of Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 18. Again, a document from the same collection and is headed "Treaty of Understanding and Cooperation of the 15th of 2July 1933", known in brief as the "Four Power Pact". It is on page 42 of the document book. This Four Power Pact was inspired by Mussolini and was to take place between Germany, France, England, and Italy. Its purpose was general disarmament and above all, to make effective the revision article in the Treaty of Versailles. This treaty did not come about because France did not ratify it.
As to the next document, I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 20, and ask the Court to take judicial notice of it. This is a "Proclamation of the Reich Government to the German people in connection with leaving the League of Nations." It is dated 14 October 1933. This proclamation, on the part of the Reich Government, ascertains the failure of the disarmament conference and explains Germany's reasons for resigning from the League of Nations. In connection with this proclamation, Hitler on the same day held a speech over the redio in order to justify German's withdrawal from the League of Nations. I submit this to the Tribunal as Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 21, and ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. The speech is on page 45 of the document book.
In order to justify that foreign policy at that time, or to corroborate that justification, Reichspresident von Hindenburg, on the 11th of November 1933, delivered a speech to the German people.
The corresponding proclamation is Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 22 and is on page 46 of the document book. It put it in evidence and ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of at. the results of the election are made public. It is on page 49; also, the text of the election leaflet. issued a German Memorandum on Disarmament, regarding the question of disarmament. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of this as Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 25. course of the disarmament negotiations and Germany's attitude towards these negotiations. I submit it as Ribbentrop Exhibit 26 and ask the Court to take judicial notice of it. The document is on page 51 of the document book, and is headed "The German Memorandum of 19 January 1934." document Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 27, on page 53 of the document book, and is entitled "German Memorandum of March 13, 1934." I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. April 1934 with an Aide Memoir of the German Reich Government to the English Government. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of this document which I submit as Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 28. suggested a pact which is known under the name of the Eastern Pact. Regarding this Eastern Pact, Germany expressed its view in a communique of the Reich Government. It is on page 56 of the document book. The date is 10 September 1934. I have given it the number, Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 30. We again request that the Tribunal take judicial notice of it.
The next document is on page 57. I put it in evidence and ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it as Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 31. This is from the Documents of German Policy, Volume 3, and is the reply of the Reich Government of 14 February 1935 to the suggestion for on air pact.
Germany took the following attitude toward this air pact, and I read from this excerpt, paragraph 2:
"The German Government welcomes the proposal to increase safety from sudden attacks from the ear by a convention to be concluded as soon as possible, which contemplates the immediate use of the air forces of the signatories in favor of the victims of an unprovoked air attack." On this occasion, the German Government published a proclamation to the German people. This proclomation is on page 59 of the document book. It carries the number Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 33. I submit this excerpt from the proclamation. Government of 14 April 1935 on Germany's attitude toward the Eastern Pact. It is on page 61 of the document book and I ask, without my reading anything from it, that the Tribunal take judicial notice of it. of the Versailles Treaty as an infraction of it. The states protested against the reintroduction of conscription in Germany. This protest was answered by a protest on the part of the Reich Government against the decision of the Council of the League of Nations on 17 April 1935. This protest is on page 63 of the document book. I have given this document the number Ribbentrop Exhibit 35, and ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. the Council of the League of Nations, challenges the right of these people to pass judgment on Germany. Germany points out that this attitude on the part of the Council is a manifestation of renewed discrimination against Germany and. consequently repudiates it.
I turn now to Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 36 which is on page 64 of the document book. This is the German Memorandum to the Locarno Powers of 25 March 1935, concerning the incompatibility of the Soviet Pact with the Locarno Treaty. Ribbentrop actively participated in the negotiations that took place in the drawing up of the statement of Germany's attitude on this matter. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of it because it contains Germany's legal attitude toward this problem.
of the document book and it again exposes briefly the incompatibility of the Soviet Pact with the Locarno Treaty. This memorandum was also given to the Locarno Powers. Its date is 25 May 1935 and I ask the Court to take judicial notice of it.
In order to prove Germany's willingness for peace, this memorandum was preceded by a speech of Hitler's before the Reichstag on 21 May 1935. Ribbentrop at the same time submitted a German statement on disarmament to London. I ask the Tribunal to accept this as Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 37. It is on page 69 of the document book.
and the reduction of armaments, I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 38, on page 77 of the document book. This is the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 18 June, 1935, in which Ribbentrop played a decisive role and for the ratification of which Ribbentrop made very particular efforts. He particularly brought the French Government, by efforts on this own part, to the point of agreeing to this Treaty which was necessary because this naval agreement would have brought about a change in Part V of the Versaille Treaty, the part that is concerned with reduction in armaments. approval to this agreement. This is Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 38. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. Ribbentrop and Hitler, considered the keystone of an exhaustive understanding between Germany and England. During the following years, as well as during his time as Ambassador in London and also as Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop made repeated efforts to bring about such a pact of agreement between Germany and England. page 79 of the document book. itself compelled on the 7th of March, 1936, to make clear its attitude through a memorandum of the German Government to the signatory powers of the Locarno Pact. This point of view is stated in document number 39. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. interested in it. Ribbentrop replied to this protest with a speech before the League of Nations. This protest, which I submit as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 40, and which is on page 83 of the document book, I again ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice thereof. page 84 of the document book. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It contains the last peace proposals on Germany's part in connection with disarmament plans at that time.
It is headed "*---* Plan of the German Cabinet of 31 March, 1936." reduction in the likelihood of war. and in connection with these relations, Hitler on the 30th of January, 1937, on the fourth anniversary of the National Socialist revolution, delivered a speech in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin, and he made a proposal that Germany and Italy should draw up a treaty. I ask the Tribunal to accept this as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 19. It is on page 88 of the document book. clause in the Versatile Treaty blaming Germany for the First world War be withdrawn. I read from this document, as follows:
"I therefore formally withdraw Germany's signature to that statement that was signed by the weak German Government at that time which states that Germany was guilty of the war."
THE PRESIDENT: Are you referring to Exhibit 44?
DR. HORN: I was referring then to Exhibit Number 43, page 88.
THE PRESIDENT: There was some passage you read in it which does not appear to be translated here.
DR. HORN: Did I understand you to say that there was no English translation of it?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I am not quite sure. I did not catch it myself.
Did you read anything which is not in the document book?
DR. HORN: No Mr. President, I read what is in my document book. It is on page 88, paragraph three and it is the paragraph that begins, "And fourthly --"
THE PRESIDENT: Third, isn't it?
DR. HORN: Yes, paragraph three of the sentence beginning, "Fourthly --"
(Interpreter: However, I do not believe that is in the English translation.)
DR. HORN: I come now to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 44, on page 90 in the document book, This document contains the German note on Belgian inviolability, dated 13 October, 1937.
order to make clear the German view I should like to read the last paragraph, which in my document book is on page 91, and which is headed "II", I quote:
"The German Government asserts that the inviolability and territorial integrity of Belgium are of common interest to the western powers. It confirms its determination not to impair that inviolability and integrity under any circumstances and to respect Belgian territory at all times, excepting of course, in the case of Belgium collaborating in an armed attack directed against Germany in which Germany would be involved." to explain the foreign political relationships that Ribbentrop found when he took over his office as Foreign Minister. When the time comes I Shall refer to these documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you filed them in Court with the secretary?
DR. HORN: Yes. In connection with yesterday's discussion I signed these documents and gave them to the general secretary? say later regarding Ribbentrop's participation in the policy that led to the Anschluss with Austria. put in by the Prosecution, and which is contained in my document book.
I am unfortunately not in the position to tell the Court what the page numbers are because we have not yet received the document book from which I am now to cite. This document follows Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 44, which is on page 90 of the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Exhibit No. 44 is the last do current in the second document book. There are not any more, are there? There are not any more.
DR. HORN: I was informed today that the English document book was finished and had been given to the Tribunal. We unfortunately have not received a copy, so I cannot give you the pagination.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I am afraid that we do not have it. We have only these two and the last exhibit in the second book is No. 44, which you have just read. If that document has already been put into evidence, it is not necessary for you to produce it. You can say that you rely upon it. That is all that is necessary.
DR. HORN: But I believe that we must immediately decide the question as to the continuation of my presentation. I want to make clear that after the Tribunal had ruled on the way in which documents were to be presented, I immediately submitted my documents to the Tribunal in a prescribed way, in that I gave them my document books with my signature. The translation department was unable to keep up, and I am now in the unfortunate position of being unable to provide the Tribunal with the assistance of the translation. Should I then continue my presentation without it?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn, we think you had better go on. Just notify us what the documents are and whether they are already in evidence or whether you are offering then in evidence now. You have told us 386-PS, but we can take a note of the fact that that is already in evidence. I do not know whether all your other documents are documents which are already in evidence or whether there are any documents which are not in evidence or whether they are documents which you are now going to offer in evidence.
DR. HORN: The following documents are new. As to 386-PS, I should like to say that Ribbentrop was not one of those who were present. This document is the well known Hoszbach document, and Ribbentrop found out about it only here in Nurnberg.
The next document to which I wish to refer is Document No. 2461-PS, already submitted by the Prosecution, the official communication regarding the meeting between Hitler and Schuschnigg in Berchtesgaden on the 12th and 15th of February, 1932. I refer to this document to prove to what extent Ribbentrop participated in this discussion. to take judicial notice is Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 11, which is in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal does not think it is really necessary for you to refer to any documents which are completely in evidence already unless you are going to read some passage in them and rely upon some passage in them which has not already been read. I mean, supposing that the Prosecution read a particular sentence out of a particular document and you went to refer to some other sentence in it, then it will probably be right for you to indicate that but, if the document has been read in full, any further reference is a more matter of argument and is not really a matter of evidence, and you will be at liberty, you see, to argue it whenever you come to make you speech. So that, I mean, as a matter of time saving, it would not be necessary to refer us to 386-PS or 2461-PS unless there is some passage in them which you rely upon and which has not been read by the Prosecution..
DR. HORN: Very well. I may now turn then to Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 11and ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It is an agreement between the German Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government on the 11th of July, 1936. When, on the 12th of February, 1938, Ribbentrop went with Hitler to Berchtesgaden to have a conference with Dr. Schuschnigg, then chancellor of Austria, he had not known that Hitler's plans had deviated between the plans of 1936 between Germany and Austria, and he conducted his discussion with Schuschnigg in the spirit of the agreement of 1936. In this contention after one month the Anschluss with Austria came about. As proof that this Anschluss corresponded to the wishes of the Austrian population, I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 12, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. It is the result of the national plebiscite to the greater German Reichstag of the 10th of April, 1938. From this document it is to be seen that at that time in Austria, 4,400,000 people had the right to vote.
4,400,000 people voted and 4,400,000 voted for the Anschluss, and only 11,000 voted against it.
THE PRESIDENT: Do we have this document? We do not have it in our books.
Does the clerk have it?
DR. HORN: It is in the document book as Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 12.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it goes from ten to fourteen for some reason. Let me lock at it. There is some mistake, apparently. It has not been copies, that is all. It is not in our books, but here it is, so it is all right. Go on.
DR. HORN: It is to be seen in this document that the Austrian people voted for it. 99.73 per cent of all votes cast expressed their desire for the Anchsluss.
As to the next document, I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 13. I ask the Tribunal to take Judicial notice of it. I submit this document, Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 13, as proof that, as developed in later negotiations, the Anschluss would not have come about had it not been for the cooperation of the English Government. I should like as proof of this to read the following from this document, Exhibit No. 13. This is a statement by undersecretary of State before the House of Commons, and it reads as follows. The beginning of it was held on the 14th of March, 1938.
"The English Government has negotiated with friends of the Geneva Convention the new situation and they are unanimous that a discussion of the Austrian situation could lead to no satisfying results, but that the result would probably be another humiliation. The Undersecretary of State stated that England had undertaken no special guarantees for the independence of Austria, which is forced upon it by the Treaty of St. Germain."
I ask the Tribunal to take Judicial notice of this document. In connection with this, there took place the reunion of Austria as set down in the law of 19 March 1938, which also was signed by Ribbentrop. related to the question of Austria. I could now -
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute, Doctor. Dr. Horn, the only desire of the Tribunal is to save time and we observe from the index in your document book that there are, I think, over three hundred separate documents upon which you wish to rely, and most of them appear to come from the various books, the German White Books, which the Tribunal provisionally allowed to you.
Would the most convenient course not be for you to put them in in bulk, saying that you are putting in Exhibits 44 to 314, or whatever it may be, rather than simply detail each document by its number?
If there is any particular passage which you want to read at this moment, you can do so; but it seems unnecessary to take up time simply to give each exhibit number, one after the other.
DR. HORN: Very well, Mr President, I shall mention these numbers, from such and such to such and such and when it is a matter of a specific number I shall mention that and ask the Court to consider it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. HORN: I may turn now to the question of Czechoslovakia. The American Prosecutor stated in his presentation that this concluded a course of events that strikes me as one of the most wretched chapter in the history of relations between peoples -- the destruction of the weak and small Czechoslovak people, I read a few chapters from Lord Rothermere's book, "Warnings and Prophecies," which was also cited by the Prosecution. It is Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 45 -
THE PRESIDENT: Did the Tribunal allow Lord Rothermere's book?
DR. HORN: The Tribunal allowed it and even put at my disposal an English copy, which I herewith hand to the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: You remember that the question of admissibility was to be finally determined when each book is offered in evidence, and I think you will remember that the-Tribunal stated in one of its orders that the opinions of particular authors upon matters of ethics, history and events would not be admitted. British Government, and therefore, unless there is some very particular reason, it wouldn't appear that his books or statements in his books are in any way evidence.
DR. HORN: It is a question here of any sort of polemic -
TEE PRESIDENT: No, but you see, the distinction which exists is this: The Tribunal under Article 21 is directed to take judicial notice of official government documents, reports, and so forth. This is not an official report or a government document. You say it is factual, it is evidence. It isn't evidence, for the purpose of this Tribunal, of any facts stated in it. So far as it is facts, it isn't evidence of the facts, and so far as it is opinion, it is Lord Rothermere's opinion.
Well, Dr. Horn, can you tell me what you want to prove by it?
DR.HORN: I should like to prove, first, a few historical facts; secondly that the difficulties which are to be found in Czechoslovakia led to a showdown with this German minority and consequently with the German Government.
I want to provide you with the reasons and motives that led to the incorporation of Sudetenland into Germany.
MR. DOOD (for the United States): very strenuously to this offer, but for the very reason given by Dr.Horn in the first place, and for the reasons given secondly, if I understood the translation correctly. I understood him to say in the first place it was offered to prove there was no such thing as a Czechoslovak people. I think that is a matter that cannot properly be raised here before this Court. We object furthermore for the reasons given in the second explanation by Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: May I again point out that herewith I wish to prove the motives that led to the separation of the Sudetenland in 1938. If I wish to adopt an attitude toward this question and adjudge it, I must also be able to adopt an attitude toward the motives. This is a prerequisite for any sort of legal adjudication. Nations as admissible evidence. If I had been permitted them, I could have at referred to these official documents, but since I did not get my hands on them I resorted to this means to provide the Court with the facts.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that, about the League of Nations? I didn't catch what you said.
DR. HORN: The documents regarding the minorities, which are in the possession of the League of Nations library -- I asked for these as admissible evidence. The General Secretary is trying to get hold of them, but so far I have not got my hands on them. Consequently, for the lack of these official documents I had to fall back on this less admissible source of evidence, namely, Lord Rothermere's book.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you specified the passages in the book which you wish to refer to? I mean, have you marked them somewhere in some copy of the book?
DR. HORN: The documents regarding minorities in Czechoslovakia, to the extent that they are in the form of admissible documents, are in the League of Nations library or in the International Court at The Hague. Nations regarding minorities. It is an official document collection.
THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you whether you had specified the particular passages in Lord Rothermere's book which you want to put in.
DR. HORN: I am sorry. I misunderstood your question. Could I request you again to give the question that you put ?
THE PRESIDENT: The question I asked was, whether you have specified that particular passages in Lord Rothermere's book which you want to use?
DR. HORN: I have marked these passages, and it is page 137, 150, 138 151, 138 -
THE PRESIDENT: 137, 138-
DR. HORN: 161, 162, 140, 044, 145 157. These are in each case just short paragraphs.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Horn, it is an appropriate time for us to break off, if we may.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, The Tribunal will rule upon the admissibility of these passages from Lord Rothermere's book when they have had the translation submitted to them. In the meantime, will you go on presenting your documents in the way that I suggested, and not stopping to detail any of them except those that you particularly want to.
DR. HORN. Very Well. territories of Czechoslovakia led to the formation of the Sudeten German Party, and the cooperation of that Party and consultation with German official sources arose. of directives given to him, had conferences with leaders of that German national group. As evidence, a number of documents have already been submitted by the prosecution, to which I propose to refer later. In this connection may I ask to make a correction in the document 2788-PS, where, on page 2, approximately in the middle, it says "because of the size and the progress which was, step by step" -- and now comes the error in the translation. It says "provocation" in our document, whereas in the original it ways "precision (Prezisierung) of the demands to be made in the fields of government which are to be avoided." Ribbentrop helped the independent action on the part of the Sudeten German leaders. As evidence to the contrary. I am referring to a part not yet read of the document PS-3060, from which the contrary can be gathered, namely, that the then foreign minister von Ribbentrop acted against the independent actions of the Sudeten German leaders with the help of his Ambassador in Prague. document? I quote:
"By order of Frank, the then leader of the Sudeten German Party, there was cooperation. Henlein, who has been trying to avoid me lately, has been con tacted and I had discussions with him and Frank and have received the following assurances.
"First, decisive policy and tactical progress of the SDP (Sudeten German Party) must be exclusively the principle laid down by the Ambassador, or the Embassy, with reference to foreign policy. My instructions must be obeyed strictly.
"These directives are given within the framework of the general policy so far as direct interference in Czech foreign policy is concerned, and the policy of the Sudetan German Party, which is to have that avoided." in the Foreign Office in contact with the Sudetan German Party, I shall put questions to von Ribbentrop when he is called as a witness. to the Tribunal for their official recognition. This document is an embassy report of the Czechoslovak Republic from the embassy in Paris. It is concerned with the sense and aim of the mission of Lord Runciman in Prague. It shows the that mission was given him by England for the purpose of gaining time for rearmament. May I read the document?
"Paris, August 5, 1938. Secret. To the Minister.
"Massigly considers the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague a good thing. Anthony Eden said, during a conversation with Ambassador Korby -- the French Ambassador to London -- that after careful reflection the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague meant a good step in the right direction, since he is going to engage England more in Central Europe than has been the case up to now.
"Massigly says that the British know that the war will happen, and they ar using every means at their disposal to delay it. He is perfectly aware that Lord Runciman's mission in Prague is for the purpose of settling that conflict that that is why he went to Czechoslovakia. It is supposed to take place so as to gain time, and Lord Runciman can probably male suggestions which will indicate considerable damage upon Czechoslovakia.
"This judgment of Massigly's is backed by further information which is extremely interesting.
"During the recent grain conference, which took place in London, the British, the Dominions, and the United States and France, had separate discussions of their own. The French delegate had a discussion with Minister of Health Elliot, and Poulson, British Minister for Agriculture, and he also talked to the famous expert, Sir Arthur Hewitt, who was in the Ministry of Agriculture and who had been given a leading task in the Air Ministry.
"From the speeches, the conduct, and attitude at the negotiations of the British, the French delegate gathered the positive impression that the British were interested in organizing grain supplies not so much to prevent the conflict but so as to win the conflict. The ministers Elliot and Poulson are both supposed to believe in the possibility of a conflict. Sir Arthur Strait said that in six months' time British aviation would have been put into order. Consequently, such importance is attributed to the gaining of time on Britain's part, I am quoting that information at this point in connection with Lord Runciman's mission to Prague, because as I said already the question of gaining time is playing a decisive part in the mission Lord Runciman was given in Paris.
"With best greetings, yours sincerely, "Pulsusky."
which Ribbentrop participated. Just how far is something I shall prove when the Defendant is examined as a witness regarding his policy. to the Tribunal as Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 47. That declaration of the Fuehrer and the British Prime Minister Chamberlain of September 30, 1938, was planned to serve the purpose of removing all outstanding difficulties between Germany and England. The reaction to that declaration or pact in Germany and England was different. As evidence for the British reaction I am referring to Exhibit Ribbentrop No. 48, which I am offering to the Tribunal with the request for judicial notice.
This is an extract from the speech of the British Prime Minister Chamberlain in the House of Commons on October 3, 1938. May I quote the following from its first paragraph:
"If there is a lesson which we have been able to learn from the event's of these least weeks, then it is the lesson that a permanent peace cannot be achieved by sitting still and waiting for it. To achieve it we need active and positive efforts. We in this country are prepared and for a long period have occupied ourselves with a long rearmament program, which in its speed and in its size is growing steadily. Nobody must believe that because of the signing of the Munich agreement we can afford it among the four powers to relax our efforts regarding that program at this present time or to weaken." that in its speed and size it is growing steadily, I should like to prove this fact with the exhibit Ribbentrop No. 49. This is a speech of the British Secretary of State of War, Here Belisha, at the Mansion House, London, on October 10, 1938; and I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the extracts which I am submitting. May I quote a few words from this document:
"Still more must be done so as to give to the territorial army as a unit complete effectiveness."
I am now skipping one paragraph and read the following paragraph, paragraph 5, which says:
"Regarding the formation of new units, these infantry brigades will have three battalions in the future instead of four, as this has laready been the case in the regular army. When using the material available, we gather that nine complete divisions after the pattern of the regular army can be formed. Furthermore, we desire the creation of a considerable number of modern corps and army replacement units--for instance, army field and army surveying units, signal troops, and so on, which in the event of a war can take their place at a moment's notice within the formations. All this is within keeping with the organization of our army." for War. Exhibit Ribbentrop No. 50 deals further with--and I emphasize this--rearmament. This is a speech of Winston Churchill's of October 16, 1938, and I beg to quote extracts from this speech and ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. I am only quoting a few sentences; I quote:
"We must rearm. There can be no doubt that we shall rearm. Great Britain must forego its traditions of hundreds of years and introduce general conscription. The British nation will face whatever might come, but, so as to speak with President Wilson, 'The tool of arms as such does not suffice.' We must have the strength of spirit actively behind it. There are people who say that we must not enter upon a theoretical controversy between Naziism and democracy. This controversy exists today, however." and far beyond the normal limitations of the needs of defense, is proved by the Exhibit Ribbentrop No. 51, which I am offering to the Tribunal with the request for judicial notice. This is a declaration of the British Secretary of State for Air, dated November 16, -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I thought you understood what the Tribunal wanted you to do, which was to put in these documents altogether. I think I have said from 44 -- wasn't it the document that you had got to?-to 300 something, and you could put them in altogether. But now you have gone through 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51, and you seem to be going through each one in detail, doing exactly what I asked you not to do.