He became Foreign Minister in February of 1938.
COLONEL AMEN: It has the late on it -- 3 October -- and it was captured with Haushofer's documents. BY COLONEL AMEN: I said, I do not recall his visit to Tokio in 1937. later concerned himself with Volkstum questions (German minority questions) and in later years I lost track of him.
Q I will just pass along through this document. You will find the next document is a letter dated 15 April 1937, requesting reimbursement and funds for this trip. Deputy of the Fuehrer Hess, sayings:
"I am using the courier to send you also personally a short report which is going to Ribbentrop at the same time. It obtains as briefly as possible a summary of what I could observe and hear over here in four weeks."
Do you see that? addressed to yourself.
A. Yes, I have that letter before me.
Q. Now, we will pass over the report for a moment and you will come to a letter dated 17 December, 1937.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal thinks this is very far from the matters which they have really got to consider.
COLONEL AMEN: Very good, sir. It seems to me that this indicates very clearly that copies of the same report which is included here were being sent simultaneously to the Army, to the Navy -- it went to Raeder -- one to the army and to Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is true that the witness's first answer was that they did not have joint agents but he eventually qualified that and said they might sometimes have had joint agents.
COLONEL AMEN: That is right, sir. If you think he has already conceded that point -
I would like to put this in as U.S.A. Exhibit 790.
THE WITNESS: I ask to be permitted to say we are not concerned with an agent. Mr. Haushofer was a frew collaborator who was interested in politics in general and in Volkstum questions. If he was in Tokio, and I believe he may have been, I told him to speak with several, different people and to report to me. I am just finding out now through these letters that for reasons of business or because he knew these other gentlemen, he reported not only to me but to these other gentlemen as well. But we are not concerned with an agent, with a joint agent here. I believe the only other gentleman who knew him closely was Rudolf Hess. I do not believe anyone else knew him. Hess and I knew him but if I were to say anything else you would get the wrong impression. This was a private traveling person. BY COLONEL AMEN:
Q. Now, I believe you have told the Tribunal that you were not very close to Himmler, is that right?
A. My relation to Himmler was good during the first few years but I am sorry to say our relationship was not good in the latter years. That was not entirely obvious to the outside and to the public but I do not wish to discuss this matter in detail.
It has already been mentioned. There were serious divergencies -
Q. I do not care what the divergencies were. In what years did you get along closely with him?
A. I did not understand your question.
Q. In what years were you close to him?
A. The first divergencies between Himmler and myself came, I believe, in the year 1941 and it concerned Rumania. We reached an agreement as far as the outside world was concerned and we collaborated and exchanged letters on birthdays but the relationship was not very good after 1941. Before 1941 our relations were good and I agreed with the idea of a Fuehrer group. I was in positive agreement on that point.
Q. And you had at least fifty social appointments with Himmler in 1940 and 1941?
A, How many did you say?
Q. Fifty.
A. Fifty -- no, I do not believe that was the case. I would not say fifty, although I cannot say exactly. But after 1941 conditions were serious between us but I believe others have testified as to that already.
Q. Well, I do not -
THE PRESIDENT: Are you dealing with social appointments between Ribbentrop or something or other?
COLONEL AMEN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that a matter which the Tribunal has to go into?
COLONEL AMEN: I expect, sir, that any person that has as many appointments as are indicated by these books, certainly would have discussed with Himmler the matter of concentration camps and the entire matters which Himmler was exclusively handling. He has told the Tribunal that he had never heard anything about concentration camps from Himmler.
THE WITNESS: I would wish to repeat my statement that at no time did Himmler discuss this matter with me and that we might have seen each other frequently but fifty, no. Perhaps five or ten, although I cannot give you the exact number and I do not believe that is of vital significance and it is not decisive.
O f course, we had to collaborate and work together on my theories and this working was greatly difficult. there not? Just take a look at this sheet of entries from Himmler's appointment book and tell me whether that conforms to your-
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal does not want this matter gone into any further.
COLONEL AMEN: Very good, sir, but these were business appointments as distinguished from social. There are no further questions. BY GENERAL RUDENKO: of the Tribunal you explained rather in detail the foundations of the German foreign policy. I would like to ask you a few questions and would like you to make extremely laconic replies, primarily in terms of yes and no. Do you consider the Anschluss an act of aggression? I would like you to answer this.
A You mean Austria?
A No, it was not an aggression. It was the execution -- After my saying "Yes", may I answer a few questions or shall I confine myself to yes or no exclusively? detail, but laconically. I would like to receive replies in the sense of yes and no. you pardon me.
A The Anschluss I did not consider an act of aggression. I considered it as an execution of the will of both peoples involved, who always wanted to be together, and something that the regime before Hitler was concerned with Do you think that the Anschluss with Austria was or was not part of the German aggression.
THE PRESIDENT: He gave you a categorical answer to that; that it was not an aggression.
GENERAL RUDENKO: Yes, I understand, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: And we have already ruled that the witnesses are not to he confined to answering yes or no. They must answer yes or no first, and then make a short explanation if they want to. But, anyhow, with reference to this question, he has answered it categorically. BY GENERAL RUDENKO:
Q The second question: Do you think that the seizure of Czechoslovakia by the German Army was German aggression?
A No, it was not an aggression in that sense. The annexation was in line with the self determination of people as was set down by President Wilson in 1919 and the annexation of the/Sudetenland was sanctioned by the Great powers in Munich.
Q You evidently have not understood my question. I have asked you whether you considered the seizure of Czechoslovakia a German aggression. as the Fuehrer told me and I believe that is correct, that it was a matter of necessity resulting from the geographical situation of Germany. This geographic position meant that Russo-Czechoslovakia was to be an areal base against Germany. The Fuehrer was of the opinion, therefore, that this region of Bohemia and Moravia would have to be occupied so that the German Reich would be protected against attacks, especially from the air. The distance between Prague and Berlin was a half-hour's distance by air. The Fuehrer told me that, with respect of the fact that the United States of America had certain spheres of interest in the Western Hemisphere, and that Russia was a large territory and England encompassed the whole globe, that Germany would be justified in taking such a small area as its sphere of influence.
Q It is clear. Do you consider the invasion of Poland part of the German aggression?
A No; I have to answer again with no. The attack on Poland, because of the position and attitude taken by the other parties, was inevitable and could not be circumvented in any way.
It would have been possible to reach a peaceful solution in accordance with German Reich, andI believe that the Fuehrer would have taken this way if the other powers had taken this road. But,as the situation was, the tension had become so great that Germany could not tolerate anything more, and Germany as a great power could not be tolerant of Polish provocation any longer, and that is how the war arose. I am convinced that the Fuehrer was never interested in conquering Poland.
Q Do you consider the attack on Denmark part of the German aggression?
A No, the "invasion" of Denmark, as we call it, was, according to what the Fuehrer told and explained to me, a preventive measure, in order to prevent the imminent landing of British fighting forces. That our intelligent reports were authentic can be carried back to the fact that later on, shortly thereafter, fighting between Germany and English troops took place after our landing, and we knew that the British troops had been prepared for a long time prior to this day and documents, which were found later and which were published, show orders to the effect that an English landing in Scandinavia had been planned and prepared to the last detail. The Fuehrer, therefore, believed he could prevent Scandinavia from becoming a theatre of war with his intervention, and I do not believe that you can apply the term "aggression" to such a measure.
Q And this theatre of Norway you don't consider aggressive action on the part of Germany either? Denmark. It was a combined action.
Q All right, that is sufficie nt. I understand you quite clearly. Do you consider that the attack on Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg an aggressive action on the part of Germany?
A That is the same question. I must say no, and I would like to explain my answer.
Q Just a moment. I would like you to give answers which are more laconic, a little more brief. The basic question is, do you deny that these actions were aggressive actions on the part of Germany? vital questions, which may not be dealt with in a sentence or two, especially since we did not have the opportunity to go into this at length before.
about three days already. I appreciate that.
A I will try to be brief. After the Polish campaign, the military concerns were the vital and decisive ones. The Fuehrer wanted to localize the border. He did not want it to expand. As far as France, Holland, and Belgium were concerned, France declared war on us. We did not declare war on France. Therefore, we had to be ready for an attack on all sides. The Fuehrer told me at that time that such an attack to the Ruhr Area was to be expected. The documents which were found later show without benefit of doubt, and show to the whole world, that this action was true. The Fuehrer, therefore, decided to take the preventive measures in this case, too, and not await an attack on the heart of Germany, but to attack first. Therefore the timetabel applied. part of Germany? discussed. I don't believe I need to say anything more on this point. merely asked you whether you considered an attack on Greece an aggressive action on the part of Germany? Greece in the granting of bases to the enemies of Germany justified intervention on the part of Adolf Hitler, so that an aggressive action cannot be talked of in this sense. It was entirely clear that British troops were about to land in Greece and that a riot or a putsch was made in Yugoslavia by the enemies of Germany in agreement with the enemies of Germany so that they could attack from that point on. The acts of the French General Staff, which we found in France, showed clearly that Salonika landing was planned.
Q Mr. Ribbentrop, you have talked about that already. You have talked about that in detail before. Do you not think that you could give answers that are a little briefer? The last question with regard to aggressive action is, do you consider the attack on the Soviet Union a part of German aggression or an aggressive act on the part of Germany? Do you or do you not?
Q Excuse me please, Defendant Ribbentrop. Do you mean literally that it was not an aggressive action? If you please -
A May I say a few words? The term "aggression" as used by the Prosecution is very serious, and international law is not clear on it, by any manner of means, even today. But you no doubt must admit that we were thus concerned with a preventative measure, a preventative war. We did attack; we don't dispute that. I had hoped that the matters which we had to regulate with the Soviet Union should have been regulated in a diplomatic way, and I did everything possible. But the political measures taken by the Soviet Union in the years 1941 and 1942 and until the outbreak of war led the Fuehrer to believe, as he told me repeatedly, that sooner or later the so-called EastWest Pincers would be applied to Germany, in the East Russia with her tremendous might, and that in the west the United States and England would make a landing against Germany, and it was the great concern that this pincer-like action would come to pass. The Fuehrer told me he had reports that a close collaboration was taking place between the General Staffs at London and Moscow. I personally did not see the intelligence reports and did not receive any, but the reports which the Fuehrer told me about -- what the Fuehrer told me -- were of a concrete nature. In any event, he was very much afraid that the political situation would work out in such a way that it would be catastrophic for him and for Germany, and he wanted to prevent a collapse of Germany and the destruction of the balance of power and might in Europe. objectives you considered it necessary to solve a number of decisive questions through diplomatic channels. Now, obviously, this testimony is a falsehood, since just now you admitted that all these actions of aggression have been justified on the part of Germany.
A No, I did not want to say that, by what I said. I just said that we were not concerned with an aggressive action, Mr. Prosecutor. I did tell how this war originated and how it developed and how it spread. But I was always concerned at the beginning of the war in the Polish crisis and later on to do everything to prevent this war. That will be shown by history, aside from this Tribunal. We later tried to localize the war and prevent it from spreading. That is true, also. Summarizing, I would like to say that the outbreak of the war was brought about through circumstances at the end which were not in Hitler's hands any longer. He could not act otherwise than as he did, and when the war spread further his decisions were prompted by military considerations and he acted solely in the interest of his people.
Q I understand you have submitted to the Tribunal No. 111, which is addressed to the Fuehrer personally. You must remember the document. It was not so long ago that you had submitted it to the Tribunal.
A No, I am not exactly sure what we are concerned with. May I look at it? No.111. It has been submitted to the Tribunal by your attorney. On page 5 there --.
THE PRESIDENT: It could not have been submitted to the Tribunal as 111, without anything more. Is it 111-PS or 111 what?
GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr President, this is the same document submitted in the name of the Defendant Ribbentrop which bears merely the number, 111. We haveonly a Russian translation here, which came to us together with a German book of documents. I had supposed that the Tribunal has the same book of documents.
THE PRESIDENTS: It is R-111. You mean it isn't 111; it is Ribbentrop 111.
GENERAL RUDENKO: The number is 311, it now appears. Mr. President, the correct number is 311, not 111, please.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I've got it now. It is in Document Book No.9
GENERAL RUDENKO: May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
the following: "After the Polish victory in the West and due to force and to the influence which we must ascribe to Hitler, in other words, Hitler's doctrine was that German hegemony must be established in the West as well as in the East." Do you remember that extract from the document?
A May I see the document? I am not familiar with it.
GENERAL RUDENKO: I would ask the attorney for the Defense to submit the document to the Defendant at this time, if you please.
DR. HORN: Mr. President -
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
Dr. Horn, the Tribunal are inclined to think that this document is quite irrelevant. It is apparently a document by the Defendant Ribbentrop, touching upon the personality of the Fuehrer. I don't know where it was prepared, but it seems to us to be irrelevant.
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, I am of the same opinion, that it is irrelevant. I included this document only in case the Defendant did not have an opportunity to give his relationship to Hitler, but since he has had that opportunity I would like to withdraw the document.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, The Tribunal consider the document quite irrelevant.
GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr. President, this document was submitted in the book of documents by the Defendant. Supposedly it is written by the Defendant Ribbentrop in the course of this trial. All the Prosecutors considered it admissibly sine, there is a series of assumptions there that are important, including a description of Hitler's personality which sheds important light on certain things. However, if the Tribunal considers the document irrelevant, then it is perfectly agreeable to me.
THE PRESIDENT: We haven't yet had an opportunity of ruling on the admissibility of these documents. It is the first time we have seen them, this morning. We all consider this document irrelevant.
GENERAL RUDENKO: I understand. against Yugoslavia. I would like you to look over Document PS-1105, which is entitled "Preliminary Plan for the Division of Yugoslavia."
I want you to look at Paragraph 4 of the first section of the document. It states "The Fuehrer said with regard to Yugoslavia" -- Have you found the place?
A. Can you tell me what page that is, please.
Q. Page 1, the fourth paragraph.
"On the subject of Jugoslavia the Fuehrer has given the following directives"
A. I must have the wrong document.
Q. 1195-PS.
A. Yes, now I find the place.
Q. I have it here. In other words again, "On the subject of Jugoslavia the Fuehrer has given the following directives:" Do you see it? Is that correct?
A. (There was no answer).
Q. "The territory of Jugoslavia must go partially to Italy and will be done in accordance with the directives to the Minister of Foreign Affairs."
Have you found the place?
A. No, I can' find that here.
Q. The first words are, "In accordance with the direct information from the Foreign Office."
A. I am sorry; I can't find that. Which paragraph are you referring to?
Q. Paragraph 4, page 1, beginning with the words:
A. Yes. This document starts, "The Fuehrer has laid down the following principles for" -- Is that the place you are citing?
Q. The paragraph ends, "In accordance with the directives from the Foreign Office." Have you got it? Then there is further reference to the OKH.
A. There must be a mistake. I cannot find anything to that effect.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, it is a quarter to one, so perhaps we had better adjourn.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours).
JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP (Resumed) (CROSS EXAMINATION) Continued BY GENERAL RUDENKO:
Q. Defendant Ribbentrop, did you take cognizance of the document?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Did you take cognizance of the full contents of the document or just Paragraph Four?
A. I read Paragraph One, theone you talked about earlier.
Q. Did you find the place where it says about the power of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the divion of the territory of Jugoslavia?
A. It says here in my document that the surrender of the territory occupied by the Italians has been prepared by the letter of the Fuehrer and then carried out by order of the Foreign Office.
Q. That is correct. That is what I have in view, exactly this place. In section two of this document, which is headed "The Delimination of the Frontiers", it is stated there -- Section Two, Page Two of the document, it is stated that as far as the delimitation of the frontiers was not exactly stated, this was done in accordance with the directives received fromthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
A. Yes, I see that.
Q. I should like to put one question in that connection. Does this document express the will of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the division of Jugoslav territory? Is that correct?
A. It appears from that that probably the Foreign Office would merely ascertain others, apart from those which had been fixed.
Q. It is clear. Regarding Jugoslavia, I should like to put another two questions to you. On 4 June--This does not refer to this document any more.
On 4 June 1941 in theGerman Embassy, under the presidency of the German Ambassador, there was a meeting at which it was decided regarding the forced evacuation of the Slovenes and Serbs. At this meeting it was decided in accordance with a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 389, of 31 May 1941. Do you know about these measures?
A. No, I must say that I do not know them. Perhaps I may read through them.
Q. Yes, please.
A. No. I do recollect that resettlement took place, but I am not informed about any details.
Q. Yes, it is evidently difficult to remember all the details but you remember that the deportations took place in accordance with the directives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
A. Yes. Well, it says here that the Fuehrer has approved a resettlement scheme, but I do not know the details. Anyway, we certainly did play a part here, since the meeting took place with the representatives of the Foreign Office, but I can not say anything in detail now since I am not informed.
Q. Yes, I understand very well. There is another question in this connection. This was forced migration of the population?
A. I do not know.
Q. You do not knew about that? All right. Here is the last question in connection with Jugoslavia. After the attack of Germany on Jugoslavia, about 200 Jugoslav diplomatic employees who tried to get into Switzerland were taken under arrest and then, in spite of their protests, which were sent to yourMinistry, were forcibly taken to Belgrade, wherefrom many of them were directed to concentration camps and died there. Why did you not take the measures which you had to take after this transgression of the diplomatic immunity?
A. At this moment I can not recollect it at all, but as far as I know, it has always been my principal instructions on how diplomates should be treated that they were to be returned to their own countries. If it did not happen in this case, then I do not know why. But you yourself say that they were returned to Belgrade. That, at any rate, is in accordance with my instructions.
Whether they were interned atBelgrade and why, that I am afraid I do not know.
I do not think we had anything to do with that. you do not knew anything about that?
Q Very well. Here is another group of questions. Who besides Hitler signed the directive regarding the Sudetenland of 21 November 1938? Do you remember it?
A I do not know what the order is that you are referring to. May I look through it?
I see that I have also signed it. This is the law regarding the re-union of the Sudetenland with the Reich.
Q Do you remember that you really signed this law?
A. No doubt. If it says so here, then it must certainly have been like that, but, of course, at the moment I do not recollect.
Q. It is quite understandable. It is clear. Who besides Hitler signed the decree regarding the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia of 16 March 1939, which in essence liquidated any state sovereignty of the Czechoslovak Republic?
A I believe that I signed that one, too. Yes, I did. It says so here.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, surely all of these documents speak for themselves. The defendant has not challenged his signature upon these documents.
GENERAL RUDENKO: I understand very well, Mr. President. I only wanted to remind the defendant. He seems not to remember a few of the things, so I just wanted to present these documents to him. occupation of the Polish territories. Do you remember it?
Apr-2-A-RT-14-1a A 12.
10.39? No, I do not remember it. them in detail.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if he does not dispute his signature, why should you waste time in putting these documents to him? His signature is on the document. He does not dispute it. This is a mere waste of time.
GENERAL RUDENKO: Yes. Then I have in connection with this only one more question. annexation of the Belgium territories, Malmedy and others.
I put these questions in order to come to a next question. Is it correct to state here that every time when a decree by the Hitler Government tried to give some basis for their directives, under such decrees there was always the signature of the Reich Minister Ribbentrop?
A I believe not. If any territorial changes were carried out, then the Fuehrer ordered them, and, as appears from these documents, all ministers concerned would then carry out countersign these orders which had originated with the Fuehrer, and, of course, I also countersigned those orders myself. already been submitted in evidence to the Tribunal as USSR 120. This is the document in which you organized the work, together with Himmler. I should like you to read to point six of this document.
A I beg your pardon. This is a different document. This has something to do with information. You were talking about forced work, labor. This seems to have something to do with communication.
Q That was incorrectly translated to you. I did not speak about slave labor. I only said that there was work involved. Please pay attention to Point Six of this document. I do not want to take up the time unnecessarily. I am quoting, It is stated here:
" The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives every possible assistance to the Secret Intennigence Service. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, as far as Apr-2-A-RT-14-2a possible, in the foreign affairs, will provide certain employees for the Intelligence Service, and they will be put amongst the foreign representatives of Germany."
I want to skip one long paragraph and will read just the final paragraph: the head of the ministry of foreign affairs regarding all the questions of the activity of the secret intelligence service in every country.
Did you sign such agreement? Isn't that true?
A. Yes.
Q. Thus, we should like to state here that the foreign apparatus of the ministry of foreign affairs really carried on intelligence activities, or, in other words, spying.
A. No, you can't really say that, for the following reasons: differences between Himmler and myself about the intelligence service abroad. Thanks to the efforts of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, that agreement was eventually signed. A cooperation had been planned, and I do by no means deny that the function existed -- that men of the intelligence service were to be used for our purposes in the foreign office. But in practice this was never carried through. The agreement couldn't become effective because it was concluded so late that the end of the war arrived first. I think the date, which is lacking in this copy, must have been 1944 or 1945, when that agreement was concluded. Thus, an actual cooperation didn't take place; but it was intended that such cooperation was to be brought about, and I was particularly interested in that. There had been Certain differences and I desired to stop them and put it on a uniform basis.
That was the reason; and apart from that I think that is a part of the activity carried on by all countries abroad. I don't think it is anything unusual.
Q. I am not asking you what you think of this; I only asked you whether it is correct that you did sign such an agreement, and you replied to this question in the affirmative?
A. Yes.
Q. I have no further question in regard to this document.
Here is another document which is from this series. Do you remember
A. That do you say -- one million? I didn't quite understands.
Q. I should like to take cognizance of this document; it is a short document.
A. May I just look through it please?
Q. Of course.
A. Yes. I recollect the matter, and I think certain funds were placed at their disposal in that connection.
Q. Yes. It was given to Kaltenbrunner; isn's that correct?
A. I can't tell you in detail, but I think I did give instructions at the time to the foreign office that financial support should be given in that matter; that's right.
Q. This is exactly the question in which I was interested. The document speaks for itself. Now I shall refer to another group of questions. you met the Defendant Keitel to discuss a memorandum regarding the possibility of an attack by Germany on the soviet Union. Consequently, nearly one year before that attack on the soviet Union you knew exactly the plans for this attack.
A. No, that isn't a correct version. The Defendant Keitel was with me at the time at Fuschl, and on that occasion he mentioned to me that the Fuehrer had certain qualms regarding Russia and that he considered a conflagration not altogether impossible. He on his part had prepared a memorandum and he intended to consult with the Fuehrer. He had objections against any conflict of that type in the east, and he asked me at the time to influence the Fuehrer in that direction, which I agreed to do. But any intention of an attack was not at all discussed. It was merely a general staff discussion. No concrete matters were communicated to me by him.
Q. Very well. I didn't want to keep the attention of the Tribunal on this question. I should like to propose another question in this connection. also your opinion regarding the war with the USSR to Hitler. Did you have a conversation with Hitler on that theme?
A. I have discussed that subject several times with Hitler, and on that occasion I had discussed the danger of preventative wars with him and he in turn informed me of his objections, which I have mentioned here.
Q. Yes; all right. It is quite correct. Tell me, did you know that the so-called "Green Map" of the Defendant Goering which contained directives regarding the purge and exploitation of the temporarily occupied territories of the Soviet Union was prepared a long time before the actual attack took place?
A. No, I didn't know it. The name "Green Folder" I heard for the first time here.
Q. Very well, That regards not only Keitel, but the contents of the document.
A. Neither the file nor the name.
Q. You didn't know. All right. You knew that already before the war directives were prepared regarding the extermination of the peaceful Soviet population?
A. No, that wasn't known to me either.
Q. Very well. When did you know about that?
A. Of such plans I heard nothing at all.
Q. And the directives?
A. All of the preparations.
Q. And regarding the directives and the Plan Barbarossa, you knew about that already before?
A. Regarding what? I didn't quite hear you.
Q. Regarding the jurisdiction in the region of Barbarossa -- that is, the Plan Barbarossa?
A. No, I have to say that I have never occupied myself personally with that, but it could be that some department in my foreign office did cooperate. I myself never concerned myself with the question of jurisdiction; I was excluded from the beginning of the conflict with the Soviet Union.
Q. I should like you to take cognizance of a telegram which you directed on the 10th of July, 1941, at 1410, to the German Ambassador in Tokio.