interrogation, I was confronted with General Falkenhorst. As I recall, I did not remember his having asked me questions regarding the carrying out of this order. Even the event itself was no longer in my memory, and I remembered it again only after I had seen the documents. to change that order; that I could only inform any one who inquired as to what to do that he should act as instructed in the order. only what is stated here in the affidavit. He edited his answer: "Keitel did not deny having had this talk with me but denied that the subject of it was what I said." without having a document number. Are you done with your statement?
A Yes. I believe that suffices.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Prosecution did not put in this document, did they? They have not offered it in evidence.
DR. NELTE: I believe so, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I think they must have put it to the defendant Keitel in one of his interrogations, did they not? Isn't that right? That does not mean that it is put in evidence, because the interrogation, itself, you see, need not be put in evidence. You must put it in now if you want it to go in.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, there is some error here. This document was put in by the Prosecution here as documentation for the assertion that the defendant Keitel had told Falkenhorst to kill these paratroopers I received knowledge of it here.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will tell me if that is so, but I cannot think of any document having been put in here that has not had an exhibit number.
MR. DODD: We have no recollection of having put it in. Many of these interrogations did not have document numbers, but, of course, if they were put in, they would have USA or Great Britain exhibit numbers.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps the best way would be for Counsel for the Prosecution to verify whether it was read in evidence.
MR. DODD: That will take no a few minutes, You r Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I mean at your leisure. Would that be a convenient time to break off for ten minutes?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at a quarter to five. They will then sit again in this court in closed session, and they desire that both counsel for the prosecution and counsel for the defense should be present then as they wish to discuss with counsel on both sides the best wayy of avoiding translating unnecessary documents. a great burden has fallen upon the Translating Division. That is the problem which the Tribunal wish to discuss in closed session with counsel for the prosecutio n and counsel for the defense. They will therefore, as I say sit here in closed session where there is room for all the defense counsel. That is at five o'clock. BY DR. NELTE: the Treatment of sabotage troops behind the invasion front? A now situation was created through the invasion, and the question of a command of troops arose. There are several documents in that respect. It is true that Supreme Commander West, after the landing of Anglo-American forces in North France, considered that a new situation had arisen with reference to the Fuehrer Order of October 18, 1942. directed against the parachute troops. Inquiry was as usual started, and General Jodl and I represented the view of the commander in the west, namely that this order was not applicable here. Hitler refused to accept that point of view, gave certain directives in reply, and according to the documents, after two editions and after one had been closed out as unsuitable, the document 551PS is the final version as approved by the Fuehrer during that report. The reason why I remember so accurately is because of the occasion of presenting that reply at the discussion of the situation. This written appendix was added by General Jodl with reference to the application in the Italian theatre. With that appendix this version certainly was approved and demanded by Hitler, and was then sent out.
Q Wasn't the question discussed in this connection just how the active support of such acts of sabotage by the population could be judged from the point of view of international law?
October 18 1942, and the well-known previously discussed leaflet. I am of the opinion that the Hague regulations about land warfare refer to any such sabotage and in their report they condemn it if the population participated in any such action, and if the population supports such action, on covers the perpetrators in any shape or form. That in my opinion is clearly expressed in the Hague regulations on land warefare, namely, that the population must not commit such supporting action. which is document 537-PS This is concerned with the treatment of members of foreign military units caught together with bandits. Do you know it?
A Yes I do. Yes, this document 537-PS has also been submitted to me during interrogations before the trial, and I have been interrogated on it, and I have made the statement, which I will briefly repeat, that it be reported that attached to the staff of these bandits, particularly the leaders of the Serbian and Yugoslav bandits, there had been military missions which we believe were certain agents and agent troops for the purpose of liaisoning with the state with which we are at war. It had been reported in this connection and inquiries had been made what should be don, in case of capturing such a mission, as it was called; in case they were and could be captured. Upon reporting this to the Fuehrer he decided that the suggestions of the military authority concerned, namely, to record them as prisoners of war should be turned down, since according to the directive of the 18th of October 1942 they were to be considered saboteurs and treated as such. That document represents the crux of that order, and it bears my name. during the examination of Reich Marshal Goering. Consequently I shall confine myself to a few questions which concern you personally in connection with that problem. You know what we are concerned with, the conception "Terror Fliers" and the treatment of terrorists fliers. What was your attitude to that? population with arms carried aboard aircraft has been explained here. These increased considerably, and that there had been thirty to forty victims in a day which had lost their lives caused Hitler to demand categorically that this question should be solved by an order.
We soldiers were of the opinion that existing regulations were sufficient, and that new regulations were unnecessary. The question of Lynching came into the problem and the question what is a terrorist flier, and on the strength of these two groups of questions the innumerable number of documents which you will note arose which treats or deals with that subject. already been discussed. In this connection are regarding your responsibility I am interested in the words which you have written across one of these documents. Please, will you explain these?
the example of the warning that prisoners of war had been shackled after Dieppe, that here top a corresponding official note should contain a warning that we would employ reprisals if the enemy commanders would not, by them selves, stop that practice. That was refused, and it was said that this was not a suitable suggestion. Jodl and myself. One record bears a remark on the margin written by me which runs as follows: "Courtmartials won't work"; at least, that was the content. I wrote that on the margin at the time because the question of sentence by court martials came up for discussion, and that very document laid down in detail for the first time what a terrorist flier was. It stated that terror attacks were always attacks carried out from low-flying aircraft, and my thoughts led me tothink that crews attacking in low-level flights could not be caught alive in 99 out of 100 cases, if they crashed, since there was no possibility of saving themselves with a parachute from such heights. Therefore, I wrote that remark in the margin.
Furthermore, I considered, apart from the fact that there couldn't be proceedings against such a flier, one would, secondly, not be able to conclude a satisfactory trial or a satisfactory investigation if an attack had been carried out from considerable height because no court, in my opinion, would be able to prove that such a man did have the intention of attacking those targets which in fact had been hit. the rules regarding court martial proceedings against prisoners of war, through the protecting power, the enemy state had to be informed and three months' grace had to be given during which the home state could object to the sentence. It was therefore, out of the question that through those channels and during a brief period the desired could be achieved.
That is what was meant by the words "That won't work."
It states: "If you should allow lynching at all, then you can hardly lay down rules for it."
To that I can't say very much, since my conviction is that there is no possibility of saying under what circumstances such methods of people's justice could be regulated or considered proper, and I am still of the opinion that rules for such proceedings cannot be laid down.
Q But what was your attitude regarding the question of lynchings? for us soldiers. One case had been reported by the Reichsmarshal in which he had prohibited any proceedings against a soldier who had stopped such actions. I know of no case where soldiers,with reference to the shooting of soldiers, behaved towards a prisoner of war in any other way than that laid down in generally known regulations. that I had a discussion with Reichsmarshal Goering at the Berghof about the whole question, and he, at that time, indicated his point of view extremely clearly. He said that he agreed -- namely, that lynchings for soldiers should be turned down under any circumstances, and that we were in an unfortunate position. I asked him to approach Hitler once more, personally, and try to clear that point of view.
I asked him to ask Hitler nit to tell us to draft an order of that kind. been drafted and had never been issued. nations and all people are so passionately interested as the prisoner of war system. That is why, here too, the prosecution have stressed particularly those cases which were violations of laws for prisoners of war, be it in accordance with the Geneva Convention, or be it in accordance with general international law. of war system in Germany, I should like to put the following questions to you.
armed forces were made acquainted with international agreements which referred to prisoners of war? is available, and in which all rules were contained, including the operational regulations which arose from the existing international agreements. That is, I think, Directive No. 38, which applied to the Army and the Navy, and also to the Air Forces. That was the basis of the service instructions, and the basic order.
Q How was that used in practice? Were people who had to occupy themselves with such questions in practice informed, or was it sufficient to draw their attention to the general directives? instructionsand every soldier, up to a point, had been instructed on it. Apart from that, no further explanations were expected at the beginning of the war. for that particular purpose. Do you know of them? Do you know that they took place in Vienna?
courses of instruction for those people who were in contact with prisoners of war in practice and that there were courses of instructions that were held. book?
A Yes. That jas been confirmed here, I think, by General Milch the other day, who had it on him. in your case? ning of the Polish Campaign in the East, since every preparatory measure for reception of prisoners of war had been refused by Hitler. He had prohibited it, but after that, on very short notice, things had to be improvised.
Q What was ordered? force to a limited extent -- but particularly the army -- should prepare appropriate measures; registration cards should be got ready -- in fact, that everything should be prepared in that connection and their organization. ment of prisoners of war and their welfare arose . with reference to international agreements, and in my opinion that contained exhaustively everything which the people concerned had to know. Apart from that, no additional instructions were issued at that time; but these instructions were dealt with according to these rules. regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. The OKW was, shall I say, the ministerial directing department which had to issue all basis regulations and directives in that respect -- prepare them, and which had the right to ascertain the observance of these instructions by means of inspections. In other words, it was the leading department issuing instructions with rights to inspect, without having, of course, command of the camps themselves.
Q Shouldn't one add the correspondence? forces, and therefore the army, navy, and air force too, was the correspondence with the Foreign Office to the protecting powers -- contact with the International Red Cross and all such departments who were interested in the welfare of prisoners of war. I had forgotten that.
Q Therefore the OKW was the legislator and the controller?
Q What did the sub-sections of the armed forces have to do? of prisoners of war, had certain under their command, just as the army, under consideration, in a considerably larger degree, through reputable commanders at home, had the task of administrating and commanding the camps in their spheres.
Q Now, let us take the prisoner of was camps. Who was at the head of such camps? prisoner-of-war system in that district, and the camp itself was led by a camp commander who had a small staff of officers, among then intelligence. officers and some such persons who were responsible for such matters. affairs in the command district?
Q Who was his superior?
A. The army district commanders were under orders of the supreme commander of the reserve army, and he in turn under the supreme command of the army.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for ten minutes (There was a recess.)
(The Tribunal adjoined until 5 April 1946 at 1000 hours.)
BY DR. NELTE: channel of orders in the prisoner of war system, the KGW. This channel, according to what you said, went from the camp commander or commandant to the army district commander and then through the commander of the reserve army to the OKH--supreme command of the army. I should now like you to tell me what the question of the responsibility was if something which had been ordered was against the Geneva Convention or was a violation of generally recognized international law. How did that affect a camp? Was the OKW responsible according to its jurisdictional responsibilities? the general principle instructions which had been published by OKW or if the non-exercising of the right to inspect came upit was connected to that. Under such circumstances I would consider the OKW responsible. and the right to control camps? inspector of the prisoner of war system, the KGW, who was, nevertheless, at the same time the chief of the department KGW in the general army department. In other words, he was carrying out a twin function. Later on--I think after 1942--it was done by appointing an inspector general who dealt with the entire correspondence and the entire official tasks who did not have anything to do with all those tasks. International Red Cross?
A If a protecting power represented by a delegation wished to inspect camps, then that was arranged by the department or the inspector for the prisoner of war system, who would accompany that delegation.
I think I ought to say that as far as the French were concerned, Ambassador Scabini officer of the German armed forces?
A I don't know whether in camps the procedure adopted was always in accordance with the basic instructions.
Direct exchange of views between instructions regarding the prisoner of war system personally?
A Yes. With general instructions I did concern myself. Apart from sible for me and dealt with these matters.
These three departments had to ions became necessary; and, as was frequently the case, the Fuehrer comparison to the other prisoners.
What can you say on that subject?
observed or ratified the Geneva Convention; and it was also due to the fact war entered into it here too.
The Fuehrer emphasized that we had a free
Q I am now going to show you the document C-388, USSR 336. It is dated 15 September 1941. Part 1 is a report of the Department Foreign Intelligence in the OKW; and part 2 is a directive of the OKW, dated 8 September 1941, regarding the treatment of Soviet Russian Prisoners of War. Part 3 is a memorandum about guarding of Soviet Prisoners of War, and the last document is an appendix which is a copy of the decree from the Council of People's Commissioners regarding prisoners of War System of July 1 1941. issuedon 2 September, Which can be attributed to the fact that, to start with, there was an order from Hitler, saying that Russian prisoners of war were not to be transported to German Reich territory. This order was later on rescinded; and now, regarding the directive of 8/9/41, which is available in its original test, regarding that, I should like to say that the reason for all these instructions was also due to the point of view that this was a battle of nationalities, people, since Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of National Socialist Germany. That, in my opinion, expresses right at the beginning, the basis on which those instructions were made and the motives to which they were due. It is a fact that Hitler, as I explained yesterday, did not consider this was a formal battle to be waged on the basis of international law, but as a conflict between two world philosophical ideas. Several statements are contained in the document regarding these separations; such persons who we considered as not dangerous, and those who, because of their political activities, had to be separated as being particularly threatening to National Socialism and particularly dangerous. it has been presented here by the prosecutor of the Soviet Union. It is a letter from the Chief of the Foreign Department of Intelligence, Admiral Canaris, in which he refers to that principal order which I have just discussed; to reiterate it for my purpose and add to it a number of explanations, together withhis objections he had about this decree, which he emphasizes underlined, he adds in the memorandum, so I needn't say any more about that. It is an extract and also the orders issued by the Soviet Union on the 1st of July, which are directives for the treatment of prisoners of war; in other words, treatment of German prisoners of war. I received that on the 15th of September, whereas the otherorder had been issued one week before that and after studying this report from Canaris, I must admit that I did share his objection.
Consequently, together with the whole file, I went to Hitler and asked him to stud it and make a statement about it. The Fuehrer told me that we couldn't expect that German prisoners of war would have the treatment according to the Geneva Convention or international law on the other side, but we had no ways of investigating it and that, according to that view, he had no intention of altering directives and that he refused bluntly, and thus I returned the file together with my remarks to Admiral Canaris, which means the order remained in force.
Q What was the treatment of Soviet Russian prisoners of war in effect; was it according to instructions or was it, in effect, handled differently?
AAccording to my own'personal observations and the reports which have been put before me, the practice was considerably better and more favorable than the very severe instructions, whichhad been issued after it had been agreed that the prisoners of war were to be transported to Germany. At any rate, I have seen numerous reports stating that, as far as the employment for labor and, in particular for agriculture, was concerned, that also in the war economy, the general institutions of war economy -- I mean, such as German railways, railroad construction as such, that the conditions in practice were considerably better than they could have been after those hard severe words which are after all contained in these instructions.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, may I on this occasion refer to document No. 6 in the document book?
MRS PRESIDENT: Which document book?
DR. NELTE: Document No. 6, in document book No. 1, No. 6 'Conditions of employment for workers from the East, as well as Soviet Russian prisoners of war. In this document book I have only quoted those passages from that book which I am submitting to you, which concern themselves with the conditions of employment for Soviet Russian prisoners of war. I am submitting this book in evidence as Exhibit K-6, and beg the Tribunal to admit it in evidence and I don't need to read, from it. In these instructions the points are accurately referred to which contain directives, from which it can be seen, that at a later period Soviet Russian prisoners of war, and in accordance with the OKW and the legislative body, we re treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention.
May I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. You don't wish to read from it?
DR. NELTE: No, I didn't want to.
BY DR. NELTE:
Q. Please, will you explain to me just what relations existed between the police or Himmler respectively on one side and the prisoner of war system, the K.G.W. on the other side?
A. May I first of all say that it was a continuous uninterrupted cause of friction, friction between Himmler and the executive police departments and the departments of the armed forces who worked in this sphere and this friction never stopped. The reason -- it was apparent right from the beginning that at least Himmler personally and his subordinates never ceased to try to influence the prisoner of war system in some form or other. the complaints about insufficient guarding of prisoners, the insufficient security measures in the camps, the lack of guards and their inefficiency, all those matters were suitable and were exploited by him and he used them to fall upon our backs continuously. He continually stated that he suspected us of these shortcomings. As a result there were continuous interferences the causes for which I could hardly recognize.
There was interference from Hitler. He adopted these accusations and he interfered with matters continuously so that in this manner the armed forces departments who dealt with these matters were continually upset. Consequently, since I could not investigate the problem, I was forced to give instructions to my officers, to my departments in the O.K.W.
Q. What was the actual cause and the purpose which Himmler attempted to achieve?
A. He wanted not only to have influence but, if possible, he wanted to handle the prisoner of war system as the Police Chief of Germany so that he would reign supreme in these matters.
Q. Did not the question of getting laborers, workers, enter into it?
A. Later on that did become apparent, yes. I think I shall have to refer to that Later but I can say now that one observation in any case was quite clear, namely that after such searches, such hunts, which took place at certain intervals in Germany for escaped persons, the majority of these prisoners of war were obviously not returned to camps from which they had escaped so that quite obviously they had been retained by police departments and used for work under the jurisdiction of Himmler.
The escaped, of course, increased every year. It became more and more voluminous. For that plausible reasons, of course, exist.
Q. The prisoner of war system, of course, is closely connected with the problem of workers. Which department was responsible for the meployment of prisoners of war?
A. The department dealing with the county labor offices in the so-called Reichslabor Administration Service, which had originally been in the hands of the Labor Minister and was later on transferred to the Plenipotentiary for Labor.
In practice it happened like this. The county labor department would state their requirements to the army district commanders who had jurisdiction over the comes. They demanded workers and these workers were supplied to them as far as that was possible under the existing general directives.
Q. What did the O.K.W. have to do with the allocation of labor?
A. In general, of course, the supervision so that the employment would take place according to the general and principal instructions which existed in which connection it was not possible, of course, not even for the inspector to examine each individual case of the employment of prisoners. For that, after all, the army district commanders and their prisoner of war system were responsible and they were the suitable persons. really start until 1942. Until then the main employer of such workers had been agriculture and the German railway system and a number of general institutions but not as much industry and this applies particularly to Soviet prisoners of war who were in the main agricultural men.
Q. What was the actual cause for these labor requirements?
A. During the winter of 1941-42 the problem arose how soldiers who had dropped out, particularly in the eastern theater of war, could be replaced.
Requirements which had to be covered were considerable, requirements for soldiers who could go to the front and join fighting units. Expressed in figures I know now that the army alone had an annual requirement of two to two and a half million replacements.
if you consider that about one million of that would come from normal recruiting and that half a million would come from rehabilitated men, then that leaves one million and a half which had to be replaced every year and, they could, be withdrawn from the war economy and placed at the disposal of the services, the armed forces. That in turn was the cause for the very short term exchange of these workers from the war economy one in turn their replacement by new workers, workers who one tried to find from among prisoners of war on one side and who, on the other hand were found through the Plenipotentiary Sauckel, who had the task of finding workers. for all replacements for the entire armed forces, that is to say recruiting and I was conciously concerned with this flow of manpower. That is the reason also why, during discussions held, with the Fuehrer referring to the replacements and finding of such replacements I was present. industry and in the armament industry? industry which even indirectly was connected with armament. It was due to a specific order from Hitler which he had issued because he thought that there might be sabotage against machines and production, matters which he considered as extremely probable and Very dangerous. Only when the emergency came more and more apparent and whom every worker had to be included in production in some form or other did we abandon that priciple. It was no longer discussed and prisoners of war were after that used in the general war production and in that connection it was my view and this is reflection in my general instructions, that their use in armament industry was prohibited to the army district, commander that is to say only in such industry which was actually producing ammunition and arms.
But, so as to complete the story, I think I ought to add that at a later stage a Fuehrer order once more provided for a further easing of the existing instructions. They became even more loose after that, and I think it has been said here that MinicterSpeer is supposed to have talked about, I don't know how many thousands of prisoners of war who Were actually employed in matters of war economy. But I should like to say that many jobs had to be done in the armament industry, which have nothing to do with the actual production of arms and ammunition. of war were apprehended and detained by the police and were even located in concentration camps. Can you give an explanation about that? earlier this morning, took place in the camps; that is, the flaying of prisoners Furthermore, as is known from documents, prisoners of war, against whom the powers of discipline of the commandant were not sufficient, were separated and handed over to the Secret State Police. Finally, I have already mentioned the subject of prisoners who had escaped and were caught and said that a majority of them were not returned to their camps, but other instructions on the part of the OKW or the Chief of the Prisoner of War System in that direction, regarding the surrender of these prisoners to concentration camps, are not known to me and have never been issued. But, through various channels, through witnesses and documents, the facts have been presented here; namely, that the channel was that of handing these men over to the police and that they did end up in these concentration camps. That is my explanation. 1650-PS. This is an order, or I'd rather say that it's supposed to be an order from the OKW ordering that prisoners of war, who have escaped and who were not working, are to be surrendered to the Security Service,the SD. After what you've just told us, you will, no doubt, have to give a statement about that. Furthermore, I am ssowing you the document 1514-PS, which is an order from the armed forces, Regional District No. 6. from which you will be able to see the procedure adopted by the OKW on connection with the surrender of prisoners of war to the Secret State Police.
Apr5-M-RT-4-2
A First of all, I want to talk about the document 1650-PS. To begin with I have to state that I did'nt know that order and that I saw it for the first time here during this trial and that, even up to now, I haven't been able to establish the fact regarding how it came about.
Q Wouldn't you like to say, first of all, that the document as such is not a document of the OKW? in a police department. It starts with the words "The OKW has ordered". After that come three numbers, and then it goes in to say, "In this connection I order -- and that's the Supreme Chief of the RSHA. It is signed by Mueller, not Kaltenbrunner. I have most certainly not signed this order, the OK numbers 1 to 3, and I haven't seen it. About that there is no doubt. The fact alone that the expression "Stage 3-D" is used proves that those are expressions which are unknown to me; they are deplete expressions. I have to state, therefore, that even now I am not sure how this document was compiled. I can't clarify the situation. There are possibilities, and I should like to name them briefly because I have thought about this a very great deal. First, I don't believe that any department of the OKW, or the Prisoner of war system, or that the chief of the general armed forces department could have issued this order without having instructions. I consider that quite impossible. It was completely contrary to the general tendencies. I have no recollection that I have ever given any instructions or have ever received any instructions of this type from Hitler or that I have passed any such instruction on to anybody else. Finally, even if this may look like an excuse, there were, of course, Certain channels which the Fuehrer used, without regard to the proper competent channels. And, if I look for an explanation, well, then there would be the adjutant through whom such orders could have been possible but that I had not heard about it. I emphasize that this is a guess and that it cannot be quoted in my favor. 1514-PS. This is a captured order from the Army District Command No. 6, which is dated July 27, 1944. In other words, it was in the summer of 1944. It deals with prisoners of war who have escaped and how they are to be dealt with.