No other basic orders were issued on this question. cases have anything to do with them, as charged by the Prosecution? You or the OKW are charged by the Prosecution of having expressed yourself to Stuelpnagel or Falkenhausen.
(Witness handed document)
A This is document 1594-PS. It is a communication from Falkenhausen, military commander of Belgium and is directed to the High Command of the Army, to the Quartermaster General and to the Commander-in-Chief of the West, also attention of Netherlands, I do not know this document nor could I know it. It is directed to the Army. The assumption that the French Prosecutor made that I received a letter from Falkenhausen is not so. I do not know this letter and it was not sent on my authority. Official communication between the officers in France and Belgium took place only between the High Command of the Army and these two subordinate military commanders. In the OKW these commanders were not subordinate either to the OKW or to me. that this document was the basis for the hostage legislation in France; that there is, in other words, a basic connection between the order you signed of the 16th, ninth month, as to the treatment of hostages in France. I show you these documents, 1588-PS and 87, the same document as UK 25.
(Witness handed document) individual matters with the individual commanders regarding the question of hostages.
Falkenhausen? called me up from Paris once on such a matter because he had received an order from the army to shoot a certain number of hostages for an attack on a German soldier. He wanted to have this order certified by me. That took place, and I believe it was testified to by a telegram, which testifies to the effect that I had a meeting with Stuelpnagel in Berlin. Moreover, the connection between me, personally, and these two commanders took place only in extraordinary matters, where they believed that they might have some support from me in matters that were unpleasant for them to carry out alone. I believe I can point out such questions as the use of forced Foreign labor from Belgium or France or, as in one case, conflicts between the military commanders and the police. In these cases I was called up directly in order to mediate.
THE PRESIDENT: It is impossible for the Tribunal to carry all these documents in their heads by reference to their numbers and we do not nave the documents before us. We do not knew what documents you are dealing with.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, for this reason, before the beginning of the session, I took the liberty of submitting to the Tribunal a list of these documents. If that did not take place, I regret it. I only regret that I could not submit the documents themselves. You will always find a number to the left of this list.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see that, but all that I see here is PS-1587, which is not the one that you are referring to, aparently, and it is described as a report to the Supreme Command of the Army. That does not give us much indication of what it is about. The next one is PS-1594, a letter to OHH. That again does not give us much indication of what it is about, except that they have something to do with the hostage question.
DR. NELTE: It is concerned with the question which the defendant Keitel is about to answer. Do you not also have No. C-128?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have that. That is "Directions for the Operation in the West."
DR. NELTE: And UK-25?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. NELTE: And PS-1588?
THE PRESIDENT: We have them all. The only thing that I was pointing out to you was that the description of than is inadequate to explain to us what they mean and what they are. Perhaps by a word or two you can indicate to us when you come to the document what it is about.
DR. NELTE: Document UK-25, regarding which the defendant Keitel is about to testify, is an order signed by him of the 16th of September regarding Communist uprisings in the occupied territories. It contains, among other thing the sentence, "The Fuehrer has now ordered that the sharpest measures should be taken everywhere in order to strike down this government as soon as possible." hostage Legislation was published in Franch, which is contained in Document 1588 PS. If you have the document 1588-PS, you will find on the third page a regular legislation regarding the taking and treatment of hostages. BY DR. NELTE: and whether the OKW was competant in these matters at all. concerned with Communist uprisings in occupied territories. The fact that this is a Fuehrer order has already been mentioned. I must clarify the fact that this order, so far as its contents are concerned, was directed solely to the eastern regions, particularly the Balkan countries. I believe that I can prove this by the fact that there is a list of the regions to which it pertains and begins "Wehrmacht Commanders, Southeast, for Bulgaria Southern Lands and Crete, and this was transmitted also to other Wehrmacht commanders and also to the OKW with the possibility of the OKH passing it on to its subordinate officers. I believe that this document, which, for the sake of saving time, I shall not read here, has several indications that the assumption on the part of the French Prosecution was the basis for the hostage law, to be found in 1588-PS, which is false and there was no basic connection between the two.
The date of this hostage law is also in September. The number is hard to read, but, as can be seen from its contents, these two matters are not connected and, moreover, the two military commanders in France and Belgium never received this order from the OKW but, perhaps, they received it through the OKH, a matter which I cannot check on because I do not know. say that its considerable strictness can be traced back to the personal influence of the Fuehrer, and the fact that it is concerned with the eastern region, which is to be seen already in the introduction, does not have to be substantiated any further. It is correct to say that this order of the 16th of September, 194 is signed by me the question of the "Nacht und Nebel". The Prosecution charges you of having participated in the "Nacht and Nebel" law of the 12th of December, 1939.
A May I say one more thing regarding the other question?
THE PRESIDENT: The date came through to us as 12 December 1941. That is not right, is it?
DR. NELTE: In the order of the 2nd of February, 1942. the date was corrected as the 7th of December, 1941. BY DR. NELTE:
Q You wanted to say something to the previous question?
Q Do you have the document, L-90?
Q What was the reason for this order, so terrible in its consequences? my name with this so-called "Nacht und Nebel* order is a serious charge against me, even though it can be seen from the order that it is a Fuehrer order. Consequently I should like to state how this order came about. of 1941 until the spring of 1942 the resistance movement and sabotage and so on in all the occupied territories became very strong indeed. Militarily it meant that troops were tied down -- troops who had to take care of the local unrest, that is, from the military point of view. And day by day, reports came in telling of what was taking place in the individual sectors.
It was impossible to handle this summarily; rather, Hitler demanded that he be informed of each individual occurrence, and he was very displeased if such matters were concealed from him by the military authorities. In this connection he said to me that it was displeasing to himand unfavorable to general peace and quiet that court-martial death sentences against saboteurs were lacking. He wished this not to occur, since it has in his interest to see that peace and order be maintained. He said that it was necessary that these things be limited, that sabotage acts be made less frequent, and to this end that it was necessary to have a clear sentence of death as punishment for such action, instead of longwinded court-martial proceedings with a long list of witnesses. be taken without further ado and without anyone's knowledge and taken to Germany and there interned and dealt with. said at that time that I feared exactly the opposite results of those that were hoped for. I then had serious discussions with the legal adviser of the Wehrmacht, who had similar scruples, because there was an elimination of the ordinary legal processes, and he advised me to try to prevent this order from being issued. My efforts were in vain. I was threatened, and consequently I gave the War Minister an order to draw up this order.
I can refer to details only in so far as this order is contained in L-90. It is intended to prevent arbitrary sabotage. deportation into Reich territory should take place only after a regular court martial proceeding and that in every case the judge or the divisional commander, together with his legal adviser, had dealt with the matter. I say that I honestly believed then that every arbitrary application of this order was by this provision avoided, and you can perhaps agree with me that the words in the order, "It is my will," meaning the Fuehrer's will, were not in there in vain. The military commanders were to see from this that this was a method with which I did not agree and which I did not consider to be the correct method. so that through regular court-martial channels an appeal was possible, This was in order that there should still be the possibility of a legal proceeding in an appeal if the verdict appeared to be challengeable. The entire and enormous tragedy, which I found out here for the first time, is this: that this order, which was only intended for the Wehrmacht and which could only determine whether a saboteur could be made to disappear in this Nacht and Nebel fashion, the whole tragedy is that this procedure was generalized, extended beyond the Wehrmacht -- it was used by the police -- and so this horrible circumstance arose, that entire groups of people were deported through this Nacht and Nebel procedure. I and those who participated in the drawing up of this order did not knew of this and certainly did not intend it. At any rate I was not informed of it. and abandoned certain requirements of law such as we understand them, came to have the consequences which the Prosecution has brought up. deported from their home country to Germany, because a penal service in prison would be considered by these patriots as dishonorable, and we felt that it would be better that they be taken to Germany where they would not be submitted to this dishonor.
Q Please elucidate one point. In the order for the carrying out of this Nacht und Nebel policy, it stated that the Gestapo was to carry out the transportation of the condemned to Germany. You stated that the people who came to Germany were to be turned over to the Minister of Justice for normal custody. Did you have some scruples about turning these people over to the SS? In other words, did you have some idea what would happen to them? Can you say anything in elucidation of that matter?
A Yes. The order that was given at that time was that these people should be turned over to the German Justice authorities. This document originated in Amt Abwehr. It characterizes the conference or agreements which had to be reached at that time regarding the method by which these people were to be taken from their native countries to Germany. That was led apparently by this Amt Abwehr, and then the police commanders. I can say in this connection -- and I have always witnessed it -- that it did not seem objectionable at that time, because I was not then of the opinion that these people were being turned over to be liquidated but that the Gestapo was simply being used as the medium in charge of the transportation. I should like to emphasize that particularly, so that there can be no doubt of it: that it was not our original idea for the people to be so treated as it later turned out they were treated as a result of the Nacht und Nebel command.
Q We come now to the question of commandos, parachute troops. The French Prosecution treats in detail of the origin and effect of the two Fuehrer orders of the 18th of October, 1942, regarding the treatment of parachute troopers and commandos.
DR. NELTE (to the Tribunal): Does the Tribunal have a copy of this order? It is 498 -
THE PRESIDENT: We haven't got a copy of the order. You mean 553-PS or 498?
DR. NELTE: The second is 553-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: We haven't got that, either, "Combatting of individual parachuters, decree 4842" -
DR. NELTE: Could you please repeat your statement? It didn't come through.
THE PRESIDENT:PS-553, "Combatting of parachuters, Decree of 4842.
That is what we have, nothing else. You also have 498 -
QPS-553 is a notice Signed by Keitel. The French Prosecution has assumed correctly that these is some connection between the document, PS-553 and the Fuehrer order of the 18th of October, 1942. The Defendant is to testify what the Seasons were that lay behind this fuehrer order and this notice.
A First of all, Document 553-PS: This notice was published by me in August of 1942 in a way similar to the Nacht und Nevel decree that I have described. The dropping by parachute of saboteurs, agents, paratroopers with explosives after this reached greater and greater proportions. The materials were dropped in thinly populated reg ions. They were then distributed all over the area governed by Germany at that time. It extended from France as far as Czechoslovakia and, from the east, as far west as Berlin. captured. This memorandum was to inform all offices outside the Wehrmacht of these things and to solicit their support in combatting them. a sort of war in the dark, and, even today, after reading this document through again, I consider this memorandum as unobjectionable. It provides that members of foreign armed forces, if they were captured by the police, should be taken to the nearest Wehrmacht office after their identification and there be turned in. French police played a large and honorable role in reducing these acts of sabotage. This will perhaps make clear how extensive these activities were: On any one day we sometimes had as many as a hundred blowings-up of bridges or railroads. So much for the memorandum. mentioned very often here and which I can characterize as subsequent results of this memorandum to the extent that those methods, illegal methods, of waging war kept on increasing. Small commando units were formed by the enemy and materials and men were landed by parachute. They were now under orders not to create disturbances in general but to attack vital and important military objects. For instance, they had the task in Norway of blowing up the aluminum works. camps discussions were devoted to how to handle these saboteurs, matters reached the point whore the Fuehrer demanded other methods, vigorous measures to combat this activity, which he characterized as "terrorism" and said that the only method that could be used to combat it was terror. I recall that the words were spoken, "As long as the paratrooper runs the danger only of being taken as a prisoner of war, he incurs no practical danger.
He had nothing to fear, and that can not be allowed to continue to be the case."
I made several attempts to express myself in this matter. General Jodl will also recallthis. We did not knew what we as soldiers were to do. We could make no suggestion.
If I may sum up briefly, daily we heard Hitler's temperamental explosions on this subject, but we did not know what we could do. He declared that this was against the Hague Convention and illegal, that it was a method of waging war that had not been foreseen in the Hague Convention. He said that this was a new war in which new methods were being used that we had to deal with. order itself and the order that those who did not carry out the first order should be punished were published. They were published, I believe, by the Chief of the Fuehrung Stab, Jodl, and then distributed. questions about how it was to be applied, particularly in connection with the threat that they would be punished if they did not carry it out, and we simply told them what was in the order. We were not in a position to change this written order. order to kill the English saboteurs involved in the sabotage actions at Stavanga. In this connection I submit to you. Document 498-PS, 508-PS, and 527-PS.
DR. NELTE: This, Mr. President, was a commando mission in the neighbourhood of Stavanga. The troops that fell into German hands alive were obliged, according to the Fuehrer decree to be killed. There was a remote possibility of letting these people testify about their case if that was demanded by military necessity. In this case the commander in chief in Norway concerned himself with the matter. General Falkenhorst. "He turned to the OKW, as he has already testified in an affidavit.
Q Would you make any statement in this connection?
interrogation, I was confronted with General Falkenhorst. As I recall, I did not remember his having asked me questions regarding the carrying out of this order. Even the event itself was no longer in my memory, and I remembered it again only after I had seen the documents. to change that order; that I could only inform any one who inquired as to what to do that he should act as instructed in the order. only what is stated here in the affidavit. He edited his answer: "Keitel did not deny having had this talk with me but denied that the subject of it was what I said." without having a document number. Are you done with your statement?
A Yes. I believe that suffices.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Prosecution did not put in this document, did they? They have not offered it in evidence.
DR. NELTE: I believe so, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I think they must have put it to the defendant Keitel in one of his interrogations, did they not? Isn't that right? That does not mean that it is put in evidence, because the interrogation, itself, you see, need not be put in evidence. You must put it in now if you want it to go in.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, there is some error here. This document was put in by the Prosecution here as documentation for the assertion that the defendant Keitel had told Falkenhorst to kill these paratroopers I received knowledge of it here.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will tell me if that is so, but I cannot think of any document having been put in here that has not had an exhibit number.
MR. DODD: We have no recollection of having put it in. Many of these interrogations did not have document numbers, but, of course, if they were put in, they would have USA or Great Britain exhibit numbers.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps the best way would be for Counsel for the Prosecution to verify whether it was read in evidence.
MR. DODD: That will take no a few minutes, You r Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I mean at your leisure. Would that be a convenient time to break off for ten minutes?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at a quarter to five. They will then sit again in this court in closed session, and they desire that both counsel for the prosecution and counsel for the defense should be present then as they wish to discuss with counsel on both sides the best wayy of avoiding translating unnecessary documents. a great burden has fallen upon the Translating Division. That is the problem which the Tribunal wish to discuss in closed session with counsel for the prosecutio n and counsel for the defense. They will therefore, as I say sit here in closed session where there is room for all the defense counsel. That is at five o'clock. BY DR. NELTE: the Treatment of sabotage troops behind the invasion front? A now situation was created through the invasion, and the question of a command of troops arose. There are several documents in that respect. It is true that Supreme Commander West, after the landing of Anglo-American forces in North France, considered that a new situation had arisen with reference to the Fuehrer Order of October 18, 1942. directed against the parachute troops. Inquiry was as usual started, and General Jodl and I represented the view of the commander in the west, namely that this order was not applicable here. Hitler refused to accept that point of view, gave certain directives in reply, and according to the documents, after two editions and after one had been closed out as unsuitable, the document 551PS is the final version as approved by the Fuehrer during that report. The reason why I remember so accurately is because of the occasion of presenting that reply at the discussion of the situation. This written appendix was added by General Jodl with reference to the application in the Italian theatre. With that appendix this version certainly was approved and demanded by Hitler, and was then sent out.
Q Wasn't the question discussed in this connection just how the active support of such acts of sabotage by the population could be judged from the point of view of international law?
October 18 1942, and the well-known previously discussed leaflet. I am of the opinion that the Hague regulations about land warfare refer to any such sabotage and in their report they condemn it if the population participated in any such action, and if the population supports such action, on covers the perpetrators in any shape or form. That in my opinion is clearly expressed in the Hague regulations on land warefare, namely, that the population must not commit such supporting action. which is document 537-PS This is concerned with the treatment of members of foreign military units caught together with bandits. Do you know it?
A Yes I do. Yes, this document 537-PS has also been submitted to me during interrogations before the trial, and I have been interrogated on it, and I have made the statement, which I will briefly repeat, that it be reported that attached to the staff of these bandits, particularly the leaders of the Serbian and Yugoslav bandits, there had been military missions which we believe were certain agents and agent troops for the purpose of liaisoning with the state with which we are at war. It had been reported in this connection and inquiries had been made what should be don, in case of capturing such a mission, as it was called; in case they were and could be captured. Upon reporting this to the Fuehrer he decided that the suggestions of the military authority concerned, namely, to record them as prisoners of war should be turned down, since according to the directive of the 18th of October 1942 they were to be considered saboteurs and treated as such. That document represents the crux of that order, and it bears my name. during the examination of Reich Marshal Goering. Consequently I shall confine myself to a few questions which concern you personally in connection with that problem. You know what we are concerned with, the conception "Terror Fliers" and the treatment of terrorists fliers. What was your attitude to that? population with arms carried aboard aircraft has been explained here. These increased considerably, and that there had been thirty to forty victims in a day which had lost their lives caused Hitler to demand categorically that this question should be solved by an order.
We soldiers were of the opinion that existing regulations were sufficient, and that new regulations were unnecessary. The question of Lynching came into the problem and the question what is a terrorist flier, and on the strength of these two groups of questions the innumerable number of documents which you will note arose which treats or deals with that subject. already been discussed. In this connection are regarding your responsibility I am interested in the words which you have written across one of these documents. Please, will you explain these?
the example of the warning that prisoners of war had been shackled after Dieppe, that here top a corresponding official note should contain a warning that we would employ reprisals if the enemy commanders would not, by them selves, stop that practice. That was refused, and it was said that this was not a suitable suggestion. Jodl and myself. One record bears a remark on the margin written by me which runs as follows: "Courtmartials won't work"; at least, that was the content. I wrote that on the margin at the time because the question of sentence by court martials came up for discussion, and that very document laid down in detail for the first time what a terrorist flier was. It stated that terror attacks were always attacks carried out from low-flying aircraft, and my thoughts led me tothink that crews attacking in low-level flights could not be caught alive in 99 out of 100 cases, if they crashed, since there was no possibility of saving themselves with a parachute from such heights. Therefore, I wrote that remark in the margin.
Furthermore, I considered, apart from the fact that there couldn't be proceedings against such a flier, one would, secondly, not be able to conclude a satisfactory trial or a satisfactory investigation if an attack had been carried out from considerable height because no court, in my opinion, would be able to prove that such a man did have the intention of attacking those targets which in fact had been hit. the rules regarding court martial proceedings against prisoners of war, through the protecting power, the enemy state had to be informed and three months' grace had to be given during which the home state could object to the sentence. It was therefore, out of the question that through those channels and during a brief period the desired could be achieved.
That is what was meant by the words "That won't work."
It states: "If you should allow lynching at all, then you can hardly lay down rules for it."
To that I can't say very much, since my conviction is that there is no possibility of saying under what circumstances such methods of people's justice could be regulated or considered proper, and I am still of the opinion that rules for such proceedings cannot be laid down.
Q But what was your attitude regarding the question of lynchings? for us soldiers. One case had been reported by the Reichsmarshal in which he had prohibited any proceedings against a soldier who had stopped such actions. I know of no case where soldiers,with reference to the shooting of soldiers, behaved towards a prisoner of war in any other way than that laid down in generally known regulations. that I had a discussion with Reichsmarshal Goering at the Berghof about the whole question, and he, at that time, indicated his point of view extremely clearly. He said that he agreed -- namely, that lynchings for soldiers should be turned down under any circumstances, and that we were in an unfortunate position. I asked him to approach Hitler once more, personally, and try to clear that point of view.
I asked him to ask Hitler nit to tell us to draft an order of that kind. been drafted and had never been issued. nations and all people are so passionately interested as the prisoner of war system. That is why, here too, the prosecution have stressed particularly those cases which were violations of laws for prisoners of war, be it in accordance with the Geneva Convention, or be it in accordance with general international law. of war system in Germany, I should like to put the following questions to you.
armed forces were made acquainted with international agreements which referred to prisoners of war? is available, and in which all rules were contained, including the operational regulations which arose from the existing international agreements. That is, I think, Directive No. 38, which applied to the Army and the Navy, and also to the Air Forces. That was the basis of the service instructions, and the basic order.
Q How was that used in practice? Were people who had to occupy themselves with such questions in practice informed, or was it sufficient to draw their attention to the general directives? instructionsand every soldier, up to a point, had been instructed on it. Apart from that, no further explanations were expected at the beginning of the war. for that particular purpose. Do you know of them? Do you know that they took place in Vienna?
courses of instruction for those people who were in contact with prisoners of war in practice and that there were courses of instructions that were held. book?
A Yes. That jas been confirmed here, I think, by General Milch the other day, who had it on him. in your case? ning of the Polish Campaign in the East, since every preparatory measure for reception of prisoners of war had been refused by Hitler. He had prohibited it, but after that, on very short notice, things had to be improvised.
Q What was ordered? force to a limited extent -- but particularly the army -- should prepare appropriate measures; registration cards should be got ready -- in fact, that everything should be prepared in that connection and their organization. ment of prisoners of war and their welfare arose . with reference to international agreements, and in my opinion that contained exhaustively everything which the people concerned had to know. Apart from that, no additional instructions were issued at that time; but these instructions were dealt with according to these rules. regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. The OKW was, shall I say, the ministerial directing department which had to issue all basis regulations and directives in that respect -- prepare them, and which had the right to ascertain the observance of these instructions by means of inspections. In other words, it was the leading department issuing instructions with rights to inspect, without having, of course, command of the camps themselves.
Q Shouldn't one add the correspondence? forces, and therefore the army, navy, and air force too, was the correspondence with the Foreign Office to the protecting powers -- contact with the International Red Cross and all such departments who were interested in the welfare of prisoners of war. I had forgotten that.
Q Therefore the OKW was the legislator and the controller?
Q What did the sub-sections of the armed forces have to do? of prisoners of war, had certain under their command, just as the army, under consideration, in a considerably larger degree, through reputable commanders at home, had the task of administrating and commanding the camps in their spheres.
Q Now, let us take the prisoner of was camps. Who was at the head of such camps? prisoner-of-war system in that district, and the camp itself was led by a camp commander who had a small staff of officers, among then intelligence. officers and some such persons who were responsible for such matters. affairs in the command district?
Q Who was his superior?
A. The army district commanders were under orders of the supreme commander of the reserve army, and he in turn under the supreme command of the army.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for ten minutes (There was a recess.)
(The Tribunal adjoined until 5 April 1946 at 1000 hours.)
BY DR. NELTE: channel of orders in the prisoner of war system, the KGW. This channel, according to what you said, went from the camp commander or commandant to the army district commander and then through the commander of the reserve army to the OKH--supreme command of the army. I should now like you to tell me what the question of the responsibility was if something which had been ordered was against the Geneva Convention or was a violation of generally recognized international law. How did that affect a camp? Was the OKW responsible according to its jurisdictional responsibilities? the general principle instructions which had been published by OKW or if the non-exercising of the right to inspect came upit was connected to that. Under such circumstances I would consider the OKW responsible. and the right to control camps? inspector of the prisoner of war system, the KGW, who was, nevertheless, at the same time the chief of the department KGW in the general army department. In other words, he was carrying out a twin function. Later on--I think after 1942--it was done by appointing an inspector general who dealt with the entire correspondence and the entire official tasks who did not have anything to do with all those tasks. International Red Cross?