The banister stated the following:
"The Fuehrer expects that in France particular attention be paid. All German officers will have to carry out their duties more accurately. He sees arising a danger, in event of invasion, of those prominent Frenchmen who were not collaborators with Germany becoming active against her. This will constitute a dangerous element against the forces.
"In all ministerial University centers those people should be sought. He believes that it would be necessary to strike a blow against these people. He suggests a number of about 2,000 people. At a moment when it will be necessary to defend Europe against her enemy, there isno reason why be should not take preventive measures in France.
"As to the practical means of putting this into effect, Ambassador Abetz will have to take up this matter immediately in order to take account of all the questions that arise out of this matter."
A I remember that discussion very well. This was a Fuehrer order, and it was made with reference to the pending invasion, saying that measures were to be taken which would arrest all resistance elements which would fall into the back of the German Army. I consider that a perfectly obvious measure made by any military command interested in the welfare of its troops. in fact we carried out a comparatively small number ofarrests. We had little to do with the actual arrests which were carried out by the police, but it is perfectly clear that the conference did take place at the time, and that we carried out what had to be done at the time as was proposed, which is, in other words, the arrest of those elements which could become dangerous in case of an invasion. That is all.
M. FAURE: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken) Apr-2-M-RT-6-1
THE PRESIDENT: There are two things that want to say. One of them relates to the prosecution and one of them relates to the defense. It is desired that the prosecution should furnish documents to the interpreters when they are going to use documents in the course of examination or cross examination. Documents need not necessarily be in the language which the interpreter is going to use but there must be some document in some language, one of the languages, placed before the interpreters in order to assist.
The other point is, that I an told that the defendant's counsel are not getting their documents ready for the translation division in anything like the two weeks beforehand which was specified by the Tribunal. The Tribunal, it is true, said that the documents must be furnished to the Tribunal or the translating division two weeks ahead, if possible. These words "if possible" are being treated to lightly and the documents, I am told, are sometimes coming in as late as fortyeight hours before the case of the particular defendant is to be taken. That is not sufficient and it will lead to delay. T hat is all.
MR.DODD: May it please the Tribunal, in the course of the cross examination of this defendant by the French prosecution, reference was made to document PS3766 and I understood Dr. Horn to say that the document was not a captured document. That was my understanding of his statement . I am not altogether sure that that was what he said when he approached the microphone. So the record will be perfectly clear, I now wish to inform the Tribunal that it is a captured document and I do not know upon what basis Dr. Horn made that assertion
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, it was claimed that a captured document was in question However, I had no opportunity to check the matter, At the head of the document it said that we we re concerned with the US. Exhibit 3766-PS I had no opportunity to check the origin of this document and, therefore, I suggested that the French prosecution determine the origin of the document, and that was my sole objection, I did not dispute whether it was a captured document but I could not check on it.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other prosecutors wish to ask questions of the defendant? Colonel Amen, the Tribunal hopes that you acre not going over ground which has already been gone over.
COLONEL AMEN: Most Certainly not, sir.
Apr-2-M-RT-6-2 BY COLONEL AMEN:
Q You speak English pretty well, Ribbentrop?
Q Almost as well as you speak German?
A No, that I wouldn't say, but in the past I was almost bi-lingual. In the course of years, I have forgotten a great deal and now it is quite difficult for me to speak English.
Q Do you know what is meant by a "yes man" in English?
AA "yes man"-- yes, I would consider that a man who says "yes" to things which he himself--It is a little hard for me to define because I am not exactly sure what you mean by it in English. In German I would define him as a man who obeys orders and is obedient and loyal.
Q And, as a matter of fact, you were a "yes man" for Hitler, isn't that correct? of a different opinion from his, had serious disputes with him, tried toresign several times, but when Hitler ordered, I always carried out his instructions. trial?
given in the course of these interrogations, and simply ask you to tell the Tribunal whether or not you made the answers that I read to you. That question can be answered yes or no, do you understand?
Q "I have been a loyal man to the Fuehrer to his last days. I have never gone back on him. I have been a loyal man to his last days, last hours, and I did not always agree with everything. On the contrary, I sometimes had very divergent views, but I promised to him in 1941 that I would keep faith in him. I gave him my word of honour that I would not get him into any difficulties."
Is that correct?
A Yes, that is correct to my recollection. I did not see the document and I did not sign any document, but I seem to recall that that is correct. any difficulties? could win this war for Germany, and therefore I did not want to make any difficulty for him, cause him any difficulty, and remained loyal to him unto the end. him, and you promised him that in '41, isn't that true?
A I said I would never cause him any difficulties, yes. Sometimes I was a difficult subordinate to him. I told him at the time that I would not cause him any trouble or difficulty.
Q In '41 you told him that no matter whether you differed with his opinion in the future, you would never press the point, isn't that true?
A (No response)
Q Well, approximately that, is that right? position -- that I would never cause him difficulties; if a serious divergence of opinion would appear, I would just keep back my own opinion.
Q Well, you gave him your word of honor to that effect, isn't that true?
Q And at that time you had talked about resigning, isn't that correct?
Q And that made the Fuehrer lose his temper and become ill, correct?
A Yes. "Ill" isn't exactly the correct term. He became quite excited, but I prefer not to mention the details.
Q Well, he said it was injuring his health, isn't that correct, and told you to stop arguing with him about any of these questions and do what he told you to do? Right? and especially since I do not believe that they would be of vital interest here, ascertaining if it is not a fact, and if you did not swear under oath, that on that occasion you swore to Hitler that you would never expresser press any divergent views to anything which he desired. Is that not correct? I told the Fuehrer that I would not cause him any trouble. After 1941 I had many a divergent view with him and told him about my opinions. of them into effect after 1941, were you?
A I didn't understand the question. I ask you to please repeat it. expressed to the Fuehrer on any of these questions after 1941, your suggestions being contrary to the Fuehrer's, were never put into effect. Isn't that correct? You always eventually did what the Fuehrer told you to do and what he wished, regardless of your own views. reply that it is not correct that Hitler never accepted proposals from after that; and I can answer question two that if Hitler uttered an expression or an opinion to me and gave an order, I carried the order through as a matter of course.
Q In other words, eventually you always said yes, isn't that correct?
Q Now, I am going to read you some more of your testimony:
"He" -- referring to the Fuehrer -- "considered me his most close collaborator. A very serious conversation we had then when I wanted to go away. I promised it to him and I have kept it to the last moment. It was sometimes very difficult, I can assure you, to keep this promise, and today I am sorry that I have given it. Perhaps it would have been better had I not given it, because it put me in a position that I could, since that moment, in very serious and important moments of this war, not talk to Hitler in that way which I would have liked to have talked to him, and in which, perhaps, I could have talked to him since this conversation in 1941.
"I must explain all this to you. If you don't know the background of these things you might think perhaps that as Foreign Minister during these last years I would like to say more about this. Perhaps I might say one could give some more information about this, but I want to be and remain loyal to this man, even after his death, as far as I can possibly do it. But I reserve myself, of course, the right for history also to show in keeping my promise, to show also the role which I have played in this whole drama."
Did you or did you not make these statements under oath to me?
Yes or no? Yes or no, please. To the second question, no, I testified under oath perhaps once or twice, but that isn't relevant now; This statement is not verbatim and it must have been inadequately translated. It is correct that I said that I was loyal to the Fuehrer and that I said further that I had divergent views from him, and that I was not always of the same opinion, and that is the quintessence of my statement. or no. Did you or did you not make those statements in the exact language that I just read them to you?
THE PRESIDENT: I think, Colonel Amen, he really did answer that,
COLONEL AMEN: But it is verbatim.
THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of opinion. He says it is not verbatim,
COLONEL AMEN: Well, very good, your Lordship. BY COLONEL AMEN: just read to you, correct? particular testimony in English, did you not? applies in this case, I can't say. In any event, this statement was to be interpreted as I have already set forth. request, was it not?
Q At whose request?
A That I don't know. I believe it just happened that way, but I can't give you any particulars. I believe I spoke English most of the time and German only very seldom. you the same question, which I hope you will answer yes or no, namely: Did you give this testimony in the course of the interrogation:
"Q Do you feel that you have an obligation to the German people to historically set forth not only the good things, but the bad things, for their education in the future?
"A That is a terribly difficult question to answer.
"Q Does that counterbalance the loyalty you feel towards the Fuehrer?
"A I do not want to stand before the German people as being disloyal to the Fuehrer."
Did you make those statements?
A Yes, it is entirely possible, but I don't recall at this minute. We said so much in the course of the last few months, and my health was not the best, you know, so that I cannot recall each and every word.
Q All right. Now, see if you recall having made these statements:
" I always told the Fuehrer openly my view if he wanted to hear it, but before all decisions I had kept myself entirely back, but if the Fuehrer carried out his orders and acted in the sense of his decision.
In a few impressive manner. This was in the Polish crisis and also in the Russian question, because I considered this absolutely important and necessary, but since 1941 I had but very little weight and it was difficult to bring opinion through with the Fuehrer."
Do you recall having made those statements? Yes, or no, please.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal has already heard a very isn't adding very much to what they have already heard.
The defendant
COLONEL AMEN: Very good, sir. I will pass to another subject. BY COLONEL AMEN: the political and the military situations, correct?
A I didn't quite get the last part of your question. between the political and the military elements.
A Yes. The Fuehrer always differentiated between these two aspects; yes for the military and not made available to your office, for example? Is that correct? little, that is correct. obtained was not made available to the military, is that correct? I do not know what information the military received from the Fuehrer.
Q Well, you told us that the Fuehrer's entire plan was to keep those political and military channels separate each from the other, correct? and I have testified to that effect several times already and for that reason I have just received knowledge of military documents here rather than before. That was in line with and in keeping with the secret decree of the Fuehrer that only those people who were concerned with it must be informed of it. jointly in foreign countries for your office, for the army and for the navy, isn't that true?
Q You are quite sure of that ?
Q And you are swearing to that?
A You mean agents who did what ? and for the navy at the same time, jointly ?
A I believe that improbable. It is possible that one man perhaps worked for different organizations but as far as concerned our organization that is quite impossible. We had a very small intelligence service and the intelligence service of the Reich worked, as far as I know, entirely separate from outs. It might be possible that a man here or there worked for more than one department. It is conceivable that at the embassy, just as British, American and Russian consular people were used for information services, but every other country does the same thing. right? line of principle is concerned. We never had secret agents, we never used them It might be that some department of the Foreign Office concerned with this might have had their agents and it is perhaps from this department that counter-espionage work was carried out or SD work was carried on, that is entirely possible.
Later I spoke with Hitler about intelligence work as I had marked differences with Himmler and through the good offices of Kaltenbrunner it was made possible to reach an agreement and to have certain intelligence reports put at our disposal also but this agreement did not function. I believe it had no practical value after 1944.
Q Will you look at Document Number 3817-PS, please? Will you files tell the Tribunal who Albrecht Haushofer was, please?
(witness handed document)
AAlbrecht Haushofer was a co-worker of mine in the earlier years. He was a man who concerned himself with Volkstum questions (German minority ques tions.)
Perhaps you will let no read the letter first. It is a letter of Haushofer? It is not signed..
Have you finished reading?
A No, not quite yet. Shall I just read the first trying to make this as short as we possibly can. Orient investigating various matters and making reports to you as early as 193 is entirely possible. it not?
A Isn't there some misunderstanding? Isn't this a letter of Count Duerkheim instead of Haushefer? Of course, you told me it was a letter of Haushofer and it is possible that Haushofer was in Tokio but I cannot at this point give you the details. At that time I sent Count Duerkheim to Tokio but it is entirely possible that Haushofer was there also.
DR. HORN (Counsel for defendant Ribbentrop): Mr. President, I can see that this letter does not contain a complete date or signature but Colonel Amen just told me that this letter was allegedly written in the year 1937 but in the year 1937 Ribbentrop was not Foreign Minister.
He became Foreign Minister in February of 1938.
COLONEL AMEN: It has the late on it -- 3 October -- and it was captured with Haushofer's documents. BY COLONEL AMEN: I said, I do not recall his visit to Tokio in 1937. later concerned himself with Volkstum questions (German minority questions) and in later years I lost track of him.
Q I will just pass along through this document. You will find the next document is a letter dated 15 April 1937, requesting reimbursement and funds for this trip. Deputy of the Fuehrer Hess, sayings:
"I am using the courier to send you also personally a short report which is going to Ribbentrop at the same time. It obtains as briefly as possible a summary of what I could observe and hear over here in four weeks."
Do you see that? addressed to yourself.
A. Yes, I have that letter before me.
Q. Now, we will pass over the report for a moment and you will come to a letter dated 17 December, 1937.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal thinks this is very far from the matters which they have really got to consider.
COLONEL AMEN: Very good, sir. It seems to me that this indicates very clearly that copies of the same report which is included here were being sent simultaneously to the Army, to the Navy -- it went to Raeder -- one to the army and to Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is true that the witness's first answer was that they did not have joint agents but he eventually qualified that and said they might sometimes have had joint agents.
COLONEL AMEN: That is right, sir. If you think he has already conceded that point -
I would like to put this in as U.S.A. Exhibit 790.
THE WITNESS: I ask to be permitted to say we are not concerned with an agent. Mr. Haushofer was a frew collaborator who was interested in politics in general and in Volkstum questions. If he was in Tokio, and I believe he may have been, I told him to speak with several, different people and to report to me. I am just finding out now through these letters that for reasons of business or because he knew these other gentlemen, he reported not only to me but to these other gentlemen as well. But we are not concerned with an agent, with a joint agent here. I believe the only other gentleman who knew him closely was Rudolf Hess. I do not believe anyone else knew him. Hess and I knew him but if I were to say anything else you would get the wrong impression. This was a private traveling person. BY COLONEL AMEN:
Q. Now, I believe you have told the Tribunal that you were not very close to Himmler, is that right?
A. My relation to Himmler was good during the first few years but I am sorry to say our relationship was not good in the latter years. That was not entirely obvious to the outside and to the public but I do not wish to discuss this matter in detail.
It has already been mentioned. There were serious divergencies -
Q. I do not care what the divergencies were. In what years did you get along closely with him?
A. I did not understand your question.
Q. In what years were you close to him?
A. The first divergencies between Himmler and myself came, I believe, in the year 1941 and it concerned Rumania. We reached an agreement as far as the outside world was concerned and we collaborated and exchanged letters on birthdays but the relationship was not very good after 1941. Before 1941 our relations were good and I agreed with the idea of a Fuehrer group. I was in positive agreement on that point.
Q. And you had at least fifty social appointments with Himmler in 1940 and 1941?
A, How many did you say?
Q. Fifty.
A. Fifty -- no, I do not believe that was the case. I would not say fifty, although I cannot say exactly. But after 1941 conditions were serious between us but I believe others have testified as to that already.
Q. Well, I do not -
THE PRESIDENT: Are you dealing with social appointments between Ribbentrop or something or other?
COLONEL AMEN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that a matter which the Tribunal has to go into?
COLONEL AMEN: I expect, sir, that any person that has as many appointments as are indicated by these books, certainly would have discussed with Himmler the matter of concentration camps and the entire matters which Himmler was exclusively handling. He has told the Tribunal that he had never heard anything about concentration camps from Himmler.
THE WITNESS: I would wish to repeat my statement that at no time did Himmler discuss this matter with me and that we might have seen each other frequently but fifty, no. Perhaps five or ten, although I cannot give you the exact number and I do not believe that is of vital significance and it is not decisive.
O f course, we had to collaborate and work together on my theories and this working was greatly difficult. there not? Just take a look at this sheet of entries from Himmler's appointment book and tell me whether that conforms to your-
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal does not want this matter gone into any further.
COLONEL AMEN: Very good, sir, but these were business appointments as distinguished from social. There are no further questions. BY GENERAL RUDENKO: of the Tribunal you explained rather in detail the foundations of the German foreign policy. I would like to ask you a few questions and would like you to make extremely laconic replies, primarily in terms of yes and no. Do you consider the Anschluss an act of aggression? I would like you to answer this.
A You mean Austria?
A No, it was not an aggression. It was the execution -- After my saying "Yes", may I answer a few questions or shall I confine myself to yes or no exclusively? detail, but laconically. I would like to receive replies in the sense of yes and no. you pardon me.
A The Anschluss I did not consider an act of aggression. I considered it as an execution of the will of both peoples involved, who always wanted to be together, and something that the regime before Hitler was concerned with Do you think that the Anschluss with Austria was or was not part of the German aggression.
THE PRESIDENT: He gave you a categorical answer to that; that it was not an aggression.
GENERAL RUDENKO: Yes, I understand, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: And we have already ruled that the witnesses are not to he confined to answering yes or no. They must answer yes or no first, and then make a short explanation if they want to. But, anyhow, with reference to this question, he has answered it categorically. BY GENERAL RUDENKO:
Q The second question: Do you think that the seizure of Czechoslovakia by the German Army was German aggression?
A No, it was not an aggression in that sense. The annexation was in line with the self determination of people as was set down by President Wilson in 1919 and the annexation of the/Sudetenland was sanctioned by the Great powers in Munich.
Q You evidently have not understood my question. I have asked you whether you considered the seizure of Czechoslovakia a German aggression. as the Fuehrer told me and I believe that is correct, that it was a matter of necessity resulting from the geographical situation of Germany. This geographic position meant that Russo-Czechoslovakia was to be an areal base against Germany. The Fuehrer was of the opinion, therefore, that this region of Bohemia and Moravia would have to be occupied so that the German Reich would be protected against attacks, especially from the air. The distance between Prague and Berlin was a half-hour's distance by air. The Fuehrer told me that, with respect of the fact that the United States of America had certain spheres of interest in the Western Hemisphere, and that Russia was a large territory and England encompassed the whole globe, that Germany would be justified in taking such a small area as its sphere of influence.
Q It is clear. Do you consider the invasion of Poland part of the German aggression?
A No; I have to answer again with no. The attack on Poland, because of the position and attitude taken by the other parties, was inevitable and could not be circumvented in any way.
It would have been possible to reach a peaceful solution in accordance with German Reich, andI believe that the Fuehrer would have taken this way if the other powers had taken this road. But,as the situation was, the tension had become so great that Germany could not tolerate anything more, and Germany as a great power could not be tolerant of Polish provocation any longer, and that is how the war arose. I am convinced that the Fuehrer was never interested in conquering Poland.
Q Do you consider the attack on Denmark part of the German aggression?
A No, the "invasion" of Denmark, as we call it, was, according to what the Fuehrer told and explained to me, a preventive measure, in order to prevent the imminent landing of British fighting forces. That our intelligent reports were authentic can be carried back to the fact that later on, shortly thereafter, fighting between Germany and English troops took place after our landing, and we knew that the British troops had been prepared for a long time prior to this day and documents, which were found later and which were published, show orders to the effect that an English landing in Scandinavia had been planned and prepared to the last detail. The Fuehrer, therefore, believed he could prevent Scandinavia from becoming a theatre of war with his intervention, and I do not believe that you can apply the term "aggression" to such a measure.
Q And this theatre of Norway you don't consider aggressive action on the part of Germany either? Denmark. It was a combined action.
Q All right, that is sufficie nt. I understand you quite clearly. Do you consider that the attack on Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg an aggressive action on the part of Germany?
A That is the same question. I must say no, and I would like to explain my answer.
Q Just a moment. I would like you to give answers which are more laconic, a little more brief. The basic question is, do you deny that these actions were aggressive actions on the part of Germany? vital questions, which may not be dealt with in a sentence or two, especially since we did not have the opportunity to go into this at length before.
about three days already. I appreciate that.
A I will try to be brief. After the Polish campaign, the military concerns were the vital and decisive ones. The Fuehrer wanted to localize the border. He did not want it to expand. As far as France, Holland, and Belgium were concerned, France declared war on us. We did not declare war on France. Therefore, we had to be ready for an attack on all sides. The Fuehrer told me at that time that such an attack to the Ruhr Area was to be expected. The documents which were found later show without benefit of doubt, and show to the whole world, that this action was true. The Fuehrer, therefore, decided to take the preventive measures in this case, too, and not await an attack on the heart of Germany, but to attack first. Therefore the timetabel applied. part of Germany? discussed. I don't believe I need to say anything more on this point. merely asked you whether you considered an attack on Greece an aggressive action on the part of Germany? Greece in the granting of bases to the enemies of Germany justified intervention on the part of Adolf Hitler, so that an aggressive action cannot be talked of in this sense. It was entirely clear that British troops were about to land in Greece and that a riot or a putsch was made in Yugoslavia by the enemies of Germany in agreement with the enemies of Germany so that they could attack from that point on. The acts of the French General Staff, which we found in France, showed clearly that Salonika landing was planned.
Q Mr. Ribbentrop, you have talked about that already. You have talked about that in detail before. Do you not think that you could give answers that are a little briefer? The last question with regard to aggressive action is, do you consider the attack on the Soviet Union a part of German aggression or an aggressive act on the part of Germany? Do you or do you not?
Q Excuse me please, Defendant Ribbentrop. Do you mean literally that it was not an aggressive action? If you please -
A May I say a few words? The term "aggression" as used by the Prosecution is very serious, and international law is not clear on it, by any manner of means, even today. But you no doubt must admit that we were thus concerned with a preventative measure, a preventative war. We did attack; we don't dispute that. I had hoped that the matters which we had to regulate with the Soviet Union should have been regulated in a diplomatic way, and I did everything possible. But the political measures taken by the Soviet Union in the years 1941 and 1942 and until the outbreak of war led the Fuehrer to believe, as he told me repeatedly, that sooner or later the so-called EastWest Pincers would be applied to Germany, in the East Russia with her tremendous might, and that in the west the United States and England would make a landing against Germany, and it was the great concern that this pincer-like action would come to pass. The Fuehrer told me he had reports that a close collaboration was taking place between the General Staffs at London and Moscow. I personally did not see the intelligence reports and did not receive any, but the reports which the Fuehrer told me about -- what the Fuehrer told me -- were of a concrete nature. In any event, he was very much afraid that the political situation would work out in such a way that it would be catastrophic for him and for Germany, and he wanted to prevent a collapse of Germany and the destruction of the balance of power and might in Europe. objectives you considered it necessary to solve a number of decisive questions through diplomatic channels. Now, obviously, this testimony is a falsehood, since just now you admitted that all these actions of aggression have been justified on the part of Germany.
A No, I did not want to say that, by what I said. I just said that we were not concerned with an aggressive action, Mr. Prosecutor. I did tell how this war originated and how it developed and how it spread. But I was always concerned at the beginning of the war in the Polish crisis and later on to do everything to prevent this war. That will be shown by history, aside from this Tribunal. We later tried to localize the war and prevent it from spreading. That is true, also. Summarizing, I would like to say that the outbreak of the war was brought about through circumstances at the end which were not in Hitler's hands any longer. He could not act otherwise than as he did, and when the war spread further his decisions were prompted by military considerations and he acted solely in the interest of his people.
Q I understand you have submitted to the Tribunal No. 111, which is addressed to the Fuehrer personally. You must remember the document. It was not so long ago that you had submitted it to the Tribunal.
A No, I am not exactly sure what we are concerned with. May I look at it? No.111. It has been submitted to the Tribunal by your attorney. On page 5 there --.
THE PRESIDENT: It could not have been submitted to the Tribunal as 111, without anything more. Is it 111-PS or 111 what?
GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr President, this is the same document submitted in the name of the Defendant Ribbentrop which bears merely the number, 111. We haveonly a Russian translation here, which came to us together with a German book of documents. I had supposed that the Tribunal has the same book of documents.
THE PRESIDENTS: It is R-111. You mean it isn't 111; it is Ribbentrop 111.
GENERAL RUDENKO: The number is 311, it now appears. Mr. President, the correct number is 311, not 111, please.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I've got it now. It is in Document Book No.9
GENERAL RUDENKO: May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
the following: "After the Polish victory in the West and due to force and to the influence which we must ascribe to Hitler, in other words, Hitler's doctrine was that German hegemony must be established in the West as well as in the East." Do you remember that extract from the document?
A May I see the document? I am not familiar with it.
GENERAL RUDENKO: I would ask the attorney for the Defense to submit the document to the Defendant at this time, if you please.
DR. HORN: Mr. President -
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
Dr. Horn, the Tribunal are inclined to think that this document is quite irrelevant. It is apparently a document by the Defendant Ribbentrop, touching upon the personality of the Fuehrer. I don't know where it was prepared, but it seems to us to be irrelevant.
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, I am of the same opinion, that it is irrelevant. I included this document only in case the Defendant did not have an opportunity to give his relationship to Hitler, but since he has had that opportunity I would like to withdraw the document.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, The Tribunal consider the document quite irrelevant.
GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr. President, this document was submitted in the book of documents by the Defendant. Supposedly it is written by the Defendant Ribbentrop in the course of this trial. All the Prosecutors considered it admissibly sine, there is a series of assumptions there that are important, including a description of Hitler's personality which sheds important light on certain things. However, if the Tribunal considers the document irrelevant, then it is perfectly agreeable to me.
THE PRESIDENT: We haven't yet had an opportunity of ruling on the admissibility of these documents. It is the first time we have seen them, this morning. We all consider this document irrelevant.
GENERAL RUDENKO: I understand. against Yugoslavia. I would like you to look over Document PS-1105, which is entitled "Preliminary Plan for the Division of Yugoslavia."