THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. You are giving a long paraphrase for the one word "yes", which is the answer you ought to have made.
A (Continuing): When compulsory labor service was instituted in the Reich, I said that I was in favor of voluntary enlistment.
That could not carry on through, and of course I agreed that compulsory labor laws would have to be instituted, and I repeated that three times yesterday and admitted it. again this morning. In year own defense document -- R-011, I think it is -- which is the letter that you wrote to Koch on the 14th of December 1942 -- I don't think it will be necessary to show it to you again; I think you saw it yesterday -- you specifically mentioned to Koch the matter of picking up people from lines in front of theaters and off the streets, those people who were attending movies and matters of that sort. You knew that was going on under your decree of compulsory labor, didn't you? You were objecting to it, but you knew it was going on.
A Yes. It always happens that these excesses are connected with each and every law, and when excesses occurred, I did protest against them and try to take steps.
Q Very good. Now, finally, with respect to this forced labor matter, would you say as a matter of fairness and honesty that your Ministry was not very largely responsible for this terrible program of forcing people from their homes into Germany, or do you say that you must accept a very considerable responsibility for what happened to these hundreds of thousands of people out of the Eastern occupied areas? laws which I issued, and for any framework of directives which were issued by my Ministry for the carrying out of these measures. The territorial governments were responsible according to law. Where they went beyond these measures, I paid attention to matters which were called to my attention. Exaggerations took place, but I must admit that some terrible things did occur, and in that connection I tried to intervene, and a series of German officials were taken to court and were sentenced. people, assuming that no great violence took place, the very fact of forcing them against their wills to leave is some thing else that you will accept responsibility for, I assume.
A (Interposing): I will take the responsibility upon myself as far as state laws are concerned which instructed Gauleiter Sauckel to put these demands to me. subject, that you acknowledged yesterday that you did consent to the taking of children as young as 10 and 12 and 14 years old and removing them to Germany, and I think you told us that at first it disturbed you, but when you found out there were unhappy recreational circumstances, your mind was eased. Is that a fair statement of your position on forcing these children from the East?
A No, that is not correct. Of course, I do not know just what the interpretation of the reading of the document was, but the opposite was true. I tried to avoid anything happening in my operational territory which would result in circumstances that would be detrimental to the children. The Heeresgruppe Mitte was acting independently, and I put the condition of taking care of the children through their own mothers, so they could have contact with their parents, and, as it says later, that they might be returned to their homeland. From that you can see that it is the exact opposite of that which the Prosecution has submitted here.
Q Well, I don't want to dwell much longer on it except to remind you that that document which you have seen and which you discussed yesterday, states, among other things, that by removing these children out of the East you will be doing more than one thing; you will be destroying the biological potentiality of those people in the East. That is what you approved among other things, isn't it?
A Yes. That is contained in the first point of the Pro-
secution and it was read. But I took this stand regarding the whole document, that it was not decisive as to my position, that when I heard this for the first time I rejected it, that later, when I had heard other reports, I found a form for which women thanked me, although it was not my merit that these people were taken care of in such a nice manner. exception of the little while of which we have been talking, you have been very benign and humane towards these people under your jurisdiction in the occupied Eastern territories. You wanted to be very kind to them.
A Yes. As far as these sentimental terms are concerned, I do not put my special claims on them for myself. However, in the terrible war in the East, which brought with it the continuous murder of German officials, I tried to carry on a mitigating policy.
Q Yes. Now I ask that you be shown document 1058-PS, which is USA 147.
(The document was submitted to the witness.)
Q(Continuing) You now have that before you. It is an extract from a speech which you made with your closest collaborators, and it has been referred to before. It is a speech that you made on the 20th of June 1941, the day before the attack was launched against Soviet Russia. I want to refer to the very first paragraph, and the only one on the paper. It says:
"The job of feeding the German people stands, this year without a doubt"-
A What page is that?
Q It is the first page; there is only one page. Oh, you have the whole document. You referred to it yesterday; I think you will be able to find it. It is at page 8, line 54. You may recall it; you talked about it yesterday. As a matter of fact, you said it was an impromptu speed. Do you find it on page 8? call it to your attention for a specific purpose--you say that the job of feeding the German people is at the top of the list, and that the Southern territories and the Northern Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. And you go on to say that you see no reason why there is any obligation to feed the Russian people with the products of the surplus territory. Then you says "We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings." ly be necessary and that the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians.
to think were quite to your credit. Were all parts of the speech impromptu, or are you suggesting that only the parts that seem damaging to you now were impromptu? This paragraph has been read by the prosecution three or four times, and yesterday when we discussed this speech I myself referred to this paragraph. Beyond that, I added that from the Four Year Plan, I was told, it was not certain whether the conquest of the Moscow industrial region could be maintained. For instance, there was a wagon factory mentioned. Some key industries would have to be curtailed, and through that a large problem in the supply of this area would result. time, or at that point, these unemployed would have to be evacuated, and I expressly referred to this document by the Eastern Ministry on this question where, under point 7, the feeding of the civilian population, point 3, is emphasized, and also later in the document where it says that famines are to be avoided in any event, and that the population was to receive special rations. do more than that. And my entire political and spiritual position is to be concluded from what I said yesterday about the keeping up of cultural contacts in the Ukraine, about independence there, about Russia.
Q All right. I don't want you to go into all that. I understand you thoroughly, and I think everyone else does. I merely wanted to point out to you that on that early date you did say there would be harsh necessities and that there would be very many hard years for the Russians. That is all. And if you don't want to acknowledge that you were serious in saying that, as you were in saying the other things, then I won't press you on it.
A Mr. Prosecutor, I believe that not much more could have been done towards this problem.
(The (document was submitted to the witness) passage. It was translated to me that these measures were to be carried through without any feeling, but in the original it says "beyond feeling," or "above feeling".
Q All right; we won't have any trouble about that.
Now, will you please look at this document? This is a memorandum found in your files, for your information. aim of German politics, notably in the Ukraine, as having been laid down by the Fuehrer.
They are, you say, exploitation and mobilization of raw materials, a German settlement in certain regions, no artificial education of the population towards intellectualism, but the preservation of their labor strength; apart from that, an extensive unconcern with the interior affairs.
Then, moving down a little bit -- because I don't think it is necessary to read all of it, much of it has been referred to in another document -- we come down to the 12th line from the bottom of that paragraph, beginning at the 14th line:
"After continuous observation of the state of affairs in the occupied territories of the East, I am of the opinion that German politics may have their own, possibly derogatory attitude regarding the qualities of the conquered peoples, but that it is not the mission of German political representative to broadcast measures and opinions which could eventually bring about the sheer desperation of the conquered peoples, instead of promoting the desired productive labor mobilization."
Then, in the next paragraph, you way:
"In home politics we had to announce our aims to the whole nation in the most candid form of aggression by way of contrast to the others. Yet, the political leadership in the East must remain silent where necessary harshness is dictated by German policy. They must remain silent about their possibly derogatory judgment of the conquered peoples. Yes, a clever German policy might be able to do more in the German interest through politically immaterial alleviations and certain human concessions than through open, thoughtless brutality." on the 16th of March, 1942?
A. This document is correct. It was submitted to me for a moment in a preliminary interrogation. What we gather from this document is the following. We may gather from it that although I knew that the Fuehrer had not accepted my rather broad proposals, I continued to fight for these proposals. And we may further see from it that I saw the Fuehrer personally, so that certain petty citizens in the East would not make derogatory remarks about other nations, that, so far as the thousands who came in were concerned, I could not expect sympathy and I could not expect antipathy either, but I could demand one thing of them in case they had a derogatory attitude, which was to keep quiet and to act decently.
extraordinarily decisive, because it says in the last paragraph, "I ask that the Fuehrer rule on this memorandum." This instruction was not contained in the document; I believe that much would have resulted from it.
Q. All right. Now let's turn to R-36, USA 699.
(The document was submitted to the witness.)
Q. (Continuing) You have seen this document before, haven't you?
A. Yes, I have seen it before.
Q. Yes. Now, this is a memorandum submitted to you by one of your subordinates, Dr. Markull, and directly submitted to you by Leibbrandt, also one of your subordinates, one of your top men, on the 19th day of August 1942. I want you to follow along with me while I read you certain passages from it.
The first few lines are dated the 5th of September, 1942, and it says: "The Minister, on the premises." It states that there is enclosed a memorandum containing the opinion of Dr. Markull on the matter of the Bormann letter of the 23rd July. to me, you told us yesterday that you were in disagreement with Bormann about some matters. Is that so?
Just answer the question. Did you tell us that yesterday?
A. As I said, on decisive matters I did not agree with Bormann, and I testified that in the course of years, on occasion, I gave him an appeasing answer.
My whole policy was to -
Q All right. Let's look at this document, which is, as I say, a memorandum about a Bormann letter to you, dated the 23rd of July, I assume 1942.
"On the 23rd of July, 1942, Party Director Bormann sent the Minister a letter which enumerates, in eight paragraphs, the principles the Minister is to follow in administering the occupied areas in the East." August, 1942, explained in detail to what extent these principles were already being put into practice or used as a basis of policy.
The next paragraph says that "any person reading this correspondence is struck, first of all, by the complete agreement of concepts. The Minister -that is you -- apparently was particularly concerned about two points; The first relates to the protection of German rule against the pressure of the S Slav race; the second to the absolute necessity of simplifying the administration. These are indeed decisive problems, of which more will have to be said."
Then there is this statement: "For the rest, the Minister -- referring to you -- not only raises no objections against Bormann's principles or even his phraseology; on the contrary, he uses them as a basis of his reply and endeavors to sow that they are already being put into practice. When, however, Bormann's letter was read out by Captain Zimmermann in a conference of the department chiefs, gave concern was shown at once, both on account of the phraseology of the letter and the future conduct of our policy."
Then it goes on to say: "In order to find out whether this concern is justified, it is best to start from a fiction."
Then, under the number I, Markull writes:
"Let us suppose Bormann's letter were issued to the Reich Commissioners as a ministerial decree. This supposition is by no means unrealistic since the Minister -- and that again refers to you -- appears to hold identical views. Since the Ostland, or the Baltic Area, presents a special case, and since the Ukraine is, or will become, probably, the most important region politically the following discussion will be based on that region."
Then, going on: "The consequences of a decree of this kind will be judged best by its effect on those men whose duty it is to put it into practice."
Moving down a little bit, he says: "Imagine the formulas of Bormann's letter translated into the language of a member of the German civil administration, and you will get, roughly, the following views:
" The Slavs are to work for us. In so far as we don't need them, they may die. Therefore, compulsory vaccination and German health service are superfluous. The fertility of the Slavs is undesirable. They may use contraceptives or practice aboration, the more the better. Education is dangerous. It is enough if they can count up to 100. At best an education which produces useful stooges for us is admissible. Every educated person is a future enemy. Religion we leave to them as a means of diversion. As for food, they won't get any more than is necessary. We are the masters; we come first."
"These sentences are by no means overstatements. On the contrary they are covered, word by word, by the spirit and the text of Bormann's letter. Already at this point the question arises whether such a result is desirable in the interests of the Reich. It can hardly be doubted that these views would become known to the Ukrainian people. Similar opinions prevail even today."
Moving on, the next paragraph, with the number "2", says:"But there is no real need to assume a fictitious decree as was done in paragraph 1. The above mentioned concepts of our role in the East already exist in practice.
"The Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine has expounded his views of the Ukrainian people, in three successive speeches." And he goes on to quote those speeches, whixh have been referred to before this Tribunal. of the local civil administration can confirm this from his own observations, and they show particularly clearly how well the soil is prepared for the Bormann letter.
Then he goes on to quote statements that have been made by saying, "We are here among Negroes", "The population is just dirty and lazy", and so on.
And then, passing on, he says:
"I may add that Kreisleiter Knuth whom the Gauleiter still retains, in spite of the gravest accusations, declared, in conversation on the Kiev question, that Kiev ought to be depopulated through epidemics. Altogether it would be best if the superfluous part of the population starved to death." It says:
"Finally among the district commissioners at least 80 per cent oppose the views described above. In many conferences with the general commissioners they emphasized th t the population ought to be treated decently and with understanding," and that statements opposing such policies referred to above will result in a catastrophe. That is what the next paragraph says.
And then Markull goes on to say:
"For the rest the only effect of the false concepts of the Master Race is to relax the discipline of our officials."
I will not take the time to read all of it. I am sure you are reading it. Then we move on and we come to this very significant paragraph, with a Roman numeral 5:
"Perhaps one ought to inquire whether there is not in fact an agreement between the policy hitherto pursued and the Bormann letter in the sense that the decrees quoted above and the other instructions of the ministry are to be understood merely as tactical moves, whereas in fact there is no divergence of opinion. The minister's reply"--I remind you each time the minister refers to you --"of 11 August might be considered to point in this direction."
Then he goes on to say:
"In answer to this it should be pointed out that the minister knows very well that it is not possible to rearrange a continent of the size of Russia by means of political tactics and by wearing the mask of a liberator, but only by applying a statesmanlike conception appropriate to the political conditions."
And so on.
And finally he says:
"Another reason why" -- I want to be fair about this document with you. He indicates that perhaps it should not be interpreted merely as a tactical maneuver, because of the inconsistency which this would imply. For in that case the word "liberation" ought never to have been mentioned and no theater should be allowed to stay open, no trade school, no university should be allowed to function. would like to read you this significant paragraph. It states-and I think you will allow me to summarize it--that this letter of Bormann's, which originated from the field headquarters, simply cannot be issued as a ministerial decree, since it would disavow the entire policy hitherto announced by the minister-yourself. Markull:
"It is necessary to point once more to the obvious similarity between the opinions professed by Koch and the instructions given in the Bormann letter." you can decide upon this question, and he suggests certain considerations which might be useful, recounting some difficulties. second paragraph.
"Without wishing to criticize in any way the statements of Party Director Bormann it is yet necessary to point out that the wording of his letter does not always bring out clearly the importance of the issue at stake. A phrase like 'brisk trade in contraceptives' had better not be brought into connection with the name of the Fuehrer.
In the same way abrupt phrases like 'vaccination of the non-German population is out of the question,' and so on, "would hardly seen to be entirely in keeping with the importance of the historical problems involved." numeral III. Markull states: "The statements set out above may appear very sharp. They are, however, dictated by concern and duty."
And finally--Well, I don't think there is any necessity to read the last paragraph. It merely talks about the philosophy which is being raised in a grandiose manner by the Japanese ally in his now districts.
assistant, Leibrandt, from your subordinate, Markull? You can answer that yes or no, by the way; that is all I want to know right now--whether or not you remember it.
Will you wait just a minute?
A I received this report from Dr. Leibrandt, and I would like to make
Q Just before you do that--you will have an opportunity; I won't shut You had written a letter in answer to the Bormann letter, hadn't you?
tions of Bormann? In your letter you had agreed with these shocking suggestions of Bormann?
Yes or no.
at all in any manner; but, on the contrary, my decrees continued with a health
Q You wrote this letter to the Fuehrer; you didn't write it to Bormann, did you?
Your answer went to Hitler?
ceptives ***tion? Wait until I finish. I was saying, in your letter to the Fuehrer *---* back those horrid suggestions of Bormann's, didn't you-those nasty ***rid suggestions of Bormann, I might say?
You wrote them to Hitler?
mann's letter. I wrote to the Fuehrer that I was not doing anymore than could sick.
But as far as health and biological propagation of the eastern peoples German doctors could do for the German people and its propagation.
The attack
Q Just so there will be no doubt about this--I don't want there to be any misunderstanding and nobody else does--are you telling us that you didn't write back almost word for word what Bormann wrote to you?
not only raises no objections against Bormann's principles or even his phrase ology.
Now surely one of your subordinates would not be impertinent enough to so?
what I demanded of them. They told me their opinions. Dr. Leibrandt came to me full of care and concern and said to me, "Mr. Reichminister, that is not in accord with what we are doing."
I said, "Dr. Leibrandt, please calm yourself. I have written an appeasing explanation.
Nothing will be changed. I will speak to the Fuehrer later personally about these matters."
a letter in which you agreed word for word with Bormann. I have no trouble with you on that score.
That is all I am trying to get you to tell this Tribunal,
A That is not correct. I must say that this memorandum which Dr. right.
But in this case I have a special problem and a special conflict, and I will insist on my position.
That may be shown in the documents I read yesterday.
May I define my position as to this?
Q Answer this question: Who were you appeasing, Hitler or Bormann, or both of them?
ministerial decrees in that sense would never be published. Point 2: I gave THE PRESIDENT:
Wait a minute. That is not an answer to the ques tion.
You said that you wrote an appeasing answer. The question is whom were you trying to appease.
Was it Hitler or was it Bormann or was it both?
A (continued) Yes; both of them; yes.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, would this be a convenient time?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
(A recess was taken.)
DR. SEIDL: Dr. Seidl for the defendant Dr. Frank. Mr. President, I have stated yesterday that the document books for Frank I have already translated, but I have just found out now about the document books, that the document books are not yet bound by the office which should have done it and for that reason, I did not receive permission from another office yet. Perhaps the Tribunal could speed that up that is, the binding of the document books, because otherwise the whole translation is unusable.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: I didn't know there was any delay but I will see to it right away that they get it as far as we are able to do it.
THE WITNESS: May I say something to this document? This memorandum, such as it is stated in the beginning, is based on the fiction, the idea of a possible ministerial decree. It uses phrases which Bormann had used in his letter but my letter which I have sent to the Fuehrer could not possibly contain these phrases but they will contain modifying statements to the extent that I myself in the Occupied Eastern Territories did not do what I am accused of now; that is to say, that I do not state any consideration of German population but that I established departments for education, for schools, and so on; that these departments, I would have to modify; but( that Bormann made these statements, used these phrases, it is unfortunate the way in which he liked to express himself, which we had to find out during the later years. covers the content of these things, but I went to point out one decisive point; that is, that here, these opinions, which Bormann mentions, were also mentioned in the surroundings of Koch and against these personal things of Koch -- in these tragic years -- my entire efforts were directed, especially to train the entire corps of administrative leaders and that can be seen from point 3, paragraph 3, where you will find it. Among the district commissars there are at least eighty percent against the opinions -
MR. DODD: I think we all know what is in it. If you have any explanation, I think you ought to make it.
THE WITNESS: Yes. On page 4, it says the greater majority of the administrative leadership corps puts its hope to the minister -- that is, myself, -- and I have tried and attempted to justify these hopes of the administrative leadership corps, that I would attempt to educate them by these decrees with regard to thousands of people in the Eastern Territories, whom they did not know, these thousands who, of course, in a fight against Bolshevism, could not always determine how things were in the East; and may I quite concretely point out that the author here says that the decree of the minister of the 17th of March, underlines and emphasizes former decrees in a sharper form.
The decree of the 13th May 1943 goes against the opinion that the Ukrainians were no people at all and against a false master standpoint. These are two decrees which I have not received and which are here; and furthermore, I assume, Mr. Prosecutor, I say concretely that he points out that, of course, the minister -- that is, myself -- knows very well that such a continent has to be treated differently than the suggestions would warrant it. As a consequence of that attitude, I have to say, after that exchange of correspondence between Koch and Bormann, I have started a definite school administration in the Ukraine with a definite organization. BY MR. DODD:
Q I am not interested in that. Just a minute.
MR. DODD: That is no answer to this, if your Honor please, and no explanation of this document. He is launching off on one of these long speeches againabout what he did after the document was received or after he wrote the letter, and I ask that he be instructed to answer that question and not to go on into statements about what he did in the administration in the Ukraine.
I don't think it is pertinent.
THE WITNESS: But I have spoke to the Fuehrer, I have spoke to the Fuehrer personally about this and I told him that this note of May 1943 --that note was also in my file --- I told him that it was impossible, with these phrases, to work in the East.
THE PRESIDENT: If there is a letter in your file or if there is not a letter in your file, your counsel can re-examine you upon cross examination, but you cannot in cross examination go into long explanations. You must answer the question yes or no and explain, if you must explain, shortly. You have been explaining this document for a long time. BY MR. DODD:
Q When did you first meet Erich Koch?
A Erich Koch?
A That may have been in the twenties. I don't know, 1928 or 1927.
Q Apparently you have known him, then, a great many years?
A I know him, yes. I haven't seen him often but as Gauleiter I talked to him on and off.
Q When did he become a Gauleiter? but the dates I could not say for sure, when he was appointed Gauleiter.
Q That is all right. I want an approximate date. Did you have much to do with him from the time that he was appointed Gauleiter, let us say until 1949? with him. Later after 1943, I talked to him several times. general reputation among his friends and acquaintances? to the other and not steady, and not quite reliable in carrying out a definite steady policy. he became the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, of his temperament in this way, that you didn't know that he did these terrible things, which he did do, while Reich Commissioner in the Ukraine, did you?