Q Didn't you in the spring of 1939 go on a journey?
A No, I didn't understand--about the dismissal of the President of the Reichsbank. I was talking about 1943 and you are talking or going back to 1939. In 1939, after the dismissal in January 1939---and I mentioned Hitler was putting it to me that I should go on a journey abroad and at the time I want via Switzerland, where I saw all my friends, to India.
Q Did you work politically in India?
A In India I was merely travelling as a tourise. I didn't carry out any political activities but, of course, I went to see several governors and I spent three days at the Viceroy's house.
Q Didn't you have political connections with Rangoon and with Chinese circles? Rangoon, I had the visit of a Chinese friend who had visited me before in Berlin on some occasion and who had been given the task by his government to talk to me about the Chinese position
Q That is Chiang Kai-Shek's China? Japan at the time. The other China didn't exist. This gentleman asked me a few questions as to Chiang Kai-Shek and the Chinese Cabinet.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I can't see the slightest relevancy to this. In the first place, we heard it once and secondly, after we had heard it, it has no relevancy to the case. We have no charge against him that he did anything in China and we will stipulate that he was as pure as snow all the time he was in China. We haven't a thing to do with that and it is taking time here that just gets us nowhere, and is keeping us away from the real charge in the case.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal quite understands if you say it is irrelevant. Why do you say it is relevant?
DR. DIX: I regret that Justice Jackson---we understand each other more than that. It is relevant. It is fully connected with the case, in this statement of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we heard three times that the defendant Schacht went to India. Three times in his evidence he dealt with that he went to India and China. How is it relevant.
DR. DIX: I am not now talking about the journey to India We mentioned it briefly to explain the timing. I had put a question, referring to Schacht's negotiations in Rangoon with the envoy coming from Chiang Kai-shek and at that point Justice Jackson raised his objection, but the fact of the friendly connections to Chiang Kai-Shek's government and support given to them is relevant for the same reason because of which I attached importance to the fact that it became clear here that as far as the Union of Soviet Republics is concerned, Schacht, during the time when Hitler was running a political campaign against them, did still pursue a pre-Soviet economic policy; and now we have case number two, where he is demanding connections which were contrary to Hitler's policy. In other words, he was pro-Chiang Kai-Shek, and with that against Hitle ally, and that was Japan. In that connection, the negotiation with the Chinese are of significance and I think they won't occupy mere than one minute. They were really going to be mentioned in parenthesis.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you consider his relations with China of any importance, it can be stated in one sentence.
DR. DIX: Yes, I am of the same opinion.
THE WITNESS: I will say it in one sentence. In a written memorandum, I advised Chiang Kai-Shek's government to continue holding out against Japan and giving the reason that the economic resources behind China would last longer that the economic resources of Japan and I advised Chiang Kai-Shek that if he pursued a solemn policy, he should predominantly rely on the United States of America.
BY DR. DIX: And then, upon your return from India in August 1939, did you not find a rather tense situation, someone who was just coming back? Did you not then get in touch with the cabinet or with Hitler so as to discuss that atmosphere?
A Of course, I found a very tense situation. There was Poland and I used my return to write a letter to Hitler, a letter to Goering, and a letter to Ribbentrop; that is to say, the three leading men, and in those letters I informed them that I had come back from India and I suggested and I expected that at least one of them would then call on me so I would com and report to him regarding my experiences and that, of course, would have given me an opportunity to talk to these leading men Much to my extreme surprise, I didn't get any answer from Hitler at all, nor any answer from Goering; and Ribbentrop answered by saying that he had seen my letter. Nothing was left to me therefore than to make my own inquiries regarding the state of affairs with Poland and when the things came to a head, I took the well-known steps, which has been described by Gisevius; I mean the attempt to get into the headquarters.
Q Yes, yes; we needn't repeat it. The question which remains open, as far as I am concerned, is that I will ask you, what were you going to tell the generals, particularly General von Brauchitsch, at that last moment, anything that might have had a chance to stop the war? general political statements would not cut any ice with von Brauchitsch. He would certainly refer himself to Hitler's leadership. I was going to tell something quite different therefore and, in my opinion, is of the utmost significance. I was going to remind him that he had sworn an oath of allegian to the Weimar Constitution.
I wanted to remind him that the law, the empowering law did not give powers to Hitler but to the Reich Cabinet and I wanted to remind him that in the Weimar Constitution there was an article, or is an article, which has never been cancelled and according to which, a war cannot be started and declared without the previous agreement by the Reichstag, with their parliament. I was considering that Brauchitsch would mention his oath sworn to Hitler and I would have told him I have sworn the some oath, and "You haven't sworn any oath other than your military one, perhaps, but this oath did not in any way cancel the oath you had sworn to the Weimar Constitution; to the contrary, the oath to the Wiemar Constitution is the one that was in force. You have the duty therefore to see to it that this entire question; namely, war or no war, must come before the cabinet, must be discussed there, and if the Reich Cabinet has passed a resolution, then the matter would go before the Reichstag." If these two steps had been taken, then I am firmly convinced that no war would have started. Brauchitsch? We don't want any repetition as far as the description of that whole action is concerned, and your visit to the Bendler Strasse, and all that, but have you anything to add to Gisevius' story or hove you anything to offer?
A I can only confirm Gisevius's statements in every single point and describe it as correct and I myself only want to add that, for amongst other reasons which kept us away from the visit, Thomas also mentioned the one that Brauchitsch would be probably arrested the very moment, that we should say anything against the war or try to stop him, but to add here as to his oath of allegiance to Hitler. The main reason, however why the visit did not come about, was perfectly and correctly stated by Gisevius and in his affidavit, it is also mentioned by General Thomas---the affidavit which we shall still submitthe main reason was the belief that war had been cancelled.
Subsequently, I went to Munich on some business matter and when I was in Munich, the declaration of war or, rather, the march into Poland surprised me.
Q You mentioned the Reichstag earlier. There was in fact, though not before but after the declaration of war, a meeting of the Reichstag and you at the time were still a minister without portfolio, so that, normally speaking, you should have sat on the minister's bench during that meeting. Did you sit there?
A I didn't participate in that meeting at all and I want to add right now that during the entire war, I only participated in one meeting of the Reichstag, something which I couldn't avoid, considering the matters which I have mentioned here yesterday. This happened after Hitler's return from Paris. During the meeting of the Reichstag, which followed the reception, I had to be present because, as I said, otherwise it would have been too much of an affront. talked about at all, but during which the Fieldmarshal titles were being given out by the dozen. mentioned to stop the outbreak of war. This brings us to that particular chapter of your attempts to make a revolt against Hitler and his Government and then, further, let us make it our principle, whenever possible, not to repeat anything which the witness Gisevius has already stated. Let us supplement or correct or add whatever you know from your own memory. Before touching upon that chapter, however, may I ask you whether you know from information received from others or any other clues, that the oppositional views and attitude held by you and your friends, and your oppositional aims, were known in circles abroad?
A I don't want to repeat anything, I merely want to point out that I have already several times stated here that I was completely in touch with my friends in Germany, not only with Americans, Englishmen and Frenchman, but also with neutrals.
stations allowed themselves to talk ablut my enmity to Hitler. Immediately all of my friends and my family got a shock anytime such matters were audible in Germany. upon with an attempt to remove the Hitler regime. Unfortunately in 1935-36 and in 1937, I had to learn the truth that all those in whom I had hopes had failed. I mean in this connection, the scientists, educated citizens and the leaders of economy. speeches, without making any statements, I could not rely on those circles. You could only rely on the military. I got in touch with generals like Kluge, only to find out first of all in the military circles if there might be men who could talk about such things. in the Munich Putsch. your activities in 1938? brake out? general whom I could got a hold of. I used the same argument which I have mentioned in connection with the impossible interview with General Brauchitsch; in other words theory wasn't all. I did in practice talk to all the Generals.
Q Wasn't that attempt regarding General Hoeppner?
Hoeppner, but in a series of conversations to got him to take action.
Hoeppner was perfectly willing and prepared and unfortunately he too lost his life in connection with the 20th of July, 1944. In 1942 - and this is something which has not been mentioned here because Gisevius wasn't a participant - in 1942 I tried again to suggest something to General Von Witzleben again, This happened by means of making a quick journey to Frankfurt where he was at that time officially stationed, but Von Witzleben appeared quite beside himself, as before, to act, but he told me of course that he could only do so when he had a chance at the front again.
Q Just one moment. In Frankfurt there was Mrs. Struenck, she was involved in this matter?
DR. DIX: May I tell the Tribunal that at this moment that Mrs. Struenck had been permitted as a witness and she is here. So as to save time, however, I have decided to drop the witness since she could only make cumulative statements regarding something which Gisevius has already said and I don't think that is necessary. The only thing which she could say that is new is something that Schacht has just stated. It is the special journey to Frankfurt to Von Witzleben, but no doubt on the strength of the experiences of this Tribunal, the Tribunal will know that such efforts that were made for a period of years and it doesn't appear necessary to submit proof for that fact. So as to save time, therefore, I am suggesting that Mrs. Struenck should not be called as a witness.
A (continued) May I perhaps say one more thing? During conversations mentioned by Gisevius here, which I had with other generals, that is Beck's group, Fromm, etc., during which I was of course always present myself. The reason why these matters did not get going for some time was because they were always waiting for the outcome of negotiations abroad. I think about that enough has been said here too; so I need not go into any more detail and I shall then come to one last point, which did not become apparent from Gisevius' statement but about which an affidavit from Colonel Gronau will be submitted here and that is something which I can mention quite briefly so as to save time.
Naturally, the group Goerdeler, my friend Struenck and others and Gisevius, together with me, we all agreed with matters relating to the 20th of July and we were all involved. I think it was mutual that whenever possible we only told each other something which the other man had to know, so as to not embarrass the other man too much, should he at any time be submitted to the tortures of the Gestapo. For that reason, apart from being in touch with Goerdeler, Gisevius and Struenck he had another connection, another channel to the generals who were ahead of that and that was the general of the Artillery Lindemann, one of the main participants in that development, who too later on lost his life. Lindemann -- if I read part of the affidavit from Gronau which refers to Lindemann, Exhibit No. 39 of our Document book, it is on page 168 of the German test and Page 156 of the English text.
Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It refers to things that have already been mentioned, and I shall only read the part that deals with the 20th of July. It is on page 178 of the English text andon page 170 of the German text, and I start with question five:
"Question: You brought Schacht and General Lindemann together. When was that?
"Answer: In the fall of 1943, for the first time in years, I saw General Lindemann again, my former school and regiment comrade. While discussing politics I told him that I knew Schacht well, and General Lindemann asked to be introduced to him, whereupon I established the connection.
"Question: What did Lindemann expect from Schacht, and what was Schacht's attitude toward him?
"Answer: The taking up of political relations with foreign countries following a successful attempt. He promised his future cooperation. At the beginning of 1944 Lindemann made severe reproaches, blaming the generals for hesitating too long. The attempt would have to be made prior to the invasion of the Allies.
"Question: Was Lindemann involved in the attempted assassination of 20 July 1944?
"Answer: Yes, he was one of the main figures.
"Question: Did he inform Schacht of any details of this plan?
"Answer: Nothing about the technical end of the attempt; he did inform him, however, on what was to happen thereafter.
"Question: Did Schacht approve the plan?
"Answer: Yes.
"Question: Did Schacht put himself at the disposal of the military in the event the attempt succeeded?
"Answer: Yes.
"Question: Were you arrested after 20 July 1944?
"Answer: Yes.
"Question: How were you able to last through your imprisonment?
"Answer: By stoically denying complicity."
Now, we have gone through the years 1941 and 1942 logically. We have talked about the putches, and we have come to 1944, something we could not avoid, and we have to go back to the year 1941.
You have already mentioned efforts abroad in 1941. You were in Switzerland. Did you make any efforts in that direction? and tried again and again to find some way by means of which one might shorten the war.
Q In this connection, the letter from Freser is important. I think Freser's letter and the way it was smuggled into Switzerland has been mentioned by Gisevius. I have had two occasions to state the contents, once when we discussed the admissibility and once when we discussed the translation, and I do not think I need do it again or that I need read it once more, but I shall submit it. It is Exhibit 31, and it is on page 84 of the German and page 91 of the English text. We shall come to that in a moment. News in the same year and which deals with the conversation of the American with Schacht in 1941. I shall not read that either since the main points of the contents have already been discussed. I submit it as Exhibit Number 32, page 90 of the German and page 99 of the English text. May I quote one sentence and may I point out that this article has already been the subject of certain accusations which happened during the cross examination of Gisevius and which were raised by the representative of the Soviet Prosecution.
GENERAL RUDENKO: I would like to make one objection in regard to the document 32; this document, an article about Dr. Schacht, is an article written by an unknown author of his conversation with an unknown economist, and it was published on 14 January 1946. That is, while the trial was actually in progress, and I think that this article cold not be presented as evidence in regard to Schacht's case.
DR. DIX: May I, before you decide, say something very briefly.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. DIX: The article has been granted. I have been permitted to use it in evidence. We have discussed it, and the Tribunal can, of course, cancel that position.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal has always made it clear that the allowance of these documents is a provisional allowance and that when the document is actually offered in evidence, they will then decide the relevancy or its admissibility, rather, and its relevancy.
DR. DIX: No, doubt, no doubt. I merely wanted to point out that we had discussed the question once before. Of course, the Tribunal can turn the document down.
THE PRESIDENT: The allowance is provisional. It is not a question of the Tribunal's reversing its previous decision. The previous decision was merely provisional, and the question of admissibility now comes up for decision.
DR. DIX: Yes, I am perfectly aware of that. It is quite clear to me, Your Lordship, but the objection raised by the representative of the Soviet Prosecution surprises me inasmuch as he, or rather, the representative of the Soviet Delegation, himself referred to that article when he questioned Gisevius. He did not submit it to the Tribunal; that is true, but he put it to the witness and referred to it. there are the slightest objections on the part of the Tribunal to permitting the document, then I shall certainly forego its use. Then if I may, and I think I may, I shall simply ask the witness Schacht whether it is true that he was talking to an American professor of national economy and that they were talking about the possibility of pence, and, of course, I leave it to the Tribunal. I thought it would have been simpler if I submitted the article.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, as you have raised the objection to this document, what have you to say about the point that Dr. Dix makes that you used the document yourself in cross examination?
GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr. President, we did not use this document in cross-examination of the witness Gisevius. There is a question of dealing with the article which I emphasize particularly.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you say that again? I did not understand you.
GENERAL RUDENKO: I say that we did not use this document during the cross examination of the witness Gisevius. We merely asked in a leading question so that when the document was presented by Dr. Dix, we would have to say something to it and said that the document has no probitive value.
THE PRESIDENT: But did you not put the contents of the document to Gisevius? I do not remember. What I want to know is did you not put the contents of the document?
GENERAL RUDENKO: No, no, we did not put the contents, and we did not talk about the essence of the document. We merely asked a leading question-whether the witness Gisevius knew about the article in the Basle News, published 14 January 1946. That was the question, and the witness answered Yes, that it was known to him.
DR. DIX: May I say one more thing? It seems to me that the Soviet Delegation does not like it very much if the article is submitted as evidence, and I therefore withdraw it. I see no reason, since I have no reasons of duty, why I should not fulfil this wish of the Soviet Delegation. I would like the Tribunal to consider the matter as settled.
May I now put my question?
You had these conversations?
Q Will you please tell us briefly whom the conversation was with?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First, your Honor, may I interpose an objection? The reason I did not join in the Soviet objection to this document was that I want to know who this economist is. I want to check this thing. There are very peculiar circumstances about this document, and I object to his retailing a conversation with an unknown economist. All I ask is that he identify time and place and person with whom he had his conversation, so that we can do a little verifying of this effort to get something before the Tribunal that did not appear until 1946.
DR. DIX: The question is now being given a significance which does not tally with its comparative irrelevance and insignificance. I shall, therefore, drop that question too. We will say nothing about the conversation with the professor, and I shall leave it to the Prosecution during their cross-examination to have the question answered which Justice Jackson has just mentioned. It is too much of an omelet. particularly anxious to get the American President over to my side, and I think that is all I wanted to say in this connection. I do not think I need waste any more time on it.
Q You meant in your letters Ribbentrop and Goering. Did you, apart from that, refer to the policy of the war in any way at any time? First of all, as far as Hitler was concerned. Hitler. In the summer of 1941 I read a long letter to Hitler, which the witness Lammers has admitted here and that it was known. I do not think he was asked about the contents of this letter here, or he was not allowed to talk about it, and I should like to do it now. "You are at present on the crest of your successful career." This, of course, was after the first Russian successes. "The opponent is thinking that you are stronger than you really are. The alliance with Italy is rather a doubtful one, since Mussolini will fall one day and Italy will drop out. Whether Japan will come to your aid is a debateable point, considering Japan's weakness before America, and I assume that the Japanese will not be so stupid as to make war against America. The output of steel, for instance, despite the fact that there is an equality of population, is about one-tenth of the American steel production, and I do not think, therefore, that Japan mill enter into the war, and I now tell you that, whatever happens, the foreign policy should be reversed by 180 degrees and that peace should be aimed at with every means that you have."
Q Did you, during the war, write Ribbentrop or talk to him?
his State Secretary, von Weizsaecker, had me reproached. He told me not to make any defeatist utterances. That may have been in 1940 or in 1941. At any rate, during one of those two years. I asked him when I made defeatist utterances, and I was told that in France I had talked to a colleague and had given him extensive reasons why Germany could never win this war. That, incidentally, was a conviction that I had before and during the war, and it remained unchanged every minute, even when France fell. to the effect that I, as Minister without portfolio, considered it my duty to state my opinion in its true conception, and in that written letter I maintained the view that Germany's economic power would not suffice to see her through that war. A copy of the letter was received both by Minister Funk and by Minister Ribbentrop through his State Secretary.
DR. DIX: I think, your Lordship, that this would be a suitable moment.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours) BY DR. DIX:
Q I spoke before of the 20th of July. Do you recall a statement made by Hitler about you in connection with the 20th of July? 1944. During that occasion, he made derogatory remarks about me to the people around him, and stated that he would be impeded by my negative activities and that it would have been better on his part if he had had me shot before the war. al questions. Within the country, and also abroad, voices could be heard-and also the Prosecution, although your capacities and qualities have been appreciated--also the Prosecution mentioned that one cannot understand how a smart man like you did not recognize the true nature, the intentions of Hitler early enough? I would like you to state your position on that accusation. gentlemen who are judging me best at a time when it still could have been useful. Those are the people who afterwards said that they have known me before what had to happen. I can only state that first, from 1920 on, until the seizure of power by Hitler, I tried to influence the nation and foreign countries in a sense which would have avoided the coming of power of Hitler. I mentioned the relation to an economy of thrift and I was not heeded. I mentioned other measures a gain and again to develop a policy of economy which would give Germany the position to live.
One did not heed me and the world, it seems now, considered me a man of great knowledge.
Hitler came to power because my advice was not heard. The German people got into great economic need and neither...
GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr. President, already for two days we are listening to discussions and explanations on the part of Defendant Schacht and it seems to me that those explanations which are being put forth by Defendant Schacht are not the answers to the questions, but are speeches which I think will just prolong the trial.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal is fully aware of the case on behalf of Defendant Schacht They don't want to stop him from putting forth his defense fully, but they would be grateful if you could make your case as short as possible, and if he could make his answers as brief as possible.
DR. DIX: My Lord, I am convinced that until the recess, and maybe even before the recess, I shall be through, but I would like to emphasize that he was accused to have been active in the seizure of power and in that connection, the question arises, how was it so?
THE PRESIDENT: I wasn't ruling that this evidence was inadmissible. I was only asking you to get on with it as quickly as you could. BY DR. DIX: with the suggestions of the Soviet Prosecutor.
A. As short as possible, I will not deal details; I only state that on account of the collapse of 1918 and the impossible conditions of the Versailles Treaty, Germany came into a great depression that the Democratic Parties which had the regime in their hands at that time, had not been able to bring about an improvement of conditions; that other nations had not recognized and realized what policies they should have towards Germany. I do not reproach any one, I just state it, and that consequently, out of that depression, Hitler achieved such a majority in the Reichstag as it had not happened since the creation of the Reichstag. didn't tell me at that time but they only tell me now, I ask them what they would have done. I have stated that I was against the military regime; that I wanted to avoid a civil war and that in keeping with democratic principles, I saw only the one possibility that the man should lead the government who had achieved that power of the majority. include myself and not with the intention to sponsor that man in his extremist ideas, but to act as a break; and, too, if possible, lead his policies into regulated forms.
Q. Then, at a later date, when you recognized the dangers, when you yourself suffered under the impossible conditions of terror -- and there the question is admissible, I am sure -- why did you not leave the country? Why didn't you emigrate?
A. Had it been only my personal fate, nothing would have been simpler than that, especially since we have heard before that I would have been offered that possibility, but it was not only concerning myself who, since 1923, had worked in the interests of the public -- it was about the existence of my country, of my nation, and I have never seen it happen in history that emigrants and, of course, I speak of those emigrants who go on their own free will, not those that have been expelled -- I have never seen that emigrants could do any good to their nation. It was not the case in 1792, at the time of the French Revolution; it was not the case of 1917 and the Russian Revolution, and it was not the case at the occasion of the National Socialist revolution which we witnessed.
To sit in a secure port abroad and to write articles -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, we don't want a historical lecture, do we?
DR. DIX: I believe we can stop here, but he only wanted to motivate why he did not emigrate. You have been understood.
BY DR. DIX:
Q. In the course of the proceedings, either in a letter or in a form -I don't know which -- mention was made about your thoughts, whether in the case of yourself one would have sacrificed himself, and if that would have served the German nation?
A. I believe that you have referred to a German quotation which has been mentioned by the American prosecutor or one of the representatives of the American prosecution, where I spoke about the silence of death in one of my notes. If I myself would have sacrificed myself, it would not have served any good because the conditions would never have become known of my sacrifice. nobody would have known "is he still alive or isn't he" or I would have been the victim of an intended coincidental accident and that possibility would not have existed either. Martyrs can only be effective if the circumstance of their death becomes known to the public.
DR. DIX: May I now call for the attention of the Tribunal? Yesterday, a question was refused me concerning the attitude of the diplomatic corps and the influence there of on men like Schacht. The question which I want to nut now is not the same question otherwise I, of course, would not put it.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection that I made was to the use of the word attitude because I don't see how witnesses can give? evidence about the attitude of a coprs. I think I said especially that the fact that the diplomatic corps were present at the Party rally might be given in evidence, but I said that the word "attitude" was far too general. What is it you want to put now?
DR. DIX: Yesterday, the question had been refused, which I stated thus: "What was the influence on Schacht by the collective attitude of the diplomatic coprs?" That question was refused and that is all about that; but, first, I should like to clarify it because I do not want to create the impression as if I want to smuggle a question into this proceedings, which may cause the same objections.
On the other hand, it is essential for my defense, my line of defense, to show that people with judgment from abroad, had had the same attitude toward the regime as Schacht and those were men who are beyond doubt, beyond suspicion, particularly beyond suspicion of their trying to create or prepare for aggressive wars; and, on the other hand, I want to show that the work of these people in the opposition was not only not sponsored by abroad but made more difficult, and that is important for me.
But, please, Mr. Schacht, do not answer before I have received the answer of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: State exactly what the question is?
DR. DIX: Yes, I want to come to it now. I, according to my notes, am concerning myself with the various corresponding successes that the Nazi regime had abroad. I wanted to nut up to him various acts of recognition, official visits, and I wanted to ask him what the influence was of all these examples of recognition on the work of that group of conspirators, but since that question is very similar to the one that has been rejected -- and I should like to make the objection myself rather than to have them made -- I wanted to submit the question first to the Tribunal and find out whether it is admissible.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the question being: "What effect did the recognition of the Nazi regime from abroad have upon the group of conspirators with whom the defendant Schacht was in contact?" That is the question, is it not?
DR. DIX: Yes.
DR. DIX: If "anerkennung" is translated correctly as "honoring them" not in the sense of recognition as usually understood in diplomatic language but as honoring -- it is a difficulty in translation and I want to make sure that there will be no misunderstanding.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. DIX: And may I put to him, first, the individual official visits which I have noted, so that he can answer the question? May I do that?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may; actual visits?
DR. DIX: Yes. The list will not be complete. BY DR. DIX"
Q. I remind you that in 1939, the delegate of the Labor Party, Alan Hartwood -
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you ought to put the question in the general way in which I put it to you and not go into the details of each visit or the details of a number of visits.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If your Honor please, I want to object to it as being generalities because it already appears that the United States did not participate in this and I tried to keep European politics out of this case, and this is the entering wedge. Now, I don't want to get into this sort of thing. I think it is entirely irrelevant that some foreigners, deceived by the appearance which the defendant Schacht was assisting in putting up, didn't start a war earlier. This thing is entirely irrelevant. The United States has desired to keep this sort of thing out of this case because it is endless if we go into it. It seems to me, if Mr. Schacht wants to put the responsibility for his conduct on some foreigner, that foreigner should be named. He has already said that the United States representatives, Mr. Messersmith and Mr. Dodd, had no part in it because they were always against then. Now, it gets into a situation here which seems to me impossible before this Tribunal and I cannot understand how it constitutes any defense for mitigation for Schacht to show that the foreign powers maintained intercourse with Germany even at a period of its degeneration.