Q. And, briefly, what was the goal, what was the aim of that action? What were the Generals supposed to do?
A. It was the aim of the action to make it clear to Blomberg that the course was steering towards the radical, and that matters, as far as economic affairs were concerned, were deteriorating and also that the Gestapo terror must be stopped.
Q. So that at the time there were economic considerations and the consideration of terror, no danger of war.
A. No, only the radicalism.
Q. We now turn to 1937. You know that that was the year of Schacht's dismissal as Minister of Economy in the Reich. Did Schacht talk to you and tell you why he remained in office as Reichsbank President?
A. Yes. I have heard in detail and experienced, the fact about his release as Minister for Economy. On the one side there was an attempt of his to be released from the Ministry, and I think I am right in saying that this didn't happen very smoothly. Schacht told Lammers one day that if he didn't find himself in the possession of the official statement of his dismissal up to a certain date, he would in turn consider himself dismissed and inform the press accordingly. resign. Just like always before, whenever a man in an important office wanted to resign, the question cropped up whether the successor might not steer an even more radical course. Schacht was implored not to leave since the radical would then gain momentum in the economic field, and I only mention the name of Ley as the head of the labor front. hoping that he, as Reichsbank President, as he expressed it, could keep one foot in. He meant by that that he was imagining that he would still be able to have a general picture of the economic situation, and that from the Reichsbank he would be able to introduce certain economic, political measures.
members of the opposition, who implored him to adopt that very attitude and to keep that one foot in.
Q. Was that decision of his not influenced by his attitude and his judgment about some of the Generals, particularly Colonel General Fritzsch?
A. Yes, that is quite right. One of the greatest disasters was the fact that so many people in Germany were imagining that Fritzsch was a strong man. I had experienced it again and again, that high ranking officers, but also high ministerial officials, told me that we could remain quite satisfied; Fritzsch was watching out; Fritzsch was only waiting for the right moment; Fritzsch would one fine day cause a revolt and end the terror. close friend of Fritzsch, so we all lived in the completely wrong atmosphere where we imagined that one day the armed forces would revolt against the SS, instead of which the exact opposite occurred, namely, the bloodless revolt of the SS, which is the fanour Fritzsch crisis, at the end of which not only Fritzsch was relieved of his post but his entire armed forces leadership staff were beheaded, politically speaking, which meant -
Q. (Interposing): Forgive me if I interrupt you, but we shall come to the Fritzsch crisis later. At this moment -- this is of course 1938 -
A. Yes.
Q. At this moment, I should like to talk about Schacht's action in 1937 and exhaust it. It is mentioned in your book -- didn't some unsuccessful attempt and some journey to visit Kluge and a journey to Muenster, didn't that all play a part?
A. Yes, I had thought that I was supposed to be brief about that.
Q. Yes, please be brief.
A. There was a great effort on the part of Schacht to get in touch with Fritzsch. It wasn't possible to have a conversation in Berlin. It couldn't be arranged, and secretive steps were taken. It was arranged for Muenster, since General von Kluge was too scared to meet Schacht publicly at the time. There was a depressing to and fro, and the end result was that the two gentlemen couldn't find each other since it wasn't possible to bring together a minister in the Reich and a commanding general.
Q Where were you at the time? What were you doing? Were you still at Muenster, or was there a change?
Schacht wanted me to return to Berlin. You see, the more and more he found himself disappointed, the more he was inclined to listen to my warnings against an increasing radicalism and a revolt by the SS. that every man amongst the opposition felt that nasty things were being prepared. We, at that time, thought that there would be another bloody 30th of June, and we were trying to protect ourselves. It was Schacht who got in touch with Canaris through Oster, to express the wish that I should be brought to Berlin one way or another. No official department, however, could be found whach at that time would offer me a post, and I had no other choice but to go on leave as a civil servant, stating that I was carrying out economic studies.
Schacht acted with Canaris' and Oster's agreement, and arranged that I should be given such a post in a factory in Bremen, but I wasn't allowed to show myself there, and so I came to Berlin to join exclusively those of my friends who were there, to be at their disposal.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we are now corning to January 1938, the Fritszch crisis. I do not think that it would be useful to interrupt that part of the witness' evidence, and if I may, I would suggest that your Lordship now interrupt the session, or we should have to have at least another half-hour.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, we'll adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 25 April 1946 at 1000 hours).
BY DR. DIX:
Q Yesterday we came to January 1938. At that time you had gone to Berlin, and you had returned to a position which Schacht had constructed for you. You were now in continuous contact with your political friends, Schacht, Oster, Canaris and Nebe. Then, at the end, you testified that at that time, within your circle, you all had the impression that something was going to happen. the decisive, inner-political last step before the war. Will you please describe the entire course and the background of that crisis, especially in consideration of the fact that during the history of that crisis the march into Austria was made, and tell us everything in consideration of the position and the actions of Schacht, which are most important in that connection.
A First, I shall describe the course of the crisis as such; and it is correct that all my friends considered it the decisive last step before the outbreak of the war.
I shall, as briefly as possible, give you the facts. I consider it right, in order not to confuse the picture, that at first I shall leave out the personality of Schacht from the description, because the facts as such are complicated enough. In my description, at first, I will not point out where the information came from, but I shall wait until I am asked for that. report that the then Reich War Minister, Field Marshal von Blomberg, got married. Details about his wife, or pictures, were not given. A few days later the only picture appeared, which was a photo of the Marshal and his wife in front of the monkey cage at the Leipzig Zoo. A number of rumors started in the capital about the past of the Marshal's wife, indicating bad things.
appeared a thick file from which the following could be seen: Marshal von Blomberg's wife had been a prostitute who had been registered in the files of seven large German cities; she was in the Berlin Rogue's Gallery. I myself had seen the fingerprints and the pictures. Finally, she had been punished for distributing pornographic pictures. through channels, to the Chief of Police Himmler.
Q Excuse me, but who was the police President at that time in Berlin? Count Helldorf recognized that the passing on of that material to the Reichsfuehrer SS would put the armed forces in an impossible position, because then Himmler would have that material in his possession, which he could use for the moral finishing-off of Blomberg and for a coup against the leadership of the armed forces. Blomberg, the Chief of the Armed Forces Keitel, who, at that time, was related, through the marriage of both children, to Marshal Blomberg. Marshal, or Colonel-General Keitel at that time, looked carefully through these files and put the demand to Helldorf to cover up the entire scandal and to keep quiet about these files.
Q Excuse me, Dr. Gisevius. Please tell the Tribunal where you know that from. me, and through Oberregierungsrat, and later Reich Criminal Director, Nebe, who was still in Berlin at that time.
the consequences. He also refused to inform the Chief of the General Staff, Beck and the Chief of the Army, General Fritsch. He sent Count Heldorf off with the files to Goering. Heldorf submitted to defendant Goering the entire file. Goering asserted to know nothing about the pictures in the Rogues Gallery and the previous convictions of Blomberg's wife but already in that first conversation and during later conversations he admitted that he had known the following: first, that Marshal Blomberg several months age had already asked Goering whether it was admissible that he have an affair with a commoner. Shortly thereafter Blomberg had asked Goering whether he, Goering, would help him to obtain a dispensation to marry that lady, as he expressed himself, "with a past." his heart unfortunately still had another lover and he had to ask Goering to help him, Blomberg, to get rid of that lover.
Q Excuse me please. Goering told that to Heldorf and you found it out from Heldorf? found it out from other sources too. Goering thereafter sent that lover away by giving him foreign currency and shipping him to South America. In spite of that Goering did not inform Hitler about that prelude. Moreover, together with Hitler, he went as best man to the wedding on the 12th of January, the wedding of Marshal Blomberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal would wish to know how you suggest that these matters which appear to be personal are relevant to the charges and in what way they affect defendant Schacht or the defendant Goering or the defendant Frick?
DR. DIX: I am here only to serve the interests of the defendant Schacht. to conceive what revolutionary consequenceit had and what influence it had on Schacht and his circle with respect to the regime. I have said once before the thing in the career of Schacht that turned him from an admirer of Hitler to an enemy was the Fritsch crisis.
Tribunal could not get the same impression which Schacht had at that time. Indeed, in no way do I desire here to wash dirty laundry. I put these questions only with the purpose of having described the Fritsch crisis in all details and that must be done in understanding the further development of Schacht and the impression of the Fritsch crisis on the circle Canaris. Perhaps if one does not understand the entire atrocious extent of that crisis and thought it may be disagreeable, one has to decide to accept these things, partly personal things, and to take notice of them. It is absolutely necessary and important point of my defense.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please: line of testimony if it is to be considered whether admissible or not now. upon cross-examination upon several aspects. One is it shows the background of the incident of yesterday, which I think is important in appraising the truthfulness of testimony in this case.
The other thing is it bears upon the conspiracy to seize power. There were certain men in Germany that these conspirators had to get rid of. Some of then they could kill safely. Some of them, as we see from the Roehm purge when they went to killing they aroused some opposition, they had to strike down by other means and the means they used against Fritsch and Blomberg show the conspiracy to seize power and to get rid of the men who might stand in the way of aggressive warfare. of the German people in allowing those Nazis to get as far as they did, believi that here at least were two men who would guard their interests and the method by which those men were stricken dorm and removed from the scene we would consider an important part of the conspiracy story and I would ask to go into it on cross-examination. proceed now.
DR. DIX: May I say one more thing, please?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix.
The Tribunal thinks, in view of what you have said and what Mr. Justice Jackson has said, that your examination must continue andyou will no doubt try to confine it as much as you can to the political aspects of the matter.
DR. DIX: Of course, indeed, sir. But the personal matters are here of such political importance that it cannot be quite left out. BY DR. DIX:
Q Dr. Gisevius, you understand the difficulties of the situation. We want here only to bring up the material as far as it is necessary to understand the truth. We do not want anything concessional but where it is necessary to explain the development to the Tribunal and I ask you to speak quite frankly.
A I ask the Tribunal to realize also my difficulties. I myself do not realty like to speak about these things. that was that institution which carried out all the wire-tapping in the Third Reich. That Research Institute was not satisfied as has been described here to only tap telephone conversations and to decode messages but it had its own information service all the way down to their own employees who could make investigations. It was, therefore, quite possible also to get confidential information about Marshal von Blomberg's wife. give these files, to turn thorn over to Hitler. Hitler suffered a nervous breakdown and decided to dismiss Marshal Blomberg immediately. Hitler told the generals later in a public meeting his first thought was to appoint as successor for Blomberg Colonel General Fritsch. The moment he expressed that decision Goering and Himmler reminded him that that was not possible since Fritsch, by a file from the year 1935, was badly incriminated.
Q Excuse me, Doctor. What is your understanding, your impression of that conversation between Hitler and the generals?
A Several generals who took part in that meeting told me about it. I have said already that in the course of events which I will have to describe Hitler had made many personal statements and we also had in our possession original documents of the Reich War Court.
referred to the fact that the Gestapo in 1934 among other enemies of the state had come to the idea to consider also homosexuals as criminals and to prosecute them as such.
The Gestapo had gone into a search for material, from convicted inmates, about homosexuals. In the course of that, one of the inmates gave a terrible story, which was so atrocious that I will not repeat it here. May it suffice that that inmate said the man in question had been a Mr. Fritsch. The inmate could not remember the correct name.
The Gestapo then turned over these files to Hitler in 1935. Hitler was indignant about the contents. He expressed himself to the generals that of such a schweinerei he did not want to know anything. Hitler gave the order that these files should be burned immediately. files, and it was up to Heydrich still to produce these files which allegedly had been burned in 1935 and to submit them to Hitler, supplemented in the meantime by extensive investigation material. which he had had from Blomberg he beleived that he could expect all sorts of bad things from Fritsch also. of the prison from the prison to the Reich Chancellory. Goering threatened that inmate first in Karinhall to have him killed unless he would repeat his statements.
Q How do you know that?
A That was mentioned in the Reich war court. Then Fritsch was asked to come to the Reich Chancellery and Hitler pointed out what accusations had been made against him. Fritsch, a man of honor had received a confidential warning from Hitler's adjutant, but it had been so incomplete that Fritsch became quite shocked in the Reich Chancellery. He did not understand what Hitler intended to do. Indignantly he disputed and denied what allegedly he had done, in the presence of Goering. He gave Hitler his word of honor that all accusations ware false. But Hitler went to the nearest door, opened it, and that prisoner entered, raised his arm, pointed to Fritsch, and said, "That is he."
Fritsch was speechless. He could only demand that a court investigation be made. Hitler demanded his immediate resignation, under the condition that Fritsch should go silently and he would leave the matter be.
Fritsch turned to the chief of the general staff, Beck. Chief of the general staff Beck intervened with Hitler. A tremendous struggle came about to have an investigation made about these terrible accusations against Fritsch. That struggle lasted about a week. There were dramatic disputes in the Reich Chancellory. At the end the famous 4th of February approached, at which date the generals were ordered to come to Berlin, who until that day--that is to say, ten days since the dismissal of Blomberg and the relief of Fritsch--had no idea that both their superiors were no more in office. that they also were completely confused and had to be satisfied to accept that the affair should be investigated by the courts.
Q And did you know about the participants of that meeting?
A Yes. At the same time Hitler surprised the generals with the report that they had a new commander in chief, General von Brauchitsch. Some of the generals had in the meantime been relieved from duty, and on the previous evening that report appeared in the newspapers in which Hitler, under the pretense of a concentration of conditions in the government, had dismissed the foreign minister, von Neurath, affected a change in the ministry of economics, had relieved a number of diplomats from duty, and then, as an appendix to that report, made a change in the war ministry and in the leadership of the army. of the court-martial which would have, to decide about the rehabilitation of General Fritsch. That was for everyone of us the moment when we believed we were able to prove before a supreme court with what means the Gestapo got rid of their political adversaries. Here was the only opportunity to hear witnesses under oath as to how that entire intrigue had been spun. So we went to work to prepare for that trial.
Q What do you mean by "we"? an honest judge and jury and participated in that Reich war court. He was a Reich court counsellor and later chief judge of the army, ministerial director Dr. Sack.
He was a man who believed that he owed it to the idea of law to work with all possible means for the clarification of these things. He did it, and he also went the way of death after the 20th of July. heard on their part the Gestapo witnesses. They investigated the records of the Gestapo, and it did not take long until, with the aid of the criminologist: Nebe, they found out definitely that in that entire affair one dealt with a double, not the General von Fritsch but a long-time before pensioned Captain von Fritsch.
In the course of that investigation the judges found out one more thing; they could prove that the Gestapo, as far back as the 15th of January, had been in the apartment of that double of von Fritsch and had questioned his mate.
May I come once mere to the dates. On the 15th of January the Gestapo had proof that Fritsch was not the culprit. On the 24th of January the Defendant Goering brings the prisoner and witness into the Reich Chancellery in order to incriminate General Fritsch. incredible extent. Here we believed that now the most sceptical general could see that not only in the lower regions of the Gestapo, invisibly hidden, even in the ranks of the ministers in the Reich Chancellery, who knew nothing about it, things occurred which would force any person of decency to work against them. That was the reason that we found ourselves in a larger group united now, and that now we saw that from now on we did not have to collect secret material about the Gestapo. That, indeed, had been the great difficulty under which we had operated.
We heard a great deal, but when we would have passed on that material, every time we would have endangered these men who had given us that material and exposed them to Gestapo terror methods. fluence General von Brauchitsch and to persuade him to put the necessary material over to the Reich War Court.
Q. What do you mean "we"?
A. There was a group, of which I have to mention Dr. Schacht, who was extremely active at that time, who at that time went to Admiral Raeder, to Brauchitsch, to Rundstedt, and to Guertner, and who tried at that time to explain everywhere: "Now the great crisis has arisen. Now we have to act. Now it is the task of the generals to rid us of that regime of terror."
But I have to mention one more name in that connection. In 1936 already Schacht had introduced me to Dr. Goerdler. I had the honor to set the same pace with that brave man from then on until the 20th of July. Now that I mentioned his name for the first time, in this room where so many terrible things are know, I want to make sure that also the name of the German I mentioned is a brave fighter for decency, and of whom I believed that one day, not only in Germany, he will be an ideal to prove that one can do his duty also under Gestapo terror faithfully until death. That Dr. Goerdler, who had always been a forceful and unerring fighter, at that time had courage beyond description similar to Dr. Schacht. He went from one ministry to the other, from one general to the next, and he always believed that now the hour had come where we had to form the great front of the decent one led by the General. Brauchitsch did not refuse at that time. He did not refuse to act to Guertner. In fact, he gave Guertner assurances for a putsch way into the limits of religion. And I man mention that Brauchitsch also gave me the solemn assurance that now he would use that opportunity to fight against the Gestapo; but Brauchitsch made one condition and that condition was accepted by the generals as a whole.
Brauchitsch said, "Hitler still is such a popular man. We are afraid of the Hitler might. We want to give to the German people and the world the last proof in the form of the session of the Reich War Court and its verdict.
Therefore, Brauchitsch postponed his action until the day when the verdict of the Reich War Court would be handed down.
The Reich war Court met. It began the session. The session was interrupted suddenly under dramatic circumstances. I have to add, however, that Hitler appointed as president of that Reich war Court the defendant Goering. And now the Reich War Court, under the chairmanship of Goering, met. I know from Nebe how thoroughly Goering during the preceding days had consulted Himmler and Heydrich. I know that Heydrich told Nebe that the Riech War Court will be the end of my career.
A. Did Nebe tell you that?
A. Nebe told me that, yes. On the same day, the very some day. The Reich War Court will be the great danger for the Gestapo. And now the Reich War Court met for several hours and was postponed under dramatic circumstances because that was the day on which the decision was made to have theGerman armies march into Austria.
At that time, already, we harbored no doubt as to why the chairman of that War Court had such an exorbitant interest to see to it that on that day the troops should get the march order and that he let then march with an apparent purpose on the outside. Only one week later the Reich War Court could meet again, but then Hitler was in his great triumph. The Germans had their first campaign of flowers behind them. The plebescite had been proclaimed. There was jubilation, and the confusion in the minds of the generals wasn't greater. So that War Court was dissolved, Frick's innocence was proclaimed. But Brauchitsch said, in that new psychological situation created by the annexation of Austria, he could no mere take the responsibility to recede to a putsch. deprived of its leading men. The generals were thrown into confusion without example, and from that moment on they continued steeply upward into radicalism.
DR. DIX: May I ask the Tribunal to be permitted to quote one sentence from a document which I will submit later as Schacht's Exhibit No. 15. My document book is still in the process of translation, but I hope that on the day of the hearing of Schacht it will be printed. It is only one sentence but it is interesting in this connection. It is from the bi-annual report.
THE PRESIDENT: Have the documents been submitted to the Prosecution and to the Tribunal at all?
DR. DIX: The documents have been discussed for the question of translation and then for the question of admissibility; and then they have been mentioned here before the Court. So, I am of the conviction that the Prosecution knows about the documents. It is only one sentence. I do not believe that there will be any objections on the part of the Prosecution. Otherwise, it will be tern from its context and I would like to bring it in now. I can save that time later. It is one sentence from the bi-annual report of the Chief of Staff of the United States about the time -
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not know what this document is, Your Honor. I should like to know because we may want to ask some questions about it. I do not want to delay Dr. Dix, but I do not have a copy of it and I do not know just what it is yet.
DR. DIX: I just wanted to shorten the proceedings, but, if I see that there are any difficulties and there will be a long discussion, I would rather not do it now and will present it then later on with my document book. It would not serve any purpose otherwise. BY DR. DIX: you please give some information as to the position of the German in a court investigation?
A Dr. Dix, I do not doubt that you are better informed andcould answer better about the competency of the Chairman of the German Court, but I would like to say the following: documents of which we thought we would be able one day to submit to the public, and I hope we will find it. From that we can see that the defendant Goering as president decided the tone of the entire proceedings as well as the questions.
be put which could have been disagreeable. every way to cloak the true facts by the manner in which he led the proceedings. crisis the decisive preparatory step to the war, and you have accepted that term. After conclusion of the description of the Fritsch crisis, would you like to give us the reason for that opinion, and what was the impression on your group, especially on Schacht? cult in the ranks of the German opposition to utter the mere thought of war. That was due to the fact that in Germany the groups in opposition were so sure of the strength of the army and of the leading men that they believed it would be sufficient to put a man of honor, like Fritsch, at the head of the German Army. This thiught seemed inconceivable, that Fritsch would cultivate a sliding into terror or into war. one day it gees beyond the limits of its own people. We believed from past history to have to apply that fact as a threat also concerning the National Socialist Revolution. Therefore, those of us who were convinced that they were faced with a revolution, not only a dictatorship, warned again and again that one day those revolutionaries would revert to war as a last means, and all the more new, in the course of the Fritzsch crisis, it became clear that radicalism was victorious. It became also clear to a large group that the danger of war could no more be denied.
Q Did also the defendant Schacht belong to that group?
A Yes. During those days of the Fritzsch crisis, Schacht, such as many others, said "This is war." And, without doubt, that also was told to the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Brauchitsch. beginning, the rearmament?
A Schacht always told me his reason. He had financed the rearmament for defense purposes. Schacht was convinced for many years that such a great people, such a large people in the center of Europe, should at least have the means for defense.
convinced of the thought that possibly from the East an offensive danger could arise. We cannot forget with what means of propaganda the German people were swamped at that time, and especially that danger arising from the East, and hints about the Polish aspirations concerning East Prussia were presented. ment served political purposes in so far as the discussion about rearmament could be started again?
A I bog your pardon. I forgot on my part to emphasize that point. Schacht was of the opinion that by all means the discussion about rearmament should be started again. He had the ides that very soon--I think he had that opinion since 1935the other side would point to German rearmament, and then Hitler would be forced on account of that wellknown rearmament, to resume the talks at the disarament conference. Scacht at that time, or is that your judgement now? not quite understand that Hitler would be inclined to go to a disarmament conference. I thought Hitler was of an entirely different mentality, and was surprised that Schacht expected such thoughts in Hitler's mind. the manner, extent, and speed of rearmament he was well informed in detail? personally, whether we could help him to get information about the extent of rearmament by questions to the Reich War Ministry. I have described yesterday the efforts he made through Oster and Thomas to got details. limit armament expenses and when these efforts started?
A These efforts started, to my knowledge, in 1936; and in heated debates about Schacht's resignation as Minister of Economics in 1937 those efforts played an important part. I recall that practically every conversation was concerned with that point. prosecution that the reasons Schacht gave for the necessity of these limitations were based primarily in the field of finance--that is to say, that he, as economic leader and president of the Reichsbank, was concerned and not as a patriot who is afraid that his country may be plunged into war.
Did you also have conversations with Schacht of which you can remember anything to that extent? Schacht was going to make. They were discussed in the circle of friends. To mention one example, Schaht repeatedly discussed such letters with Goerdeller. Always there was one main question: What can one say so that such a letter would not be considered a provocation, but so that it could serve the purpose to interest the rest of the well meaning ministers and also the War Ministersvon Blomberg and get them at Schacht's side? or Schwerin-Krosigk, who were more loyal to Hitler--how could we convince them to join Schacht rather than to say that Schacht once again, with his well known sharp tongue, had provoked Hitler and Goering. have mentioned, had been discussed with the leading men of the opposition group. conspiracy which you and your friends had with Schacht?
A I want to deal with that word of "conspiracy." Whereas up to that moment our activity could only be a called appositional, now, indeed, a conspiracy started. And from now on one man steps into the foreground, who later played an important part and was to play an important part as head of that conspiracy.
The Chief of General Staff at that time. General Beck, was of the opinion that the time had come when a German General should give the signal for the nation and for abroad. I believe it is important for the Tribunal to know the last reason which may have determined Beck to that step. Juterberg. held a speech before the Generals. That speech was intended as rehabilitation for Fritsch. time, quite frankly, before German Generals, a large group--about Hitler's intention to cover Czechoslovakia with warefare. Beck heard that speech. He was indignant that he, as chief of the General Staff, now for the first time heard of an intention of that kind in an audience of that form without having been informed or consulted about it previously.
an immediate interview. Brauchitsch refused it and kept Beck waiting for several weeks. Beck was not patient. He wrote a censored memorandumin which he, as Chief of General Staff, contested against the fact that the German people were thrown into war adventures. it is the right time to say a word about that.
Q One moment, Doctor. Will you only tell us what is the thought of your knowledge about Beck's thoughts and the negotiations between Beck and Brauchitsch? with him. and until the last hour of his life on the 20th of July I was close to him. again and again has struggled with the problem as to what a Chief of General Staff should do if he recognizes that everything is driving to a war. Therefore, I owe it to his memory, and to my oath here, to say that Beck took the consequences as the only German General to leave his post voluntarily in order to show I that also with Generals in leading positions there is a limit, where under the sacrifice of their position and their life they have to resign rather than to accept any more orders. of war technicians. Beck saw in the German Staff the conscience of the German Army, and so in this way he educated his staff. He suffered during the last year of his life under the fact that men whom he had trained in that sense did not go that way of conscience, that path of their conscience. I owe it to that man to say that he was a man of character.