Q Will you explain this to us. In the entry in war diary, it says "All commanders are reminded again" and so on.
A I don't know what that means. I could not say. My staff, which is here, has told me that that referred to the four wireless messages which I had sent, because before the "Laconia", any such declarations or any such statement was not made. Again, that is the fifth wireless message. end of the Laconia incident?
Q To whom was it directed? boats, submarines in enemy areas. We had various ocean areas, North Atlantic, Middle Atlantic, South Atlantic; we had different channels, wireless channels. The other submarines, since they were close to conveys, could not use that order because the rescue measures were out of the Question for them, but I have found out, and I was told now, that the order was sent out to submarines; that is, on all channels; that is a question of communication but it doesn't do any harm.
order was the air supremacy and the danger from it. If that is correct, how could you in the same order maintain the directive to rescue captains and ship engineers? That can be found under figure 2. have to go on deck, between that and picking up a captain there is, of course, a great difference concerning the risk, because the submarine remains all clear for diving, whereas in the first case the alert is interrupted and is impossible.
However, one thing is clear. In taking with us these captains, there was a military purpose which had been ordered by the Naval Warfare Command. As a matter of principle, and generally, I would like to say that in the pursuit of a military aim, that is to say, not by the rescuing but by the capturing and taking along important enemies, one has to run or can run a certain risk. Besides, that addition was not essential for me, because I knew that practically there would be very small results, if not nothing at all.
I remember quite clearly having asked myself "Why do we still pick them up?" We did not want to drop a general order like this. But the essential point is first the risk, which is much greater in the case of leaving the alert conditions; and, secondly, the pursuit of a military aim.
Q What do you mean by the last sentence in the order "to be hard?"
A To be hard against oneself. I have preached to my commanders for five and a half years, and also with this order I felt that my entire concern and grave responsibility for the submarines, and, therefore, the necessity now faced with the overwhelming enemy air force, should make me prohibit rescues. order, because it is very definite that on one side there is the harshness of war, the necessity to save your own submarines; and, on the other side, the traditional sentiment of the seaman. misunderstood that order, that is to say, in the sense that survivors should be killed, and in several cases he had instructed other U-boat commanders in that sense. One moment, Great Admiral. I wish to put a question to you now.
As commanding officer, don't you have to assume, according to your own principles, also the responsibility for misunderstanding of your orders? in context. Moehle, however, is the only one who had any doubts about the importance of that order. I regret that Moehle did not find occasion to clear these doubts immediately, either with myself, to whom everybody had access at all times, or with several staff of icers, who in my staff were also responsible, or partly responsible, for the drafting of these orders, or with his immediate superior on Kiel. his doubts, the transmitting of these doubts had no consequences. If such consequences had occurred, of course I would assume responsibility for them. is wellknown to you, who in the spring of 1941, in connection with the sinking of the Greek steamer Peleus, actually fired on life boats? he neither knew about Moehle's interpretation or Moehle's doubts, nor of the message, completely reversed, of my decision in the case of U-386, That was the case which Moehle mentioned where the U-boat found life rafts with fliers, and I admonished that they shouldn't take them on board. And it was just the other way, and that was given in writing to the commander as criticism on his actions, and, contrary to that, some office said that I had admonished him as to why he had not destroyed these survivors. Eck neither knew about the interpretation or the doubts of the Moehle order, nor of this story. He acted on his own, and his aim, his tendency, was not to kill survivors but to remove the fragments; because he assumed that otherwise, on the following day, he would be spotted by Angle-American planes on the basis of these fragments, and eventually destroyed. His purpose, therefore, his aim, was an entirely different one than it is stated here in the Moehle interpretation, expect that you would approve of his actions. Did you ever during the war hear about that case Eck?
A No. It was here during my interrogation when I heard about it, and that because Eck was captured during the same action.
Q Do you approve of his actions now that you know of them? that is, from the point of view of soldiers' ethics, one cannot deviate. decision. He had the responsibility for his boat and his crew, and that responsibility is a grave one during war.
Therefore, if for that reason he believed "Otherwise, I shall be spotted and destroyed" -- and that reason was not unfounded, because in the same ocean area during the same time, I believe, four submarines had been destroyed by bomb. If, therefore, for that very reason he came to that decision, a German court martial would have taken that into consideration without doubt. does not fully realize the responsibility which a small commander of that kind carries. war, or after, in which a U-boat commander fired on shipwrecked people or life rafts? describe the sinking of the ships Noreen Mary and Antonice? Do you recognize the value of these documents as proof, according to your experience, or don't you?
A No. I believe that they cannot stand a thorough examination. We received a large number of similar reports from the other side, and we were always of the opinion, and stated that opinion also in writing to the OKW, that one has to be extremely sceptical in dealing with these cases, because a shipwrecked person can easily believe that he is fired at.
These may be shots which are not aimed at him at all, but at the ship;
that is to say, misses of some sort. shows, in my opinion, that my conviction is correct, that outside of the case of Eck no further cases occurred during the long years in the ranks of the German submarine forces. which the problem has been examined, or at least touched upon by the Fuehrer, whether it was permissible to kill survivors. Was that question examined again by the flag officer of submarines, or the Naval War Command?
Q That was in 1943? office in which I was informed that about 87% of the crews of merchant ships which had been sunk, were returning home. And that was disadvantageous. We wondered whether it was not possible to do something against it. foreign office that, although I had already been forced to prohibit rescues for the reasons that submarines were dangerous, other measures were out of the question for me. which deals with this case. I submit this entry as Doenitz 42. It is pages 92 to 94 in Volume 2 of the document book.
I shall read first the first and second sentences of Page 92. The entry is on the 4th of April, 1943.
"The German Foreign Office pointed to an assertion of the British Transport Minister according to which during sinkings of Merchant vessels an average of 87% of the crew were saved. To this statement the Naval War Command (SKL) made a comprehensive reply to the Foreign Office."
Then there is the stating of their position on the next page; and I should like to read a part of that. what is the importance of that in this connection?
A That these people would certainly get home.
did not need a long period of training, with the exception of officers, and that they had resisted already an order to pick up captains and chief engineers. What is the meaning of that?
Q One moment. By "a thing like that", you mean the military necessity of destruction after shipwrecks?
A Correct. It means that there are plenty of crews available, because they could be quickly trained from unskilled manpower. our own submarine crews. Did such reprisals against German U-Boat crews occur at any time during the course of the war?
A I do not know. I have not heard about reprisals in that connection. I only received the report that on theoccasiron of bomb hits on U-Boats from the air, the men swimming in the water were shot at. But whether those were individual actions or reprisals, I do not know. I would like to assume that they were individual actions. and I should like to read that to you:
"A directive to take action against lifeboats of sunken vessels and crew members drifting in the sea would, for psychological reasons, not be tolerable for U-boat crews, since that would be contrary to the innermost feelings of all seamen.
To issue such a directive could only be considered, if a decisive military success, could be achieved by it. " ness of the war. Are you, in spite of all that, of the opinion that psychologically such a measure could not be tolerable for U-boat crews? powers, we had to fight a very hard war. Germany had nothing else for that naval warfare than submarines. Therefore, from the beginning--and that was still during peace-time--I developed the U-boats; I trained the U-boat crews in idealism and love of country. and supported it by personal contacts with the crews of the flotillas and bases. That was necessary to achieve high morale and high fighting spirit, because otherwise the severe struggle and the enormously high losses, as can be seen from the diagram, would have, made it impossible to carry on. because it had to be, it was possible to continue operations only because we could replenish our forces with people who were full of enthusiasm and full of moral strength. I would never have permitted these men to be given an order which was unethical or against the fighting morale, let alone the possibility that I myself would have given an order of that kind, because it was my entire wish to keep that morale high. you?
Q Was that at the time of high losses? when everyone knew that he was only good for two or three actions; then he was lost.
Q How high were your losses?
losses.
Q And crew members? Of these 40,000 men 30,000 did not return. Of these 30,000, 25,000 were killed and only 5,000 were captured. air in the vast areas of the sea, and the Atlantic, without their being any discussion of the question of rescue.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I come now to a new chapter. Maybe this would be the right time to recess.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: conspiracy. The Prosecution is accusing you that beginning with the year 1932 on the basis of your close connection with Hitler and the party, you participated in a conspiracy to bring about aggressive wars and war crimes. Where were you in the Weeks of the seizure of power by the National Socialists in the early part of 1933? leave to Dutch India near Ceylon, a journey which took well into the summer of 1933. This journey, which at the request of Admiral Raeder, President Hindenburg granted me.
Q Thereafter, you became the Commander of a cruiser?
A Yes. In the Autumn of 1934 until the summer of 1935 I was active as the Commander of the Cruiser Emden. We cruised the Atlantic around Africa into the Indian Ocean and returned. were appointed Commander in Chief of the Navy in the year 1943 were you politically active in any way? when I became the head of the State, but not before then. affidavit by the Ambassador Messersmith. It has the number U.S.A.75 2nd there are printed the decisive extracts in Volume 3, Page 100. In this affidavit Ambassador Messersmith says that from 1930 until the Spring of 1934 he acted as Consul General for the United States at Berlin.
Then until 1937 he was at Vienna and from there returned to Washington. He gives us an opinion about you with the remark:
"Among the people whom I saw frequently and to whom I refer in many of my statements were the following."
Then your name is mentioned. Therefore one must get the impression that during this period of time you were active politically in Berlin or Vienna. Is that correct?
A No. At that time I was Korvettenkapitaen, and from the end of 1934 I was Fregattenkapitaen. Ambassador Messersmith in order to determine just upon which facts he was basing his opinion. This interrogatory was answered and I am submitting it as Doenitz Exhibit 45. The answers will be found on Page 102 of the Document Book and I am submitting them to you:
"During my residence in Berlin, and during my later frequent visits there as stated in my prior affidavits, I saw Admiral Karl Donitz and spoke to him on several occasions. However, I kept no diary and I am unable to state with particularity when and where the meetings occurred, the capacity in which Admiral Donitz there appeared or the topic or topics of our conversation. My judgment on Donitz expressed in my prior affidavit is based on personal knowledge, and on the general knowledge which I obtained from the many various sources described in my prior affidavits."
Did you, Mr. Grand Admiral, see and speak with the Ambassador? In the time in question I was not at Berlin. I was at Wilhelmshaven or along the North Sea Coast or in the Indian Ocean. If he alleges to have spoken to me it would have had to be at Wilhelmshaven or in the Indian Ocean. Since neither is the case, I believe that he is mistaken and there must be some confusion as to identity.
Q Were you a member of the N.S.D.A.P.? decoration the Golden Party Emblem, and I may assume from that that I became an honorary member of the party.
before you became Commander in Chief of the Navy? Grand Admiral Raeder in the Autumn of 1934 as Commander of the Cruiser Emden I told him that I was leaving for foreign parts. I saw him again on my return with the Emden some time later. From the Autumn of 1934 until the outbreak of war in 1939, in the five years I saw him a total of four times; that that includes the two reports that I made to him. political occasions? of the fleet in the Baltic Sea, and during this review of the fleet when two U-boats should maneuvers and attacks I was together with him on the bridge of the flagship so I could give him the necessary technical explanation.
The other occasion was a very large festivity; the entire group of generals and admirals were present when the new Reichschancellery was completed in the Forststrasse. That was in 1938 or 1939. I saw him there on that occasion but I did not speak with him.
Q How many times during the war until you were mode the chief had you seen the Fuehrer?
A In the years 1939, 42, 43, I saw the Fuehrer four times. Each time there were short military discussions about U-boat warfare; and always large groups. military scope or sector? in Chief of the Navy? in the offensive or defensive stages? political or military position, that as Commander in Chief of the Navy? for I was to be the first soldier, or the head of the Navy; and my appointment to this position arose from purely military reasons and military reasons which motivated Great Admiral Raeder to propose my name for this position. Purely military considerations were the determining ones for the filling of this position.
Q You know, Mr. Great Admiral, that the prosecution, from your taking of this position, draw very extensive conclusions, especially as for as the conspiracy is concerned, and among other things, the prosecution contends that your accepting of this position ratified prior happenings, such as all efforts of the Party since 1920 or '22, and the entire German policy, domestic and foreign, at least since 1933. Are you familiar or do you realize that there was any such there? Did you have any reason or thoughts about this?
A This idea was very, very far from my mind. In fact, it never entered into my mind, and I do not believe that there is a soldier who, if he received the military command, would have any such thoughts, would have any such knowledge.
My position as Commander in Chief of the Navy was for me a position of authority and it was a command which I, of course, had to follow as I had to follow every other military order unless my health would not permit it.
I had to agree and believed thatI could be effective and useful to the Navy, and I took this position and my inner convictions went along with it. Anything else would have been desertion or disobedience. close relationship to Adolf Hitler, and you know, also, just what conclusions the prosecution draws from this relationship. Please tell me just what this relationship was and what about the bases therefore?
A In order to be brief, I may perhaps explain the matter as follows: My relation had three bases. First of all, I accepted and agreed to the national and social ideas of National Socialism:
the national ideas which were expressed and the honor and dignity of the national, its freedom and its equality of rights and its protection and security; and the social tenets which perhaps had as their nucleu no cast struggle, but human and social admiration of each parson, disregarding career, profession or economic consideration.
On the other hand, subordination of each and every one to the interests of the community and of all. It was a matter, of course, for me to see with respect the high authority, and I hailed the high authority of Hitler when, in peace time, he succeeded in carrying through his national and social objectives and realized them as quickly as possible in a peaceful manner. Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht and the Wehrmacht, through its oath, had vowed him loyalty. That this oath was holy to me is a matter of course, and I believe that the decency in the world everywhere will be on the side of him who keeps his oath.
The third tie was my personal relationship to him. Before I became Commander in Chief of the Navy I believe that Hitler did not have a complete picture of me and of my personality. He had seen me too few times and only in a circle of many people. How my relationship was to be to himwhen I became Commander in Chief of the Navy was completely open, and my starting this connection was very unfavorable. My position was burdened because of the imminent collapse of U-boat weapon and, second, through my refusal to scrap large ships, and that was a conviction which Raeder had to put over, for in his opinion they did not have any great value. I, as well as Grand Admiral Raeder, had been against the scrapping of these ships, and only as the result of argument he finally agreed. But despite that, I noticed very soon that, so far as matters of the Navy were concerned, he had confidence in me, and in other things as well treated me with dignity and respect, far as military matters were concerned of the Army or of the Luftwaffe. He never asked for my advice or consulted main militarymatters, matters which did not concern the Navy as well; nor did I at any time give any expression dealing with matters of the Army and of the Luftwaffe, for on the whole I lacked the basic knowledge along these lines. Of course, never did he consult me on political matters of a domestic or a foreign nature; never did he ever consult me or call me in onmatters of that sort.
Q You said, Mr. Great Admiral, that he never asked you for advice on political things, but those things might have had some connection perhaps with questions of the Navy.
Didn't you participate then either?
A If you mean by "political, for instance, consultations of the commanders through the so-called Nationalist leaders who belonged to this group, then I of course participated, because this came within the sphere of the Navy.
Q Beyond those questions, didn't Hitler ever consider you a general councilor or adviser, as the prosecution claims and which they base on a long series of meetings which you had with Hitler since 1923 at the Fuehrer's headquarters? a matter of principle, and in particular, as I have already said, the Fuehrer asked me for advice and received advice from me only in matters of the Navy and sea warfare, and it was very strictly limited to this department.
Q You were then, according to the diagram, from 1933 to 1945, sometimes once and sometimes twice a month called to the Fuehrer's Headquarters?
Please describe to the Tribunal, just how a day like that would be. Describe your activities, what you did during the day? when the Fuehrer was at Berlin. I flew to the Fuehrer's Headquarters at intervals of two to three weeks, but only then if I had a concrete military problem of the Navy which I had to present to him, and for which I needed his decision. discussion of the general military situation. That was a discussion with the Fuehrer in which the Staff reported to the Fuehrer about these things which had taken place within the last twenty-four hours along various sectors of the front. At the military discussion of the situation the center of gravity was with the armymatters or aerial matters, and I only spoke when my Naval Expert who described the naval situation, when this report needed some explanation or supplementation by me. Then at a certain time which was determined by the Adjutant's Office, my military speech, which was the aim of my journey, actually took place, and when it came to this report of mine, only those were present who were concerned with this matter, that is, since it was mostly a matter of reinforcements, Kaitel or Jodl were present or the Fuehrer. six weeks on one occasion, and when I came to the Fuehrer at the Headquarters the Fuehrer invited me for lunch. This invitation was after the 20th of July, 1944, the day of the attempted plot. These invitations stopped then. against the ethics of war. I, and with me the entire Navy, and this is my conviction, about the mass extermination of people, of which I am accused in the indictment, including concentration camps, after the capitulation in May, 1945, I only received knowledge of them then. I did not know about it at that time. intelligence, who seemed to have an almost universal education, and a person who almost exuded power and who had tremendous strength. On the other hand I knew and very seldom deliberately went to the Headquarters, for I knew that my power would be strongest that way, and, secondly, that after several days, say two or three days sojourn at the Headquarters I had the feeling to go away from his powers and suggestions, and I am telling about this, and in this connection without doubt it was better for me at his death than to have been constantly exposed to his personality and tremendous power of suggestion.
Q You said just now, Mr. Great Admiral, that you never received an order which was in violation of soldierly ethics. You know the decree Stated destruction and sabotage of civilians in 1942, didn't you receive this order?
was Commander in Chief of the U-boats. For the soldier at the front this order was unequivocal. I have the feeling that I was a very grave matter, but under Point I of this order it was clearly and nuequivocally expressed that they were directed to act in view of the demeanor of the enemy forces, and the killing of prisoners, but beyond the superficial order, the Fuehrer had demanded reprisals and these reprisals had been made public in a report to the Wehrmacht. there was no possibility and no authority to ask for an accounting if the considerations were present that this decree was justified, and as Commander in Chief of this U-boats through you they had to carry through this order? concerned with carrying through of this order? Chief of the Navy was I ever concerned with this order, and one may not forget first of all in this decree exclued expressly were those who were taken prisoners in battles at sea, and , secondly, that the Navy had no territorial authority on land, and then as a matter of basic principle I was really not in a position to have carried out many one of the points of this order. dent of this sort is described where in the summer of 1943, a group of saboteurs were shot in Norway, and I mean document of the Prosecution, GB-208. The incident is described and pictured in such a way that the crew of a Norwegian Motor Torpedo was inprisoned on a Norwegian Island. The Motor Torpedo Boat was on a belligerent mission at sea. The document does not say who interned the crew, but it does say that the crew members while they were being taken prisoner were wearing their uniforms, and they were interrogated by a naval officer, and that on the order of Admiral Von Schroeder they were given over to Security Service and that Security Service later shot them. Was this incident over reported to you or did you ever learn of it? cution.
this nature was not brought to your attention? Wouldn't this have been reported to you? captured by the Navy, Admiral Von Schroeder, who was Commander in Chief there at Alcott would have had to report this matter to his Commander in Chief of the Navy and I am convinced that he would have done so, for the regulations were very unequivocal in this matter would have been reported to me as Commander in Chief of the Navy.
of it through the document? this applies and if they had a mission at sea, then this measure, the shooting whichtook place -- was completely wrong under any circumstances -for it considered very expressedly this commander order, Therefore I consider it completely out of the question, I do not believe that Admiral von Schrader whom I consider an especially noble sailor -- he would have participated in a matter of this sort. According to the circumstances of this incident, this was not reported to the High Command; this incident as it is now ascertained, through the control of the German press in that day, was not made public in the Wehrmacht report, as it would have had to take place if it had been a matter concerned with the Wehrmacht. For all of these reasons I assume the following: they were taken from this island by come vehicle to Bergen, that there some eleven or twelve -- if I recall correctly -- naval officers interrogated them, as the Navy, of course, was interested in this interrogation, and that then the giving over of these people to theSecurity Police took place, since prior to that time they had been captured by the Security Police, the SD. never prisoners of the navy?
A No. If they had been such, a report to the High Command would have taken place.
Q Mr. Grand Admiral, from this case I would like to ask you, on the whole, in your position as Commander-in-Chief and in your visits at the Fuehrer headquarters, didn't you experience some things which brought to your attention to separate yourself from Hitler?