A second time, later on--I can't tell you whether it was before or after the outbreak of war--Himmler himself touched on the subject and spoke about the so-called biblical scientists, a matter which has often been raised by the Prosecution and called the persecution of a religion. Himmler only told me that it was impossible to suffer refusal to serve in the armed forces considering the condition the Reich was in, that it would have terrible consequences, and he went on to say that he had often personally talked to these detainees so that he could understand them and convince them. That, he said, had been impossible, however, because they replied to all questions with quotations from the Bible which they had learned by heart, so that nothing could be done with them. From that statement of Himmler's, I gather that if he was telling me such a story he couldn't possibly prepare a shooting action against these Bible scientists. paper from Columbus. I gather from that that the United States, too, were detaining Jehovah's witnesses during the war in tained in such camps.
Presumably, under similar conditions, every state would proceed against such a refusal to carry out one's war service in some form or other.
That, of course, was my attitude, and I couldn't call Himmler wrong in that connection.
Q A few more brief questions. Did you intervene in the case of Pastor Niemoll
A Yes. When the case of Niemoller was heard before the courts in Germany, I dispatched an official from my office to that trial because I was interested in both from the official and the human point of view. This official -- his name was Dr. Zigar -- made a report to ma from which I gathered that the indictment was partly based on misunderstandings on the part of the authorities, and that partly he wasn't as seriously incriminated as I had assumed. him whether he couldn't think about the case. Sometime later, when I was with the Fuehrer, I brought the conversation around to that subject, and I said that I had considered the whole proceedings to be most unfortunate, and particularly the outcome they had had. The Fuehrer told me, "I have only demanded one statement from Niemoeller, and that is that he as a clergyman will not make speeches against the state. That he refused, and I can't let him out. Apart from that, I have given orders that he should receive the most decent treatment possible, that he, being a constant smoker, ought to have the best cigars, and he must have the possibility of carrying out all the scientific research he wants to."
I don't know on what reports the Fuehrer based this statement, but as far as I was concerned it was so clear that I could not intervene any further in the matter.
Q We come to the last question but one. Is it true that after the seizure of power you, on your part, had to have your attitude towards the Jews investigated, and that the whole treatment of Jews immediately after the seizure of power was bringing about a certain amount of doubts, that originally it had been thought of treating the Jewish question completely differently?
A I won't deny that during that time of struggle, until 1933, I too had used very strong words and published them in this connection. Many hard words and suggestions appeared in that connection. After the seizure of power I thought--and I also think the Fuehrer thought the same--that one could distance oneself from the whole thing, and that a certain parity and honorable treatment on the question was to be introduced. Under "parity" I understood something which I stated in a public speech on the 28th of June, 1933, and also during the Party rally in September of 1933, quite publicly, something which was published and which come over all the broadcasting systems. That is, that in my opinion it was not possible that the hospital system in Berlin had 80 per cent of Jewish doctors and that 30 per cent would be parity. and that the Reich Government, in connection with these measures of equality, was making exceptions for all those members of the Jewish people who had lost a relative during the last war, be it father or son. The expression I used was that we would now have to make efforts to solve the problem in that manner. that the activities in connection with the emigration, or in support of this emigration to numerous states abroad had brought about the result that the situation deteriorated and that matters had occurred which were regrettable, and which deprived me of my inner strength to continue in the manner which was demanded of me. which has been mentioned here- and what has been testified to the other day in this courtroom, that was something which I considered absolutely impossible and I would not have believed it even if Heinrich Himmler had told me so himself. There are things which, even to me,appear to be humanly impossible, and this is one of them.
DR. THOMA: I have one just question, and in that connection I want to refer to document RO-15- 3761. This is contained in the document book, but it has not yet been submitted to the Tribunal with an exhibit number.
It is a letter from Rosenberg, addressed to Hitler, containing the request that he did not wish to be nominated as a candidate for the Reichstag. BY DR. THOMA: development of National Socialism from its beginning until its dreadful end, and you have participated in it, you have watched its honorable rise and its dreadful descent, and you must know that everything meant one person. Will you inform this Tribunal what you did yourself and what efforts you made to see to it that not all power was centralized in that one person? And will you tell the Tribunal what you have done so that the effects were alleviated? which has also been submitted to the Tribunal under the number USA 725.
(The documents were submitted to the witness.) movement from its very beginning, and that I was completely loyal to a man who, during these years of struggle, was admired by me, because I could see his personal devotion and the passion with which this former German soldier was working for his nation.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, exactly what is your question to the witness? We don't want him to make a speech. We only want to know what question you are putting to him. BY DR. THOMA: public, regarding the limitations on the Fuehrer's power? my book "Myths of the 20th Century", have represented the view that the leadership principle could not be applied to one head but that both the leader and those he leads have a joint duty. I also stated that this conception "leadership principle" should have its climax in the establishment of a senate, or, as I considered it, a council, which would have a correcting and advisory capacity.
senate hall built in the Brown House in Munich with 61 seats, which he himself considered necessary. I once more represented that same thought during a speech in 1934.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal doesn't think this is in answer to the question as to what he did to limit the Fuehrer's power. We want to know what he did, if anything, to limit the Fuehrer's power.
DR. THOMA: In public speeches and before enormous meetings statements were made. I draw your attention to a -document in book 1, volume 2, at page 118, where he has publicly pointed out-
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, I didn't want you to point it out to me, I wanted the witness to point that out to the Tribunal. BY DR. THOMA: you have made? the question either. They signify that I have stated that the Socialist State must not breed a caste which would reign over the German nation, and that the leader of the German nation must not be a tyrant. However, I have never seen Adolf Hitler as a tyrant. Like many millions of National Socialists, I have trusted him personally on the strength of the experiences I have had during 14 years of struggle. And his personal powers were not limited by me; I did not want to limit them, conscious as I was that this was a personal exception for Adolf Hitler. That is, this was not the National Socialist conception of a state. However, this would not mean the leadership principle as we understood it, or the new order for the Reich and its future. during those years--that was supported by me too. And the effects, particularly those of the wrong masters, were branded by me, in the middle of the war, before political lenders, when I stated that this concentration of power as it existed at that moment, during that war, could only be a phenomenon of the war and could not be regarded as the National Socialist conception of a state.
It might be comfortable for some one, it might be comfortable for 200,000 people, but to carry it on later would mean the personal death of 70 million. Gauleiters and other political leaders. I got into touch with the leaders of the Hitler Youth, fully conscious that after the war a reform would have to be carried out in the Party, so that the old ideas of our movement, for which I had fought, would be reestablished. However, that was not possible; fate has finished the movement and things went a different way. that the Party, right from the beginning, did not have the plan to take over power alone, but that it was going to collaborate with other parties?
A That, of course, is a historical development over 14 years. If I can utilize that letter in this connection, then I would like to say, for instance, that at the end of 1923, after the collapse of the so-called Hitler revolt, when the representatives of the Party were either captured and detained or had emigrated to Austria, and when I remained in Munich together with a few others, I represented the point of view at the time that there had to be a new development and that the Party would now have to justify itself in the struggle of parties. down. My collaborators and I continued to try to influence him, however, and the Fuehrer wrote me a long, hand-written letter in which he once more reiterated the reasons why he didn't like my suggestion.
Later on he had, nevertheless, agreed. In this letter here before the Tribunal I asked him not to nominate me for the Reichstag, and the reason was that I did not want to achieve the advantages of a member of the German Parliament, and the second reason was because I considered that I had been in Germany for too short a time, so that after so few years of my activities I didn't think I could expose myself so much.
DR. THOMA: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defendants Counsel want to ask any questions
DR. SERVATIUS: Dr. Servatius, Attorney for the Defendant Sauckel. BY DR. SERVATIUS: ports regarding conditions in connection with recruiting of workers in the occupied eastern territories. Did you investigate to find out whether the statements contained in these reports were the truth? were investigated continuously as the years went by, and I have asked the Tribunal to hear the export on the question, Dr. Beil, as a witness here. This request has been granted by the Tribunal, and I now here that he is sick and that he can only give a written statement in which he reports his experiences. From my own knowledge I can say the following:
Dr. Beil and the so-called central department for people of eastern nationalities were reporting these things to me frequently. In a letter which ha: been mentioned I transmitted them to Sauckel, and they continued to reach the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine or any other administrative officials, together with a request for a reply, and some of these details proved correct, whereas some others proved untrue and exaggerated. As far as I know the general plenipotentiary, Sauckel, has gone into the complaints he received from me and made them the cause for his own intervention. The German Labor Front too, responsible for the welfare of all foreign, workers in Germany, continuously negotiated with the ministry for eastern affairs and has made requests continuously.
Eventually, at the end of 1944, Dr. Ley, as the chief of this welfare department, thought that he could inform me that after considerable difficulties ties the trouble have been surmounted and good conditions had at last been achieved.
I replied to him that I wanted to express my pleasure in that connection. wrong. The active execution was carried out by members of my ministry together with executives of the German Labor Front, and they went to inspect a number of labor camps so as to investigate the complaints and then have them alleviated by means of the German Labor Front.
Q You are mostly talking about conditions in Germany, aren't you, which didn't come under your juridiction. In the memorandum of the 16th of March, 1942, which has been mentioned, a reply to your complaints -- in that memorandum you are telling Koch that he must only use legal means and that the guilty persons must be properly prosecuted. Was that your reaction to the reports? complaints already.
Q And what did Koch reply? and lawful means, but in the document which has been read today, his report dated the 16th of March, 1943, he made several complaints that I didn't always believe his assurances, but that in every case did the minister for eastern affairs not only intervene but even asked him to make reports regarding these instructions.
Q So he denied considerable wrongs, did he ?
A Yes, he denied them. He only referred to one particularly drastic case in that document, namely, that certain houses had been burned down in Volhynia because those who had been called upon to work had resisted by force, and he said that he had no other means. This case in particular caused new reproaches on the part of the eastern ministry.
Q Was he entitled to such measures, in your opinion? orders coming from the departments in the Reich. He was responsible for their execution and he was responsible for orders for the execution. He had at least I believe, often overstepped the limitations of his instructions and acted on his own initiative, and as he thought in the interest of war economy.
He introduced measures which sometimes I heard about and sometimes I did not. As appears from the documents -
THE PRESIDENT: The question you were asked was whether in your opinion he was entitled to burn houses because people refused to work, and you have given that long answer which you have just given.
It seems to me to be no answer to the question.
A (continued) The right for the burning down of houses, in my opinion he did not have. That is why I intervened and he tried to justify himself. with a certain amount of administrativ coercion. How far was that permissible? Is there legal and illegal coercion? How do you judge the measures which were carried out in practice? the urgent demands from the Fuehrer I could not maintain that attitude of mine, so that I agreed that some legal form could be given to certain ago groups which were to be called up from which all those were to be eliminated who were required in the occupied eastern territories, whereas all the others were to be recruited with the help of their own administrations, that is to say, there own burgomeisters in the occupied territories. There is no doubt, of course, in this connection that so as to give emphasis to these demands of the administration gendarmes were used for the execution of this program. it? of the Ukraine was subordinated to investigate and to interfere in accordance with the instructions which he had received from me.
Q But why did you go to Sauckel as well? Was it Sauckel's duty to stop this the right to give instructions to mem the ministry for eastern affairs, and over and above that he had the right to bypass me and give instructions to the Reich Commissioner, a privilige which he has used by giving lectures in the district of the Ukraine and eastern territories on several occasions.
Q Was Sauckel responsible for the conditions in the Ukraine? course on the basis of the authority given him by the Fuehrer he made his demands so strongly and precisely that the regional governments which were responsible to the general commissioners did feel it their duty to, back the published notices for recruitment by a certain amount of executive power, as appears from document 285-PS, from the general commissioner in Zhitomir, and I think from another report, the number of which I have forgotten, from the district commissioner in Kaunas.
Q Did Sauckel have an organization of his own?
A Well, of course he had a staff, but I can't make a statement on the size of it. He took care that the civil administration had labor offices attached to them, and his demands as far as civil administration in the east was concerned were handed over to the administrative departments for their carrying out. In my opinion and as far as I know he had no very large organization.
Q Before Sauckel came into office, wasn't there a department in your ministry called labor, which had its corresponding departments which were labor offices?
A I can't give you a precise answer to that. I think a main department labor and social police did exist at the very beginning of the ministry, but I can't toll you the exact date at the moment. Perhaps Dr. Beil's statement will contain some details. departments?
A I am informed as far as I have told you, only I can't give you the date for the foundation of that main department in the ministry for eastern affairs. eastern territories? administration. That is,the Reich Commissioners had continuous contact and correspondence with the labor offices attached to the Reich Commissioners would of course have been going on. A correspondence on a lower level was, of course not going on, but the departments attached to the Reich Commissioners were obviously corresponded with.
Sauckel's. That are the departments you mean? Later on, he was to achieve collaboration with that section and he was the formal head of that department working on social policy. He was very rarely at the Ministry for Eastern Affairs since he was being used by Sauckel most of the time and apart from that, he had another few gentlemen who, with my department, were negotiating regarding the reduction of the --
THE PRESIDENT: Witness Sauckel will give all this information. What is the good of wasting our time putting it to Rosenberg.
DR. SERVATIUS: It is important so as to ascertain responsibility. I wouldn't be able to call on Rosenberg as a witness later. A great number of questions will arise.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand that, of course, but these are all details of Sauckel's administration which Sauckel must know himself.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, but I would have no opportunity later on to ask the witness Rosenberg regarding the consequences and the result of the organizations, whois responsible, who has the right to supervise, who had the duty to intervene? Whey are these measures addressed to us, why does he react to them? One can't understand all that, if one can't ask the witness about it first of all. I would suggest that, if possible, Rosenberg should be called later on in connection with Sauckel's case and after Sauckel has spoken to abbreviate the matter.
THE PRESIDENT: There is no issue with the prosecution about it; If there is no issue with the prosecution, then Sauckel's evidence about it will be quite sufficient.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the witness Rosenberg, in a letter addressed to Sauckel, mentioned the fact that his departments were using these letters which had been objected to. Since, in my opinion, such department didn't exist, but since Rosenberg was addressing the wrong person, it must be possible for me to ascertain which service department did in fact exist. It is a complaint raised by Rosenberg regarding the conditions and instead of addressing himself to Koch(?) he is addressing himself to Sauckel.
THE PRESIDENT: Ask him some direct question, will you? BY DR. SERVATIUS: him?
A I didn't receive a fetter in reply to it -- nor had he replied, to it, but I heard that Sauckel on the occasion of a meeting of labor offices at Weimar, referred to these complaints in detail and that he was making efforts to do his best so as to remove the grounds for the complaints.
Q Didn't that meeting take place a fortnight later; namely, on the 6th of January 1943, and weren't you present, too?
A No, I spoke in one meeting at Weimar; it may be I spoke at one meeting; whether or not at this one, I can't tell you.
Q Did you hear Sauckel's speech on the occasion of that meeting?
Q Did you get the speech in writing later?
A I can't remember it either.
DR. SERVATIUS: Later on, when Sauckel's case comes up, I shall submit the speech, in document form. I have a number of more questions. BY DR. SERVATIUS: themselves with recruiting laborers?
A Yes. I have received several reports that the so-called "Todt" organization, for the carrying out of their technical tasks, were recruiting workers and using them and I think the railway administration and several other authorities in the East were making efforts to create for themselves replacements of workers.
Q Isn't it right that the armed forces were demanding workers, that workers were demanded for road construction by industry, home industry, and that there was a general effort to keep the laborers, the workers in the country, too, and not let them go to Germany?
A That is correct and that is understandable. It is understandable that the armed forces and the organization Todt and various other departments were asking for asmany laborers as possible for the work they were doing and they probably didn't want to give any of their workers up either. That is understandable. under all circumstances and that all obstacles must be removed. Did that refer to the resistance of the local department which didn't want to give up these workers? which I had with Sauckel in 1943, and which is in evidence as a document which has been mentioned today; reference was made to these documents. Sauckel stated that by order of the Fuehrer he would have to raise a large number of new workers in the East and in this connection, I am thinking of the armed forces most of all, who had been hoarding workers and been active in Germany. in connection with the Germanizing of the East?
A I don't understand that question.
Q What do you understand in connection with Germanizing? In carrying out the resettlements in the East, forces were transferred; they were allotted to Sauckel upon his request.
A First of all I don't know for certain what resettlement you are talking about.
cerned with just who were sent into Polish territory; presumable they reached your territory, too. Don't you know about that? of the Jewish population from Germany, in certain towns and camps in the East, was the responsibility of the Chief of the German Police, who had the same tasks for the occupied Eastern Territories; that in connection with the transfer to camps and concentrations in certain towns, there my have been a possible shortage of labor but I don't know what that can have to do with Germanization.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Before we adjourn, I should like to know v/hat the position is about the defendant Frank's documents. Does anybody know anything about that,
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am able to say that in so far as we are concerned, we have been in consultation with Dr. Seidl for the defendant rank as well as the representatives of the Soviet prosecuting staff. We are prepared to be hoard at any time that the Tribunal would care to hear us on the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Y es. Then, Dr. Thoma, how many witness have you got and how how long do you think you will be in the defendant Rosenberg's case?
DR. THOMA: I have only one witness, my Lord, the witness Riecke. I believe that as far as I am concerned, I shall deal with him in no more than one hour; probably it won't take as long as that. It will depend on cross examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Yes; then you may finish the defendant Rosenberg's case tomorrow.
DR. THOMA: It depends upon the cross examination, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, of course. We may. Then, Dr. Seidl, will you be able to go on at once in Frank's case? Supposing we finish Rosenberg tomorrow -- tomorrow being Wednesday, is it not? Will you be able to go on Thursday morning in Frank' s case?
MR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I can start with Frank's case as soon as Rosenber berg's case is finished. As far as documents are concerned, I only had difficulties regarding one document and I have foregone the presentation of it but apart from that, these are documents which already mostly have been presented by the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: If there is any one document in question, we can hear you upon it now. As I understand you, you only have one document about which there is any difference of opinion.
DR. SEIDL: That has been settled. I no longer want to present it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SEIDL: There are no differences of opinion.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you are perfectly ready to go on?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Have they been translated yet?
DR. SEIDL: As far as I know, they have all been translated.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, thank you.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 17 April 1946 at 1000 hours).
Military Tribunal, in the matter of: The
MR. DODD: Just before recess yesterday afternoon the Tribunal inquired as to the status of the Frank document book and when I informed the Tribunal that we were prepared to be heard Dr. Seidl advised that we had a pact to which we had agreed. I was not aware of that at the time. I think we were both a little bit in error. The situation is that last night about 6:00 o'clock we did reach an agreement so that there is no difficulty at all about the Frank books.
DR. THOMA: I would like to make a brief correction. Yesterday we discussed a document as to the reasons for the Special Staff Rosenberg. My client repeatedly asked me to bring in this document. There is a possibility that I confused thus document with other documents which I recovered but which were not grated me and I just wanted to make that correction as this time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You do not want to do anything more than just make that verbal correction?
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other defendant's counsel who wishes to ask any questions? BY DR. HAENSEL (Counsel for SS).
Q. Witness, are you of the opinion that you, as Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer, were carrying out the spiritual objectives of the N.S.D.A.P. and its subsidiary organizations? Are you of the opinion that that which you did in carrying out these objectives for the planned combating of Jewry and that every thing you said and wrote was as an official statement of the Party and may be considered as an official statement?
A. If I may answer this long series of questions one by one I would like to say my office as far as spiritual education was concerned worked with the Hauptschulungsamt, with the main school system of the SS.
We were in constant contact with them. My office distributed the "Leitheft" of the SS, which was a journal which was published. I myself read this journal, had it in my hands, and through the years found that in this journal at least very valuable thoughts were published and, of course, I had through all these years reason to work with the SS and not to enter into any conflict with them. blem was contained and expressed in the program of the N.S.D.A.P. and that is the only official statement to which I tried to keep the Party members. Anything which I said about that point and what others wrote about it were just reasons that were set forth. Much of what was said was accepted but as far as the Fuehrer and the state was concerned, any thoughts that were advanced were not binding to the Fuehrer and to the state.
Q. Was your objective as to combatting Jewry limited in any way? Did you picture that the Jews were to be eliminated from economic and state administration or did you view stronger measures such as extermination as necessary? What was your final objective?
A. According to the Party program and in line with the objective I had, the leadership and the directions in the German state were to be changed as it existed from 1918 to 1933 and that was the vital point. As far as elimination from economic life was concerned we did not talk about it at that time. harsh political battle an investigation and examination of the question Would have to take place and emigration from Germany was talked about as far as Jews were concerned. Later when matters became more critical I uttered the same thoughts and very prominent Jewish leaders made proposals that German unemployed be sent to Africa, Asia and China.
and today, one could differentiate three kinds of measures against the Jews. First, up until '33, that is the taking over of power; that would have been propaganda measures. Point 2: After '33, these measures which were shown in the laws against the Jews which were issued; and then, finally, after the war, certain measures which without doubt can be considered crimes against humanity. Do you agree to this tripartite arrangement?
Q Then, I would like to call your attention to group 2; that is, to these measures which were instituted after the taking over of power and which were laid down in laws against the Jews. Did you participate in the formulating of the laws?
THE PRESIDENT: You are counsel, are you not, for the SS?
DR. HAENSEL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What have these questions got to do with the SS?
DR. HAENSEL: The questions concern the SS in the following way: If the Party in itself had the total objective of laws against the Jews, the SS was bound to these objectives and could not go beyond these objectives and had none beyond that point. I wanted to establish when the making of laws and measures against Jews turned into criminal acts, and that up until that time the SS in no manner took criminal measures against the Jews.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, he said already that the Jewish problem was contained in the Party program, and that is all that you want, is it not?
DR. HAENSEL: I wanted to show that the fact that this question was contained in the Party program did not mean that it was a crime against humanity. In the Party program there was just a general sentence which I do not believe that, as such, it was a crime against humanity and-
THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of construction of the Party program. It is not a matter for him to give evidence about. It is in a written document. The Party program is contained in the written documents.
DR. HAENSEL: But, Mr. President, up and above the Party program, a series of decrees and laws were issued which expanded the Party program and the question;;
THE PRESIDENT: They are also documents which this Tribunal has to construe; not for this witness to construe.
DR. HAENSEL: The question is, in so far as the defendant can tell us, how far the SS might have gone in the carrying out of these measures.
THE PRESIDENT: He can tell us the facts; he cannot tell us the laws or the interpretation of documents. If you are asking him about facts, well and good, but if you are asking him to interpret the Party program or to interpret the decrees, that is a matter for the Tribunal.
DR. HAENSEL: Very well. BY DR. HAENSEL: that all Germans should be unified in a greater Germany and that p;int is set down in the Party program. the preparation of a war or did you believe, also, that it could be arranged through peaceful means? speech of 1932 before an International Congress, at which I made a (speech and gave a proposal which was approved by the Fuehrer, that the four great powers should investigate and examine the general European problems. In these proposals they said that we would dispense with German colonies; that we would not insist on Alsace-Lorraine; and that we would not insist on the Southern Tyrol.