half of the year 1935, I noticed that my opinion that Hitler did not approve of what I thought could be considered revolutionary excesses and that he was really willing to bring these forces into a regulated atmosphere, was wrong. Hitler did nothing to stop the excesses of individual Party members or Party groups. At all times, probably he had the idea which recently--or I believe today--was mentioned by a witness that the SA have free play for once. That is to say, to the masses of the Party, he gave some things, so to speak, as a means of recreation, things which in a regular state are absolutely incompatible, and that suspicion on my part grew in the course of the months, and then, for the first time, in May 1935, I saw cause to bring these matters up with him. I don't know if you want me to discuss these things now, but I am ready to tell you about them. you how you changed your mind about Hitler from your original point of view all the way to becoming a conspirator against Hitler. incident. The very moment when I had to recognize--and, of course, that did not come with lightening speed but in the course of weeks and months it crystallized--the moment when I had to recognize that Hitler intended a war or at least was not ready to do everything to avoid a war, that moment I told myself that that was a tremendous danger which was raising its head and that only violence could crush violence. was excluded. There was no freedom of assembly. There was no freedom of speech. There was no freedom of writing. There was no possibility to discuss things in even a small group. From A to Z one was suspected, and every word which you said in a group which consisted of more than two persons was dangerous. There was evidently only one possibility against that terror which excluded every democratic criticism, and that was to meet this situation with violence.
And that is how I found out that in the face of Hitler's terror only an attempt like a putsch, a coup d'etat, a final attempt at assassination was possible.
Q. And is it right to say that the decisive factor to change your mind occurred during the so-called Fritsche crisis? actions and affairs of the Party members -- the Fritsche crisis gave the absolute assurance that here a basic and principal change was occurring in the political leadership, by the fact that within about ten days Blomberg was removed, Fritsche was removed, Neurath was removed and that Hitler not only called a man who was so incapable in foreign politics as Ribbentrop but also that he in his speech soon thereafter in the Reichstagannounced that from then on rearmament had to be increased. Consequently the Fritsche crisis was the decisive factor to change my opinion and to confirm my assurance that every attempt at a peaceful development would have to fail and only violent means have to be used.
DR. DIX: On account of the importance of the Fritsche crisis may I again quote from the documents? The document which I already wanted to produce on the occasion of the interrogation of Gisevius and which I could not do because the document was not available. The same statement about the Fritsche crisis which Gisevius and Dr. Schacht has now made was also made by a smart officer with good political knowledge abroad. May I point to Exhibit No. 15 of my document book? That is page 41 of the English text, and 35 of the German text. It is a bienniel report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War over the period 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1945. I quote one sentence from it:
"The history of the German High Command from 1938 on is one of constant conflict of personalities in which military judgment wasincreasingly subordinated to Hitler's personal dictates. The first clash occurred in 1938 and resulted in the removal of von Blomberg, von Fritsche and Beck and of the last effective conservative influence on German policy."
So here also that change has been clearly understood. In conclusion I would like to ask a question of Dr. Schacht.
Q. Were you only disappointed by Hitler or did you consider yourself deceived by Hitler at that time? Will you answer that?
A The answer is that I never felt disappointed by Hitler, because I had not expected more of him; from a knowledge of his personality it was what I could have expected.
But I certainly considered myself deceived, because whatever he had previously promised to the German people and thereby to himself, he has not kept afterwards. capabilities his adherents got privileges before all other citizens. He promise to put the Jews under the same protection which foreigners had. He deprived them of every legal protection. He had promised to fight against political lies and together with his minister, Goeb bels, and by himself, he has never done anything else but disseminate political lies and political fraud. He promised to the German people to maintain the principles of positive Christianity and he tolerated and sponsored measures by which institutions of the Church were damaged and insulted. Also, in the foreign political field he has always spoken against a war on two fronts -- and then undertook it himself. He has broken all laws of the Wiemar Republic, for the enforcement of which he had taken the oath. He mobilized the Gestapo against personal liberties and freedoms. He made impossible all free communication of thought and ideas. He released criminals and put them in his service. He has done everything in the way of not keeping his promises. He deceived the world, Germany and me. power. In November 1932, you stated publicly that Hitler would become Chancellor, Reich Chancellor. What made you make that statement? elections of 1932 got 40 per cent of all seats in the Reichstag for his party. That is a result of an election, if I an informed correctly, which had not occurred since 1871, since the Reichstag was founded; and for me, for myself as a democrat and a follower of the democratic parliamentary government, it was inevitable that that man now was to be put in charge of forming a Cabinet. I could not have seen any other possibility. There was only one alternative and that was a military government. But the Cabinet of von Papen already had had some special authority and still could not stand against the parliament, the Reichstag; and when Schleicher attempted to establish a military regime without the participation of the Nazis he failed after just a few weeks, because he had seen himself put before the alternative either to start a civil war or to resign.
have thought differently about it -- but Schleicher was also of the opinion that the Armed Forces could not stand a civil war, and Hindenburg was certainly not ready to risk a civil war or to tolerate a civil war. But he saw himself forced by necessity to put the reins of Government into the hands of the man who, thanks to his propaganda and the incapability of all preceding governments, and also thanks to the policies of the foreign countries toward Germany, had won the majority of German votes. and the Nazi regime to come into power. I want to ask you now whether between the July elections, 1932, and the day when Hitler became chancellor -- that is the 30th of January, 1933 -- you had spoken publicly for Hitler.
A I want to state at first that Hitler's power in July, 1932, Hitler's climax of power, had been reached by gaining 232 seats in July. Everything else that followed is only a consequence of that Reichstag election during that entire period -- with the exception of the one interview you mentioned, I have not said any more than that Hitler would become Reich Chancellor, and according to democratic rules. I repeat that during that entire period I have not written or spoken a single word publicly for Hitler. Cabinet, did you speak to Hindenburg about the Chancellorship? competent gentlemen, be it Hindenburg, Meissner or anyone else, to exert any influence in favor of Hitler, and I had nothing to do and did not participate in any way in the nomination of Hitler to Reich Chancellor. prestige of your name -- in November 1932 -- at the disposal of Hitler, and he refers to a statement made by Goebbels in the latter's bock, "From the Kaiserhof to the Reich Chancellery." What can you say about that?
be mobilized against me here, but it is not my fault if Mr. Goebbels made a mistake. Reichstag elections of the 5th of March, and there is an affidavit by von Schnitzler, EC-439, US Exhibit No. 618. What do you have to say about that? It is our Exhibit No. 3 of our document book, page 11 of the English copy. Chancellor and the elections of the 5th of March were to be a new basis for the forming of the government, Hitler asked me whether at the occasion of a meeting which Goering was to call, and which would have the purpose to raise funds for the elections, whether I would not take the role of the banker for them. I had no cause to refuse that. The meeting took place on the 26th of February. I had pleaded for an election fund. The Prosecution, however, has presented a document, D-203, which apparently is a record of the election speech made by Hitler on that evening. that it is our Exhibit No.2, on page 9 of the English text. Excuse me. Please will you Kindly go on.
A D-203. That document closes with the following sentence:
"Goering then led over very cleverly to the necessity that other circles not taking part in this political battle should at least make the financial sacrifice so necessary at this time." it can be seen very clearly that not I have pleaded for funds, but that Goering had pleaded for funds. I have only administrated these funds later. Prosecution has carefully left out those decisive passages by which I would not be accused. I quote the two sentences, therefore, as follows: I'm sorry I have to quote in English because I have only the English text in front of me.
"Dr. Schacht opposed to the meeting the raising of an election fund of, as far as I remember, three million Reichsmarks. The fund should be distributed between the two 'Allies' according to their relative strength at the time being. Dr. Stein suggested that the Deutsch Volkspartei should be included which suggestion, when I rightly remember, was accepted. The amounts which the individual firms had to contribute were not discussed. " Party only, but for the Nazi Party and the Allied nationalistic group, in which, for instance, were also von Papen and Hugenberg, and during that very meeting it was extended to a third group, the German Volkspartei. That was, therefore, a collective fund for thoseparties who went into the election campaign and not just a Nazi fund. seizure of power, had been issued and which established the totalitarian rule of the Nazis. We have to consider the question of your personal responsibility as a later member of the cabinet and, therefore, I have to discuss these laws with you in detail; but I should like to recall to you, first, the Enabling Act; then the law about the prohibition of parties and the establishment of one party; the law about the unity of party and state; the expropriation of the SPD and the trade unions; the law about the legal limitation of professions for Jews; about the peoples' court; the law about the legalization of the murders of 30th June 1934; and about the murder of the offices of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President in the person of Hitler. How is it your personal responsibility in your capacity as member of the cabinet with respect to those laws?
A When all these laws were issued I was not even a Cabinet member. I had no voice in the Cabinet. I had a voice in the Cabinet only after the first of August 1934, at which time the last disastrous law or merger of the offices of Chancellor and President was issued. And I didn't have anything to do even with that law.
Q I don't know whether I mentioned it, but I want to make sure there is no misunderstanding. It doe not cover the merger of the offices.
A Of course not, because I was not even in the Cabinet. I had received my nomination as the minister on the 3rd or 4th of August. I did not take part in the deliberation of that law. I did not vote for it, and I nave not signed it. Then as a member of the Reichstag you would have voted for these laws, because after 1933 there Were only unanimous votes in the Reichstag.
A Yes. Unfortunately, there is much in the trial brief which is not correct. During my entire life I was never a member of the Reichstag, and one look into the Reichstag Handbook could have enlightened the Prosecution about the fact that also during that time I was not a member of the Reichstag. the Reichstag, because I had been neither during that time.
Q Did Adlof Hitler ever take an oath on the Weimer Constitution? Reichs Chancellor, to Reichspresident Hindenburg. During that oath he swore that he would not only respect the constitution but also all laws unless they were changed legally, that he would observe them and protect them.
A No, it has never been repealed?
Q Was the Fuehrer principle put down anywhere legally? which was made later to reduce the responsibility of the individual ministers-and that hits me, also--by saying that it has become a common law, that is not correct. The responsibility of the ministers continued to exist, my own also, and only the terror and the violent threats of Hitler kept them down. Cabinet, whether the Cabinet after 1933 was a National Socialistic or a combination of the parties of the Reich, or the question of the development of Hitler to an autocratic dictator, all these questions I have put to the witness Lammers.
I do not wish to repeat them, but do you have to add anything to what Lammers had testified about?
A I made only two notes. In the Reichstag speech of Hitler on the 23rd of March 1933, he mentioned "It is the sincere desire of the National Government." end of quotation. So we See it is not the National Socialist Government, as it was always said later, but the National Government.
And another one. In the proclomation to the armed forces which the War Minister von Blomberg issued in February 1933, the sentence is included: "I assume the office with the firm will lead the Reichswehr according to the testament of my predecessors as a means of power superior to the party and directly connected with the State." coalition cabinet, whereas Hitler, by his methods of terror and violence, forced a pure Nazi dictatorship out of it. 4, page 14 of the English text.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
DR. DIX: Mr. President, my I ask a question? Do we continue tomorrow, because tomorrow is the first of May, and there is some amount of uncertainty whether there is a session tomorrow or not.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal will go on tomorrow.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1 May 1946, 1000 hours.)
Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al., Defendants Lord Justic Lawrence presiding.
0900-1300
THE PRESIDENT: Before we go on with the case of the Defendant Schacht, on behalf of the High Tribunal on the applications by Dr.Sauter on behalf of the Defendant, Von Schierer, the first application to which any objection was taken related to the group of Documents, Nos. 30-31-4568-73-101-124- and 133. That application with respect to that group of documents is denied.
The next matter was an application with respect to No. 118-A. That application is granted and the document is to be translated.
The next was No. 121 and in that case the application is denied. As regard to witnesses, Dr. Sauter withdrew his application for the witness, Marsalek. application that Ueberreiter be called as a witness.
Dr. DIX: (Counsel for Schacht) Yesterday, much to my sorrow, I did not, after an answer given by Dr. Schacht to my question, as to whether he was disappointed by Hitler or whether he considered himself deceived by him, after his answer, I did not have a chance to read from a Document which deals with the same principle. I am referring to a passage, which has been submitted to the High Tribunal and which has been quoted several times - Exhibit 34,. Page 114 of the English Text, This passage may be found on page 124 of the English Document books and its passage is as follows:
"Dr. Schacht, even in the years 1935-36 actually, as may have been seen from numerous statements, knew he had fallen into the role of a man, whom in good faith had put his strength and ability at Hitler's disposal, but, who now found himself betrayed.
"Of the many statements made by Dr. Schacht, I quote only one which Dr. Schacht made at the occasion of a supper with my wife and myself in the summer of 1938. When Dr. Schacht made his appearance, it could be clearly seen that something was seething within him and during the supper, it suddenly bursted out of him when in deep agitation he almost shouted at my wife, 'My dear lady, we have fallen into the hands of criminals how could I ever have suspected that?'" Yesterday I mentioned three Documents:
(1) A speech made by Schacht for a Geographical Society at Frankfurt on a night in December and then a theme Schacht had written on the Colonial Problem and a speech given at Koenigsberg by Schacht.
I wish to submit these Documents: The speech to the Geographical Society at Frankfurt is the Document Exhibit 19, Page 38, Eng Page 54. The theme on the Colonial Question, is Exhibit 21, German version page 53 and English version page 59.
The speech at Koenigsberg is Exhibit 25 of my Document Book, German Version Page 66 and English Version Page 73. BY DR. DIX. Ministry of Economics and when you became Minister of Economics, you were familiar with the happenings of the 30th of June, 1934 and the legalization through the Cabinet. Did you have no doubts or qualms to enter the Cabinet and what reason prompted you to put aside these doubts and objections? would have been concerned, these would have been the only considerations. It would have been very simple not to assume office and to resign. Of course, I asked myself what I would gain for the future development of German politics, if I did refuse office. At this point we were already at a stage in which our public and private opposition against the Hitler regime had been made impossible. Meetings could not be held, societies could not be established, any expressions in the press had been put under censorship and any possibility at all of a political opposition, without which no Government can live, had been prevented by Hitler through his policy of terror.
There was only one position, or one way, from which one could try to be critical and perhaps to form an opposition, and serious measures by the resume could be prevented. That way only - the only way to do it was to be in the Government itself. With that deliberate knowledge, I entered the Government and I hoped in the course of the years I could find a certain amount of support and backing among the German people, there were still a large mass ofspiritual leading professors, scientists, and teachers of whom I could not expect they would simply acquiesce in the regime of coercion. There was also a large mass of industrialists, leaders of enterprise, leaders of economy, all of whom I could not assume that they would turn their business over to that coercion, which was inimicable to the economy. I expected a promise of support from all of the circles - support which would make it possible for me to have the moderating influence in the Government, therefore, I entered the Cabinet of Hitler - not with enthusiastic agreement, but because of the necessity that one would have have to keep on working for the German people and apply the break to stop wrong measures and that could be done only by being part of the Government. within the party? the party, of course, the decent element were in large numbers, but the largest part of the population had joined the party because of their own free will, because of good instinct, because of the tremendous need in which the German people found themselves.
I would like to say about the S.S for instance. In the beginning, there were numbers of decent people who advocated the S.S. for Himmler gave the SS the aspect of fighting for an ideal of life. time which had the significant title. It was written by an SS man, "Schafft Anstaendige Kerle", meaning produce decent men.
But,in the course of time, Hitler knew full well to work within the party and its organizations to bring all cooler elements around him and to chain all of those elements to him and I might say that he was deliberate in this.
As far as misdeeds or thoughts were concerned, he used these thoughts for his own gain in order to shackle these people to him.
Yesterday I talked about some of the phases of Nazi ideology. I did not want to do that with the idea of a derogatory intent. I did it for a certain reason. In the course of developments, I mentioned that many Party members who were within the inner circle of Hitler and who occupied more or less leading positions gradually became afraid because of the consequences of the injustices and the evil deeds to which they were instigated by the regime. I had the decided feeling that these people used all sorts of sedatives in order to protect themselves against their own consciences, and that it was only the flight from their own consciences that made them act the way they did. Otherwise, we could not explain the large number of suicides that took place at the end of the regime. conspiracy and in this violation of the peace. Did you at any time have secret discussions or secret orders or secret directives which might be interpreted as going toward an objective like that? given me which might have contained something wrong. Never did Hitler ever suggest anything to me which he knew that I would not carry out, something that might not agree with my moral point of view and which I would, therefore, not carry through. At no time did I ever make a remark or expression that one of my fellow ministers or one of the leading men in the inner circle of Hitler -Of course, I could not control that circle -- but speaking about my fellow ministers and the others whom I met in official contacts, they never showed in any way that there was an intent to commit a war crime. On the contrary, we were always very glad when Hitler swung one of his large speeches in which he told, not only the entire world, but the German people and assured them that he did not want anything except peace and peaceful work. That Hitler deceived the German people, his workers, his colleagues and the entire world, is one of the things that I mentioned yesterday. take an oath or an obligation to the Party or other National Socialist organization?
A Not a single oath and not a single obligation beyond my oath to the head of the state as an official.
Q Did you know the leading National Socialists personally and socially? That is, Hitler, Goering? Did you know them intimately well?
A I never had relations of that sort with Hitler. He repeatedly urged me in the first years to come to the luncheons at the Reichschancellory where he was lunching with his closer friends. I tried to do that twice. I attended twice at various intervals, and I must say that the niveau of the discussion at the luncheon and the abject humility which was given Hitler was not to my liking, and I didnot like the conditions and the surroundings as a whole, and I never went back again, I never called on Hitler personally in a private matter.
Of course, naturally, I had to attend the large public functions which all other high officials attended also, but we certainly we cannot speak of a close, intimate relationship between ourselves, and that applies to the other gentlemen as well. visited each other on occasion, but social gatherings which took place in the first period had a more or less official character. As far as personal, private gatherings were concerned, we can not really speak about that. well? men: Let us start with Bormann.
A I rather gather that you are going to give me a list. Therefore, I would like to make a few introductory remarks. glory from Paris. All of us -- the ministers and the reichsleiters and the dignitaries of the Party, state secretaries, and so forth -- received an invitation to be present at the station to greet Hitler on his arrival. At that time I was in Berlin. Therefore, it was impossible for me not to acquiesce in this suggestion. That was in the year 1940.
The conflict between Hitler and myself had been going on for some time, and it would have been an affront if I had stayed away. Consequently, I went to the Bahnhof, saw a large number of Party dignitaries, ministers and so forth, but, of course, I do not remember just who all these people were.
Q I beg your pardon; I would like to interrupt you. I have a rather poor memory for films and weekly newsreels, but I believe that that reception was shown in a weekly film and I believe that you were just about the only civilian who was present among those people. it. They mentioned that among all the gold braid, I was the only civilian in civilian clothes and that I stood out as such. Of course, one could see from that film who was present at the time. Morning to many people and inquired about their health and so forth, and I also recall that I arrived at the station with Rosenberg in the same car, because there were always two people occupying a car. I did not attend the reception which followed at the Reichschancellery. Rosenberg did go, however. I said, "No, I would rather not go. I am going home." Sauckel, Speer, Seyss-Inquart, Kaltenbrunner--that you probably saw them for the last time then? with any one of them except Hitler himself.
Q Did you speak with Hitler at that time? of my life. We were standing in rows, and Hitler passed by rather quickly. When he saw me, he came up to me with a triumphant smile and extended his hand in a most cordial manner, something which I had not seen from him in a long time, and he said to me, "Now, Mr. Schacht, what do you have to say now?" admiration or a similar sentiment, and he expected me to admit that my prognos about the war and about the disaster of the war was wrong, for he know my attitude about the war.
It was extremely hard for me to evade an answer like that, and I really searched my mind in order not to make that expression that he expected and said only, "I can only say to you, 'God Protect you." That was the only significant conversation which I had that day. through a neutral and non-critical remark such as I gave him. you just when I saw these gentlemen last.
Q Hess? here in the prison. Since years before the beginning of the war.
Q Ley?
Q Ribbentrop?
A I saw him last after my being thrown out of the Reichsbank. I talked with him about the journey to India, and that must have been, I would judge, February 1939. I have not talked with him since then.
Q Now Rosemberg?
A Perhaps, of course, not mentioning this reception of Hitler's that I have talked about, I would say '36.
Q And now about Frick?
A I perhaps saw him last in the year '38.
Q Schirach?
Q Speer? I attended the world exposition in Paris in the year 1937.
Q You mean before you being taken prisoner?
Q Sauckel?
Q Seyss Inquart? Austria, when I visited a colleague in the Reichsbank.
Q Kaltenbrunner?
Q How about Frank?
A Perhaps in the year 193? or '38, I saw him here. that I saw him after '38. tance?
A I never had any contact, with Keitel. I perhaps saw him at a social gathering, but never after '38.
Q How about Jodl?
A I made Jodl's acquaintance here in the prison.
Q How about Doenitz?
A I met Mr. Doenitz here in the prison.
Q Raeder?
A I believe I have known him for quite some time. In the beginning we exchanged visits among our families, partially of an official character and partially friendly, but I believe that I have not seen him or talked to him since '38.
Q How about Brauchitsch?
A I have not talked with him since '39'--no, '38, since the Fritsch affair.
Q How about Halder?
A Halder, as you know, I saw in connection with the Fall Putsch of '38 but not after that. Reichsbank? 1939, I saw him only once, when I wanted to discuss my future activity with him. I had to take this matter up with him. And on that occasion he asked me might svail myself of this opportunity to take this journey now, so there would not be so much talk about my leaving the Reichsbank. saw Goering for the last time. And then, after my return in August, I did not see him again. Then the war came. And now, during the war, I saw him twice.
Shall I tell you about those two occasions?
Q I didn't understand you.
A Shall I tell you about those last two times?
A I saw him once in February 1940. At that time various American magazincs and periodicals had suggested to me to give the German opinion on the situation and to put this down in writting. I was rather ready to follow these suggestions, but because we were at war, could not follow this suggestions without advising the Foreign Minister of this. The Foreign Minister advised me that he had nothing against my writing an article for an American paper, but that before sending off this article, he wanted to have the article aubmitted for censorship.
Of course I was not interested in that. I did not think of that possibility and, consequently, did not write this article.
There were further inquiries from America and I said to myself, "It isn't su ficient for me to talk with the Foreign Minister, I must go to Hitler in this matter." So, with that aim, I called on Hitler, who received me very soon, and I told him at that time, among other things, just what my experience with von Ribbentrop had been in this connection, and I further told him that I thought it might be expedient to write these articles; but that it seemed vital to me that one should have some one constantly in America who could clarify German interests in the press abroad, in America that is.
told me that he would discuss this matter with the Foreign Minister. Consequently, this entire thing came to naught. Funk, who most likely had a discussion with Ribbentrop on this matter, I was put in connection with him. I tried to get an answer through Funk, at any rate, but this answer was to the effect that it was too early for a step of that sort. And that was my visit in 1940.
Q Pardon my interruption. So that we can avoid all misunderstandings, if Hitler had given you permission that you could have come to America, just what would your activities have been?
A First of all, I was not interested in going myself; I rather made a general suggestion. But, naturally, I would have been very happy to go to America for I saw a possibility-
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think it is material to know what he would have done if something happened that did not happen.
DR. DIX: I just wanted to preclude any misunderstand, and I can assume that this misunderstanding will not arise. BY DR. DIX: more in a rather private matter. In the previous year I had lost my wife through death and now intended to remarry. As minister without portfolio, which I remained to be, I had to tell the Reichschancellor and the head of the state of my intention. I called on him for that reason; but there was no political discussion at all at this meeting. When I left, he asked me, "At one time you had the intention that some one should go to America, but the time seems to be a little late for that now."