Therefore, we were interested in proving that here there was a group which washonestly trying and which would stand by its word, positively and negatively, and I believe we kept our word in what we said equally truthfully and friendly, that we could not bring about this putsch as we said before but that was our hope. These negotiations took place, started during October and November 1939. Later on, in the spring, they were concluded and when I am asked I shall continue.
Q Please tell us about the conclusion of these associations? of 1939, actually General Halder was concerned with putsch intentions and that these intentions came to naught, for at the very last minute Hitler called off the Western Offensive--confirmed by the position of Halder at that time, we believed that we should continue these negotiations and discussions at the Vatican. We reached what you might call a gentleman's agreement and I believe that I may say and make the assertion, that we could give the generals unequivocal proof, but in the case of the downfall of the Hitler regime, an agreement with a decent civil German government, that agreement could be reached.
Q Did you see all these proofs and materials of this? in a comprehensive report and this report--Dr. Schacht and Hassell worked with these reports before it was given to Halder by Thomas. Halder was quite taken with this and gave this report to von Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch was dismayed and threatened to arrest the middleman Thomas; then this action had come to naught.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the last notes that I have got down in my notebook are these, "that we knew that if Holland, Belgium and the other countries were attacked, it would have very grave consequences and we therefore negotiated with Halder and Brauchitsch and they weren't prepared to help us to stop the war at that time. We wanted peace with honor, eliminating politics.
We took all possible steps." Well, now, since I took those notes down, I think we spent nearly ten minutes in details which are utterly irrelevant about further negotiations. If they took all possible steps, what is the point of giving us these details about it?
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, if a witness is called in a matter of such tremendous importance where he has always to figure with the counsel of accused, and must believe that people who are of a different opinion from his, these are just generalities, please give us particulars and facts; and then I cannot dispense with the facts that the witness must testify to a thorough negotiation with the Pope in the Vatican, than if he just said that the result of this action was a comprehensive report which was submitted -
THE PRESIDENT: I agree with you that the one sentence about some negotiations with the Vatican may have been properly given but all the rest of it were unnecessary details.
DR. DIX: We have concluded this chapter, your Lordship. BY DR. DIX: November but that it did not arise because the Western Offensive did not arise; therefore, we need not enter into this conversation. I would like to ask you at this point, during the winter and spring, was the winter and spring uneventful as far as your group is concerned or were further plans made and whether acted upon?
and Brauchitsch. Aside from these two gentlemen, we tried to reach the generals in the West. and General Hoepner. We also tried to reach Field Marshal Rundstedt, Beck, and Leeb, and tried to influence then also. But here, General Thomas was an intermediary.
Q And how did they react, these generals?
Q Now, we are coming to the summer of 1941. Hitler is in Paris. The aerial offensive against England is imminent. What was the picture at that time in your group and in your activity as conspirators?
AAfter Paris, our group was without influence for months. The success of Hitler influenced everyone, and it took much effort on our part to use all the avenues of approach open to us and to try at least to prevent the bombardment of England. Here also again the group acted in unison, and we tried, through General Thomas and Admiral Canaris and others to prevent this disaster.
Q Do I understand you correctly that when you use the word "group" you mean the group which was led by Beck, in which Schacht participated?
Q Now, tell us please, at that time weren't there again conversations by Schacht in Switzerland?
A That was a little bit later. In the meantime, in 1941, and after this journey of Schacht's into Switzerland, he tried to plead for a peace conference as soon as possible. He knew that Hitler was concerned with the attack on Russia, and we believed that we should do everything to avert, if possible, this disaster. myself took part in the bringing about of a dinner with Mr. McKittrick, which took place in Basel, and I know that Schacht tried to express the thought that everything would have to be done to initiate negotiations.
DR. DIX: In this connection I would like to remind the Tribunal most respectfully that an article in the Basler Nachrichten, which I read when we discussed the admissibility of documents, deals with the meeting of Schacht and an American economist.
That article deals with the same journey which the witness is discussing now, and I would like to refer to that later. BY DR. DIX:
Q Now, the war was on. Do you have anything to say about the imminent war with Russia and the actual war with Russia? catastrophe.
Q Now, let us turn to the time of Stalingrad. What happened and what was done by your group after this critical period in the war? generals to a Putsch, we then tried to win them to a Putsch when they had met disaster and this huge catastrophe. been predicted by Dock since November of 1942. Immediately, we made all preparations because this had been prophesied with almost mathematical exactitude when the army of Paulus had been defeated and had to capitulate, so that even at this period of time a military Putsch could be organized. discussions raid preparations. I can testify to one point, that this time much had been prepared for keeping in touch with Field Marshal Witzleben. Again, things turned out differently because Field Marshal Paulus capitulated, did not give us the cue word, which Kluge, to start the Putsch in the East.
Q Was this the time of the so-called Schnaberndorf?
Q Then I have an intermediary question. Up to now you have told us the aim of Beck's group, and you described it as a Putsch movement. That is a group which wanted the downfall of the government. Wasn't the aim increased now, so that we may speak of an assassination?
A Yes. From the moment when the general again deserted us, we saw that a Putsch was not to be hoped for, and from that moment on we tried to take every step to bring about an assassination.
DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and OKW): Mr. President, I must object to the testimony of the witness Dr. G isevius. His testimony has incriminated the group which I represent, but this testimony is so general that it cannot be referred to as fact. Furthermore, he has just said that the Field Marshal in the East had deserted his group.
These expositions are judgments of the witness, but they are not fact. tion by the Court that the testimony of the witness as made, in which he asserted that the general had deserted and had let his group down, be stricken from the record.
DR. DIX: May I please reply briefly I am sorry I cannot agree with the opinion of my valued colleague in objecting to the statement that the generals let them down and saying that it was not the testimony of the facts.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we need to hear further argument upon it. It certainly won't be stricken from the record until we have had time to consider it, and Dr. Laternser will have his opportunity of examining this witness and he can then elucidate any evidence he wants to.
DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, if I put the motion with the reason that the witness is giving testimony which is far above his scope as a witness, and that he is giving his judgment, it seems to me a matter of testimony which is inadmissible and should be stricken.
THE PRESIDENT: If you mean that the evidence is hearsay, that will be perfectly obvious to the Tribunal, and doesn't make the evidence inadmissible, and you will be able to cross examine him about it.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I may have been misunderstood. I am not basing my request that it be stricken from the record on the allegation that the witness made statements from hearsay, but I am just saying that he is stating a judgment. He is not giving reasons for facts, and he says that the general in the East let his group down.
DR. DIX: May I answer briefly with just one sentence: If I try to influence a group of generals for a Putsch, and if they do not Putsch, that is a fact and I can say about this fact, "They let us down." I can only say, "They did not Putsch", but that is merely a matter of expression, but both are fact and not judgment. We are concerned with the action of the general in an ethical or military sense.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on. BY DR. DIX:
the policy of the conspirator group changed from Putsch to an attempt at assassination, is that correct?
Q Can you tell us anything further about this item?
A You had asked me about the first step. Since Beck had given up all hope of bringing the generals to a Putsch, at that time it was said, "Now there is nor thing left for us but to free Germany, Europe, and the world through a bomb attack Immediately after this decision, the preparation for this was started.
Oster talked with Lahousen. Lahousen took the bomb from his arsenal. The bomb was taker to the headquarters of Kluge at Smolensk, and with all means we tried to bring about the assassination and the assassination was unsuccessful only because at the occasion of Hitler's visit to the front, the bomb which had been put in his airplane did not explode. This was in the spring of 1943.
Q Now, in the Abwehr, OKW, something took place which influenced matters, which influenced Schacht and also as to your remaining in Germany.
Willyou please describe that? OKW and at the request of Schellenberg an investigation against the group Canaris was started. A special conference was called on the first day of this investigation and Oster was dismissed from his office and a number of his colleagues were arrested. A short time thereafter Canaris was dismissed from his post. I myself could not remain in Germany after this time and this group which had carried on this conspiracy had been eliminated. Schacht as Reich Minister without Portfolio. Were you together with Schacht at about that time?
A Yes. By accident I happened to be in Berlin on that day and I saw how this letter of dismissal arrived. It was an unusually sharp letter and I remember that during the night I was asked to the country estate of Schacht and since it stated in the letter that Schacht for the time being was to be dismissed we were wondering whether he was to be arrested.
DR. DIX: I would like to remind the Tribunal that I read this letter when Lammers was examined and this letter of dismissal from Hitler to Lammers has been read into the record and is contained in my document book. BY DR. DIX: Berlin. How did that happen?
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the 20th of July, 1944?
DR. DIX: Yes, the well-known day of the20th of July. We are almost at the end now.
A (Continuing) A few months after the elimination of the CanarisOster circle or group General Olbricht was interested in founding a new group. At that time Count von Staufenberg went into action. He replaced Oster in all activities and after several months and after many unsuccessful attempts and discussions in July 1944, when matters were ripe, I secretly returned to Berlin in order to participate in these events.
Q You had no direct connection with Schacht at this attempted assassination?
Staufenberg and it was agreed expressly at this time that no other civilian except Goerdler and Lauschner and myself were to be instructed and informed in this matter. We tried to spare and protect lives so that we did not initiate anyone except these we had to. to you.
Schacht had high positions of state under the Hitler regime. You, doctor, were as is shown by your testimony today an arch enemy of the Hitler regime. Despite that you had, as can be seen from your testimony today, special confidence in Schacht. How can you explain the prima vista and this fact which seems to be contradictory in itself? will try to be as brief as possible. But I would like to emphasize that as far as the problem of Schacht is concerned, I was not the only one who had headaches as to this matter but my friends as well. Schacht always placed a question, presented a puzzle to us. Perhaps the contradictory nature of this man is the answer. He had a position in the Hitler regime but indubitably he entered the Hitler regime for patriotic reasons. I would like to testify that from the moment duplicity or deception became known to him he decided for the same patriotic reasons to join the opposition. Despite the many puzzles and contradictions which Schacht presented to us we stayed with Schacht as he had tremendous courage and he had a strong line of ethics so that he did not believe only in German ideals but in the ideals of humanity. That is why we stayed with him; that is why we considered him one of us and if you ask me personally I can say that the doubts which I had about him many times were dispersed during the dramatic events of 1938 and 1939 and I buried all these doubts and thoughts emphatically. that. It is a joy to me to be able to testify to this here now.
DR: DIX: Your Lordship, I am now at the end of my questioning of this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants' counsel want to ask questions of the witness? BY DR. BOEHM (Counsel for the SA): the Steel Helmet organization. What were the dates of your membership? in 1933. You know that without exception they were men who had served in the First world War. I would like to ask you now whether the domestic policies which the Stahlhelm followed, whether the aims they set were to be reached in a legal manner or in another way? for the legal way. Versailles, which every organization of national tendencies took up, done in a legal manner or in a revolutionary manner, that is was force intended in the carrying through of this fight? but I can say those members of the Stahlhelm organization whom I knew, they were for the legal way.
Q Is it correct to say that in the year 1932 and '33 hundreds of thousand, without exception, without differentiation as to party and race, entered the Stahlhelm organization?
A Yes, that is correct. The more things came to a head in Germany, the more critical they became, the more people had rightist, that is Stahlhelm tendencies. I myself saw the Stahlhelm grow for I was a speaker and I saw the increase from 1929 to 1933 and experienced it. I would like to picture it as such, that those who did not want to join the NACP and the SA deliberatel entered the Stahlhelm so that within the German sphere there would be a counter balance against the rising brown tide. That was the tenor ofour recruiting for the Stahlhelm.
I thought I would like to ask you on this occasion whether it was up to the individual member of the Stahlhelm to say no or to protest in any way against his being taken over into the SA. Reich.
Q What would have been the possible consequences? with the SA leader or Party leader. At that time I was not a Stahlhelm member and I can say that it must have been very hard for many people to make the decision to reject the transfer into the SA. Minister Selte at the top had been betrayed or as it was said during that time, sold into the SA. A nontransfer into the SA was a sign of distrust against National Socialism.
Q From my correspondence with the former members of the Stahlhelm, it may be seen that these people who, as former members of the Stahlhelm, were taken over into the SA, remained a foreign body and were in steady and constant opposition against the NSDAP and the SA.
Is that correct? only say that I assume that these meters of the Stahlhelm did not feel very much at home in their new surroundings. since 1934, took part in crimes against the peace, against the church, and so forth? You talked rather freely yesterday regarding the SA leaders. I would like to ask you to limit your answers to a circle of SA members, which would differentiate between the simple SA man and the Brigadefuehrer. leader -- and I remember the statements you made yesterday -- could you tell that these people intended to commit crimes against the peace?
A Of course, it is very hard to answer such a general question. If you are asking me about the SA men, I can only say no. into concentration camps?
A Yes, I saw that many times. Many SA men were interned in 1933, 1934 and 1935, in those years; that is, when it was my official capacity to observe these things. They were arrested by the Gestapo, beaten to death, were tortured, and were put into concentration camps. could they judge from the activity of the SA, from an individual to the entire membership, and gather that the SA intended to commit crimes against the peace?
A No. If I recall correctly, the higher command of the OKW tried to find out whether Hitler was planning a war; and, of course, I cannot assume that a simple SA man would have knowledge of something that we ourselves did not know positively.
Q The prosecution asserted that the SA incited the youth and the German people to war.
You were a member of the Gestapo. Did you observe anything like that? An activity along those lines could not escape your notice.
A That is another tremendously general question. I do not know how far certain thoughts would have been looked upon as war-like, but I cannot imagine that in the years up until 1938, among the mass of the SA, that there was a different opinion and mood from the mass of the German people; and the opinion was that the thought of war was utter nonsense. SA intended to commit crimes against peace, or that they had already committed such crimes?
AAs far as the simple SA man is concerned, I must say "no" again, and this is true of the mass of the SA people. As far as the higher leaders are concerned, that I do not know. However, the mass of the membership did not know about such things and had not been trained for that. series of SA men, that they committed acts for which they should be punished. You know the SA and know what took place during revolutionary periods and afterwards. Are you in a position to give me an estimate, on a percentage basis, of just how many of the members of the SA acted in such a way that they should be punished? 1932 or 1933, the SA-
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. Dr. Boehm. The Tribunal doesn't think that is a proper question to put to a witness, what percentage of a group of this sort, of hundreds of thousands of men, take a certain view.
DR. BOEHM: This question seems to be very important for my case, Mr. President. We are concerned here with a witness who was outside the SA, who belonged to the Gestapo, and as such was perhaps one of the few who could look into the activities of the SA, and actually did look into them. He seems to be a man who will create and get the confidence of the Tribunal.
I wanted him to state the number of the SA membershipwho should have been punished. He is one of the few who can give any testimony in that connection. I believe that if the witness is in a position to give his testimony here, the testimony given by him will be of great importance to the Tribunal also.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that not only this witness, but other witnesses, are not in a position to give such evidence, and the question is denied. BY DR. BOEHM: to the SA? members were arrested by the Gestapo. these men, and how many? Unfortunately, there were many who committed misdeeds and who ran around scott free.
Q What relation were they to the entire SA, as a membership?
THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question over again. BY DR. BOEHM:
Q Do you know under what circumstances one could leave the SA? here also.
DR. BOEHM: I have no further questions. BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff, OKW): colleague Dr. Dix, that after the defeat at Stalingrad a military putsch was to be organized. You testified at that point that discussions had already taken place, as well as the fact that preparations had been made, and that the execution or carrying through of the military putsch was prevented because the Field Marshal in the East had let down the conspirator's group. can follow your conclusion after the Field Marshal let down this conspirator's group. Generaloberst Beck tried to get in touch with this other Field Marshal. He wrote letters and he sent couriers. I remember, above all, correspondence with General Field Marshal von Mannstein, and I saw the answer of von Mannstein in the year 1942. I had this reply in my hand. lost, von Mannstein could reply only that the war was not 1 st so long as one did not consider it as lost. Beck said that an answer like that from the Field Marshal--he said that as long as he had a reply like that, strategic questions could not be dealt with. Marshal von Mannstein. General Treskow, also a victim of the 20th of July, journeyed to the headquarters of Mannstein. Oberstleutnant von Schulenburg also went to the headquarters of Mannstein. However, it was not possible to win von Mannstein for our side.
and he again tried to get in touch and win Mannstein. This time discussions went so far that Kluge gave us definite assurances, and he also assured us that a discussion could be had in the Fuehrer's headquarters, and the date was set. Because of the importance of that day, a special telephone connection was made from headquarters, from Fellgiebel to the OKW in Berlin. This telephonic connection was established, and I personally was present when this telephone conversation took place. Even today I can see the stack of paper in which it was said, in sober words, that Mannstein, against and contrary to the agreement made previously, had permitted himself to be persuaded by Hitler to remain in office. And Kluge was satisfied, with very small military concessions. like to emphasize and repeat again what Beck said at that time when we were let down.
Q What other preparations had been made in this special connection? Witzleben was the commander of the entire West, and for that reason he was very important for the bringing about of a putsch in the West. We had further direct agreements with the military governor of Belgium, General von Falkenhausen. In addition, just like on the 20th of July, 1944, we had a certain quota of armored troops in the vicinity of Berlin, and had deployed them there. Furthermore, the commanders of the troops involved had been called together in the OKW in case these people were to act.
Q That was all at the time of Stalingrad? that, would have to be made.
Q Yes. What were the reasons why this intended military putsch was not carried through?
A What was that?
Q Witness, what were the reasons why this putsch was not carried through?
was the first known mass capitulation; it was something which we had not expected. Paulus, before the capitulation, gave out a call to the Eastern Front and to the German people, in which the strategy of Hitler and the giving over of Stalingrad were branded.
With this clew work Kluge wanted to say that in the future he would not take any further military orders from Hitler and, through this chain of events, we hoped to circumvent the problem of the oath which always gave him trouble, so that one field marshal after the other would refuse military obedience to Hitler, and Back was to take over the supreme military command in Berlin.
Q Witness, you just mentioned the military oath. Do you know anything about the fact whether Blomberg and Beck resisted or tried to resist when the armed forces took their oath to Hitler? cribed the day of his giving of the oath to Hitler as theblackest day of his life and gave me an exact picture of how he personally felt. He told me that he had been summoned to a military roll call; and that suddenly it was said that an oath of allegiance was to be given to thenew head of state; that a new oath was to be used; and Beck never rid himself of the terrible thought that at that time he perhaps should not have given his oath. And he told me that while he was on his way home, he had told one of his colleagues, "This is the blackest day of my life." Polish campaign and the Western campaign, that is with the beginning of the Western campaign, a further military putsch was to be tried, and that this putsch never materialized because Halder and Fieldmarshal von Brauchitsch evaded it, and you used the term "ausgewiesen." And now I'm asking you to tell me just how you arrived at this opinion. Give me the facts for your opinion that they had evaded -
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not raise an objection that this is harmful to us if we hove plenty of time, but this evidence as to these putsche, and threatened putsches and rumored putsches and rumored putsches was all admissible here in our view only as bearing on the attitude of the defendant Schacht's. We are not trying these generals, for being in a putsch or not being in a putsch. For allpurposes it is just as well as they should not be i a putsch. I do not know what purpose this can have in doing it over again, I call the Tribunal's attention for the limited purpose which this historical matter was admitted and suggest that it is serving no purpose in this connection to review it.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the answer to that, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: Since the witness talked about this complex of questions and testified that Halder and Brauchitsch evaded and I am not in a position to determine whether the judgement used by the witness is correct as seen by the facts, I believe I am obligated to clarify this point. Rather generally, I would like to add that, as far as the Prosecution is concerned, the justification is there for the prosecution to enter into this point. I would like to refer to the contention of the French Prosecutor in which he said that in allthese circumstances it was beyond comprehension why the whole German people did not rise to a man against the entire regime. That is, if I am to start with the assertion of the Prosecution, then my questioning of this point is of great importance, and I, therefore, ask that I may be permitted to ask this question.
THE PRESIDENT: The charge against the High Command is not that they were a criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter; that is to say that they planned an aggressive war or that they committed war crimes or crimes against humanity in connection with an aggressive war. Well, whether or not they took part or were planning to take part in a putsch to stop the war does not seem very material to any of those questions.
DR. LATERNSER: I agree with you, Mr. President, that it is not of special importance. On the other hand, I believe that if a point -
THE PRESIDENT: I did not say that it was not of special importance. I say thatit was not material to the relevancy. The Tribunal does not think that any of these questions are relevant.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw my question. I have one more and that will be my final question. BY DR. LATERNSER: 20th of July participated in the assassination?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what has that got to do with any charge against the High Command?
DR. LATERNSER: The General Staff is accused of having been a participant in a conspiracy. The question -
THE PRESIDENT: We are not here to consider the honor of the High Command. We are here to consider whether or not they are a criminal organiza tion within the meaning of the Charter, and that is the only question with which we are going to deal with so far as you are concerned.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the General Staff and the OKW is accused of having been participant in a conspiracy. If I prove, and I am trying to do that with this question, that of this General Staff on the contrary took part in an action against the regime, then the answer of my question to this point can be used that the opposite was true; and, for that reason, I ask that I be able to put my question.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think what the General Staff did in July, 1944, when the circumstances were entirely different to what they were in September, 1939, has any relevancy to the question whether they took part, either before or in September, '39.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I put myself on the side of the Prosecution, I must assume that the Prosecution assumes that the conspiracy continued. I have not seen from anything that has been submitted that the conspiracy stopped or supposedly stopped at a certain period of time. So that the answering of this question seems to be of importance. I would like to supplement my statement, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Laternser.
DR. LATERNSER: I wanted to add, Your Honor, that just as far as the membership of my group is concerned, the period of time between '38 and '45 -