If anybody knows anything about this conceptions, then it is I. 1939, but as early as the late autumn 1934. I have had opportunities quite often to discuss the question of a political last will with the Fuehrer, and he turned it down, giving us a reason that one could never appoint a successor by means of a political last will, that the developments in political events should give complete freedom of action at all times. Quite possibly someone could state political wishes and conceptions, but never binding statements in the shape of a last will. That was then, and as long as I have ever had his confidence, always his conception.
Now, what was he aiming at with the contents of this document? People were called together with the Minister of War, the Supreme Commander of the Army, the Supreme Commander of the Navy, the Air Force, and the then Reichs Foreign Minister. Shortly before that the Fuehrer had informed me that he was going to call that meeting, mostly to put pressure behind General von Fritsch, since he was dissatisfied with the rearmament of the Army. He said it wouldn't do any damage if von Blomberg would also exercise a certain pressure on von Fritsch. didn't want the thing to look too military. It probably wasn't necessary but he wanted to make it very clear to Fritsch that the foreign political situation required a forced speed of armament and that for that reason he had asked the Foreign Minister to come along, who know nothing about the details. in such connections. He went to great length to picture the political situation, and he talked about the whole world situation from all angles; and anybody who knew him as well as I did knew the purpose he pursued. He was quite clearly aiming at saying that he had considerable plans, and that this and that was the political situation.
The final result was the creation of a strong armament program. I would like to say that if the Fuehrer, one or two hours later, had talked to another group, for instance, diplomats, or the Foreign Office, or shall we say, officers of the Party, then he probably would have represented matters quite differently.
attitudes of the Furher , but the extent of significance which is being attached to that document today, that I can hardly attach to this document, not to the best of my ability.
Q You said you had been appointed the successor of the Fuehrer. Were you in that capacity led into all political problems by the Fuehrer? until long into the war. Of course he kept me informed of all important political and military problems. I was included, and this mostly occurred during many and long discussions, which would take place for many hours, day after day. Occasionally about foreign political questions I was sometimes surprised, but whenever possible I would include myself. On one occasion he did say, in fact, that I had my own foreign political opinions, and that he didn't always find it easy to agree with me, but I want to emphasize that in all important political questions I was included. about which, during the interrogation or examination of the witness Milch, statements were made.
A record of that has also been made, and it is Document L-79. According to the wording of that record, you participated in this meeting, and the Witness Milch stated that you were not present.
A I was, in fact, not present. Milch went there at the last moment to represent me, but of course if the witness Milch says that he had not had the Fuehrer's permission to inform me, then you must understand that in that way the Fuehrer would not have such a point communicated to me by my Secretary of State, but that he wished to communicate it to me personally.
No, I am sorry, I have actually been present at that meeting. I just now see that from another clue, but even if I hadn't been present I think Milch must be talking about another meeting. Then that wouldn't be of any importance. It is out of the question that the Fuehrer would have had a conference with such gentlemen without notifying me either before or afterwards if I myself was absent. It is, therefore, not at all important. informed previously, or, if I wasn't present, afterwards in great detail by the Fuehrer. But I gather that Milch must have made a mistake here, and he is probably referring to another meeting, since right at the end I asked questions about the armament program, which I now recollect exactly.
Q What was the significance of that meeting? views, told us about the situation, and described the position of the Army which arose from that situation. Once more the point he had in mind was that the Army, from the point of view of armament and preparedness, should be aware that he expected all sorts of political developments, and that he reserved for himself complete freedom of decision. time -- and I needn't emphasize how easily matters which are regarded retrospectively are regarded in a different light of development and represented in that way than compared with what they have in fact been before. It is easy to say afterwards, "I wanted that at that time, this and that." I have achieved it in the meantime, and it is of course so easy to say "That has always been my intention," although one knows perfectly well that originally a number of other factors were important regarding whether developments would be just like that, and that in fact his intentions may have been completely different under different circumstances.
on the part of the adjutant have arisen, but, on the whole, it is one of those typical conferences which the Fuehrer used to hold when he had one particular purpose in mind which he wanted to achieve, and he wanted to lend the necessary emphasis to that aim.
visits to Poland. What was the purpose of these visits? atmosphere. He requested me to take on that task and that for the reason he believed that I would find it easy to make contact with these Polish gentlemen, which was indeed the case.
The president of the Polish State invited me. This was in 1935, 1936, 1937 -- in fact every year -- and I spent one or two weeks in Poland on each occasion. I had discussions with the then Marshal Pilsudski and later on always with the Foreign Minister. a serious task -- that apart from a continuing improvement of relations I should tell Poland that we were interested in a strong Poland, because a strong Poland would be an excellent barrier between Germany and Russia. The solution of the Danzig and Corridor question was emphasized at that time by the Fuehrer, and it had to be expected that until then he was hoping that some opportunity would arise to come to a solution with Poland about that problem. The Lithuanian problem came into that, and what is the decisive factor is that he did not say, "You must hoodwink Poland. I am going to fall upon them afterwards." It was never the case, as it has been put here, that we used to get together and conspire for the attack to come, referring to every point of our intention. In fact, the whole situation arose out of the political developments as it does in the whole world, and always has.
Anyway, I was given that task. I conscientiously took it seriously and I carried it out in the honest belief that it was true. Consequently, when the clash occurred and Poland was invaded this was a situation that was very unpleasant for me. question?
A It was always quite clear. It was that Danzig and the Free State, as purely German territory, should at some date in the near future be returned to Germany. On the other hand,we certainly recognized that Poland should have access to the sea and a port.
Consequently, our first thought has always been that the Free State and Danzig should be returned to us and that through the Polish Corridor a German traffic lane should be created. That was a most modest demand which for a long time was considered to be an absolutely necessary demand, and appeared as such. We considered that a perfectly bearable demand. November 1939. The record of that conference is the Document 789-PS, which will be presented to the Tribunal. I ask you to identify the document and tell me, briefly, what your attitude toward that conference is.
AAbout that I can be comparatively brief. This is an address before the supreme commanders of those formations and armies which were to be used for the attack in the West after Poland had been dealt with. It was a matter of course and required no discussion when the supreme commander of an armed force who is actively leading that force decides to carry out a strategic and considerable tactical operation. In this case it meant that after the end of the Polish Campaign the Fuehrer wished definitely -- and that was perfectly correct -- as early as that autumn to change his troops over and carry out the blew against France, so that as early as the autumn and winter of 1939 the end of that campaign could be achieved.
What prevented was the weather, since without using an airforce, and particularly the penetration of the Maginot Line, that could not be carried out. We needed good weather for at least four or five days, what be call flying weather, only week after week it was impossible to promise him that and the ratter dragged on until the winter and was eventually postponed until the beginning of the following spring. But here he was of the opinion that he could still carry it through in the near future. whom he was giving orders for that attack. It was one of the speeches that were customary in such cases. Naturally, since the Fuehrer was not only a military man but in the first place a politician, it always arose that these military speeches, which a military person would have confined to the military and strategical problems, always ended in his stating his political conceptions, et cetera. It must never be forgotten that he gave such speeches not only as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, but as the head of the state in Germany, and that is why so frequently even during military speeches such a strong political momentum crept into the speeches. of the principal tendencies of the policy. Why, during such speeches he wasn't even asked whether he approved of the military plans or not. That appeared at another time. If a matter was finished and when he discussed the strategic attack of the plan with the commander, then, in the way of summing up, which was added to the political discussion, the generals were then told the final great thought of the Fuehrer; and if -- and this I emphasize since it has crept in so often in the trial -- if a general had been able to say, "My Fuehrer, I consider your statements wrong and I don't agree with the pact we have made" or "This is not the policy of which we can approve," it would be impossible to understand. Not because that particular general would have been shot, but I world have doubted the sanity of that man, because how can one imagine that a state can be led if during war or before a war the political leaders have decided, whether wrong or right, what they are going to do and the individual general would then vote whether he was going to follow or not, whether his army corps was going to enter into the battle "but not until I have asked a division."
Perhaps one would help and one would stay at hone. That right in that case would have to be reserved for the simple people too. Perhaps this is the way to avoid wars in the future, if you ask every general and every soldier whether he wants to go hone or not; but not only in the leadership of this state but in any state of the world the military formula is clearly defined. When there is a war or when the leader decides that there is a war, then the military leaders receive their military task. On that they can made comment. They can comment whether they prefer an attack on the left or the right or in the center, but anything else, whether he will march through a neutral state or not, is not the business of the military leaders. That is entirely the responsibility of the political loaders of the state. In this case the possibility of general discussion, arguments between right or wrong, could not possibly follow. When the general received the order that the supreme war lord had decided, that finished all argument for a soldier, and that refers to the Fieldmarshal just as to the ordinary soldier.
Q A Fuehrer Decree of October 7, 1939, bears your signature. In that decree, Himmler was given the task to Germanize -- That decree is Document 686-Ps -- Toil me of what significance that decree is? paign had ended. Poland at that time had been conquered and the Polish State as such had ceased to exist. I draw your attention to the note of the People's Commission, of Moletov, who defines his attitude in that connection and in consequence, that in justice that Germany had felt, when in the Treaty of Versailles German provinces had been detached and given to Poland, that injustice had been eliminated from tie victory of Britain. There is therefore a matter, of course, for us that that part of Poland which, until 1918, had been German, would once more go back to Germany and Germanize, that is to say, included in the fatherland, but in that territory, in the course of years, more than one million Germans who lived there originally or had property there, particularly agriculture property, territory, farms, and so forth, these Germans had been thrown out and disappropriated. That is quite clear from numerous complaints which, during the years after 1919 had been sent to the League of Nations about that subject -- a study of all these complaints and all the events which had been reported as to that and still may be in the archives at Geneva, would prove and confirm to what enormous degree the decolonization of that German territory was carried out. That decree was aiming at the retracting of those steps so that these territories would become German once more, which means that those farms from which Germans had been driven, should once more come into the hands of Germans. The fact that this task was given to Himmier, did not meet with full agreement from ma and up until that tine, that was not of decisive importance. He was given the task not in his capacity as the Chief of the Police but -- as is known -- that he was always particularly and keenly interested in the questions of reincarnation of German men and time, that department -- just a moment -- after all, it is immaterial anyway -- that new department was formed and he was issued the new tasks. The Fuehrer published the order. I cooperated, of course, since I was the Chairman of the Ministerial Council at the time and, then also signed by the Chief of the Chancellery Lammers. My attitude was positive. It simply met with my approval. I know the Germans had been driven out; I knew they were German territories and I wanted them to come back to us, but I want to draw your attention to the fact that I am here talking about the former German province.
Q You mean the Western Polish Provinces?
A Yes. The Government, for instance, was not designated for the Germanization, if Germans were settled there later on, and I am not certain of that -- then that does not, was not done on the basis of this decree. You asked about my attitude regarding the Memel problem. Danzig and the Polish Corridor, I have dealt with. Memel was a comparatively small matter. In Memel, according to the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations there was, shortly before that the Lithuanians who occupied Memel and the neighboring territory to prevent the plebiscite. Compalints of the government did not bring any results just as none of the others. It was regretted, it was considered wrong, and it was not considered right what was done but as far as returning of the country or the carrying out of that plebiscite was concerned, that was out of the question. After the Lithuanian rule which was at the time it had occupies Memel, it was naturally our absolute national right to rectify that thing and to occupy Memel this time ourselves. removal of economic goods from Poland, That is the document we see 418 and has been presently to the Tribunal and I should like you to explain that decree to us. economic procedure should be adopted in all the Polish territories occupied by us. It regulates the obtaining of administration of the Polish State within the territories occupied by German troops and it gives a ruling on the money and credit system. It orders certain economic measures, preparation for arguments which would arise with foreign creditors, and so forth; confiscation can only be carried out by the trustee department, and so forth. It is not so much the taking away of economic goods, and that was in fact not done -- to the contrary. In the Genral Government, too, the economic system which existed there and particularly that which was there, being the war purposes of that period, was strengthened and extended. That economic factor, which was not absolutely essential, was cut down just as much as it was in the remainder of Germany and would have been in any other State in the event of war.
As far as properties are concerned that existed and were important for the conduct of the war, such as steel or copper or tin, it was my will and my view that these raw materials should be used there where they could most quickly be used for manufacture. If it was on the spot and the traffic problem permitted it, then they should remain there and be used right there. If it was not possible to usethem in the country, then I would of course if I had the important raw materials there, would have had them brought to wherever their use could best and quickly be put into the war economic situation. That is generally what the decree says and that was my principal view and my principal order. They were put in the quickest and suitable use wherever possible.
Q On the 19th November 1925, a Dr. Muehlmann made an affidavit, which haw b een presented by the prosecution under 3042-PS,(?) and which is worded as follows: I am quoting three short sentences:
"I was Special Deputy of the Governor General of Poland and had to secure art treasures in the Government General. The order was given to me by Goering in his capacity as the Chairman of the Committee for the Reich Defense. I confirm that it was the official policy of the Governor General Frank, that all important art treasures of Polish public institutions or private collections, or belonging to the church, be taken into custody. I confirm that the art treasures which I have mentioned were in fact confiscated and I am aware that in the event of a German victory, they would not have remained in Polish hands but would be used to complete German art property."
Poland. I sat as Chairman of the Ministerial Council and would have not the right.
In fact, however, Muehlmann, who came to see me, told the world.
It was my view that the art treasures from without the world.
It was my view that the art treasures during the time of war, bombing, or anything like that.
I want to emphasize immediately, and so-called personal collection.
That is on the other side. That these the art treasures were left where they were.
The exception regarding of the Fuehrer.
But he had given an order, and I communicated that by letter to Muehlmann and Frank; he had sent a letter in order that against by the Fuehrer's drawings from Lemberg, that the Fuehrer's building in order to save them from Russia and to handle them.
He Muehlmann can confirm that straight away.
What happened after that and where they went, I don't know, and perhaps with that I have answered the question referring to the Polish Art Treasures.
Apart apart of being brought to Lemberg Dramatic Museum.
I just happened
Q What connection did you have with Quisling?
A Quisling. Quisling. I met Quisling long after the occupation of Norway for the first and only time.
He was in Berlin at the time, and visited me.
I had a short and immaterial me, and anyway, that is immaterial.
In that letter the name of that was given it by them; you are to give a lot so that you would on my experience, they gave well.
Apart from that I think I must have
Q What was your attitude towards the Norway campaign?
A The Norwegian campaign, that surprised me rather; that was informed for quite some time.
The Fuehrer went very far with that not at all in an offensive way, that situation.
The whole of that over this strategic problem; since from between what was the point of my Airforce coming through from a basic airport to England, as any reasonable expert is to say, of course.
Consequently from the strategic point of view, and as Supreme Commander of the Airforce I could only approve of that operation. My objection merely was that I was opposed too late, and secondly, that the plan did not appear quite effectively but apart from that, that my attitude was perfectly positive.
Q Was Hitler afraid of the occupation of Sweden in that connection? decided to occupy Norway, we already had considerable and detailed information regarding the intended occupation by the Britishhand French, which we got to later, or even confirmed, when we had access to the Brish paper's, and papers of the French General Staff. I offer to say to you in this connection that there was particularly a plan not only to occupy Norway, but presumable all Nordic to intercept Swedish ore supplies for Germany, and over and above that to interfer in the rations, and finished financial conflict at the time going on, and at the time in the State of Finland. The Fuehrer feared, of course, that Sweden would give in to British contribution, and as a like result hoping Finland then would permit the march through with the cutting off of Swedish resources and supplies which was coming to us, I had a very heavy responsibility at that time, and I took it upon myself by showing Hitler that I knew Sweden, and the Swedish people, and the King so well; that I knew they would bring Hitler to bear on Sweden, and no matter how powerful an opponent that Sweden would offer every resistance to defend its neutrality, if necessary, with arms against any one who wish to threate them, and from that matter was the reason for that action, and that I personally would, pledge my word for that conviction, and with all my knowledge, I would-take it upon myself to see that they could remain unafraid in that respect, and with that the question was settled. THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. (The Tribunal adjourned until 15 February 1946, at 1000 hours) BY DR. STAHMER:
Q What reasons existed for the invasion of Holland and Belgium? and strategic point of view. It has been examined from these points of view. We were wondering whether the neutrality of the two states would be absolutely guaranteed.
THE PRESIDENT: Something seems to be wrong with the equipment. The Tribunal will adjourn. BY DR. STAHMER:
A I repeat. At first, we had to determine whether the neutrality of Holland and Belgium would, under all circumstances, be assured in a conflict. In the beginning, it seemed it would. Then, information came in that particularly between Belgium and France, but also between Holland and England, negotiations had taken place. There was an incident at Venlo where a Dutch general staff officer had been caught on German territory, and neutrality could not be maintained under the pressure.
THE PRESIDENT: The translation isn't coming through quite loud enough there. BY DR. STAHMER: a tremendous danger for the struggle in that the right flank was menaced and exposed. The purely military offices had to be concerned with strategic matters only, and they knew, since they were asked to give their opinions, that they had to give this information in a purely military sense, that is, to point out that of course by occupying both countries, the purely military and strategic situation would be different.
Then, if this would not have taken place, such an occupation would have taken place on the part of the enemy. neutrality of these countries was the fact that most of the flights from Great Britain into Germany went ever Dutch or Belgian territory. Reliable information reached us, informing us that the Belgian Army, which had been deployed, at the beginning of the war, on the western front, were prepared with all their forces along the German border. French General Staff and the Belgian General Staff had taken place, and that under pressure from the French General Staff they had given assurances they would participate in the construction of the fortification line along the Maas against Germany. as well as Admiral Darlan and the Chief of the Air Force, Vuillemin, considered the occupation of Belgium necessary under all circumstances and demanded it for the security of France, and that considerable negotiations had taken place between theFrench and the British Governments. The information at the time was highly reliable, and how true it was we could ascertain later when, after marching into France, we found the secret documents of the French General Staff and also minutes of conferences which had taken place between the French and British government, the so-called Supreme Military Conference. neutrality on the part of the countries in the face of increased FrenchBritish pressure, and that then, the Ruhr area particularly, whichwas so vital to us, would have been exposed to extreme danger. How justified this opinion was can be seen from reports in which the British Chief of Government suggested and had explained also by experts in the War Council how best the Ruhr Valley could be attacked by low-flying British aircraft which would approach over Belgium and then, at the last moment, ever the shortest distance could attack the Ruhr Valley from Belgium, and in this manner could destroy the most important industries there.
French Prime Minister that he, on his part, was worried about French industry and wanted to leave it to the other side to make the first attacks against industry. England insisted, however, at all times, on carrying out this attack from Belgium on the Ruhr Valley.
the war was over?
In France the war was not at all terminated. It was just an armistice generously.
Already in the preamble of the armistice there was unconditional one.
Later we gave to understand that quite a number of considered.
The situation was such that Germany at that moment had to by German troops all the way to the Mediterranean.
There were no reserves in England.
Everything which had been there was in the mentioned as requests.
The Fuehrer had a certain generous solution for these movements.
But at the same time it was a matter of course the officers, and so tried to stave off the danger.
So that in that into captivity.
That was a fundamental prerequisite in order to avoid the danger of a renewed war in our back in France.
I believe that move around freely.
As far as I know, that has happened for the forms later?
A One has to distinguish between two phases. The first phase German forces against the French army.
This struggle was executed and Geneva.