Although these accounts differ in some minor details, such as precise words used and precise times when they were used, they afford each other almost complete corroboration. We think it appropriate for this Tribunal to have before it a relatively full account of the way in which the German Government on 11 March 1933 deprived Austria of its sovereignty. First I shall give the report of the day's events in Austria as given by the Austrian Nazis. I refer to document 312-PS, U.S.A. 61, a report from Gauleiter R her to Reich Commissioner Buerckel, and I shall read from page eight of the English version.
For the purpose of the German interpreter I am starting following a tabulation: First case; second case; third case; and following the sentence: "Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with Gauleiters."
"On Friday, 11 March, the minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in Vienna after a visit with the Fuehrer. After talks with Seyss-Inquart he went to see the chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. the 'Landesleitung' had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, GlaiseHerstenau, Fishboeck, and Muhlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the proposal of the two ministers.
"In regard to Rainer's proposal, von Klausner ordered that the government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400 hours, signed by legal political 'front' men, including both ministers and also State Councillors Fishboeck and Jury, for the establishment of a voting date in three weeks and a free and secret ballot in accordance with the constitution.
"On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of copies, and a telegram to the Fuehrer calling for help were prepared.
"Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a session of all ministers for two p.m. Rainer agreed with Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Fuehrer and the statement to the population at three p.m. and at the same time he would start all necessary actions to take over power unless he received news from the session of the ministers' council before that time. During this time all measures had been prepared. At two-thirty Seyss-Inquart phoned Rainer and informed him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and had recalled the plebiscite but that he had refused to call a new plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two ministers had resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered 'No.' Rainer informed the 'Reichskanzlie' through the German Embassy, and received an answer from Goering through the same channels that the Fuehrer will not consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign.
Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by Globocnik and Muhlmann. Talks were had between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg. Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures the party wished taken. Rainer's answer: 'Re-establishment of the government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the party, and calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force. Seyss-Inquart premised to have these measures carried out, but very soon the announcement followed that everything might be threatened by the resistance of Miklas, the president. Meanwhile word arrived from the German Embassy that the Fuehrer expected the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a national majority, the legalization of the party, and permission for the legion (that is the Austrian Legion in Germany) to return, all within the specified time of seven-thirty p.m.; otherwise German troops would cross the border at eight p.m. At five p.m. Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by Muhlmann, went to the Chancellor's office to carry out this errand.
"Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a government which included blacks, reds, and National Socialists, and proposed the post of vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and therefore a weak and unpleasant political situation might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernette, Director of the cabinet Huber, Guide Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attache General Muffe, and the 'Gruppenfuehrer' Keppler (whose name I told you would reappear significantly) who had arrived in the meantime, were already negotiating. At seven p.m. Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations again. Situation at seven-thirty p.m.: stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a German invasion.
"Gruppenfuehrer Keppler explained that the Fuehrer did not yet have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break out any moment because Rainer ordered the entire party to demonstrate at three o'clock.
Rainer proposed storming and seizing the government palace in order to force the reconstruction of the government. The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After eight p.m. the SA and SS marched in and occupied the government buildings and all important positions in the city of Vienna. At eight-thirty p.m. Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiters of Austria to take over power in all eight 'gaus' of Austria, with the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all government representatives who try to resist should be told that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.
"With this the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the complete occupation of Austria within three hours and the taking over of all important posts by the party.
"The seizure of power was the work of the party supported by the Fuehrer's threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in the government. The national result in the form of the taking over of the government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual seizure of power by the party on one hand, and the political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other; but both factors may be considered only in the relation to the Fuehrer's decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently issued by the Fuehrer." again through the events of March 11, 1938, and to live through them in most lively and interesting fashion. Thanks to the efficiency of the defendant Goering and his Luftwaffe organization we have a highly interesting document, obviously an official document from the Luftwaffe headquarters headed "Geheime Reichsache," top secret. The letterhead is stamped Reichsluft Fahrtministerium Forschungsamt. If I can get the significance of the German "Forschungsampt" means the "Research Department" of Goering's ministry. The document is in a characteristic German folder, and on the back it says "Gespraeche Fall Oesterreich," "Conversations about the Case on Austria," and the paper cover on the inside has German script writing. In time I will ask the interpreter to read it, but it looks to me as if it is "Privat, Geheime Archive," which is "Secret Archive," Berlin, Gespraeche Fall Oesterreich (Case About Austria). I offer that set of documents in the original file as they were found in the Air Ministry, identified as our 2949-PS. I offer them as Exhibit U.S.A. 76, and I am, in offering them, reminded of Job's outcry: "Oh, that mine enemy would write a book." search organization within the Air Ministry, and addressed to the defendant Goering, states in substance--well, I will read the English translation. It starts: "To the General Fieldmarshal. Fieldmarshal. Enclosed I submit, as ordered, the copies of your telephone conversations." Evidently the defendant wanted to keep a record of important telephone conversations which he had with important persons regarding the "Case Austria," and had the transcriptions provided by his research department.
Most of the conver-
sations transcribed and recorded in the volume I have offered were conducted by the defendant Goering, although at least one interesting one was conducted by Hitler. For purposes of convenience our staff has marked these telephone calls in pencil with an identifying letter running from "A" through "Z" and then to "AA". Eleven of these conversations have been determined by a screening process to be relevant to the evidence of this particular time. All the conversations which have been translated have been mimeographed and are included in the document book handed to the defendants. The original binder contains, of course, the original set of conversations. A very extensive and interesting account of events with which we are very much concerned can be developed from quotations from these translated conversations. I turn now to copies of the telephone conversations. The first group in part "A" of the binder took place between Field Marshal Goering, who was identified by the letter "F" for field marshal, and Seyss-Inquart, who was identified as "S". The transcript prepared by the research institute of the Air Ministry is in part in the language of these two persons and is in part a summary of the actual conversations.
I quote from part "A" of this binder, and because of the corroborated nature of this transcript and its obvious authenticity I propose to quote this conversation in full.
"F--(hereafter I shall use Goering and Seyss-Inquart)--F. How do you do, doctor? My brother-in-law; is he with you?
"Seyss-Inquart: No.
"Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn:
"F: How are things with you? Have you resigned, or do you have any news?
"Seyss-Inquart: The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for Sunday, and therefore he has put S(Seyss-Inquart) and the other gentlemen in a different situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being ordered, among others curfew at eight p.m.
"F: Replied that in his opinion the measures taken by Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment he could not commit himself officially. Goering will take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections he could see a postponement only, not a change of the present situation which had been broughtabout by the behaviour of the Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.
"Thereafter a conversation took place between Goering and the Fuehrer. Afterwards Goering phoned again Seyss-Inquart. This conversation was held at 1505.
"Goering told Seyss-Inquart that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy any more the confidence of our government because he had broken the Berchtesgaden agreement, and therefore further confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently the National Minister, Seyss-Inquart, and the others are being requested to immediately hand in their resignation to the Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. Goering added that if after a period of one hour no report had come through the assumption would be made that Seyss-Inquart would no more be in a position to phone. That would mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. Seyss-Inquart was then told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed upon.
As a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal President for Seyss-Inquart to form a new cabinet would follow Schuschnigg's resignation."
Thus you see that at 2:45 p.m. Goering told Seyss-Inquart over the phone that it was not enough for Schuschnigg to cancel the elections; and twenty minutes later he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state that Schuschnigg must resign. That is your second ultimatum. When informed that about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned he pointed out that in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head of the cabinet.
MR. ALDERMAN: Shall I go into another one?
THE PRESIDENT: I guess we better adjourn now until two o'clock.
(Recess taken from 1235 to 1400).
Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, a hour later, following the conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart, with which I dealt this morning, the defendant Goering telephoned to Dombrowski in the German Embassy in Vienna. I refer to the telephone conversation marked TT on page 2, Part C, of Document 2949-PS. In that conversation, in the first place, the defendant Goering showed concern that the Nazi Party and all of its organizations should be definitely leagalized promptly. I quote from page 2 of the transcript:
"Goering: Now to go on, the Party has definitely been leagalized?
Dombrowski: But that is...it isn't necessary to even discuss that.
Goering: With all of its organizations.
Dombrowski: With all of its organizations within this country.
Goering: In uniform?
Dombrowski: In uniform.
Goering: Good.
Dombrowski: calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have everything is all right."
must be formed by 7:30 p.m., and he transmitted instructions to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart as to who should, be appointed to the Cabinet. I quote from page 3 of the English text of the transcript of the conversation:
"Goering: Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Fuehrer, and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names.
One thing I have forgotten.
Fishbeck must have the Department Dombrowski:
That is understood.
Goering: Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security and Bahr is to have the armed forces.
The Austrian Army is Dombrowski:
Yes, yes.
Goering: Give me the name.
Dombrowski: Well, your brother-in-law, isn't that right?"
"Goering: Yes.
Dombrowski: Yes.
Goering: That's right, and then also Fishbeck."
And about 20 minutes later, at 5:26 p.m., Goering was given the news that Miklas, the president, was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as chancellor, and he issued instructions as to the ultimatum that was to be delivered to Miklas. I quote from the telephone conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart, in Part E of the folder, the part marked with capital R, pages 1 and 2 of Part E. I'm sorry. I thought the interpreters had the letter marked.
They do not, I understand.
"Goering: Now remember the following: You go immediately together with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lt. General Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please do inform us immediately about Miklas' position. Tell him there is no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we received before, action was delayed, but now the situation is that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship." There follows in the transcript a sentence which is broken up. "M," - I suppose that means Lt. General Muff -- "does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party with all its organizations". There is again an interruption in the transcript. "And then call out all the National Socialists all over the country. They should now be in the streets; so remember report must be given by 7:30. Lt. General Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand it in four hours, we shall make him understand it now in four minutes."
An hour later, at 6:20 p.m., Goering had an extensively interrupted telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When he told Keppler that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Goering said - - I read from Part H - - It is about a third of the way down on the page.
"Goering: Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him. Just go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that Seyss-Inquart (S.I.) shall call on the National-Socialists guard, and in five minutes the troops will march in by my order." After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed the defendant Goering that Miklas was still sticking to his old view, although a new person had gone in to talk to him, and there might be definite word in about ten minutes. The conversation proceeded as follows: I quote from page 2 of Part H, beginning about the middle of the page:
"Goering: Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes back; then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich Chancery as usually, but it has to be done fast. I hardly can justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do so; if it can not be done, then you have to take over the power all right?
"Seyss-Inquart: But if he threatens?
"Goering: Yes.
"Seyss-Inquart: Well, I see; then we shall be ready.
"Goering: Well me via Blitz." on a plan for Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. The plan which was already discussed involved the use of both the National Socialist forces in Austria and the German troops who had been crossing the borders. Later that night Goering and Seyss-Inquart had another conversation at about 11 o'clock. This was after the ultimatum had expired. Seyss-Inquart informed Goering that Miklas was still refusing to name SeyssInquart as chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as follows, and I quote from part I of this folder:
"Goering: OK." What's the German word for OK? Shoen. "I shall give the order to march in and then you make sure that you get the power. Notify the leading people about the following which I shall tell you now: Everyone who offers resistance or organizes resistance will immediately be subjected to our court-martial, the court-martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?
"Seyss-Inquart: Yes.
"Goering: Including leading personalities; it does not make any difference.
"Seyss-Inquart: Yes, they have given the order not to offer any resistance.
"Goering: Yes, it does not matter; the Federal President did not authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.
"Seyss-Inquart: Yes.
"Goering: Well, now you are officially authorized.
"Seyss-Inquart: Yes.
"Goering: Well, good luck, Heil Hitler."
I'm sorry; that conversation took place at 8 o'clock instead of 11. I meant to say 8 o'clock. It is quite interesting to me that when the defendant Goering was planning to invade a peaceful neighboring state, he planned to try what he referred to as major war criminals before German court-martial, the leading personalities. of action for taking over power. Then something very significant was sent on that subject over the telephone, at least so far as these transcripts indicate. But there was another historical event which was discussed over the telephone. I refer to the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart sent to the German Government requesting the German government to send troops into Austria to help Seyss-Inquart put down disorder. A conversation hold at 8.48 that night between Goering and Keppler proceeded as follows: I read from page 1 of Part L:
"Goering: Well, I do not know yet. Listen, the main thing is that if Inquart takes over all powers of government that he keeps the radio stations occupied.
"Keppler: Well, we represent the government now.
"Goering: Yes, that's it. You are the government.
Listen carefully. The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes : 'The provisional Austrian Government which, after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, considered it its task to establish police and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request to support it in its task to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose, it asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible.
"Keppler: Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but everything is quiet.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say "quiet"?
MR. ALDERMAN: Quiet.
THE PRESIDENT: In my copy, it is "quick."
MR. ALDERMAN: That is a typographical error. It is "Quiet".
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
"Everything has collapsed with the professional groups. Now lot us talk about sending German troops to put down disorder." The SA and the SS were marching in the streets, but every thing was quiet. And a few minutes later, the conversation continued thus, reading from page 2 of Part L:
"Goering: Then our troops will cross the border today.
"Keppler: Yes.
"Goering: Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as possible.
"Keppler: Well, send the telegram to Seyss-Inquart in the office of the Federal Chancellor.
"Goering: Please show him the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are asking him--well, he doesn't even need to send the telegram. All he needs to do is to say, 'Agreed.'
"Keppler: Yes.
"Goering: He doesn't know me at the Fuehrer's or at my place. Well, good luck. Heil Hitler."
Well, of course, he didn't need to send the telegram because Goering wrote the telegram. He already had it. It must be recalled that in the first conversation, Part A, held at 3:05 p.m., Goering had requested Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon, but now the matter was so urgent that Goering discussed the direct wording of the telegram over the telephone. And an hour later, at 9:54 pm. a conversation between Dr. Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went on as follows, reading from Part M:
"Dietrich: I need the telegram urgently.
"Keppler: Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees.
"Dietrich: This is marvelous. Thank you.
"Keppler: Listen to the radio. News will be given.
"Dietrich: Where?
"Keppler: From Vienna.
"Dietrich: So Seyss-Inquart agrees?
"Keppler: Jawohl."
Next the actual order to invade Austria. Communications in Austria were now suspended but the German military machine had been set in motion. To demonstrate that, I now offer in evidence captured document C-182, offered as Exhibit USA 77, a directive of 11 March 1938 at 2045 hours, from Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This directive initialed by General Jodl and signed by Hitler orders the invasion of Austria in view of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The directive reads:
"Top secret. Berlin, 11 March 1938, 2045 hours. Supreme Commander of the armed forces, OKW," with other symbols. "35 copies, 6th copy. C-in-C Navy (pencil note) has been informed. Re: Operation Otto. Directive No. 2.
"(1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian government have not been fulfilled.
"(2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting.
"The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.
"(3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.
"I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all forces to the full as quickly as possible. Signed Adolf Hitler. Initialled by Jodl and by a name that looks like Warlimont."
avoid possibility of disaster from that sort. At the very and that was Italy.
Italy had massed on the Italian With what a Sigh of relief did Hitler at 10:
25 p.m. that night inform Price Phillipp von Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just come back from the Palazzo Venezia, where Mussolini had accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. The situation can really be grasped by the reading of the conversation. The record of the conversation shows the excitement under which Hitler was operating when he spoke over the phone. It is a short conversation, and I shall read the first half of it from Part "N" of the transcript of 2949-PS. I'm afraid Part "N" may be blurred on the mimeographed copy. "H" is Hessen and "F" is the Fuehrer.
Hessen: "I have just come back from Pallazzo Venezia. The Duce accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner He sends you his regards. He had been informed from Austria, Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had then said it would be a complete impossibility; it would be a bluff; such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus, and It could not be changed any more. The Mussolini said that Austria would be immaterial to him." Hitler: Then, please tell Mussolini, I will never forgot him for this."
Hessen: "Yes."
Hitler: "Never, never, never, whatever happens. I him."
Hessen: "Yes, I told him that, too."
Hitler: "As soon as the Austrian affair has been thin; nothing matters."
Hessen: "Yes, my Fuehrer."
Hitler: "Listen, I shall make any agreement - am no never shall I forgot that."
Hessen: "Yes, my Fuehrer."
Hitler: "I will never forget it, whatever will happen happen, even if the whole world were against him."
Hessen: "Yes, my Fuehrer."
The Tribunal will recall the reference in Jodl's diary to the letter which Hitler had sent to Mussolini.
It is dated March 11th.
It may be found in the official publica tion "Dokumento Der Deutschen Politik", Volume 6, 1, page 135, number 24-A. I ask the Court to take judicial notice our document 2510-PS.
In this letter, after stating that and I quote:
"I have decided to reestablish order in my fatherland fashion openly and by its own decision."
He stated that this was an act of self-defense; that he had no hostile intentions towards Italy.
And after the whichthe world so well remembers.
I again cite Documente and the document reads:
"Mussolini, I shall never forgot you for this."
We now shift our scene from Vienna to Berlin. We have shifted our scene I meant, from Vienna to Berlin.
It may The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart's appointment was made at 11:
15 p.m. This is noted in Dokument Der Deutschen phone transcript.
On Sunday, March 13, 1938, the day after his fatherland, phone defendant Ribbentrop in London.
I American vernacular, a kind of international "double talk" to soothe and mislead other nations.
I quote from Part 1 of item "W" of document 2949-PS.
Goering: "As you know"--speaking to Ribbentrop in London-- "As you know, the Fuehrer has entrusted me with (Fuehrung der Regierungsgeschaefte), and therefore I wanted to inform you.
These is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the radio".Ribbentrop:
"Yes, it is fantastic, isn't it?"
Goering: "Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely overshadowed.
The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me last night.
You must remember it was the first time that he saw his homeland again.
Now, I mainly want to talk about political things.
Well, this (Volksreferenkn) have presented the ultimatum.