and the Fuehrer confirmed that he had given this order, and told me why. He gave the reasons as I have just given them to you. I told him why this order, according to our opinion.
was completely impossible and what repercussions would be on my fliers in the West.
answered that the fliers which were flying against Russia would be beaten to death immediately on emergency landing, and that the fliers going to the West should not expect a special privilege in that regard for themselves. I told him that these two things really had no connection. lieve it was General Quartermaster--to write to the OKW. I asked thatthe Luftwaffe be requested that these camps would be taken away from them, that I did not wish to concern myself with camps if cases of this nature were to be repeated, and this document described thiscondition, and this is what I know about this condition. 1944 the Fuehrer decreed strictest measures against the so-called terror fliers. Did you comply with this Fuehrer decree and give instructions to shoot enemy terror fliers or to have them taken in by the SD?
A The concept "terror fliers" was confused. A part of the population and of the press called everything "terror fliers", called everyone a terror flier who attacked cities. There was much excitement among the German population because of the heavy and continued air attacks on German cities, attacks by which the population in part saw that the industrially vital targets were less frequently hit than houses and non-military targets. Then in that way some German cities had been hit to the utmost in their residential districts without the industry which was nearby in the same cities being hit, or at least vitally hit. These attacks in part were on military targets and in part non-military targets. Reports came repeatedly to the Fuehrer, and I too received word of these reports, that the civilian population was attacked with machine guns and that some vehicles which were definitely known to be civilian vehicles, some vehicles which were Red Cross property, had been attacked. terribly excited about it--that a group of children had been attached that way.
Men and women who stood in line in front of stores had been attacked that way, and these activities were designated asthose of terror fliers.
The Fuehrer was unusually excited about it. The populace took to mob law and lynching, and we tried to curb these activities. I heard that the police and Bormann had instructions not to do anything. These reports multiplied, and the Fuehrer decreed that these terror fliers should be shot, or expressed himself in that line of thought. terrogated these fliers had said that their superiors had prohibited such attacks, that they were only to attack militarily known targets. sources which might be concerned in this were called in, and we were of the opinion, as Brauchitsch has already declared, that not only the people in the Air Force, but OKW and other military offices were of the opinion that it would be hard to formulate and to defend a decree; that the concept of the terror fliers would have to be established once and for all. In order to do this, four points were set down, and those points have already been read. opinion that these fliers, since they were prohibited by their own superiors to do these things, that they could be prosecuted by a military court.
No definite decree was ordered and no office of the Luftwaffe has ever received any instructions to undertake any steps in this direction. conference between Himmler, Ribbentrop and myself took place at Oberursel. My adjutant von Brauchitsch told me that he had received a document that such a conference had taken place, but it does not say it actually took place. Now, the day of 6/6/44 is an important day, for it is the day of the invasion - or D-Day. I cannot tell just exactly where I was, but I think it was at Klessheim. Klessheim is a castle near Berchtesgaden and served the purpose of housing fliers. would take place, I, as Chief Commissioner of the Luftwaffe, was not present for each of these visits. It made no difference whether it was Bulgaria, Rumania, Finland, or whoever it was; it might even have been Italy. I made it a point not to be there in such cases so that the Fuehrer would have an opportunity to say, "I must first consult with the Commissioner in Chief of the Luftwaffe" whenever they demanded help and machinery. my estate near Nurnberg, and the accompanying physician can testify to that if necessary. In the morning hours I learned about the invasion. This actually had been proclaimed as an invasion. I thought it might be an invasion or just another measure. I left after luncheon and arrived at Berchtesgaden in the early evening. It is a 4 1/2 hour journey and therefore I did not take part in the conference with Ribbentrop or anyone, and I would like to emphasize this point. The conference was carried on by my adjutant Von Brauchitsch and he was the one who told the OKW that it was my opinion, without first consulting me, that it would be the thing to have a proceeding. The decisive thing is that none of the offices of the Luftwaffe gave instructions of this notice as the Fuehrer ordered, and did not make or issue any such decree.
A document which has already been read concerns Luftgau No. 11, about the shooting of American fliers. I believe they were Americans, The Luftgau No. 11 is concerned in this document.
I looked into the document very carefully, together with its appendices. It is stated very definitely that the Luftgau No. 11 reported that the fliers who had had a forced landing at the lake had been aided by the police, that they had not all been shot. The Luftgau reported its proceedings, and in its appendices each of the men is mentioned by name, and its proceedings, and in its appendices each of the men is mentioned by name, and what happened to them. Some were taken to hospitals, others were shot. It made no difference whether it was our own fliers or hostile fliers, as it was an emergency landing, but a report of our own or hostile craft and the reason for landing was to be put down on a report sheet. They had to say what happened to these fliers, whether they had been brought to a hospital. The shooting by the police is recorded. we have hundreds of these reports, and the reports which came to our office were in connection with matters of this kind, and our documents show that in all clarity. were present at briefing sessions with the Fuehrer every day. It happened that the Fuehrer, in an uncordial tone of voice, told me that he wished to know the names of some of the officers we had protected fliers from the population, and that he wanted these officers punished. I never punished these officers, and I in turn told the Fuehrer that they had already been punished, and also pointed out that some of our own fliers who had made emergency landings had been mistreated by our own people because they did not recognise them. and the Fuehrer, when I again pointed out these things, very sharply said: "I know that. Both air forces have come to an agreement." I told him that we did hot have an agreement but that fliers are always comrades, even though they fight each other. Force, when it came to the punishment of subordinate soliders who committed crimes in the occupation territories?
hours in the solving of these problems. I put more stress on the fact that first the adjutant of the Luftwaffe should be heard on this point. In many cases I rescinded the judgments because they were too mild. Especially if they were involved in the death sentence which had been passed by a Tribunal, I always upheld the death sentenceunless there was an appeal for mercy by the party condemned. Some of the families of Luftwaffe men had been sentenced to death and I confirmed this sentence, because they had murdered some of the people who lived, in the occupied countries of the East and the West. If, for example, in France, Russia, Holland, or any other country, the local civilian inhabitants would help hostile fliers to escape, or if they sabotaged aircraft or engaged in espionage, the state of war made it necessary. Ingeneral, I would like to emphasize in this connection, of course, that the death penalty which had been described was also put into effect. air force, I decreed mercy and never confirmed a sentence for a woman. into consideration whether these measures were in agreement with the Hague Convention?
A The Hague Convention was for land waffare. When I scanned it over on the eve of the Polish campaign, I was reading the Articles and I was sorry that I had not studied them much sooner. If I had done so I would have told the Fuehrer that with these rules as they had been put down, paragraph by paragraph, a modern war could not be waged, but that in a modern war, with its technical improvements, the stipulations of 1906 and 1907 would have to be changed in order to have a new type of warfare. Those stipulations made in the Hague Convention were for land warfare. I questioned these stipulations through logic, because these regulations up to 1907 were for land warfare, and from 1935 and thereafter there was not only land warfare but also air warfare.
That, of course, was not included in the stipulation. Hague Convention. But that is not the decisive point. phases of war: the war of weapons by land, on the sea, and in the air; the economic war which is an integral part of every modern war; and, third, the propaganda war, which is also an important part of warfare. On the basis of logic you take these into consideration. considered part of the booty of war. I must say that today, in modern war, the weapons of our opponents have only little value, that raw materials such as steel, aluminum, copper and tin have much more vital use as far as booty is concerned, and are much more useful than abandoned weapons which we may take. Beyond that we are concerned only with raw material no matter who has it. The Hague Convention provided that those things can be confiscated which are necessary, but that is not a decisive point. You can agree to that. war. In this case, in the economic war, a question of manpower is of the utmost importance, much more so than in 1907. The Russian-Japanese war, the English-Boer War, might be cited in 1907, but they have come up by different causes. In those days it was a war of army against army and the population itself did not seem to be involved. It cannot be compared with the total war of today which involves everyone, even the children, through bombing attacks. the economic war and he should be utilized. I am not saying that warfare should be exploited in such a way that a person's property should be damaged. His working power is to be utilized as much as possible.
occupied territory where fighting was still going on for 1, 2, 3 and 5 years and other men were still coning in. As far as the question of labor is concerned, it was established as a measure of security and we are duty-bound to feed the occupied countries. If possible, it was our duty to distribute manpower and at the same time, those who did not have work in their own countries might have become a danger through the resistance movement against us, and it would be in our interest to eliminate these people. Therefore, we should use them in Germany, and we did use this labor for security reasons so that they would not be active in their own country and would not work against us. On the other hand, they served to help in the economic war. I am being very brief in all of these matters concerning propaganda war. and that we consider a matter of course. Propaganda is very important, and propaganda as waged by radio -- and no one knows better than Germany, through experience. The many dangers of the resistance and underground movements, and also sabotage by the Allied forces -- these things happened and they hay be traced back to propaganda. to govern modern warfare, for in its essential aspects it does not take into consideration the air war, modern warfare, or propaganda warfare. greatest war leaders and our enemy, the former Prime Minister of England, Winston Churchill used: "In the struggle for life and death there is no legality."
THE PRESIDENT: The court will adjourn.
"The Tribunal adjourned until 16 February 1946 at 1000 hours.)
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I have just one more question which I have not asked directly before, that is, of Goering to maintain peace in the months of July and August, 1939, before the outbreak of the war. I have several reasons for which I have not previously asked that question, as I had the intention of asking Goering only after the questioning of the witness Dahlerus about this, because Dahlerus had not arrived at that time, and I wanted to avoid any interruption is the reason I have not called Dahlerus before. defendant Goering on this point again after having examined Dahlerus, who has arrived in the meantime. For reasons of saving time I consider this is important, because in my opinion I would save quite a number of questions thereby, or, whether I can hear him after the cross examination as to this question. If this is granted I shall put the question to him, but it seems to me more important to put this question after examining Dahlerus, who, as I say, has arrived in the meantime.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Honor, perhaps I can help on this point. If the Tribunal could consider this application without its establishing a precedent in other cases, I should have no objection for this reason, that with Dahlerus we are to understand that some one will have to go into the matter in detail as to the events that happened within the last fortnight when it might well be a saving of time if that detail were only gone into once, and that it would be rather difficult for Dr. Stahmer to examine the witness Dahlerus humself without going into the details. While I feel strongly with the Tribunal the defendant should not be recalled except in the most exceptional circumstances, I think in this case it might conceivably bring about a shortening of time.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that if the witness Dahlerus were called, it might obviate the necessity of calling the defendant Goering in reference to those events?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It might obviate that necessity, and it would in any case mean, I should think, that the defendant Goering would only have to answer very few questions, but if it were opened up now, it would be difficult to avoid both witnesses covering the same ground.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is only concerned with the saving of time, and as the Tribunal is informed by the defendant's counsel, Dr. Stahmer, that it may save time, the Tribunal is prepared to adopt that course, and to allow the witness Dahlerus to be called before these questions are put to the defendant Goering, but it must not be taken as a precedent for the recalling of any witnesses.
DR. STAHMER: Thank you. Thank you, sir. Then I have no more questions at this time to ask the defendant.
DR. OTTO NELTE: Counsel for the defendant Keitel. defendant Keitel in connection with orders, directives, and so forth. They were always quoted as Keitel's orders, Keitel's decrees, and so forth, and the prosecution based its indictment against the defendant Keitel on these things. I would like to clarify by questioning you on the position of Field Marshall Keitel; what was his authority, and what responsibility he had as chief of the OKW; or in any other official function. Do you know of that decree of 4 February 1938, which I hand you, by which the OKW was created, and Keitel was appointed?
Prosecution concerning the organization of the German Armed Forces?
Q I Will have it shown to you. (Witness was handed document.)
of the OKW, do you consider that correct?
A No, it is not correct. On top you can see the words "Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht," then a line and then below "Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces," and from there on the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.
That is wrong.
in relation with the protocol department of the Foreign Office. As Minister and Chief of the Chancellery.
It was his job to maintain of the Reich.
It was his function as assistant to the Fuehrer not concerned, had a higher position within that machinery.
After he as it used to be expressed before, the Maison Militaire (Military House), became the High Command of the Armed Forces, the Wehrmacht.
function in fact. At that moment he needed an instrument, a staff In Germany, in a military way, the word "Chief" has a different meaning than Commander in Chief.
The responsibility and right to give Chief.
His assistant in the staff leadership, the working out and staffs.
Thus, General or Colonel-General Keitel was also Chief of the Wehrmacht.
That meant for one that the entire machinery of the apparently used in different ways; first as the Staff of the High the Armed Forces, that is to say, Hitler, is that right?
A That is correct, as such, but it is not very clear. The to the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.
The orders could only be issued upon command of the Supreme Commander, signed "I.A.," that is to say, "Im Auftrag" (by order).which belonged to that staff.
An order or a command or directive form.
The letter began, "The Fuehrer has ordered . . " or "Upon command of the Fuehrer, I hereby inform you . . " May I express it quite emphatically.
At one time I told Colonel General Keitel, "I am only bound by orders given by the Fuehrer and only decrees or complied with.
Directives or orders which start, Upon command of the Fuehrer,' or 'By order of the Fuehrer' go to my chief of staff elements.
Whether they are signed, 'By command of the Fuehrer, Keitel, Colonel General,' or 'Meier, P.F.C.' doesn't make any difference to me.
But if they are signed by direct command from you which you want bearing for me.
I am Supreme Commander and immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer and the Fuehrer only."
different attitudes and conditions?
Q Does the same apply to Himmler as Chief of the SS? Forces. There existed, since the beginning of the war, the Waffen SS divisions and corps. That was a purely fighting unit. It was subordinate tactically and strategically to the respective offices of the Army; as far as personnel and equipment were concerned, it was subordinate to Himmler, and he had nothing to do with the OKW. Here again, it could only happen that the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, with regard to the Waffen SS, transmitted orders or decrees from the Fuehrer. during the examination of Field Marshal Kesselring by Justice Jackson. Field Marshal Kesselring spoke of the Waffen SS as guard units. Then he was asked "When did they have to guard?" In speaking of the word "guard", we do not mean it the way it has been translated, as sentries, but in the opinion of the Field Marshal, that means just elite troops, just as in the Russian language there are guard corps. In the old Imperial Army there was a guard corps, and also formerly with other armies. The Waffen SS was not designed as a unit to guard anything, but was an elite unit as far as equipment and personnel were concerned, during the first years of the war. relations between Adolf Hitler and Field Marshal Keitel, that is to say, how these official relations were thought of by Hitler when he created the office of the OKW. That is to say, I should like to know: what was Keitel supposed to be and what was he really after 1938 in his official functions?
AAdvisor is a disputable expression. I may take advice from somebody as to whether he thinks it will rain during the coring three hours if I want to go riding, but I may ask for advice also in important and decisive questions. That depends on the temperament and the attitude of the person who is willing to seek advice, and the one who wants to give advice.
was not in order, and one had to be on very good terms with him. That is to say, one had to have great influence -- and I ask you to understand me correctly -- such as I had beyond doubt for many years in order to assist the Fuehrer in major questions not only by advice, but also by suggestions and even protests, without being asked. On the other hand, if this relation to the Fuehrer was not given, suggestions were brushed aside curtly wherever he had made his decisions, or where he did not wish to let the advisor reach a position where he could have influence on him. decisive questions, certainly was not an advisor. In current, everyday affairs, he may have been an advisor in the way that he may have suggested here and there what the Fuehrer would say to the various commanders, or that he could point out this or that question concerning problems of deployment. After all, advice by the Chief of the General Staff is still more important than advice fromthe chief of an organization or staff office. In strategic and tactical decisions, of course, the Chief of the General Staff would have sane say. In other questions, it would be more the Chief of the Leadership Staff. Organizational questions were to be discussed with the Chief of the High Command primarily, because the Fuehrer himself, as I have explained before, had established several supreme offices. He had to limit himself in his signatures. It took weeks, sometimes, until one could get the necessary signatures for the Fuehrer, especially during the war, in view of the tremendous amount of work, so that the business of signatures was transferred to the respective staff offices. That explains why there was hardly any decree or order which the Fuehrer had given which was not signed by Keitel, who was very industrious.
Q Wasn't the job that Field Marshal Keitel had a very thankless one? I mean, frequently he came into a position where he had to mediate between the various offices which were under the Supreme Commander.
A That depended very much on the personalities. It goes without saying that if it cameto a clash between the Fuehrer and myself, or other determined supreme commanders, the Chief of the High Command was hit from both sides, stepped upon. He came between the two strong personalities; the one protested that in speaking to the Fuehrer, he had not done enough; the Fuehrer rejected him and said he himself would take care of it.
remember that once Field Marshal Keitel approached me and asked me whether I couldn't see to it that he be given a front-line command, that he would be satisfied, though a Field Marshal, with one division if he could only get away, because he was eating more rocks than bread. Whether thankless or appreciated did not make any difference as far as the task was concerned; he had to do his duty wherever the Fuehrer commanded it. that he could not get his personality through with the Fuehrer? the Army, and groups of the Wehrmacht, and it was easy to make that reproach because they were far away from Adolf Hitler and they themselves did not have to make reports. I know that especially after the collapse, quite a number of generals took the position that Keitel had been a typical "yes-man." I can only say I should be interested personally if I could see those who considered themselves "no-men."
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal doesn't think -- at least I should like to ask you; what relevance do the charges against Keitel have to the gossip on the General Staff? or any reproaches which may have been made to him by the General Staff? What has that got to do with the charges against Keitel?
DR. NELTE: If one wants to do Justice to the defendant Keitel, that is to say, if one wants to try to establish what role he has played in the terrible tragedy, then that is only possible if one establishes clearly what his function was, his responsibility, and then, if one takes into consideration -
THE PRESIDENT: I know that perfectly well and we have spent three-quarter of an hour in hearing the defendant Goering describe what his relationship was and what his function was. What I asked you was what it had to do with this case, the criticisms or gossip of the General Staff about Keitel? I say we have spent three-quarters of an hour in hearing what the defendant Goering says his function was, and what his relationships with the Fuehrer, and nothing else.
DR. NELTE: I have begun with the organization of the OKW. I wanted to determine the chain of command between the OKW and the chief of the OKW on the one hand and the parts of the Wehrmacht on the other, and then I have tried to clarify the repsonsibility which as chief of the OKW following the will of hitler he had to have and how he executed these. during the last few minutes, during the statements of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: My interruption was made because you asked the Defendant a question about somebody being reproached for something or other by the other members of the General Staff, and that seems to me to be totally irrelevant.
DR. NELTE: The last question which I put was whether there had been any possibility of Field Marshal Keitel asking for his release from his position. May I assume that this question is relevant?
THE PRESIDENT: You may certainly ask that question, as to whether he asked to be relieved of his command.
THE DEFENDANT GOERING: If you please -
THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, Dr. Nelte, that question was asked before, the question at which I interrupted you, and I have the answer written down, that Keitel asked for a command not even of a division.
DR. NELTE: That was the question which he put to Roach Marshal Goering. He came to him, Goering, and asked him. Now I want to ask whether there existed any possibility with Hitler of achieving a release. has played an important role in these proceedings generally. One has to distinguish between the two phases - peacetime and wartime. prominent and decisive position and very well known. if he was very well kno to the Fuehrer, that went without question. If he was in an important position and well-known to the Fuehrer, then the Fuehrer used his persuasion and appealed with all means at his disposal, if he so desired, that the man remain at his post.
However, if a General had asked to be relieved by the Fuehrer and had given his reason that principally he was of a different opinion politically, then without a doubt it would have come, though not on the same say, to a retirement -- but at the same time it brought on an extraordinary suspicion by the Fuehrer for this personality.
In wartime conditions were entirely different. The General, just like any soldier, was told to carry out orders, and the Fuehrer generally, not only for Generals but for all important personalities of the state, had stated he did not desire to see any applications for retirement. He himself would decide if a person had to leave or not, and he personally could not retire if he wished, and he considered that to be desertion. wartime and that had been rejected, he certainly could not insist. If he did he violated a law and could be accused of desertion.
Field Marshal Keitel could well say to the Fuehrer, "Please have me transferred to a different station, but the Fuehrer did not like to change the personalities in his immediate circle and in wartime -- that I know of him personally -- he would not have agreed to a change, particularly concerning Gield Marshal Keitel, with whom he was used to working, unless the Field Marshal had become ill or unable to continue his duties. apparent when Field Marshal von Brauchitsch was retired? Fuehrer had also discussed it at length with me previously. the command of the Army or leave it to somebody else, So we were discussing candidates for the succession. The Fuehrer at that moment did not agree with the leadership of the Army by the High Command of theArmy on the Eastern Front. The Supreme Commander was Brauchitsch and the Chief of General Staff Halder. I suggested to the Fuehrer at first that he remove the Chief of the General Staff, because I thought he was the less capable.