Q And now, having come back from Switzerland, what happened next, particularly with reference to Schacht?
the crisis of August and that the generals could not be deterred from the view that Hitler was only bluffing and that there would only be another Munich or another Prague. And now all those desperate efforts began, which we made in order to influence the loading generals, and, in particular, Keitel, hoping that the final order to march against Poland would not be given.
Q But let's come back to Schacht's return from the Swiss journey in spring of '39. You know that Schacht left Germany and made a journey to India? possible; then to go to China. But on the way the order reached him, coming from Hitler, that he was prohibited from touching upon Chinese soil and that he had to return. He came Back a few days before theoutbreak of war.
Q Did Schacht have sympathies for Chiang-Kai-Chek against Japan?
A Yes, he did. He sympathized to quite an extent with the Chinese Government, just as we all did. We all have quite a number of good and dear Chinese friends with whom we attempt to keep in touch because of the Japanese agreement pact.
Q When did Schacht come back, roughly, from India?
A I think it was the beginning of August; I'm not certain.
Q Now, the first turning towards war. Did Schacht, before the outbreak of war, take any steps to prevent the outbreak of war? individually since that would create the impression that only Schacht was taking these steps, whereas, in fact, the situation was that a large number of people were now fighting and that everybody took just those steps which were most obvious to him and everybody informed the other regarding what he had done and if the other considered that suitable. It is for that reason that I am afraid that it would be a completely erroneous picture if I described individually only those steps taken by Schacht personally, leaving out all the other desperate efforts made in August '39 until the attack on Holland and Belgium.
Schacht was doing something, but, after all, we are talking about Schacht's case and I should like to ask you, therefore, to confine yourself to the description of Schacht's efforts. knew of all these matters and were in fact fellow perpetrators. As far as he is concerned, I can only say at this particular moment that Schacht was a fellow author of the Thomas memorandum, addressed to General Keitel, or in fact the two memoranda, in which Schacht, together with our group, pointed out the dangers of war to Keitel. And, further, I can say that afterwards Schacht, through Thomas and Cararis, was taking steps to intervene with Brauchitsch and Halder. But I must emphasize that all the steps taken by Beck and Goerdeler were taken with full knowledge of Schacht and all his participants. This is a very large action.
Q But doesn't an attempt of Schacht's play a special part that at the very last moment, at the end of August, Canaris was used to approach Brauchitsch?
A Yes. After the attempt of Thomashad failed, after these two memoranda had failed, and after Thomas had talked to Keitel and asked him to see Goerdeler, Schacht had failed. Schacht tried to approach Brauchitsch or Halder. For that purpose Halder paid frequent visits to General Halder and it was typical that during those critical days he could not get past the anteroom of Halder's office and that he could not get past General von Stuelpnagel. Halder denied his presence and had only a message delivered that he didn't want to see Schacht. Subsequently, on the dramatic 25th of August, we took yet another step; that is the day when Hitler had already once given the order to march. As soon as the news of that reached us, the news that Hitler had given the order to march to Halder, Schacht attempted, together with me, first of all, to get in touch with Thomas and then, together with Thomas, we went to see Admiral Canaris, so that both Thomas and Canaris should accompany Schacht when he without previous announcement would go to the headquarters to the Fuehrer, so as to put Brauchitsch and Halder before the accomplished fact of his being present there.
accordance with the existing constitution, before the outbreak of a war, the Reich Cabinet should be heard. Brauchitsch and Halder would commit perjury if they, without knowledge of the political influences concerned, would give an order for a war. That generally or in principle was what Schacht intended to say so as to give a motive for that step of his. straight to Canaris.
DR. DIX: It was the OKW, My Lord, situated on Bendlerstrasse. He meant the OKW or the OKH, rather.
A (Continuing) When we arrived, the OKW were waiting at a corner downstairs at the street. Canaris was sending Oster down to us. And that was the moment when Hitler suddenly, between six and seven in the evening, withdraw his marching order to Halder. The Tribunal will no doubt remember that Hitler, impressed by the renewed intervention on Mussolini's part, quite suddenly withdrew the marching order which had already been given. Unfortunately, Canaris and Thomas and all our friends were now under the impression that this withdrawal of an order to march was an unheard of loss of prestige for Hitler. Oster thought that it was unparalleled in the history of war that a supreme commander had withdrawn such an important order in the cause of a nervous breakdown. And Canaris said, "Now the peace in Europe is saved for fifty years, because now Hitler haslost all reputation before the generals." And, unfortunately, because of this psychological change, we all became victims of the impression that we could look forward to the following days peacefully. decisive order to march, this was a surprise, a total surprise for our group as well. Oster called me to the OKW. Schacht accompanied me. And when we asked Canaris whether he couldn't arrange a renewed conference with Brauchitsch and Halder, Canaris said, "It is too late now."
He had tears in his eyes, and he said, "That is the end of Germany."
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we now come to the war, and I think that we perhaps better deal with the war after lunch.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
BY DR. DIX:
Q Dr. Gisevius, before the morning recess we had just arrived at the discussion of the outbreak of the war, and so that your subsequent testimony may be understood, I have to ask you first what use you were put to during the war. called in by General Oster. Since it was a regulation that all officers or other members of the Abwehr had to be checked by the Gestapo, and since I would never have received permission to be a member of the Abwehr, they just used the means of giving me a forged mobilization order. Then I was at the disposal of Canaris without doing any direct service. constituency you have already mentioned? Who participated in this group, and what was done? head of all oppositional movements, all oppositional movements which were active in Germany with the exception of the Communists with whom we were not in touch at that time. We were of the opinion that only a General could have the position of leadership during the war, and Beck was so far above the purely military that he was the man to unify all groups from the left to the right. Dr. Goerdeler was called in as his first assistant. and Goerdeler?
A Oh, no. I must add something. On the contrary, now all oppositional groups who had just had vague connections with each other, now they were unified, and especially the left oppositional movement, which had been decimated in the first years since their leaders had been interned.
like to mention Leuschler and Dr. Karl Muehlendorf, but I must also recall Dr. Habermann, Dr. Kaiser, the Christian and Catholic circles, the leaders of the other religious movements, and the political men like Ambassador von Hassel, State Secretary Plank, Minister Popitz, and many, many others. the question of a Putsch or of a forceful doing away with Hitler or a plot on him? Did they have the same thought that perhaps a plot of an assassination, which later took place, might come through? strongly, that the Dolchstoss legend had done much damage, and the leftist circles believed that they did not want to expose themselves to the danger that it could be said later on that Hitler or the German Army had not been conquered at the front. The leftist wing had been of the opinion for years that now it must be proved to the German people at all costs that militarism had murdered itself in Germany. letter which you, Doctor, wrote approximately at this time--that is, about the end of 1939--which you smuggled to Switzerland for Schacht. It is a letter to the former president of the International Bank at Basel, and then president of the First National Bank of New York. This is a man of influence, and who probably had access to President Roosevelt. the admissibility of evidence I submitted the most essential points, and since Justice Jackson does not have the document book before him and remarked just a little while age that he did not like it especially if I were to start using documents, I will dispense with carrying through my original intention.
I will read this letter later on when I cite my documents, but in order to refresh the witness' memory about this letter, I will give you the quintessence of the contents of the letter, that Schacht made the suggestion to Frazier that now the moment had come-
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I make no objection to the use of the letter from Schacht to leon Frazier as one banker writing to another. If you want to claim that Mr. Frazier was influential with President Roosevelt, I should want you to prove it, but I have no objection to the letter.
DR. DIX: The letter is dated the 14th of January 1946. I will not read it in its entirety, for there are six long pages.
THE PRESIDENT: What date was it?
DR. DIX: I had the wrong letter. The 16th of October 1939. It will be Exhibit Number 31 in my document book.
"It is said that now would be the proper moment so that President Roosvelt could give peace to the world."
THE PRESIDENT: Is the letter from Schacht?
DR. DIX: Yes, written by Schacht to Frazier.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have proof for the letter?
DR. DIX: If the High Tribunal would prefer it that way, then Schacht can use that letter, Then in that case I will only ask the witness whether it is true that he smuggled this letter into Switzerland. May I do that? BY DR. DIX:
A Yes. I took this letter to Switzerland and mailed it there.
Q Very well. That happened in the sense of the bringing about of peace, or against the expansion of war. As far as your group is concerned, that is, your oppositional or conspiracy group, did you carry through other foreign political activities? means at our disposal, and the expansion of the war could be done through Holland, Belguim or Norway. We knew and saw clearly that if a step was taken in this direction, tremendous consequences, not only for Germany, but for all of Europe would result. Therefore, with all the means at our disposal we wanted to prevent the spread of the war in the West.
troops from the East to the West, and to bring about the attack on Holland and Belgium and to violate their neutrality. during the coming winter months we would gain so much time so that the individual Generals at the top, such as Brauchitsch and Halder and the leaders of the army groups, could be convinced by us that they should at least oppose the expansion of the war. Brauchitsch and Halder evaded and said it was too late now, that the opposition would fight Germany to the end and destroy her; but we did not share this opinion. We believed a peace with honor was still possible, and what I mean by honor is that we of course would eliminate the Nazi domination until the very end.
The purpose of showing and proving to the generals that the foreign countries did not wish to destroy the German people but wanted to protect themselves only against the Nazi terrors for that proof we undertook allpossible steps abroad and a small fragment in the attempt was the letter written by Schacht to Frazier (?), which was confirmed with hintings and showing that certain domestic political developments were imminent and that if we could gain time, that is, after we had lived through the winter, we could interest the generals in a putsch, in a revolution.
DR. DIX: May I interrupt you for a moment. I would like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the witness is referring to a hint contained in the letter. This letter is in English. I have no German translation and I must therefore read this sentence. It is that "the earlier discussions would be opened, the easier it will be to influence the development of existing conditions." BY DR. DIX:
Q Now, I would like to ask you: What did Dr. Schacht mean with the words "certain existing conditions are to be influenced," did he mean your efforts and aims?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I must interpose an objection. I am not sure whether you have misunderstood it. I think that what Schacht meant is not a question to be addressed to this witness. I shall have no objection to Dr. Schacht telling us what he meant by his cryptic language, but I don't think that this witness can interpret what Schacht meant unless he has some information apart from anything that now appears. I don't want to be overtechnical about this, but it does seem to me that this is the sort of question which should be reserved for Dr. Schacht himself.
DR. DIX: Mr. Justice Jackson, of course, is correct but the witness said the letter was sent to Switzerland and I assume he discussed the contents of the letter with Schacht and would therefore be in a position to explain the cryptic words.
THE PRESIDENT: He didn't say he had; he hasn't said he ever saw the letter except the outside of it. He hasn't said he ever saw the letter. BY DR. DIX:
contents? clearly. I helped in working out the letter. I was there when the letter was drafted and when it was written.
DR. DIX: Then I believe Justice Jackson will withdraw his objection.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. BY DR. DIX: words? certain developments and now that the expected and encouraging word from the other side -- but I do not want any misunderstandings to arise here. In this letter it is also shown very clearly that President Roosevelt had been disappointed on many scores to the German side, so that we had to ask him and beg him to take up steps. President Roosevelt had taken various steps.
Q Now, if I may give you the clue word, Vatican action? we tried to get a declaration from the British Government, and we were interested in it and again it was out attempt -
THE PRESIDENT: Is the original of this letter still available or is this only given from memory?
DR. DIX: The original document, yes, that is a letter signed by Schacht. That is here and that was kept during the war in Switzerland and now brought back for statements by this witness. BY DR. DIX:
A We tried at all cost to prove to General Halder and Obeis ? that this theory was wrong, that there could be no more dealings with a decent German government. We believed that we would have to follow a certain way and a sure way. The Holy Father was trying himself to bring about some sort of solution in this matter, for the British Government had become unsure, and rightly so, whether the trustworthy group was existing in Germany, a group with which it could actually talk and I remember that shortly thereafter the Venlo incident took place at which, under the excuse of a German oppositional group, people who were under the English Secret Service had been kidnapped at the Dutch Border.
Therefore, we were interested in proving that here there was a group which washonestly trying and which would stand by its word, positively and negatively, and I believe we kept our word in what we said equally truthfully and friendly, that we could not bring about this putsch as we said before but that was our hope. These negotiations took place, started during October and November 1939. Later on, in the spring, they were concluded and when I am asked I shall continue.
Q Please tell us about the conclusion of these associations? of 1939, actually General Halder was concerned with putsch intentions and that these intentions came to naught, for at the very last minute Hitler called off the Western Offensive--confirmed by the position of Halder at that time, we believed that we should continue these negotiations and discussions at the Vatican. We reached what you might call a gentleman's agreement and I believe that I may say and make the assertion, that we could give the generals unequivocal proof, but in the case of the downfall of the Hitler regime, an agreement with a decent civil German government, that agreement could be reached.
Q Did you see all these proofs and materials of this? in a comprehensive report and this report--Dr. Schacht and Hassell worked with these reports before it was given to Halder by Thomas. Halder was quite taken with this and gave this report to von Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch was dismayed and threatened to arrest the middleman Thomas; then this action had come to naught.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the last notes that I have got down in my notebook are these, "that we knew that if Holland, Belgium and the other countries were attacked, it would have very grave consequences and we therefore negotiated with Halder and Brauchitsch and they weren't prepared to help us to stop the war at that time. We wanted peace with honor, eliminating politics.
We took all possible steps." Well, now, since I took those notes down, I think we spent nearly ten minutes in details which are utterly irrelevant about further negotiations. If they took all possible steps, what is the point of giving us these details about it?
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, if a witness is called in a matter of such tremendous importance where he has always to figure with the counsel of accused, and must believe that people who are of a different opinion from his, these are just generalities, please give us particulars and facts; and then I cannot dispense with the facts that the witness must testify to a thorough negotiation with the Pope in the Vatican, than if he just said that the result of this action was a comprehensive report which was submitted -
THE PRESIDENT: I agree with you that the one sentence about some negotiations with the Vatican may have been properly given but all the rest of it were unnecessary details.
DR. DIX: We have concluded this chapter, your Lordship. BY DR. DIX: November but that it did not arise because the Western Offensive did not arise; therefore, we need not enter into this conversation. I would like to ask you at this point, during the winter and spring, was the winter and spring uneventful as far as your group is concerned or were further plans made and whether acted upon?
and Brauchitsch. Aside from these two gentlemen, we tried to reach the generals in the West. and General Hoepner. We also tried to reach Field Marshal Rundstedt, Beck, and Leeb, and tried to influence then also. But here, General Thomas was an intermediary.
Q And how did they react, these generals?
Q Now, we are coming to the summer of 1941. Hitler is in Paris. The aerial offensive against England is imminent. What was the picture at that time in your group and in your activity as conspirators?
AAfter Paris, our group was without influence for months. The success of Hitler influenced everyone, and it took much effort on our part to use all the avenues of approach open to us and to try at least to prevent the bombardment of England. Here also again the group acted in unison, and we tried, through General Thomas and Admiral Canaris and others to prevent this disaster.
Q Do I understand you correctly that when you use the word "group" you mean the group which was led by Beck, in which Schacht participated?
Q Now, tell us please, at that time weren't there again conversations by Schacht in Switzerland?
A That was a little bit later. In the meantime, in 1941, and after this journey of Schacht's into Switzerland, he tried to plead for a peace conference as soon as possible. He knew that Hitler was concerned with the attack on Russia, and we believed that we should do everything to avert, if possible, this disaster. myself took part in the bringing about of a dinner with Mr. McKittrick, which took place in Basel, and I know that Schacht tried to express the thought that everything would have to be done to initiate negotiations.
DR. DIX: In this connection I would like to remind the Tribunal most respectfully that an article in the Basler Nachrichten, which I read when we discussed the admissibility of documents, deals with the meeting of Schacht and an American economist.
That article deals with the same journey which the witness is discussing now, and I would like to refer to that later. BY DR. DIX:
Q Now, the war was on. Do you have anything to say about the imminent war with Russia and the actual war with Russia? catastrophe.
Q Now, let us turn to the time of Stalingrad. What happened and what was done by your group after this critical period in the war? generals to a Putsch, we then tried to win them to a Putsch when they had met disaster and this huge catastrophe. been predicted by Dock since November of 1942. Immediately, we made all preparations because this had been prophesied with almost mathematical exactitude when the army of Paulus had been defeated and had to capitulate, so that even at this period of time a military Putsch could be organized. discussions raid preparations. I can testify to one point, that this time much had been prepared for keeping in touch with Field Marshal Witzleben. Again, things turned out differently because Field Marshal Paulus capitulated, did not give us the cue word, which Kluge, to start the Putsch in the East.
Q Was this the time of the so-called Schnaberndorf?
Q Then I have an intermediary question. Up to now you have told us the aim of Beck's group, and you described it as a Putsch movement. That is a group which wanted the downfall of the government. Wasn't the aim increased now, so that we may speak of an assassination?
A Yes. From the moment when the general again deserted us, we saw that a Putsch was not to be hoped for, and from that moment on we tried to take every step to bring about an assassination.
DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and OKW): Mr. President, I must object to the testimony of the witness Dr. G isevius. His testimony has incriminated the group which I represent, but this testimony is so general that it cannot be referred to as fact. Furthermore, he has just said that the Field Marshal in the East had deserted his group.
These expositions are judgments of the witness, but they are not fact. tion by the Court that the testimony of the witness as made, in which he asserted that the general had deserted and had let his group down, be stricken from the record.
DR. DIX: May I please reply briefly I am sorry I cannot agree with the opinion of my valued colleague in objecting to the statement that the generals let them down and saying that it was not the testimony of the facts.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we need to hear further argument upon it. It certainly won't be stricken from the record until we have had time to consider it, and Dr. Laternser will have his opportunity of examining this witness and he can then elucidate any evidence he wants to.
DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, if I put the motion with the reason that the witness is giving testimony which is far above his scope as a witness, and that he is giving his judgment, it seems to me a matter of testimony which is inadmissible and should be stricken.
THE PRESIDENT: If you mean that the evidence is hearsay, that will be perfectly obvious to the Tribunal, and doesn't make the evidence inadmissible, and you will be able to cross examine him about it.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I may have been misunderstood. I am not basing my request that it be stricken from the record on the allegation that the witness made statements from hearsay, but I am just saying that he is stating a judgment. He is not giving reasons for facts, and he says that the general in the East let his group down.
DR. DIX: May I answer briefly with just one sentence: If I try to influence a group of generals for a Putsch, and if they do not Putsch, that is a fact and I can say about this fact, "They let us down." I can only say, "They did not Putsch", but that is merely a matter of expression, but both are fact and not judgment. We are concerned with the action of the general in an ethical or military sense.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on. BY DR. DIX:
the policy of the conspirator group changed from Putsch to an attempt at assassination, is that correct?
Q Can you tell us anything further about this item?
A You had asked me about the first step. Since Beck had given up all hope of bringing the generals to a Putsch, at that time it was said, "Now there is nor thing left for us but to free Germany, Europe, and the world through a bomb attack Immediately after this decision, the preparation for this was started.
Oster talked with Lahousen. Lahousen took the bomb from his arsenal. The bomb was taker to the headquarters of Kluge at Smolensk, and with all means we tried to bring about the assassination and the assassination was unsuccessful only because at the occasion of Hitler's visit to the front, the bomb which had been put in his airplane did not explode. This was in the spring of 1943.
Q Now, in the Abwehr, OKW, something took place which influenced matters, which influenced Schacht and also as to your remaining in Germany.
Willyou please describe that? OKW and at the request of Schellenberg an investigation against the group Canaris was started. A special conference was called on the first day of this investigation and Oster was dismissed from his office and a number of his colleagues were arrested. A short time thereafter Canaris was dismissed from his post. I myself could not remain in Germany after this time and this group which had carried on this conspiracy had been eliminated. Schacht as Reich Minister without Portfolio. Were you together with Schacht at about that time?
A Yes. By accident I happened to be in Berlin on that day and I saw how this letter of dismissal arrived. It was an unusually sharp letter and I remember that during the night I was asked to the country estate of Schacht and since it stated in the letter that Schacht for the time being was to be dismissed we were wondering whether he was to be arrested.
DR. DIX: I would like to remind the Tribunal that I read this letter when Lammers was examined and this letter of dismissal from Hitler to Lammers has been read into the record and is contained in my document book. BY DR. DIX: Berlin. How did that happen?
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the 20th of July, 1944?
DR. DIX: Yes, the well-known day of the20th of July. We are almost at the end now.
A (Continuing) A few months after the elimination of the CanarisOster circle or group General Olbricht was interested in founding a new group. At that time Count von Staufenberg went into action. He replaced Oster in all activities and after several months and after many unsuccessful attempts and discussions in July 1944, when matters were ripe, I secretly returned to Berlin in order to participate in these events.
Q You had no direct connection with Schacht at this attempted assassination?
Staufenberg and it was agreed expressly at this time that no other civilian except Goerdler and Lauschner and myself were to be instructed and informed in this matter. We tried to spare and protect lives so that we did not initiate anyone except these we had to. to you.
Schacht had high positions of state under the Hitler regime. You, doctor, were as is shown by your testimony today an arch enemy of the Hitler regime. Despite that you had, as can be seen from your testimony today, special confidence in Schacht. How can you explain the prima vista and this fact which seems to be contradictory in itself? will try to be as brief as possible. But I would like to emphasize that as far as the problem of Schacht is concerned, I was not the only one who had headaches as to this matter but my friends as well. Schacht always placed a question, presented a puzzle to us. Perhaps the contradictory nature of this man is the answer. He had a position in the Hitler regime but indubitably he entered the Hitler regime for patriotic reasons. I would like to testify that from the moment duplicity or deception became known to him he decided for the same patriotic reasons to join the opposition. Despite the many puzzles and contradictions which Schacht presented to us we stayed with Schacht as he had tremendous courage and he had a strong line of ethics so that he did not believe only in German ideals but in the ideals of humanity. That is why we stayed with him; that is why we considered him one of us and if you ask me personally I can say that the doubts which I had about him many times were dispersed during the dramatic events of 1938 and 1939 and I buried all these doubts and thoughts emphatically. that. It is a joy to me to be able to testify to this here now.
DR: DIX: Your Lordship, I am now at the end of my questioning of this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants' counsel want to ask questions of the witness? BY DR. BOEHM (Counsel for the SA): the Steel Helmet organization. What were the dates of your membership? in 1933. You know that without exception they were men who had served in the First world War. I would like to ask you now whether the domestic policies which the Stahlhelm followed, whether the aims they set were to be reached in a legal manner or in another way? for the legal way. Versailles, which every organization of national tendencies took up, done in a legal manner or in a revolutionary manner, that is was force intended in the carrying through of this fight? but I can say those members of the Stahlhelm organization whom I knew, they were for the legal way.
Q Is it correct to say that in the year 1932 and '33 hundreds of thousand, without exception, without differentiation as to party and race, entered the Stahlhelm organization?
A Yes, that is correct. The more things came to a head in Germany, the more critical they became, the more people had rightist, that is Stahlhelm tendencies. I myself saw the Stahlhelm grow for I was a speaker and I saw the increase from 1929 to 1933 and experienced it. I would like to picture it as such, that those who did not want to join the NACP and the SA deliberatel entered the Stahlhelm so that within the German sphere there would be a counter balance against the rising brown tide. That was the tenor ofour recruiting for the Stahlhelm.