of the Plenipotentiary Labor for Manpower. It is already USA Exhibit 206.
The document on page 15 is a letter from Professor Dr. Kubijowytsch, Chair man of the Ukrainian Main Committee, to the defendant Dr. Frank. It already has the USA Exhibit No. 178 and I will read only the first sentence from that document, in order to show what the relation was between the defendant Dr. Frank and the author of that letter. I quote:
"Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I should like to state critical conditions and the painful happenings, which create especially painful conditions for the Ukrainian population within the General Government."
Then I pass to page 16 of the document book. That is an excerpt from USA Exhibit 275; the report of the SS Brigadefuehrer Stroop about the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto. I quote the second paragraph of II, from which it can be seen that the order came immediately from the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler. I quote:
"When the Reichsfuehrer SS visited Warsaw in January 1943, he gave the order to the SS and Police Leader in the District of Warsaw to transfer to Lublin the armament factories and other enterprises of military importance, which were installed within the ghetto, including their personnel and machines." prosecution has submitted during the cross examination of the defendant Kaltenbrunner.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: As far as I understand there is some misunderstanding here. The document he named does not deal with Warsaw, but it is a document of the chief of the SS police of the Galicia district with regard to the Jewish question in Galicia. It does not relate to Warsaw. I would like him to explain or define this.
DR. SEIDL: The document on page 16 is the report by the SS Brigadefuehrer Stroop, which has already been submitted as USA Exhibit 275. It is a report by SS Fuehrer Katzmann, which apparently the Russian Prosecutor means, concerning the solution of the Jewish question in Galicia. That is on page 17 of the document book. That is on the next page. Apparently it has been overlooked in the document book which was prepared for the Russian Prosecution; it was overlooked to put that page 16 in. the affidavit by SS Brigadefuehrer Stroop, which during the cross examination of the Defendant Dr. Kaltenbrunner, under No. USA 804, has been submitted. That affidavit has the number 3481-PS. I could not include that affidavit in the document book because that affidavit was submitted by the Prosecution only at a time when I had sent the document book to be translated. submitted during the cross examination of Dr. Kaltenbrunner. That is the affidavit by Karl Kaleske. That affidavit has the number USA 803, 3840-PS. That would be page 16B of the document book. and which deals with the solution of the Jewish question in G alicia. It is on page 17 of the document bock. That report has the number USA 277 and the L number 18. I quote pages 4 and 5:
"After it had been found in more and more cases that Jews had succeeded in making themselves indispensable to their employers by providing them with good in scarce supply, it was considered necessary to introduce really draconic measures."
I pass to paragraph 2 and quote:
"Since the administration was not in a position and showed itself too weak to master this chaos, the SS and Police Leader simply took over the entire disposition of labor for Jews.
The Jewish labor agencies which were manned by hundreds of Jews were dissolved. All certificates of labor given by firms or administrative offices were declared invalid, and the cards given to the Jews by the labor agencies were revalidated by the police offices by stamping them."
I pass to page 19 of the document book. That deals with the letter of the Reichminster and Chief of the Reich Chancellory to the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police Himmler, of the 17th of April 1943. That document has the number 2220-PS and the Exhibit No. USA 175. I quote:
"In our conference of 27 March of this year we had agreed that written memoranda should be worked out about conditions in the General Government, on which our intended mutual report to the Fuehrer could be based. The material compiled for this purpose by SS Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger was submitted to you immediately.
Based on this material, I have had a report prepared which sums up the most important points of this material, subdivides them clearly, and culminates in an exposition of the measures to be taken.
"The report has been checked together with SS Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger and has his complete concurrence. I am submitting a part of it to you herewith." End of quotation.
It is signed "Dr. Lammers."
I pass to page 20 of the document book. I quote:
"Secret.
"Concerning conditions in the General Government.
"The German administration in the General Government has to fulfill the following tasks:
"First, to increase agricultural production and seize as much of it as possible for the purpose of securing food for the German people, to allot sufficient rations to the native population occupied with work essential to the war effort, and to carry off the rest for the armed forces and the homeland."
I leave out the following points and pass to the letter "B", where Krueger or his assistant criticized the measures of the General Government:
"German administration in the General Government has failed extensively with respect to the tasks listed under 'A'. Even if a relatively high percentage, namely over 90 percent, of the delivery quota of agricultural products for the armed forces and the homeland was successfully met in the year 1942, and if the labor procurement requirements of the homeland were generally satisfied, still on the other hand two things must be made clear: First, these accomplishments were achieved for the first time in the year 1942. Before that, for example, only 40,000 tons of bread grain had been delivered for the armed forces. Secondly, and above all, one had failed to create for the achievement of such performances those prerequisites of an organizational, economic, and political character which are indispensable, if such performances are not to lead to a shock to the entire situation from which chaotic conditions could eventually come about in every respect.
This failure of the German administration can be explained for one thing by the system of the German administrative and governmental acticity in the General Government as represented by the Governor General, and secondly by the misguided principles of policy in all thos questions which were decisive for conditions in the General Government.
"First: The spirit of the German administration in the General Government. From the beginning it has been the endeavor of the Governor General to create a state organization out of the General Government which was to lead its own existence in complete independence of the Reich."
Then I pass to page 22 of the report, No. 3, and I quote:
"Thirdly, the treatment of the native population can only be led in the nigh direction on the basis of a clean and orderly administrative and economic leadership. Only such a foundation permits that the native population be handled strictly and if necessary even severely, on the one side, and on the other side that one may net generously with them and cause a certain amount of satisfaction in the population by certain liberties, especially in the cultural field.
Without such a foundation severity strengthens the resistance movement, and meeting the population halfway only undermines the German reputation. The above-mentioned facts prove that this foundation is lacking. Instead of trying to create this foundation, the Governor general inaugurates a policy of encouraging the individual cultural life of the Polish population, which in itself is already overshooting the goal, but which under the existing conditions, and not the least in connection with our military situation during the past winter, can only be interpreted as weakness and must achieve the opposite of the aim intended.
"The cases are numerous in which the German administration puts the requirements of the racial Germans in the General Government in the background in favor of the interests of the Poles and Ruthenians, in their endeavor to win the latter over to them. The opinion was advanced that racial Germans settled somewhere else were not to be located immediately as settlers, but for the duration of the war were only to be employed as farm workers. Legal foundation fo expropriation of Polish property have not been created up until now. Bad treatment of racial Germans by their Polish employers has not been stopped. German citizens and racial German patients were allowed to be treated in Polish hospitals by Polish physicians, badly and at great expense. In German spas in the General Government the sheltering of children of German citizenship from territories which were threatened with bombing and of Stalinggrad fighters ran into difficulties, while foreigners took convalescent vacations there, and so on. The big plans for resettlement in the Lubin district for the benefit of racial Germans could have been carried out with less friction if the Reich Commissioner for the strengthening of Germandom had found the desirable cooperation and assistance of the administration."
I pass to page 24 and quote, under C:
"The administrative system, represented by the Governor General personally, and the actual failure of the general German administration in the most various fields of dicisive importance, did not only shake the confidence and the will to work of the native population, but has also brought about the result that the Poles, who have been socially divided and constantly dis united throughout their history, have come together in a united national body through their hostility to the Germans. In a world of pretense, the real foundations are lacking on which alone those achievements which the Reich requires from the General Government, and these aims which it must see realized in the latter, can be brought about and fulfilled in the long run. The non-fulfilment of the tasks given to the general administration naturally had to lead, as happened, for example, in the field of the strengthening of German ways and characteristics, that other administrative bodies, for instance Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Volkstum, and the Police, took over these tasks."
Now I pass to page 27 of the document book. That is the repearedly mentioned report by the Governor General to the Fuehrer od the 19th of June 1943 The document has the number 437-PS, USA Exhibit 610. Of this document the Prosecution has so far quoted only page 10 and 11, and these are the points in the memorandum by the Governor General which have been severely criticized
THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking now of the report which begins on page 20?
DR. SEIDL: I mean the report which begins on page 27. We have already finished the report which begins on page 20.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what number did you give to that on page 20?
DR. SEIDL: The report on page 20 is an integral part of the letter which begins on page 19, and which already has the USA number 175.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Now I come to the document on page 27. That is a memorandum which has already been mentioned by various witnesses, and was submitted under No. 610 by the Prosecution. Of this report, the Prosecution has only submitted pages 10 and 11, that is page 36 and 37 of the document book, that is to say, only those passages in the report which were considered as perpetrations of the police, and against which perpetrations the Governor General complained to the Fuehrer.
page 27 of the report, which is page 53 of the document book, and I quote under No. 2:
"The almost complete discontinuation of the posibilities for participation in the cultural field has led, down to the lowest classes of the Polish people, to serious discontent. The Polish middle and upper classes are extremely hungry for education. Experience shows that the possibility of a cultural occupation would at the same time be connected with a diversion from the political questions of the day. German propaganda frequently comes across the objection, brought up by the poles, that the restriction of cultural activity enforced by the German authorities does not only show no difference towards the Bolshevist lack of culture, but also shows that it even remains below the amount of cultural activity, allowed among Soviet citizen. the same basis. Its well considered purposes are without doubt the decline * of the Polish educational standart. The realization of this goal appears, considering the necessities of war, not always beneficial to the German interests. With the duration of the war the German interest in the mobilization of able foreign replacements increases in the various fields of knowledge. However mere important is the fact that the crippling of the school system and the extensive hampering of cultural activities adds in rising proportions to the promotion of a Polish "National Community" (Volksgemeinschaft) conspiring against Germany, under the leadership of the intelligentsia. What was not possible during the course of Polish history, what even could not be done during the first year of the German administration, namely the achievment of a goal, which was aimed at a common purpose and a national community holding together from within for better and for worse, threatens now to become slowly but surely reality because of German measures. The German leadership cannot pass this process of alliance of individual Polish classes without noticing it in the face of the growing defensive power of the Poles.
The German leadership should promote class distinctions by certain cultural concessions and if possible to play one class against the other. vitable pressure of the circumstances, observed, have created, further by clever Bolshevist agitation, a tremendous feeling of hate in wide circles. The workers won thus, come often with a deep resolution for positive resistance, aven active sabotage. An improvement of the recruiting methods in connection with the continuation of the attempts to stop still present abuses in the treatment of Polish workers in the Reich, finally a care even if it is only meager, for the family members left behind, would cause a rise in morale, which would convert itself into an increased desire to work, and increased production for the German interest. the removal of the Polish element from all important positions. The available amount of German help had always been quantitatively and qualitatively insufficient. Besides, during the past year a considerable delivery of German personnel had to take place under pressure of the replacement needs of the armed forces.
Previously, non-German help had to be called in to a greater extent. By a considerable change in the treatment of the poles, the administration could, by use of all necessary precaution, use the Polish element more for collaboration, without which the administration considering the present amount of personnel, not to speak of future transfers, cannot be kept working. The increased participation of Poles would help further to raise the moral in itself. "Besides the positive change put down in these proposals, a number of methods, observed previously in the treatment of Poles, need a change or even must be completely abandoned at least for the duration of the fighting in Europe. (1) I have already shown in special reports that confiscation and evacuation of arable land have caused great and irrepairable damages for the agricultural production. Not less great is the damage to morale connected naturally with such actions. Already the seizure of a great part of the Polish large estates has embittered the naturally anti-Bolshevistically inclined strata of the population, hit by it. But their opposing attitude does not count nearly so much, because of their numerically small strength and their complete segregation from the mass of the people, as the position of the mess of the population consisting mainly of small farmers. by Military-political reasons - has already had an unfavorable effect on the mentality and attitude of many farmers. At any rate, this evacuation has been kept within certain territorial limits. It has been carried out carefully prepared by the governmental offices, having avoided all unnecessary harshness. The evacuation of Polish farmers from the LUBLIN district, held necessary by the Reich This happened during the winter 1942/43, when great losses ocurred especially among members of the last group.
The evacuation brought with itself a complete expropriation of movable and immovable property of the farmers.
The entire Government.
The general impression was that the Pole would have a fate similar to that of the Jews.
The evacuation in the District LUBLIN was a welcome by the skill, for which it is known.
This had the result that considerable parts The consequence was a tremendous deterioration of the security situation.
These 2) Already at the first mention of the crime of KATYN, it became obvious constitutes a primary argument in Communist propaganda slogans.
The shooting again and again without the knowledge and against the rail of the Fuehrer must be prevented under all circumstances.
This does not apply naturally to the executions of bandits and partisans. In cases of collective punishments which nearly always hit innocent people and which are politically indifferent, the unfavorable, psychological effect is immeasurable. Serious punitive measures and executions should only be carried out after a procedure satisfying the most primitive conceptions of justice and under publication of the sentence.
"Even if the court procedure is carried on in such a simple, imperfect and improvised manner, it servos to avoid or to lessen the unfavorable effect of a punitive measure which the population considers as purely arbitrary, and hampers the Bolshevist agitation which claims the German measures there to be only the prelude for future incidents. Added to this is that collective punishment, which naturally is directed primarily against the innocent, in the worst case against forced people or desperate ones, are not exactly judged as a sign of strength of the ruling power from which the population expects that it will hit the terrorists themselves and that it liberates them thus from the insecurity which burdens them."
"3.) Besides the most important suppositions mentioned in 1.) and 2.), for the pacification of the General Government, security of property among the non-agricultural people, must also be confirmed, to be granted insofar as it is not opposed by urgent needs of war. The appropriations or confiscation without compensation in the industrial sector, in commerce and trade and other private property was not to take place in any case, insofar as the owner or the custodian has not committed an offense against the German authorities. If the use of industrial enterprises, commercial concerns, or real estate is necessary for war-essential reasons, it should be preceded in every case under avoidance of hardships and guarantee of appropriate compensation. Through such a procedure the initiative of Polish employers would on one side be furthered and on the other hand, damage to the interests of German war economy would be avoided.
"4.) With the influencing of the attitude of the Poles an importance is due to the influence of the Catholic Church, which cannot be entirely overestimated. I do not mistake that the Catholic Church always belonged to the leading fighters for an independent national Poland. Numerous clergymen also made their influence felt, even after the German occupation. Also, hundreds of arrests were carried out in these circles. A series of priests were taken to concentration camps and also shot. However, in order to van the sentiment of the Polish population, at least a legal attitude of the church is necessary, if not cooperation as well. It can be won without any doubt, especially today under the effect of the crimes of Katyn, for a reinforcement of the defensive front against Bolshevism with the Polish people, which must already, out of instince of self-preservation, refuse a Bolshevistic reign in the Vistula area. However, it is a prerequisite for that to refrain in the future from all measures against their activity and their property inasmuch as they are not necessitated by immediate war interest "Damages exceeing by far the advantages obtained in the individual cases have been caused up to the most recent time --."
THE PRESIDENT: I had thought that your extracts were going to be brief. You have now read from page 53 to page 65.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, this document is the only one of this kind which is available to me and in consequence of the fact that the Prosecution has only quoted those passages literally which the defendant, Dr. Frank, himself has criticized severely, I consider it my duty now to read a number of passages, to quote them, in order to give the entire picture correctly and to show what really the defendant, Dr. Frank, intended to achieve with this document. I shall only quote a few more lines and then I will pass to another document.
THE PRESIDENT: I had hoped that one or two extracts from that document would show what the defendant Frank was putting forward, one or two paragraphs
DR. SEIDL: Yes. Then we come to the next document, Mr. President, that is on page 68, the affidavit by the witness Dr. Buehler, which I presented to the witness today and which has received the number Exhibit Frank 1, page 68 in the document book.
On page 70 there appears U.S.A. Exhibit 473. If I remember correctly that is the document which has been read entirely by the Prosecution and I would like to ask the Court only to take official notice of that also in the defense of Dr. Frank.
former Kreishauptmann, Dr. Albrecht. To be exact I have to state that this is not exactly an affidavit in the true sense of the word. It is only a letter which Kreishauptmann, Dr. Albrecht, through the General Secretary of the Tribunal, has sent to me. I then returned the letter in order to have it sworn to by the witness but I have to say that until now that sworn statement has not been returned so that for the time being, this exhibit would only have the material value of a letter. letter that document can be accepted by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal did consider that matter before when your application was before it. They will accept the document for what it is worth. If you get the document in affidavit form you will no doubt put it in.
DR. SEIDL: Yes. That will be Exhibit Frank Number 7. I forgego the quoting of the third point and cone to page 74 of the document book and I quote under figure 4:
The struggle of Dr. FRANK against the exploitation and neglect of the General Government in favor of the Reich. Conflict with Berlin. " The first meeting with Dr. FRANK occured shortly after the fundation of the General Government in the Fall of 1939 in the Polish district-capital RADOM where the 10 Kreishauptmaenser of these districts had to report concerning the condition of the population of their administrative district and the problems of a possibly quick and effective reconstruction of the general as well as the administrative and economic life. " Outstanding was the special attention shown by Dr. FRANK and his ceep concern about the area entrusted to him. This found expression in the instructions not to consider or treat the General Government or allow it to be treated, as an object of exploitation or as a useless area, but rather as a center of public order and an area of concentration at the back of the fighting German front and at the gates of the German homeland, like a bridge of land between the two, There fore the loyal native inhabitants of this country have as citizens of the GG a claim to the full protection of the German administration. For this purpose the constant efforts of all authorities and economic units would be demanded by him, and, by constant control through supervising authorities, be personnally superintended by him through periodic inspection trips with the participation of the central expert authorities.
In this way, for instance the two district captaincies (Kreishauptmannschaften) which were administered by me were in the course of four years inspected by him personally three times. " In face of the demands of the Berlin central authorities, who believed it possible import more from the General Government into the Reich than was advisable Dr. Frank represented vigorously the political independence of the German Government as a "annex"(Nebenland) of the Reich, and his own independence as being directly subordinated to the Supreme Head of the State only, and not to the Reich Government. He also instructed us on no account to comply with demands of that kind which might come to us on the basis of personal relations with the authorities by whom we were sent, or the specialist ministries in the Reich which was equally expected from us, to report him about it. This firm, attitude brought Dr. Frank the displeasure of the Berlin government circles, and the nickname "France" (Frankreich) to the General Government. " A campaign of calumny has been initiated in the Reich against him and against the entire administration of the General Government by systematically generalizing and exaggerating regrettable ineptitudes and human weaknesses of individual at the same time attempting to belittle the actual constructive achievements." number 6 and will quote number seven.
"7. Dr. Frank as a oppontent of Violent Actions against the Native Polulati Especially as an Opponent of the SS.
"Besides the exploitation and the pauperization of the General Government, the accusation of the enslaving of the native population as well as their deportation into the Reich and many atrocities of various kinds appeared in the newspaper reports on the Nurnberg War Crimes Trials and are presented as serious evidence against Dr. Frank. As far as atrocities are concerned, the guilt does not lie with Dr. Frank but in part with the numerous non-German agitators and provocateurs who increased with the additional pressure against the fighting German fronts increased their underground activity, and for the Security Organization in the General Government, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger and his agencies.
My observations, however, in this respect are sketchy because of the strict secrecy of these offices.
"On the other hand, Dr. Frank Trent so far in accommodating the Polish population that this was frequently objected to by his German compatriots. That he did the correct thing by his stand for the justified interests of the Polish population is proven, for example, by the impressive fact that barely a year and a half after the defeat of the Polish people in a campaign of eighteen days the concentration of German army masses against Russia in the Polish area took place without a noteworthy disturbance, and that the Eastern railroad could leg the troop transports move with Polish personnel up to the most forward unloading points without having then delayed by sabotage."
I quote the last paragraph on page seventy-nine:
This humane attitude of Dr. Frank which earned him respect and sympathy among considerable groups of the natives led, on the other hand, to bitter conflicts with the SS, among whose circles Himmler's say, 'They shall not love us, but fear us,' circulated as a key word of their thinking and action.
"At times it came to a complete break. I remember exactly that Dr. Frank during a government visit of the Carpathian districts of the District Captaincy (Kreishauptmannschaft) of Stanislau in the summer of 1943 in Jaremtsche on Pruth complained most bitterly during a lonely walk with me and my wife about the arbitrary acts of the SS which quite frequently crossed him political course. At that time he called the SS the Black Plague, and pointed out when he noticed our astonishment at hearing such criticism even from his mouth that it would, for example, be absolutely unpreventable if my wife should be innocently arrested some day or night by agencies of the Gestapo and should disappear never to be seen again without having received the possibility of a defense in a legal trial. Some time afterwards, he held a speech before the students in Heidelberg which attracted much attention and was loudly applauded about the necessity of the reestablishment of a German constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) as would always have done justice to the real requirements of the Germans. When he wanted to repeat this speech in Berlin, he is said to have been forbidden by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor as reported to me by a reliable, but unfortunately forgotten source, to make speeches for a quarter of a year at Himmler's instigation.
break down of Dr. Frank, which made necessary a fairly long convalescent leave. As far as I can remember this was in the winter of 1943/44/" on to page eighty-four of the document book. That is an affidavit by SS Obergruppenfuehrer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski of the 21st of February 1946. This affidavit received the exhibit number "Frank No. 8."
THE PRESIDENT: Didn't this witness give evidence?
DR. SEIDL: The witness was questioned here by the prosecution and I made the motion at that time that either 1 could interrogate the witness again or that I would have the use of an affidavit. On the 8th of March 1946 the Tribunal made the decision, if I remember correctly, that I could use an affidavit from that witness but that the prosecution would be free if they desired to question the witness again.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SEIDL: I shall read the statements of the witness concerning this affair, and I quote under number one:
"1. Owing to the infiltration of Russian partisan groups over the line of the river Bug into the General Government in 1943, Himmler declared the General Government to be a guerilla warfare territory. By this it became my duty, as Chief of the guerilla warfare units to travel over the General Government to gather information and experience, and to submit reports and suggestions for fighting the partisans.
"In the general information Himmler gave me, he called the Governor General Dr. Frank a traitor to his country, who was conspiring with the Poles, and whom he would expose to the Fuehrer very shortly. I still remember two of the reproaches Himmler made against Frank:
"(a) At a lawyer's meeting in the Old Reich territory Frank is said to have stated that 'he preferred a bad constitutional State to the best conducted Police State', and "(b) During a speech to a Polish delegation Frank had disavowed some of Himmler's measures and had disparaged, in front of the Poles, "2. After having personally obtained on a circular tour information on the spot about the situation in the General Government, I visited the higher SS and Police-fuehrer Krueger and the Governor General, Dr. Frank, in Cracow.
"Krueger spoke very disapprovingly about Dr. Frank and made Frank's faltering and unstable policy towards the Poles responsible for conditions in the General Government, he called for harsher and more inconsiderate measures and said that he would not rest until the traitor Frank was overthrown. I had the impression, from Krueger's statements, that personal motives also influenced his attitude and that he himself would have liked to become Governor General.
"After that I had a long discussion with Dr. Frank, I told him of my impressions, while he went into lengthy details about a now policy for Poland which aimed at the pacification of the Poles by way of concessions. In agreement with my personal impressions Dr. Frank considered the following factors responsible for the sente situation in the General Government:
"(a) the inconsiderate resettlement action taken now, in the midst of war, especially the senseless and purposeless resettlement Globocznik the Lublin SS and Police-fuehrer and "(b) the insufficient food quota allotted to the General Government.
is pronounced enemies of any conciliatory policy Dr. Frank designated Krueger and Globocznik who should be recalled without fail. With the conviction that failure by Dr. Frank would only mean a more inconsiderate and uncompromising person as his successor, I promised him my support. Having been assured of strictest secrecy I told Frank I shared his opinion that Krueger and Globocznik would have to disappear. He, Dr. Frank, knew however that, Himmler hated him and that he was urging Hitler to have him removed. With such state of affairs any request on Frank's part to have Krueger and Globocznik recalled would not only be rejected, but would even strengthen their position with Himmler. Frank should give me a free hand, then I could promise him that both would be relieved within the shortest possible time.