I gave Hitler very brief reasons for my action by saying, "If I have to assume responsibility for economic policy, then I must have command. If, on the other hand, I do not have command, then I do not wish to have to assume responsibility." measures, lasted approximately two and a half months, until eventually Hitler had to decide, in order to prevent an increase in the conflict and prevent it from becoming public, that he would have to grant me the right to resign.
Q When you say "drastic measures", do you mean the so-called sit-down strike?
DR. DIX: May I, in that connection, submit to the Tribunal Exhibit No. 40 of my document book, which is an affidavit from another officer of Dr. Schacht's in the Reichministry of Economy, Dr. Asmis. In the English edition it is page 180, and I shall only quote a brief passage from this long affidavit. I quote:
"When this was unsuccessful" -- it means his fight -- "and when developments continued in the sphere which he considered wrong, he" -Schacht -- "in autumn 1937, long before the beginning of the war and as an upright man, drew the consequences and applied to be released from his office as Reichminister of Economy, and thus his co-responsibility.
"A normal resignation was apparently not possible for him in this connection, since for reasons of prestige the Party required the use of his name. Consequently, in autumn of 1937, he simply remained away from the rooms of the Ministry for several weeks. He started this sit-down strike, as it was called as a joke in the Ministry, and went in an official capacity only to the Reichsbank."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to trouble the Tribunal with all this detail? There is no dispute that he did resign and the only thing that he has got to explain is why he continued to be a Minister. The Prosecution have given their evidence about his resignation and about the conflict between him and the defendant Goering. What is the good of going into all the detail of it, as to this sit-down strike and all that sort of thing? That doesn't interest the Tribunal.
DR. DIX: He did not remain Minister after that.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought he had remained a Minister until 1943.
DR. DIX: Minister without portfolio, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn't say Minister with Portfolio, I said Minister.
DR. DIX: Yes. Of course, there is a difference, but I shall come to that later. I had understood you to mean as active minister, but I shan't go into it. It is a misunderstanding. Anyway, this is the end of that, anad I was merely trying to illustrate how difficult it was to resign.
BY DR. DIX leased. Have you anything to add to the statements made by Dr. Lammers or not? I also received from fellow-defendant Speer during my imprisonment here. He was an ear witness at least, during the row between Hitler and myself, on the occasion of the decisive discussion when I did push through my resignation.
If the Tribunal will permit it, I will read it very briefly. There are two or three sentences. I quote. Speer has informed me of the following:
"I was on the terrace of the Berghof at the Obersalzberg, and I was waiting to submit my building plans. This was in the summer of 1937, and Schacht came to the Berghof. On the terrace" -
MR JUSTICE JACKSON (Interposing): Speer is present in the room. For one defendant to testify as to a conversation with another defendant is a very convenient eay of getting testimony without access to cross examination, but it seems to me that it is a highly objectionable method. testify to a conversation of this character when the defendant Speer is in the courtroom, can be sworn, can give his testimony. He sits here and is available.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the subject of the conversation?
DR. DIX: The subject of that conversation is a matter which refers to the defendant Schacht. It is a statement of Hitler's regarding Schacht; it is not a matter which applies to the defendant Speer. That is why I would consider it suitable, since it is a matter that applies to Schacht, that he should make a statement about it. I would, of course, consider it appropriate that he not read something which Speer has written to him, but that he give his own account of the event with reference to Hitler and Schacht, and that he should merely say "I have heard that from Speer." That appears to be better.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may give that. BY DR. DIX: from Speer?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is even more objectionable to me than to have a written statement from Speer. If we are to have Speer's testimony, it at least should be Speer's and not a repetition of a conversation between the two defendants. If Speer has made a written statement, it can be submitted to us in the ordinary course. before it has been used here, and it seems to me that if this is a document signed by Speer -- which I don't think it is -- if it is, that is one thing. We can then see it and perhaps it can be used. If it is a conversation, I should prefer Speer's version.
DR. DIX: May I say something? The question of procedure does not appear to be a principal one. Certainly it can be dismissed when Speer is examined. However, I don't know whether Speer is going to be called; probably he will be. In practice it seems better if we hear it now, but of course that is up to the Tribunal to decide. It is not a question of importance.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow the evidence. BY DR. DIX: which was conducted in a very loud tone. At the end of the discussion Hitler came out on the terrace and he talked to the people there, amongst them Speer. He said that he had had a very serious argument with Schacht, he could not work with Schacht, and that Schacht was disturbing his financial plans.
you remained as the Chief of the Bank of the Reich; you were Reichsbank President. Were you approached by Hitler or the Minister of Finance in your capacity as President of the Reichsbank and were you asked for credit? March, 1938, beginning with that date the demands for money made to the Minister of Finance became more urgent and towards the end of that year he found himself in the embarrassing situation where he couldn't even pay salaries to his civil servants. He came to me and he asked me to grant him a special credit. According to its charter and statute the Reichsbank was entitled, and to some extent had an obligation, to advance to the Reich up to four hundred million marks per annum. The Reich Minister of Finance had those four hundred million and he was asking, over and above that, to have further credit; the Reichsbank refused to give him that. at the time, all the large banks together gave him a credit of a few hundred million marks. However, the Reichsbank did not participate in these credits. it seems that you might have been thinking of additional currency circulation. Did Hitler or anyone else ask you to get the presses going? to have a conference regarding the financing of the Jewish emigration from Germany in an orderly manner, something which I had suggested. On that occasion I had a talk with Prime Minister Chamberlain. to inform Hitler about these matters. On that occasion we did, of course, also refer to the financial requirements and needs of the Reich. As before, I refused to give credit to the Reich, and I drew his attention to the very difficult financial situation which seemed to indicate the necessity of reducing state expenditure, and, with that, expenditure on armament, or at least it should have done so.
In particular, I pointed out that at the beginning of December the first instalment of the so-called Jewish fine -- which had been collected, after the murder of von Rath in Paris, from the Jews, and which had been collected to the extent of 250 million marks at the beginning of December -- I pointed out that this first instalment had not been received entirely in cash, but that the Reich Minister of Finance had to consent to collect a considerable part of that fine in kind, as the British say, because it was impossible to make liquid the necessary cash for this payment.
Hitler replied to me: "Money can be issued in exchange for these goods. I have looked into the question of our future financial attitude in great detail and when I get back to Berlin in a few days I shall, together with you and the Minister of Finance, discuss my plans."
I recognized at once that it was Hitler's intention that the printing presses should now be utilized for his expenditure, be it with or without the nesessary backing. The danger of an inflation had now finally become imminent. And since I realized at a once that this would be the very point where, as far as I and the Reichsbank were concerned, we had to say "stop", I replied to him: "All right, in that case I shall give instructions that the Reichsbank, as far as this joint discussion with the Minister of Finance is concerned, shall submit a memorandum to you which will define the attitude of the Reichsbank to this problem." in the Directorate of the Reichsbank. We saw, to our own personal satisfaction, that this was giving us an opportunity to take a step by which we could finally turn away from that type of policy. submit to Hitler is dated January 7, and I think the prosecution have submitted it as an exhibit. the Directorate of the Reichsbank at that decisive moment so far as further state expenditure and armament expenditure were concerned, and what we had to tell Hitler, I beg to have permission to quote again, only two very brief sentences from that memorandum. It says, and I quote:
"To a decisive extent, unhindered expenditures are threatening our currency. The unlimited growth of government expenditures destroys any attempt for an orderly budget. It brings the govern ment finances to the verge of bankruptcy, despite a tremendous increase in taxes, and it undermines the currency and the banknotes."
Then there is another sentence, and I quote:
"Since, during the two foreign political actions in the East and in Sudetenland, there was an increase of public expenditures, the fact that after the termination of these two actions a reduction of expenditure is not noticeable but that everything seems to indicate that there will be a further increase of expenditure, there seems now to be an absolute duty that we should point out what the consequences on our currency system are likely to be.
"The undersigned Directors of the Reichsbank are aware and agree that while they have gladly cooperated to attain the great goal, it is now time to put a stop to it."
DR. DIX: This memorandum has been submitted by the prosecution under the number EC-369, but it is being submitted again as Exhibit 24 in my document book, and it is at page 70 of the English text and page 63 of the German text.
I shall have to put several questions to Dr. Schacht on that memorandum, but I think that perhaps there isn't time now and I shall have to do so tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT: If you must, Dr. Dix, but do you think that is very important? At any rate, you had better do it tomorrow, if you are going to do it at all.
DR. DIX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, can you inform us whether those extracts are the same as those extracts which were refused in the case of the defendant Ribbentrop?
DR. SIEMERS: I have made a list and I can hand that to the Tribunal in writing. Some documents are the same, some do not tally, and some are lacking. I have done that in writing.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
(A recess was taken until Thursday, 2 May 1946, at 1000 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal would like to know exactly what your letter means, which they received from you, relating to the following documents which the letter says have been withdrawn. What I want to know is, does that mean that they are not to be translated? Let me read you the numbers: 18, 19, 48, 53, 76, 80, 81, 82, 86, and 101. Now, does your letter mean that those documents are not to be translated?
DR. SIEMERS: No, Your Lordship; that means that the British Delegation informed me yesterday morning that the objections against these documents on the part of the British Delegation no longer exist.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
DR. SIEMERS: I had written the letter on the 30th of April, in the afternoon, after I had had a conversation with Sir David. The following morning I was informed
THE PRESIDENT: We won't bother with that. You say that their objections no longer exist. If they agree to that, well and good.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: My Lord, apparently there seems to have been some misunderstanding about three of them, 80, 101, and 76. The others were not objected to.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: My Lord, on 76 there seemed to be some misunderstanding between DR. Siemers and myself. I understood that he did not want to persist in the legal report on the Altmark incident, and I think Dr. Siemers thought that I wasn't persisting. However, I thought Dr. Siemers was withdrawing that.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well then, are you still objecting to that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: I am still objecting to it if it is not withdrawn, My Lord. However, the others in the list Your Lordship mentioned--that is, 18, 19, 48, 53, 82, and 86--there is no objection to.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
May-2-M-RT-4-1
DR. SIEMERS: Concerning Document 76, I agree with Sir David. 76 can be stricken.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That's all I wanted to know.
DR. SIEMERS: No. 80 -
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then -
DR. SIEMERS (continuing) -- about which I have spoken with the British Delegation -
THE PRESIDENT: You need not tell me about it.
DR. SIEMERS: I assumed there would not be any objection. I would like to ask that it be admitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is right. In order that the Translation Division should get on as soon as possible, the Tribunal has decided upon these documents and the only questions upon which the Tribunal has decided is that they shall be translated. The question of their admissibility will be decided after they have been translated, and I will take them in the categories of objection which are set out in Sir David's memorandum.
In Category A. the first category, No, 66 will be allowed. No. 76. as Dr. Siemers has now said, goes out. 101 to 107 will be allowed the rest are disallowed in "A" In "B" the following documents will be allowed: 39, 63, 64, 99, and 100. And, of course, 102 to 107, which are allowed under "A". The rest will not be allowed.
Category C: The following will be allowed: 38, 50, 55 and 56. The remainder are not allowed.
Category D: The following will be allowed: 29, 56, 57, 60 and 62.
Category E: The following will be allowed: 31, 32, 36, 37, 39, 41, and of course, 99 and 101 which have already been allowed. the relvance of any of the documents in that Category, but it will have them translated, with the exception of Documents 73.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH JONES: My Lord, I wonder whether the Tribunal would allow me to mention the document numbers of the additional extracts from Der Sturmer which were put in cross-examination of Streicher. I had the numbers, ready to present at a convenient time.
THE PRESIDENT: The exhibit numbers?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH JONES: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean read them?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH JONES: With the permission of the Tribunal, I have proposed to hand in that schedule, which is in effect a catalogue or index to the two bundles which the Tribunal had -- Bundle A and Bundle B -- and I proposed then putting this schedule in as an exhibit itself, which will become GB-450, and if the Tribunal agree, that would save reading any numbers out.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH JONES: There is another request I would make. The original of the newspaper, "Israelitsches Wochenblatt," was put in, or has been put in. Those volumes I have borrowed from a library, and I was going to ask the Tribunal' permission to have the extracts photographed and substitute, with the Tribunal's secretariat, the photostats and take back the originals so that they might be returned.
THE PRESIDENT: There seems no objection to that.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH JONES: I am very much obliged.
THE PRESIDENT: You have no objection to that, Dr. Marx?
DR. MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): I have no objection. necessary. But the presentation of these documents is according to what -
THE PRESIDENT: You have a copy of this document here, this exhibit.
DR. MARX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you whether you had any objection to the original of the Jewish newspaper being returned-
DR. MARX: No.
THE PRESIDENT: -- after it is photographed.
DR. MARX: No, I have no objection.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
LT COL. GRIFFITH JONES: I am Very much obliged.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Dix? follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION (continued) BY DR. DIX:
Q Dr. Schacht, I believe you should supplement the answer to the question I put to you yesterday. I put to you that there are memoranda to Hitler and letters from you to Hitler which were full of National Socialist phraseology, letters and memoranda from the date of the seizure of power until later when you went into opposition. The Prosecution, particularly in the oral presentation, if I remember correctly, referred to one letter which you sent to Hitler before the seizure of power in 1932, and there is another letter of large content of August 1932. I believe it would be proper if you would state your position with respect to these two letters, supplementing your answer to my question. 32, I had in no way interferred or intervened in the development of the National Socialist movement. I stepped aside completely, After that movement achieved its tremendous success in July, 1932, of which I spoke yesterday, I recognized clearly the developement to come; according to the principles of a democratic political concept there was only one possibility, and that was that the leader of that overwhelmingly large party now should receive the job of forming the government. The other theoretical possibility was a military government and in that connection, eventually a civil war, which I considered impossible from the beginning, and incompatible with my principles. I endeavoured to achieve an influence on Hitler and his movement, and that explain the two letters which you have mentioned.
Q Now, we come to the territorial plans of Hitler. What did you know about the plans of Hitler against Austria?
AAbout the plans against Austria I have never known anything. The plans Hitler had for Austria I did not know in detail either. I know only that in the same way as the majority of all Germans -- he was in favor of an Anschluss of Austria with Germany.
Q What did you know about his plans against Czechoslovakia? I did not know anything. Sudeten question, did you hear a statement of Hitler's, any remark of Hitler's about Munich which was of importance for your attitude toward Hitler?
Will you tell the Tribunal about that remark about which you have heard? time Hitler was given more in Munich than he had ever expected. According to my observation at that time -- and I expressed that also in my conversation with Ambassador Bullit --Hitler tried to achieve autonomy for the Germans in Czechoslovakia and in Munich the Allies presented him the Sudeten-German territories on a silver platter. I assumed, of course, that now Hitler's ambition would be satisfied and I was surprised and shocked-- and I must say that. When a few days after Munich I saw Hitler I did not have any further conversation with him at that time, but I met him surrounded by a few people, mostly SS men, and from the conversation between him and the SS leaders I could hear the remark, "That fellow has spoiled my march into Prague. That is to say, he used the word, "versiebt," which means" made impossible."
achieved with foreign politics, but he lacked that which I explained yesterday, the gloire, the whole build-up which I could understand from that remark. feelings toward Hitler? did my close friends, that by such an intervention on the part of Allied politics, our attempt to remove Hitler was -- and we didn't know what would happen in the future, of course, -- made impossible. But of course, at that moment we had to resign ourselves.
Q What did you know about the plans of Hitler against the Memel Land?
A I didn't know anything at all about that, and never heard anything about it. As far as I remember, I found out about the annexation of Memel Land on my trip to India, on which I had started. anything about the negotiations and the attack against Poland?
Q Therefore, we do not have to speak here about the May meeting of '39. Switzerland, and then I went to India, started on my trip to India via Genoa, so I neither heard about the Hacha affair, that is the establishment of the protectorate in Czechoslovakia, nor of Memel Land nor of Poland at all, because I did not return from the trip to India until the beginning of August. treated here. Did you approve these measures?
Q Did you express that disapproval at any place or at any time? Wagner who had been sent by Halder, and who, after the collapse, also committed suicide. He informed me about the intended invasion of Belgium. I was shocked, and I replied at that time, "If you want to commit that insane action, then no one can help you anymore."
THE PRESIDENT: What time?
THE WITNESS: Before the march into Belgium. When exactly it was, I could not say. It may have been in November 1939 or it may have been in April 1940, but I do not know for sure any more when it was.
BY DR. DIX:
in a struggle for life or death. Didn't that cause you, since you were still Minister Without Portfolio, although you had no particular field, to cooperate actively, to keep yourself at their disposal?
Q Did anyone ask you to do that? upon order of Chief of General Staff Halder, was to persuade me to support the German interest at the occasion of the invasion of Belgium, by supervising banking matters in Belgium, and I refused definitely. Falkenhausen, who wanted to consult me concerning the Belgian administration of finances, and I refused my advice and did not make any statement of any kind.
May I relate another instance where I was approached. One day, shortly after America was dragged into the war, I was approached by the newspaper published by Goebbels. They wanted me, because of my knowledge of American conditions, to write an article for that paper, Das Reich, to assure the German people that the war potential of the United States should not be overestimated. I refused to write that article, and explained that just because I knew American conditions very well, my explanation could only be just the opposite. There also, I refused. the Hoszbach meeting, or the meeting about which we have the Hoszbach notes? 1945, here in my cell, and I was very much surprised that during all previous interrogations I had never been asked about these notes, because it can be seen clearly from these notes that the Reich Government could not be and should not be informed about the warlike intentions of Hitler, and therefore could not know anything about them.
ory to attacks, for instance the meeting of November 1940 in which the attack on Russia was discussed? 1936 and therefore has nothing to do with the war. I never took part in any meeting which indicated any intentions of war or the attack on Russia, and never found out anything about it.
Q Does that also apply to the meeting of May 1940? not take part in any meeting in May 1940, nor in any such meeting. During the entire period when I was minister without portfolio, I never took part in any official meeting or conference. which the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka had in Berlin? exception, of course, of whatever may have been on the radio or in the press. someone's disposal for Nazi propaganda the sum of 200,000 marks. your dismissal in order to get out of the financial responsibilities. I ask you to reply to that accusation and to tell the Tribunal briefly, but exhaustively, about your reasons and the practical deliberations which were at the basis of the memorandum of the Reichsbank Directorate which led to your dismissal and that of your assistants.
A I should like to divide the question into two parts. The first question is whether I tried to get rid of my job as President of the Reichsbank. To that question I have to answer yes. Since the middle of 1938, we in the Reichsbank always thought that if there should not be a change of the official course, we certainly did not desire to continue in office, because --and that brings me to the second part of the question -the responsibility which we were expected to share then, we did not want to assume.
defensive rearmament in order to achieve equality of Germany in international politics, that which we had done until then, we assumed responsibility, and we assume it before history and this Tribunal. But as to the responsibility for any further rearmament which eventually carried in itself the potential of danger of war or which would lead intentionally to war, that responsibility none of us wanted to assume. a further increased rearmament -- and I spoke about that yesterday in connection with the conversation of the 2nd of January 1939 which I had with him at that time -- when we found that out, when that became clear, we wrote the memorandum which is in the hands of this Tribunal, from which it can be seen clearly that we were opposed to every further increase of expenditure and would not assume any responsibility for that. From that, Hitler could see that he could not use the Reichsbank in the future for any purposes of financing rearmament with the same directorate and with the same president as they had then. because without the Reichsbank he could not go on, and he had to take another step. He had to change the Reichsbank Law. That is to say, the independence of the Reichsbank from government resolutions had to be removed. At first he did that secretly because we had that kind of thing of the 20th of January 1939. That law was published only about a half-year later, and that law removed the independence of the Reichsbank and the president of the Reichsbank became only a mere bank teller for the demands for credit by the government, that is to say, Hitler.
The Reichsbank directorate did not want to continue. It was therefore dismissed on the 20th of January, the Reichsbank president, the vice president, and the main financial expert, Reichsbank Director Huelse, and in addition three members of the directorate of the Reichsbank, Director Vocke, Director Erhardt, and Director Blessing insisted they be permitted to leave the Reichsbank.
Two other members of the Reichsbank directorate, Director Puhl, whose name has been mentioned here before, and Director Hoetschmann, remained in the directorate, and therefore they could not help but stay. randum, that is to say, to get out of that financial responsibility. The second accusation was that that memorandum does not mention limitations of armament explicitly, but that that memorandum essentially treats only matters of currency, finances, and economy, and that therefore it was not Dr. Schacht opposing rearmament, but a Dr. Schacht who was worried about matters of currency as President of the Reichsbank, and it was that Dr. Schacht who spoke in that memorandum. It is therefore necessary that you as the author, at least co-author of that memorandum, should state your position, your interpretation of that memorandum.
objection which I made to Hitler's actions--and that does not only go for myself but for all ministers--could only be made and expressed with arguments which were taken from the field in which one worked. Had I said to Hitler, "I cannot give you any more money because you intend to wage war," I would not have the pleasure to have this conversation with you. I would have had a conversation with my priest, and it would have been very unilateral, because I at this time would be silent in my tomb, and he would have had a monologue. about it one more moment. In conclusion--and please check me--I believe I understand you to mean that this memorandum in the end contained demands, such as further possibilities to raise funds by increase of taxation or other sources, both impossible. Taxation could not be increased. The free market, as far as capital was concerned, had already had an unsuccessful attempt at a loan. funds could not be raised for an unhealthy rearmament program. You could only construct your dismissal. Did I understand you correctly, or did I interpret you correctly? two possibilities of an answer, either a change of financial politics--and that meant to stop armament, that is to say, a basic change of Hitler's policy--or the Reichsbankpresident had to be thrown out. The latter happened. Hitler would definitely change his course by 180 degrees. ended with your dismissal.
A Hitler confirmed that himself. In that letter of dismissal he said it verbatim. We heard it, also, from the testimony of Mr. Lammers, that Hitler personally wrote that remark into the letter, that my name was connected and would remain connected with the first epoch of rearmament, but the second epoch of rearmament I refused. Hitler understood that very clearly, because when he received that letter from the Reichsbank he told the people around him, "This is mutiny."
Q How do you know that? the political stage could not be attributed to your opposition to war preparations but to disputes of power with Hermann Goering. As such, that reproach seems to be refuted by statements made by Goering and Lammers. made already by Goering and Lammers, or whether you disagree. entire evidence which he had studied he had not found a single item which showed my opposition to war politics. I can only say if a man, because he is near-sighted, does not see a tree, there is no reason to assume the tree is not there. remained a member of the Cabinet as a Reich Minister without portfolio. That That was the cause for the misunderstanding that occurred yesterday. portfolio, that is, Minister of Economy. Your Lordship has told me that he was still Minister, though without portfolio, until January 1943. Of that fact, witness, you were accused by the Prosecution. What caused you to remain Reich Minister without portfolio? Why did you do that? Did you have any financial reasons? I hope you will excuse me if I mention that here, but the trial brief, on page 5, accuses you of that motive. Minister of Economy met with great difficulties, and you have also submitted several affidavits. had occurred a break or a difference of opinion between one of his assistants and himself. When in the end he approved the dismissal, the resignation, he stated the condition that nominally I should remain Minister without portfolio.