Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab, the Armed Forces Leadership Staff, where there were officers representing the three branches of the armed forces.
Q So there was no change in the field of tasks and competence? operations fields between OKW and Armed Forces Leadership Staff on one hand, the General Staff of the Armed Forces Branches, excluding the SKL, on the other side?
A Yes. As far as SKL, the Naval war Command is concerned, of course, there was no change.
Q Now, as far as the other branches, was there?
A That I can not say. I do not know about that.
Q Von Brauchitsch and Halder would have to tell us?
DR. NELTE: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, is the affidavit that you referred to contained in your document book?
DR. NELTE: No, not yet. It will be Number 19 of my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Will you have translations supplied to the Tribunal?
DR. NEITE: Yes. BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and OKW): Staff and OKW, and you belonged to that alleged group for the longest time?
Q In what manner did you become a member of that so-called group? as Chief of the Navy Command. I did not enter that group by doing so. became Chief of the Navy. One did not know anything about any group of that kind. one had to do it voluntarily. Was there any possibility at all that military leaders could apply for any posts?
A No, it was only a question of military capabilities. It was a military order. There was no word of any possibility of volunteering. of the group at the time when you belonged to it? of the armed forces. Certainly not. A large number, yes. conference about a an with the purpose of starting aggressive wars?
A No, there was never such a conference; such a conference never took place. It has been mentioned frequently here, and it has also been explained how the various enterprises came about -- the political decision of the Fuehrer, a directive issued by him, and then the draft of the final order. meetings which took place under the leadership of Hitler. I mean purely a meeting of military officials.
A What do you mean, within the various branches?
questions, but not about aggressive war.
Q Yes, that is what I meant by my question. The Prosecution assorts furthermore, that that group which has been accused was only established by the National Socialist Regime. Is that correct?
A In no way whatsoever. There was no group in existence, but the organizationwas such, as has been frequentlyexplained here.
Q And such as has always existed in all armies of the world? of power by Hitler, the high military leaders had the choice of either cooperating or of accepting the consequence that the new regime would establish new armed forces, that is, armed forces of their own, and that on the basis of these facts, the generals decided to cooperate. Is that assertion by the Prosecution correct?
A No. It is not true that any joining of forces had taken place. I know that such intentions existed. For instance, once in 1934 I reported to the Fuehrer that I had been informed that the Sa Gruppenfuehrer Killinger, who had come out of the navy, had the intention of becoming the Chief of the Navy, but any further intentions I did not experience, I did not notice. First of all, there has never been a joing action of generals against such intentions.
Q So the assertion made by the Prosecution is not correct?
A No, not correct. That wasnot a method which would have been in accordance with the sentiments of the soldier -- that such a joining of forces could be brought about. in that group would have been bribed by the regime because of the chance of conquest. Is that correct?
intentions of the Party to come to power in Germany?
A I do not know that that ever happened. Do you mean the seizure? sole power in Germany, sole domination of Germany, was the Party supported in that direction by military leaders, as far as you know? in which it came to your oath to Hitler. If such an intention existed in the mind of one of the commanders in chief, was there any possibility of refusing the oath?
of us saw any necessary to refuse that oath. did agree, did quite agree with the principles and aims of National Socialism. Is that correct? the principles of National Socialism and how far one could train one's soldi in these principles. Anything that went beyond that was rejected and speaking for the navy only, the question did not find any acceptance in the Navy. that group, did they ever get any information about the political situation and the intentions of Hitler so that one could speak about the participation or par ticipation in the conspiracy?
A No. It was generally prohibited to speak to anyone about speeches speeches in which Hitler spoke about intentions and plans. The officers below the level of commander-in-chief of the armed forces branches, were only inform when it had come so far that the directive was issued.
A I had to limit that. I have to qualify that. That directive was fir. issued, first written by the high command of the army, so they only received the information as soon as the directive of the individual branches of the armed forces was issued and that was sometime later. been experts but that they had known the intentions of aggression of Hitler and had cooperated. Can you name any military leaders who, before they had received orders took a positive attitude to aggressive action?
A I could not say that. I have explained yesterday how Admiral Karls pointed out to me the danger which was menacing in Norway but he did not do any thing further than give me the information and pointed out the existing danger to me and explained the situation there. von Fritsch, and that of chief of staff, Beck, concerning the question of a war was known. I just wanted to ask you, did the commander in chief of the army, Fi marshal von Brachitsch, have the same attitude concerning the war?
ken yesterday already in detail.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you have been putting this class of ques desires me point out to you is, that there has been no cross examination by an member of the prosecution challenging any of these points, so this evidence is entirely repetitive and cumulative and is bound to be put by you to every military and naval witness who comes into the witness box and it is simply a waste of time to the Tribunal. When questions are answered by a witness and are not cross-examined to by the other side, it is practice to assume that the answer are accepted.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, that, for me, is a very important ques which has just been touched upon. That is the question of whether a question inadmissible because in the opinion of the Court it is cumulative. I should li to make a short statement concerning that, as to whether or not the question is cumulative.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Laternser, you can understand what the Tribu nal has said to you, that it is new desired, in view of the directives of the Charter, that this trial is to be as expeditious as it can reasonably be but it does not desire to have the same evidence adduced to it over and over again. Is that not clear?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I may assume that the Tribunal accept the proof which I want to bring by my question as true, then I can forege these questions but I cannot find out whether that is the case and unless I know for sure that I have succeeded in bringing certain proofs, then I have to try to
THE PRESIDENT: What I wanted to point out to you was that you asked the same questions of a great number of witnesses and that those questions have no been cross examined to and in such circumstances, you can assume that the answ
DR. LATERNSER: If I am able to draw that conclusion, then, of course, I shall not put such questions in the future. I have only a few more questions, Mr President.
BY DR. LATERNSER: and the OKW, two affidavits have been presented by the prosecution -- one by Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and one by Colonel General Blaskowitz. In these affidavits, both generals state that in general, among the generals, before the war, the opinion was maintained that the question of the Corridor eventually by force would have to be decided. Is that opinion stated by two generals correct? Was that the attitude in general at that time? never made any statement of that kind. The Polish question was discussed by us in the navy only as far as it has been mentioned during the last few days here; that is to say, that an attack of Poland against parts of Germany shou be prevented under all circumstances. The political treatment of that questi
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant says he has vnever heard of this suggest
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that was the reason why I put the question to the witness.
THE WITNESS: The political question after 1933 was only handled by and decided by him and he has said expressly that he would make all policies. BY DR. LATERNSER: opinion which Blomberg and Blaskowitz have mentioned?
A Well, at any rate, I have never heard it from the generals. It didnt exist in the navy Yes.
Q You were present at the conference of the 23rd of November 1939? conference. Admiral, do you remember that in the course of that conference. Hitler reproached the generals because they still had old-fashioned ideas of chivalry and that these ideas should have to be rejected.
A That, I could not say with certainty. I believe that I can recall having heard such a statement, having heard that Hitler was of that opinion.
defense counsel has already put to you in the course of his examination. It is the document C-66, submitted by the British prosecution under GB-81. It is in the document book 10, on page 13, of 10-A, page 35. On pages five to seven, last paragraph of that page, you have said the following and I quote: "It can be seen from many statements and plans, the Fuehrer expected an end of the Russia campaign in the Fall of 1941, while the OKH was very sceptical." Admiral I wanted to ask you what was the scepticism? possible to conclude such a tremendous campaign in such a short period of time and many others shared that opinion, whereas the Fuehrer believed that on account of the new weapons and his strategy, he could conclude that campaign very quickly.
that is, the OKH - - any principal objections before the beginning of the Russian campaign? against it, but I could not say anything definite.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no more questions.
DR. KRAUS: Dr. Kraus, defendant's counsel, representing Dr. von Luedinghausen for von Neurath.
BY DR. KRAUS: believe by the co-defendant Goering, that Fieldmarshal von Hindenburg had expressl desired that Herr von Neurath should be foreign minister. Do you know anything about that? that wish, and it caught my attention because Fieldmarshal von Hindenburg until that time had only been interested in the nomination of the War Minister and the Chief of the Army and Navy, and had considered it his privilege. It was the first time that he expressed that wish in the case of a foreign minister. regarding the appointment of ministers.
A No. He had expressed that wish about the Reich War Minister, also to other previous governments, or the Social Democratic Government. that exception in the case of Neurath? up to that time, which had been peaceful, should be continued in Germany. He was sure that von Neurath would continue these policies in his intentions. time? political principles, weren't you? What were the main principles, the main lines of his policies?
A Herr von Neurath endeavored to see a gradual recovery of the German people achieved, and he wanted to try to gain a quality of the German Reich with peaceful means.
also along the intentions of Hindenburg, and especially on this point both of us agreed easily. policy of understanding with England, and a peaceful policy of balancing.
Rhen I have another question to you, Admiral. A Fritz Wiedemann, who was the adjudant of Hitler from '35 to '39, has submitted an affidavit. The Prosecutio has submitted that affidavit under PS-3037. In that affidavit Mr. Wiedemann states that on the 28th of May 1938 a conference took place in the Wintergarten of the Reichs Chancellory with all important people of the Foreign Office, the Army, and the leading offices. That was a tremendous meeting, in the face of which one could almost doubt as to whether all these people would have found room in the Wintergarten. Brauchitsch. There had been present at the same time, also, von Neurath, von Ribbentrop, and of course you. stated it would be his definite will that Czechoslovakia should disappear from the face of the map. Do you know anything about that meeting? meetings, I have not the least recollection of that meeting. The composition seems very unlikely. I have never seen in the same meeting von Neurath and von Ribbentrop together. I should like to doubt whether von Neurath during that time was even in Berlin. He was certainly not present at that meeting, but I could not remember any meeting in which von Ribbentrop was present as the Foreign Minister when military matters were discussed. I believe this Mr. Wiedemann is mistaken, because I believe I have never seen him in a meeting in which such matters are alleged to have been discussed. The Fuehrer usually sent his personal adjudants out. I believe that is a mistake. You would have kept it in your mind.
A Yes. During that summer the opinions of the Fuehrer were changing greatly. I believe that in the month of May a mobilization took place in Czechoslovakia. I could not say it with certainly, but a meeting of that kind where a statement like that would have been made I believe I did not take part in
DR. KRAUS: No more questions. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendant's counsel wish to ask any questions?
( No response)
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases, I entirely agree.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 20 May 1946, at 1000 hours.)
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dr. Horn wishes to ask some questions.
DR. HORN: Dr. Horn, for the defendant, von Ribbentrop. My Lord, and gentlemen of the Tribunal: May I please put a few more questions to the defendant and witness. BY DR..HORN: a so-called neutrality patrol of North American war ships, which went past the 300 mile limit and was extended to about 1,000 miles? place at some time or other. lished in the United States which referred to North American ports and the foreign ships therein which were thereby confiscated, amongst them 26Italian and two German ships? during the summer of 1941. Predominately there were Italian ships and a few German. I can't swear to the exact figures, though. prepared to give the Soviet Union every possible help. Did you speak about this to Hitler, and what was his attitude toward it?
A The fact is correct. I think there was a question of interest on the loan too, and very probably I did speak to Hitler about it. However, his Attitude I can't tell you anything about. I can only that all these measures at that time in no way deterred us from the course we had set for ourselves. to him that up to the present and for the future, too, we wouldleave American ships completely unnolested. We would continue, I said, to do so in spite, of the considerable disadvantages which would arise from that. That is something I mentioned here the other day.
Q In 1941, the American Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, with the aid of Mr. Knox, Mr. Forrestal, and Mr. Hull asked repeatedly that the United States fleet should be used to safeguard British transport of war material to Great Britain. That was done in a public speech. At the close of July, 1941, Secretary of the Navy Knox gave an interview for the purposes of the press, and informed them of the order to shoot at German ships. neutrality?
A Your facts are correct. Hitler did subsequently express the order that under no circumstances would we on our part be allowed to fire. Later on, with the episodes involving two destroyers, this situation finally did arise.
DR. HORN: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
THE MARSHAL: Your Honor, the report is made that Defendant Goering is absent this morning. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Captain Schustler, "The Fight of the Navy Against Versailles", had you not?
Q Would you look at a certain section? It is an page 26 of Document Book 10. he not?
A Yes. And I might add that this book was written because we in the Navy were part of the National Socialist program and had been accused that after 1933 we had notdone enough to strengthen the navy. That is why all these matters were mentioned in that book. not?
A Yes; at any rate, everyone who wanted it could have it. Book, which givesthe preface? You will see at the end of the first pragraph that it says, It is to give a reliable picture of the fight of the navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.
clearly the services of these men who, without being known in wide circles, applied themselves with extraordinary zeal and responsibility to the service of the fight against the peace treaty. that actually few in the navy fought with regard to invading the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles? necessary to improve our defenses, which I explained during the recent days here. It was a matter of honor for every man to do it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: It is Page 28, My Lord, and it is Page 126 of your copy. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q It gives a summary of contents. You see, it is in four sections. The first section deals with the first defensive actions against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles, and then enumerates what they were doing. The second is independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich government and legislative bodies.
Q Just let us see. From 1922 to 1924 you were inspector of naval training at Kiel, were you not?
Q You were asked whether you were inspector of training. The answer was "yes", wasit not? have a very complete knowledge of the weapons available for your service? transfer of guns from the North Sea to the Baltic, all of which was done by a special command, which in turn was directly under the ordersof the commander of the navy.