(Consultation between members of the Tribunal, en banc.)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you may ask the questions.
Q. Ambassador Gauss stated, under No. 13 of his affidavit:
"The Reich Foreign Minister's airplane arrived around noon of the 31st of August at Moscow. I had accompanied him to advise on legal matters. On the afternoon of the same day Ribbentrop spoke with Stalin, at which time only Ambassador Hilger, as interpreter, and perhaps Ambassador Schulenburg were present as the German delegation. I was not present.
"The Reich Foreign Minister returned from this long conference and stated that the treaty wanted by the Germans would be brought about. Further discussion of the documents about to be signed was set for the late evening. I personally took part in the second conference. So also did Ambassador Schulenburg and Ambassador Hilger. On the Russian side the negotiations were conducted by Stalin and Molotov, whose interpreter was Favlov. Without difficulty and with rapidity, we reached an agreement on the text of this, German-Russian Non-aggression Pact.
"In the preamble of the text of the agreement that I drew up there was rather a long statement regarding friendship between Russia and Germany, to which Stalin objected with the remark that the Soviet Government, after it had been subjected to insult by the Nazi government for six years, could not make public all of a sudden protestations of friendship between Soviet Russia and Germany. That passage in the preamble was thereupon deleted or changed.
"Along with the Non-aggression Pact, a discussion took place about a secret protocol, which, as I recall, was called a secret protocol or secret additional protocol, the terms of which dealt with a limitation of the two spheres of interest in which various European countries were considered. Whether the expression "sphere of interest" or other such expressions were used therein, I do not recall. Germany declared that it had no interest in Latvia or Esthonia but did consider Lithuania to be part of its sphere of influence.
"Concerning Germany's interest in the other two Baltic countries, this can be said: The Reich Foreign Minister wanted to except a certain part of the Baltic from agreement, but the Soviet government, particularly since it was interested in the ice-free ports in this region, was not agreeable to this exception.
"Because of this point, which had already been discussed in Ribbentrop's first discussion, Ribbentrop had a telephone conversation with Berlin, which took place only during the second discussion, in which he was empowered, in direct conversation with Hitler, to accept the Soviet standpoint. A demarcation line was laid down for the Polish territory. Whether it was drawn on a map annexed to the protocol or whether it was simply described in words, I do not now recall. Moreover, in regard to Poland, an agreement was reached that the two powers, at the final decision of these questions, would act in concord. It is, however, possible that this last agreement regarding Poland was reached only after the change foreseen in Paragraph 5 of the protocol.
"Regarding the Baltic countries, it was determined that Germany had only economic interests there.
"The Non-aggression Pact and the second document were signed rather late that same evening."
Witness, in the sworn affidavit of Gauss, this is to be found: that at the final decision regarding Poland, the two countries would act with each other's knowledge. Was this agreement reached already on 31 August?
A. Yes, that is true. At that time the serious German-Polish crisis was already at hand, and this question was discussed, and I should like to emphasize that there was not the slightest doubt in either Stalin's or Hitler's mind that if all the negotiations with Poland came to naught the territory that had been taken from these two powers by force of arms would be reunited with the two powers by force of arms. In this,sense, the eastern territories would be turned over to Germany. It was also agreed that Stalin would never accuse Germany of aggression because of its actions in Poland.
Q. Another question -
A. Rather, if an aggression was spoken of here, this would be spoken of in both cases and that both parties would be spoken of as guilty of it.
Q. Was the demarcation line in this secret agreement described only in words or was it drawn on a map annexed to the agreement?
A. The line of demarcation was drawn roughly on a large map. It ran along the Rivers Rysia, Bug, Marew, and San, and that was the line of demarcation that was to be adhered to in case things reached Apr-1-M-RT-2a-1 the point of war with Poland.
agreement, not Germany, but Soviet Russia, was to receive the greater amount of territory? situation was this: That all regions east of these rivers were to go to Soviet Russia, and all west of these were to be occupied by German troops . The organization of this territory as intended by Germany still lay open and had not yet been discussed by Hitler and me. It later became the General Government of Poland after the regions lost to Germany following the first world war incorporated into Germany.
Q. Now, something else: You stated last Friday that you wanted Russia to join in the Tripartite Pact. Why did that fail?
A That failed because of Russian demands. The Russian demands-I should perhaps say first that I had agreed with Molotov in Berlin that we would negotiate further over diplomatic channels. I would exert my influence on the Fuehrer to see to it that regarding the demands already made by Molotov in Berlin a compromise agreement of some sort could be reached. Russian demands. In this report, first, the demandswas renewed for Finland T he fuehrer, as known, told Molotov that he did not wish that, after the winter's war of 1940, up in the north there war should break out anew. The demand regarding Finland was brought up again, and we supposed that would lead to an occupation of Finland That was difficult, since it was a demand that the Fuehrer had already turned down.
A second demand concerned the Balkans, specifically, Bulgaria. Russia wanted basis there and close relations with Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government, with which we had close relations, did not wish this. question to meet these Russian demands because of our economic interest an wheat, oil, and so on. Moreover, the will of the Bulgarian governmnet was against it.
Apr-1-M-RT-2a-2 military nature, and then, also, the wish that Molotov had expressed to me in Berlin to have the outlet of the Baltic Sea. Molotov told me at that time that, of course, Russia was interested in Jutland and other such regions.
the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer said we would have to get in touch with Mussolini, who was interested also in a part of these demands. This took place, but both the Balkan demand and the Dardenelles demand found no reception by Mussolini. and on the question of Finland, neither Finland nor the Fuehrer wanted to agree to these demands on the part of Russia.
Negotiations took place during several months. I recall that on the basis of a telegram from Moscow in December 1940 I had another long conversation with the Fuehrer. It was my idea that if we could reach some compromise between the Russian wishes and the wishes of the various participants, we could then reach such a strong coalition that would finally bring England to peace.
THE PRESIDENT: What is this all an answer to? What was your question that this is supposed to be an answer to?
DR. SEIDL: In essence he has answered the question already. The question was, what circumstances -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Dr. Seidl, if he has answered the question you should stop him.
DR. SEIDL: Very well. BY DR. SEIDL:
Q. I now come to another question. That intentions did Hitler have in regard to the military strength of Russia?
A. Adolf Hitler told me once and expressed himself so -- this was during the time that he became worried about what was taking place in Russia in the way of preparations against Germany. He said, "We of course do not know what is concealed behind this door, and we may one day be obliged to break this door open." state to him that on the basis of what he knew about Russia already it should cause him great concern about attacking Russia.
Q. What induced Hitler to run this danger of on offensive action against Russia?
A. This was as follows: -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Hasn't this been dealt with extensively and exhaustively by the defendant Goering? You are here as counsel for Hess.
DR. SEIDL: If the Tribunal is of the conviction that this has already been adequately handled, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Before you sit down, Dr. Seidl, you were putting Gauss' affidavit to the defendant, I suppose with the intention that he should say that the affidavit was true; is that right?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You didn't put to him paragraph 4 of the affidavit at all, did you?
DR. SEIDL: I cited only number 3, numbers 1 and 2; 4 and 5 I did not read, in order to save time.
THE PRESIDENT: The answer to my question was, yes, you did not put it. Should you not put the end of paragraph 4 to him, which reads in this way:
"The Reich Foreign Minister regulated his words in such a manner that he let a war-like conflict of Germany with Poland appear not as a matter already finally decided upon but only as an imminent possibility. No statements which could have included the approval or encouragement for such a conflict were made by the Soviet statesmen on this point. Rather the Soviet representatives limited themselves in this respect simply to taking cognizance of the explanations of the German representatives."
Is that correct?
DR. SEIDL: That is so.
THE PRESIDENT: I am asking the witness. Is that correct?
THE WITNESS: I may say the following to this. When I went to Moscow no final decision had been reached by the Fuehrer -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Well, couldn't you answer the question directly? I asked you whether the statement in the affidavit was correct or not. You can explain afterwards.
THE WITNESS: Not quite correct, no.
THE PRESIDENT: Now you can explain.
THE WITNESS: Not precisely correct insofar as a decision on the part of the Fuehrer to attack Poland had not yet been reached. There is, however, no doubt that during the discussions in Moscow it was perfectly clear that the possibility, if the last effort at negotiations failed, could be taken at any time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is the difference between that and what I have just read to you? What I read to you was this:
"The Reich Foreign Minister regulated his words in such a manner that he let a war-like conflict of Germany with Poland appear not as a matter already finally decided upon but only as an imminent possibility. " That's all.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, may I mention something very beiefly in this connection? The witness Fauss was only present at the second conference. He was, however, not present at the previous conference between the witness von Ribbentrop or the one hand and Molotov and Stalin on the other hand. At this conference only Ambassador Hilger was present. Consequently, I ask the Tribune in view of the importance of this point, to call the witness Hilger
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, as you know, you can make any application in writing for calling any witness that you like, and also the Tribunal wishes me to say that if the Prosecution wish to have the witness Gauss here for a cross examination they may do so.
DR. SEIDL: Very well. Then I should like to put in evidence as Number 16 the sworn affidavit of Ambassador Gauss.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
MR. DODD: May it please the Court, as far as I understand, there is some slight danger of the witness Gauss being removed from Nurnberg. I would like to state at this time that we would like to have him retained here for long enough time for possible cross examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Do any other members of the defendants' counsel want to ask questions?
BY DR. NELTE (Counsel for Keitel):
Q. The defendant Keitel states that in the autumn of 1940 he discussed the question with Hitler of war with Russia, and in order to do so came to Fuschl to talk these questions over with you. He believed that you too had doubts about this. Do you recall that at the end of August he was in Fuschl?
A. Yes, he visited me there.
Q. Do you recall that Keitel then stated to you his opinion of the war that might be threatening?
A. Yes, that is so. He spoke of that at that time. I believe he said that the Fuehrer also discussed it.
Q. What I am driving at is this. Keitel states that he spoke with you about a memorandum that he intended to submit to Hitler, and this concerned itself with the doubts that he felt about waging a was with Soviet Russia.
A. That is so. Keitel told me at that time that he intended to submit a memorandum to Hitler, and he expressed his doubts about a conflict between the Soviet Union and Germany.
Q. Did you have the impression that Keitel was an opponent of that war at that time?
A. Yes, that is so. I had that impression very clearly.
Q. Is it true that he, as a result of this discussion, asked you in your turn to support his point of view by talking with Hitler about these doubts?
A. Yes, that is so, and I told him at that time that I would do so, that I would speak to Hitler, and he also would do the same.
Q. Another question, regarding the flight of the French General Giraud. Is it true that Keitel, when the French General Giraud escaped from Koenigsteir asked you to take measures in order to bring about, through the French Government, the voluntary return of Giraud to Germany?
A. Yes, at that time he suggested whether or not it might be possible, by way of negotiations with the French Government, in some way or other to induce Giraud to return to imprisonment.
a meeting took place with Giraud in occupied France?
A. Yes, such a meeting took place, I believe Amabssador Abetz met Giraud, who, as I recall, appeared in the company of Laval. The Ambassador did everything he could in order to induce the General to return, but that finally did not succeed. He was promised safe, conduct for this return. However, then Laval and the General went away again. branding of Soviet prisoners of war by marking on their skin. Keitel, who is asserted to be responsible for this order, states that he spoke with you about these questions at the headquarters at that time in Vinnitza, that he had to speak with you because this question of prisoners of war had touched the international law department of the Foreign Office. international law scruples against this branding which Hitler wished?
A The situation was this. We heard of the intention of identifying prisoners of war in this way. We went to the headquarters and spoke with Keitel about this matter. It was my opinion that such a way of identifying prisoners was out of the question. Keiter was also of this opinion and, so far as I recall, gave orders that this intended form of identification should not be used.
DR. NELTE: I have no further question. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER (counsel for defendant Doenitz):
Q Witness, when did you make the acquaintance of Admiral Doenitz? of the Navy.
Q That was in 1943? influence on foreign policy or attempt to have such an influence? on foreign policy.
Q Do you recall Marshal Antonescu's visit to the Fuehrer's headquarters on the 27th of February 1944?
ters on the 27th of February 1944 ?
A I recall that Antonescu visited the Fuehrer'several times, every six months or so, and I believe that at the beginning of 1944 he did visit the Fuehrer. military discussion? this. When Antonescu came, the Fuehrer explained the military situation to him that is, he invited him to take part in the so-called noon military discussion--of of the situation. I don't recall the exact date now, but there can be no doubt that Marshal Antonescu took part in a military discussion of the situation. tical nature with Antonescu?
A These discussions begas as follows: Either the Fuehrer was alone with him, or perhaps I was there. Then the others withdrew, and the Fuehrer and he had a long political discussion.
Q Did Doenitz take part in these political discussions ? these political discussions with Antonescu. Sometimes, very occasionally, that was the case, but that Admiral Doenitz took part in a discussion with Antonescu I can hardly believe.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I have no further questions. BY DR. SIEMERS (counsel for defendant Raeder): a discussion between you and the Japanese Ambassador Matsuoka. The document carries the number 1877-PS, and the number USA Exhibit 152. It is on page 1007 of the German court record. following passage concerning Raeder:
"The Reich Foreign Minister returned once more to the question of Singapore. In view of the Japanese fears of submarine attacks from the Philippines and the interference of the English Mediterranean and home fleet, he spoke once more with General Admiral Raeder. Raeder said to him once more with General Admiral Raeder.
Raeder said to him that the English fleets in this year were so busy in British home waters and in the Mediterranean that they could not spare one single boat for the Far East. The American submarines Admiral Raeder considered so bad that Japan did not have to worry about them." proke with him about strategic matters regarding Japan, or about the value or uselessness of American submarines. I should be obliged to you if you could clarify this point, whether there is some error here as to the person involved in this discussion.
A That is altogether possible. I do not now recall either that I ever spoke with Admiral Raeder about German-Japanese strategy. We had only very loose connections with Japan. have had that from the Fuehrer, and he must have induced me to say that. I could not have said it on my own initiative, because I did not know about them things. However, I do know that the Fuehrer spoke to me several times about points relating to Japan, so it is possible that this originated with the Fuehrer. I do not know who has testified to this.
Q This document carries the title, "Notes on conference between the Foreign Minister and Matsuoka."
A Oh, Yes, I have seen that. Then it is possible that the Fuehrer said that, in fact, I consider that probable, and it can be that some mistake was made in the notes.
Q. Witness, did you inform the defendant Raeder of such political discussions that you had with Matsuoka?
A. No, that is not possible.
Q. Did you ever speak with Raeder about other political questions or have him present at political negotiations?
A. No, that was not our practice at all. Rather, the Fuehrer kept military and political matters strictly separate so that a military man never had an opportunity, through me, to discuss political matters, and I, as Foreign Minister, never had an opportunity to discuss military matters at my office.
If there were discussions, they took place at the Fuehrer's headquarters. These matters were very sharply separated. If such discussions took place at all -- and at the moment I can't remember any -- then they were always at the Fuehrer's.
DR. SIEMERS: I thank you. BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW):
Q. Witness, Baron Steengracht, whom you had as a witness, answered my question as in whether the high military men were informed of political matters in the negative. I ask you now whether you, as Foreign Minister, oriented the high military men in political matters.
A. No, I must anwer the question as I answered the previous question. That was not our practice. All the political and military matters came in contact only at the Fuehrer's. The Fuehrer told me what I had to do in a diplomatic and political field, and told the military men what they had to do militarily. but it happened only seldom, and what the military men had to know of a political nature they never found out from me, but if they found it out at all, they found it out from the Fuehrer.
DR. LATERNSER: No further questions. BY DR. BOEHM (Counsel for the SA):
Q. Witness, did you have an order, on the basis of which you informed the SA leadership of the development and treatment of foreign political matters?
A. The SA? No. There was no such order.
Q. Did the SA leadership have any influence on foreign policy at all?
A. No.
Q. And then I should like to ask another question for my colleague Dr. Sauter who is sick. in which von Schirach was discussed and the question of accusing him before the Volksgericht was brought up?
A. Yes.
Q. what consequences would such a trial before the Volksgericht have had?
A. I cannot say, of course. I do not know the details of this matter. I only know that Himmler, in my presence, made the suggestion to Hitler that Schirach should be brought before the Volksgericht for some reason or other. I don't know the details. However, I, in my turn, said that this would make a very bad impression, particularly in a foreign political way, and I know that the Fuehrer then did not give Himmler any order at all. make such a suggestion, the consequences would have been very serious.
Q. How is it that you were witness to this conference, and what was your attitude at it?
A. I have already said that I sold at that time that it would make a very bad impression. I said that to Himmler and Hitler, I am not familiar with these matters.
DR. BOEEM: No Further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other questions on behalf of the defendants' counsel? BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q. Witness, when you began to advise Hitler on matters of foreign policy in 1933, were you familiar with the League of Nations' declaration of 1927?
A. To which declaration are you making reference?
Q. Don't you remember the League of Nations' declaration of 1937?
A. The League of Nations made many declarations. I ask you to inform me of which you are talking.
Q. It made rather an important one, about aggressive war in 1927, didn't it?
A. I do not know about such a declaration in detail, but it is clear that the League of Nations, like everyone else, was against aggressive war, and at that time Germany was a member of the League of Nations.
Q. Germany was a member, and the preamble of the declaration was:
"Being convinced that a war of aggression would never serve as a means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence an international crime..
A. (Interposing) Not in detail, no.
Q. It was rather an important matter to be familiar with if you were going to advise Hitler, who was then Chancellor, on foreign policy, wasn't it?
A. This declaration was certainly important, and it corresponds exactly to my opinion at that time. Unfortunately, the individual people demonstrated that the League of Nations was not in a position to save Germany from disgrace.
Q. Did you continue to hold that as your own view? Did you continue to hold the expression of opinion I have quoted to you from the preamble as your own view?
A. That was my basic opinion, but on the other hand I was of the opinion that in some form or other Germany also had to be helped.
Q. So I gathered. Now, apart from that, if you weren't familiar in detail with that resolution, were you familiar in detail with the BriandKellog Pact?
A. Yes, I knew about that.
Q. Did you agree with the view expressed in the preamble and in the pact that there should be a renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy?
A. Yes.
Q. I just want you to help us on how you carried that out. Let's take the first example. Are you telling this Tribunal that as far as you know, no pressure or threats were made to Herr von Schuschnigg?
A. You mean in the discussions on the Obersalzberg with Hitler?
Q. Yes, on the 12th of February.
A. At this discussion -
Q. (Interposing) Witness, answer the question first, and then you can give your explanation. Are you saying that no pressure or threatswere put to Herr von Schuschnigg on the 12th of February? Answer that yes or no, and we will go into the explanation later.
A. In that sense, no. I believe that the great personality of the Fuehrer made such an impression of Schuschnigg, and the arguments that he presented, that Schuschnigg finally declared himself agreeable to the proposals that Hitler made to him.
Q. Now, let's just look into that.
A. I personally, after the first talk with Adolf Hitler, had a conversation with Schuschnigg from which I could perceive his reaction to the first conference. This reaction was that of having received a vast impression from Hitler's personality and attitude. Schuschnigg, in this conversation, emphasized to me that this conversation with Hitler took place in a very friend ly way and that he, and I quote him, regarded this as a historical occasion by which the two people should be brought closer together.
Q. Who were present at the Berghof -- I don't say in the room, but in the building or about? Were there present Hitler, yourself, the defendant von Paper, the defendant Keitel, General Sperrle, and General von Reichenau?
A. I believe that is so, yes.
Q. And on the morning of the 12th, I think that Hitler and von Schuschnigg were together for about two hours before lunch in the morning, isn't that so?
A. I don't know the time precisely. Anyway, they had a long conversation.
Q. And then, after lunch, von Schuschnigg was allowed to have a short conversation with his own Foreign Minister, Guido Schmidt, isn't that so?
A. I can't say that precisely, but it is possible.
Q. Then, after that, con Schuschnigg and Guido Schmidt were called before you and the defendant von Papen, isn't that right?
A. I don't remember that. I don't believe so.
Q. Don't you remember that? Just think again.
A. Do you mean -- then I didn't understand the question, perhaps.
Q. Then I'll put it again. After a conversation that Schuschnigg had with Guido Schmidt, he and Schmidt came before you and the defendant von Papen and had a conversation with you, about which I will ask you in a moment.
Now, isn't it right that you and von Papen saw von Schuschnigg and Guido Schmidt?
A. No, I don't believe so. I don't believe that is true.
Q. Don't you remember exhibiting to von Schuschnigg a typewritten draft containing the demands made on von Schuschnigg? Now, just think.
A. That is altogether possible. Hitler had dictated a memorandum, and it is possible that I gave it to Schuschnigg, yes, but I am not sure any more of the details.
Q. What memorandum -
A. (Interposing) Let me add that I do not know about this and I must add for the better understanding of the thing that at this time I was not at all oriented regarding Austrian problems because Hitler handled these matters personally, and I, for a few days -
Q. (Interposing) If you hand someone a memorandum at what you have described him as saying was a historic meeting, presumably you can give the Tribunal at any rate an outline of what the memorandum contained. What were the points in the memorandum?
A. Curiously enough, I really do not remember that in detail. This whole meeting Teas one between the Fuehrer and Schuschnigg, and everything that was agreed to there was suggested to the Fuehrer by someone else, or was suggested by the Fuehrer himself and then dictated. I did not know the details. I only know that it was a question then, first of all, of bringing about better relations between Germany and Austria, because National Socialists had been arrested in Austria and thus the relations between the two countries had been greatly troubled.
Q. Well, if I remind you, perhaps, it will bring it back. Weren't the three points the reorganization of the Austrian cabinet, including the appointment of the defendant Seyss-Inquart to the Ministry of Security in the Interior; second, a general political amnesty of Nazis convicted of crimes; and thridly, a declaration of equal rights for Austrian National Socialists and the taking of them into the Fatherland Front?
Are these the points that you were putting to von Schuschnigg?
A. That is more or less correct, I guess, although I don't remember exactly. That would correspond to what I knew about Austrian matters at that time.
Q. And did you tell von Schuschnigg that Hitler had informed you that these demands which you were offering were the final demands of the Fuehrer and that Hitler was not prepared to discuss them?
A. I can't recall it in exactly those terms, but that is possible. It is possible that I told Schuschnigg something to that effect.
Q. Did you say, "You must accept the whole of these demands"?
A. No, I don't believe so. I exercised no pressure on Schuschnigg at all I know that this conversation lasted from an hour to an hour and a half and was confined to generalities and also personal matters. From this conversation I had a very favorable impression of Schuschnigg's personality and could not have exercised any pressure on him.
Q. You told us that before, and I am suggesting to you that at this conversation you were trying to get Schuschnigg to sign the document containing these terms which you agree that you may have had. I want you to remember the answer and remind you of that.
Don't you remember Herr von Schuschnigg turning to the defendant von Paper and saying, "Now, you told me that I wouldn't be confronted with any demands if I came to Berchtesgaden," and Herr von Papen apologizing and saying, "That is so. I didn't know you were going to be confronted with these demands.)
Dont you remember that?
A No, I don't. Also, that cannot be true. Hitler again and Guido Schmidt remaining with you to make some alterations in the document which you were putting?
A That is quite possible, that changes were made. I don't remember the details, though. Hitler telling Schuschnigg that he must comply with these demands within three days? for the first time today, because in a moment I will show you some document.
Are you sure you didn't hear that Hitler told Schuschnigg he must comply within three days or Hitler would order the march into Austria? military and political pressure? There could be no other pressure than suggesting marching into Austria, could there? at that time, that would have been a pressure, certainly, but in the long rum it would have been impossible to find any solution between these two countriesif they had not come closer together, and I, I should like to emphasize, always stood on the view that these countries should enter into close relations, and I had in mind a customs union. that took place on the 12th of February. Don't you know that Schuschnigg said "I am only the Bundeskanzler. I have to refer to President Miklas, and I can only sign this protocol subject to reference to President Miklas?" Don't you know that?
A No, I don't remember that in detail.
Q Don't you remember Hitler pointing to the door and calling Keitel?
A No; I have already heard about that here.
Q You know it is true, don't you?
Q You know it is true, don't you?
A No, I don't.
Q Don't you remember Keitel going in to speak to Hitler?
A I have already said I haven't heard about that. I don't know about that. dition that within three days these demands would be fulfilled, otherwise Germany would march into Austria?
A No, that I didn't know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I think it would be convenient if the witness had the German document book in front of him. I tried to get most of the pages agreeing.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps this would be a good time to break off.
(A recess was taken). BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Witness, will you look first, at the defendant Jodl's diary, the entry for the 13th of February, it is the Ribbentrop document book page 9, U.S. 72, 1780-PS. The entry is as follows:
"In the afternoon General K."--that is Keitel--"asks Admiral C."-that is Admiral Canaris--"and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for those deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval." hold of rumors or gossip, is it? That is a definite order, a superior order to General Keitel, isn't it?
A I don't know anything about any military measures, so that I couldn't pass any judgement about the value of this note. The Fuehrer did not inform me about any military measures.