had he not, that it would not be possible for them to be bombed, as Warsaw, Rotterdam, and other cities were bombed? He said before the war when our air force was growing, and at the beginning of the war, when there were great successes in Poland and in France and they were very obvious, he said to the German people that the air force would do its job and do everything to prevent, to keep away from the country bombing attacks. There was reason for that, and that the development later was a different one--that could not be seen at that time. not, that the Luftwaffe would be able to keep enemy bombers away from Germany? German people in the form of a directive or of a speech. At times when one spoke about that, the German air force, after the successes in Poland and France, was at the peak. An official proclamation or declaration or statement to the German people--I don't know anything about any such. any such assurance, if it had been given, was misleading? the fact that the British and American air force in so large numbers came into the play. entirely inadequate to cope with the situation; is that not a fact? defense was not depending only on the air force crews, but it was also a radio, technical war, and in this kind of war, it has to be admitted that the enemy was essentially better off than we were. It was not only a war in the air, but it was also a radio war.
Q It had become apparent that Germany could not cope with it; is that not a fact, by 1943?
A Yes, in the year 1943, it was not a hundred per cent clear. There were low and high points. There were efforts made to increase the strength of the fighters, the per centage of the bombers; it was not one hundred per cent obvious that the enemy air force could not be countered successfully. That could be seen only from the middle of 1944. cities progressed, did he not? started with their large attacks on German cities; specifically when the first great British air attack on Cologne took place. From this moment on it was obvious that there were differences of opinion, first of a lighter nature, between the two gentlemen. the strength of the air defenses of Germany? marshal of any such. Discussions between Hitler and the Reichsmarshal were, in spite of all tensions, very moderate. The criticism, allegedly, was getting worse in 1944 and 1945, but I was not present because, since 20 July 1944 I was retired. intentional misstatement, but he had misled him or had misunderstood the strength of Germany's air defenses. Was that not generally understood in your circle?
A Of the misleading there could not be any idea. The reports which the air force made to the Fuehrer were always correct. Even the weaknesses were reported to the Fuehrer at all times. to as tremendous efforts, to recapture his influence with the Fuehrer? through me that he might participate. The Reichsmarshal came more frequently than usual to the Fuehrer's headquarters, and he told me also, "I'll try everything to get into the right relations with the Fuehrer again". He said that personally to me.
anything that would offend the Fuehrer? I was no longer active. I had no contact any more. some from the point of view of the German people's criticism of the government, had it not, in 1944? tacks, and I can only say one thing--that Adolf Hitler suffered most from it. If one has seen that, if one has been present when the bombing of a German city was reported to him, he was deeply moved. Likewise the Reichsmarshal, because the terrible details of such bombings were tremendous. I have seen such bombings in Berlin. Whoever has been present will never forget it. Reichsmarshal, was it not, to explain to the German people why this was going on? An explanation has not been given. It was only said that all measures would be taken to prevent such things. measures could be taken that would prevent it?
A No, no, no. I pointed out before that it was a war on the field of broadcast techniques, and there were moments when in the defense we could cross the measures of the enemy if we found a means to hit him. would be taken, you had then no means at your disposal, that you knew of, to use, did you?
Q That were they, and why were they not used?
A The reference is to the following means. The most important areas were protected by flak, and there were radio technical means, because the stations would have made it possible to disturb the reports in enemy planes.
Q The movement to satisfy the German people under the bombing attacks was a matter of great concern to the Reichsmarshal, was it not?
would be informed.
Q And see that the population was satisfied, were they not?
A It is easy to say "satisfied". He could only assure the German people that he would do anything in his power to stave off these attacks. in of the bombing of Warsaw and of Rotterdam and of Coventry? that time? Polish Army, and there were strong forces, artillery. The forts were manned, and two or three times Adolf Hitler announced that the cities should be evacuated by civilians. That was refused. Only the foregin embassies were evacuated. The Polish, Army, which was in the city and defended the city and, that is to say, in a very dense circle of forts, even from the center of the town, heavy artillery was firing outside. The fortress of Warsaw was therefore attacked and also by the Luftwaffe, but only after the ultimatum, that is the request from Hitler, was refused.
Q Was Coventry a fortified city?
A Coventry was no fortress. Coventry, however, was a city on which the key industry of the enemy air force was, in which the aeroplane motors were built, a city which, as I know, many factories and many parts of these aeroplanes were manufactured inside the city. The air force at that time, that I know, had the order only to bomb the industrial targets. If the city has lso been hit, then that is only to be explained by the means of navigation at that time, Williams? the German-Polish border late in August '39, did he not?
Q And would you care to tell the Tribunal what you know about the fictitious incidents along the Polish border?
A I do not know anything positive. I was asked by Colonel Williams whether I knew before about the incidents of the Gleiwitz Broadcasting Station. I told him, no, I didn't know about it. It was only that the incidents at the Polish border were very similar to those which happened at the Czech border, and that is just an opinion of mine. It may be they were intended, but a positive evidence according to anything which would have been put in, seen by our side, I did not have.
Q Did you not tell him on the 6th of November 1945, as follows:
"I heard about it, but I personally at that time had the feeling that all these provocations that had taken place had originated from our side, from the German side. As I said, I had no real proofs of that, but I always had that feeling. Did you not say that? feeling; is that right?
A I cannot remember that very well now. I only know that from the press. The report from the press gave me that suspicion.
Q You were asked, were you not, this question and gave this answer:
A "Q But you are of the opinion that what appeared in the press and these incidents that were reported were not true, but done merely to cause an incident as an excuse for an invasion?"
And did you not make this answer:
"A I had that feeling. I cannot prove it, but I definitely know I had a feeling that the whole thing was being engineered by us."
Did you not make that answer to that question?
A Well, the minutes will show it, such as you have read now. If it is in the minutes, I have said it, but at the moment I cannot remember the words.
Q You do not deny the fact, however? personal opinion.
Q Well, it was you opinion?
A Yes, sir.
Fuehrer's desire to make war on Poland and whether you did not give this answer:
"Gentlemen, this question is very hard to answer, but I can state under my oath that the Fuehrer actually wanted the war against Poland. I can prove that he actually wanted a war of aggression against Poland by all the surroundings and the remarks that were made around the Fuehrer. I was present during the night when Hitler gave Henderson his conditions that he wanted Danzig, and I concluded from all the conferences that the Fuehrer had with the ambassador--I had the impression that the Fuehrer did not really want the Poles to accept those conditions."
And I ask you if you made those answers to Colonel Williams?
A I can say the following:
I was not present at the conference. If I said that, I didn't express it correctly. I was not at the conference that the Fuehrer had with Henderson, but I was,as the other adjutants,standing in the anti-chambers and only there in the hail one heard how they talked among each other, and one said this, the other said that, and from these talks I gathered that the conditions which Henderson received for the Poles in the evening--that the deadline for the answering of these questions was given for the noon of the next day, and it was so short that you could assume that there was some intention behind it. anti-room and talking with the people who were about Hitler that night? were waiting in the anti-room without taking part in the conferences. about your interrogation on that subject. Were you not asked this question:
"Then we can summarize your testimony this morning by saying that you knew in 1938, several months before Germany attacked Poland, that Hitler fully intended to attack Poland and wage an aggressive war against her; is that right?
And did you not make this answer:
"I can only say that with certainty, from the night when he told Henderson he wanted Danzig and the streets to the Corridor, from that moment I was sure Hitler intended to wage aggressive war."
Where you asked that question and did you make that answer?
now, wouldn't it? It is a fact, isn't it? mission of the request by Adolf Hitler to Henderson and the short time that Henderson was granted, I assume that there was a certain intention. That is the way I would like to formulate it precisely. evidence, 27. You have seen that before, Mr. Witness?
A Yes. A copy of this document has been shown to me by Colonel Williams, and I have told him that personally I cannot remember that I was present; but if it says so, if my name is on the minutes, on the document, then I was there.
Q But your name is on the document, isn't it?
A Yes. Then I was there. I cannot remember the content of this conference. I told Colonel Williams presumably what has been spoken about, because Colonel Schmundt has marked it down in writing and I got a copy. Colonel Schmundt is a man who was very exact about his notes, very conscientious about his notes.
Q That is all in his handwriting?
Q And it is signed by Colonel Schmundt?
A It is signed by Lt. Colonel Schmundt. The corrections are not in his handwriting.
Q But the body of the document is in his handwriting?
A I didn't understand.
Q The body of the document is his handwriting?
A Yes; that is his own handwriting. I know it, yes, sir, indeed. to read it, and then you said, did you not: "I think that the thoughts are right as they are expressed here; these are the thoughts that the Fuehrer usually voiced to us in a small circle"? You made that statement?
Q And you said that. "I cannot remember whether these things were expressed on that day. However, it is possible the thoughts that are put down here are the thoughts of Adolf Hitler."
You said that to Colonel Williams, did you not? Exhibit 798-PS, United States Exhibit 29 in evidence.
Q That's right. You said, did you not, that you did not recall whether you were present but that the thoughts that were expressed -
A (Interposing) I have said that the thoughts, as far as the thoughts are concerned, are correct.
Q They are correct. That is all about that.
A But I have to say one more thing. I have tried to talk to Colonel Williams and could not reach him. Probably I have listened to this discussion, this meeting. for Colonel Williams. in evidence, Number 580. Is that your hand writing?
Q And signed by you? it not?
Q You prepared this memorandum for your files; is that right?
A I don't know to whom I gave this.
Q Well, it says the notes for the files on that discuss ion; is that correct?
Q Goering was present at that conference; is that correct?
A Yes. He may well have conducted that meeting.
Q In fact, the note says he conducted it, doesn't it? who are named in the list at the head of the note. those men were men connected with the armed forces of Germany, were they not? General Milch was active in armament. Kesselring, I believe, chief of staff. They were all gentlemen who were in leading positions.
Q All concerned with the Air Force you say. And this meeting was held on the 2nd of December 1936. Are we correct about that?
Q Then Goering opened the conference by saying "The world press is excited about the landing of 5,000 German volunteers in Spain. Official complaint by Great Britain. She takes up connection with France." Refreshing your recollection, that is what occurred, is it not?
Q Then Goering said "The general situation is very serious," and that he took over full responsibility, did he not?
A Yes. "The conditions are very serious. England is rearming also, and we have to get into a state of readiness."
Q Now, he next said, did he not, that "Silence until 1941 is desirable. However, We cannot know whether there will be implications before. We are already in a state of war. It is only that no shot is being fired so far." Did he say that?
Q And he also said, did he not, that "Beginning January 1, 1937, all factories for aircraft production shall be run as if mobilization had been ordered."
Q Well, it is there in thetext, isn't it?
action taken against the Jews on the night of November 9 and 10 of 1938. very worried.
Q He was informed about them the next day? me in captivity. He has told me that Hermann Goering, a few days after, came to the Fuehrer with matters of evidence and complained to the Fuehrer.
Q What did he complain about? myself--but Wiedmann told me that the people who caused that had been Heydrich and Goebbels, and he complained about them.
Q And Heydrich and Goebbels were both officials in Hitler's regime, were they not?
A Dr. Goebbels was Minister of Propaganda, and Heydrich was Chief of the Gestapo. to Hitler that they had been incited by the officials of the Nazi regime.
AAbout the details as to what was spoken about I don't know. Captain Wiedmann can say something about that. Fuehrer and with the country, wasn't he? of Gauleiters.
A The meeting of Gauleiters was a few weeks later. I was not present. I heard about it from the former Gauleiter of Styria, Dr. Ueberreitor, who is in captivity here together with me. This Gauleiter Ueberreiter took part in that meeting.
Q How long did he wait before he called the meeting?
A Dr. Ueberreiter told me that it was a few weeks after. 1938 at his offices in the Reich Ministry for Air? and Goebbels and many others? Is that the meeting to which you refer?
A Well, in this case it would be necessary to ask Dr. Ueberreiter who was at that meeting. He told me, Ueberreiter, that besides the Gauleiters there were other people present. he conducted? stenographers took minutes of such meetings. by what had happened to the Jews on the night of the 9th and 10th of November 1938? injustice. It would be unreasonable economically, and it would harm our prestige in foreign countries. Dr. Ueberreiter told me in that sense Goering had spoken to the Gauleiters. pogroms, Goering promulgated the order fining all of the Jews a billion Reichsmarks, confiscated their insurance, and passed a new decree excluding them from economic life? Did you know about that?
A I have heard about the formulating of the regulation. I had nothing to do with that; I was only the military adjutant.
you say he complained about, is that right?
JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all.
MR. GRIFFITH JONES: May it please the Tribunal, I have only one matter which I want to make clear. BY MR. GRIFFITH JONES: Holstein in July or August of 1939, at which Goering met a number of Englishmen, and you described those Englishmen, the first time you mentioned them, as members of the government, and the second time you mentioned them I think you referred to them as economic specialists? economic leaders; no members of the government.
Q I am obliged to you. Would it be correct to say they were leading industrial and business gentlemen with no connection with the government whatsoever?
A I don't know to what degree these gentlemen were influential. At any rate, Hermann Goering said at the end the gentlemen should use their influence with important people in England to further the peace. gentlemen took place at the instigation of Dahlerus? I was brought to that thought in a discussion with Doctor Stahmer, who told me about that thing before. Doctor Stahmer told me that he knew Mr. Dahlerus had asked these gentlemen to come to Germany. Only after this information I assumed that Dahlerus asked these people to come.
Q Do you know that it was the object of Mr. Dahlerus that leading German and English personalities should meet, in order that they should understand one another's points of view?
A Mr. Dahlerus was later again in Berlin after that meeting, and on that occasion, in conversations with him, I gained the impression that he was greatly interested that between Germany and England a peace should be conserved, and that he, Reichsmarshal Goering, tried to establish this connection with important British circles.
Q One last question to you. Do you know that in arranging that meeting and throughout the course of the negotiations thereafter Dahlerus stressed the British point of view to Goering and in particular tried to impress Goering with the fact that the English were losing their patience with the policy of aggression being pursued by the German Government?
A I cannot remember this thought which you mention now. I cannot remember that I have spoken to Dahlerus about that.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other questions to ask?
Dr. Stahmer, do you want to examine?
DR. STAHMER: I have only one more question. BY DR. STAHMER: fore and which you have before you, there is one paragraph which has not been read entirely. In my opinion it is very important for the interpretation and for the sense and meaning of that meeting.
It says there, "General conditions are very serious. Russia wants war. England rearms strongly. Therefore, order from today highest readiness, No consideration for financial difficulties. Colonel General assumes full responsibility."
Is this "Order highest readiness from today on" only because Russia, as it says here, wants war and England rearms strongly? Was that the motive?
A What?
Q Was the motive for that "Order highest readiness from today on" the general situation being serious? At any rate, there was no intention of attack but defense? in my opinion.
the thought of defense.
Q If it says here "Colonel General assumes full responsibility", that could be understood to refer to the fact that no consideration should be taken of financial difficulties? had frequent controversies with the Reich Finance Ministry, because the Luftwaffe had too high expenses.
DR. STAHMER: Thank you. I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
DR. STAHMER: As next witness I should like to call General Fieldmarshall Erhard Milch. ERHARD MILCH, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q What is your name?
Q Repeat this oath after me: pure truth and will withhold and add nothings.
(The witness repeated the oath.) BY DR. STAHMER:
Q Witness, have you taken part in the First World War?
Q In what position? flyers.
Q After the end of the First World War when did you leave the army?
Q What were your activities after you left the army?
Q When did you re-enter into the Wehrmacht?
Q In the air force?
Q What position did you have when the Second World War began?
Q When did the military rebuilding of the Airforce start?
Q To what extent?
Q Can you give us more details about that?
also the Disarmament Conference. Consequently, the question of whether disarmament should continue had been attempted by Hitler in discussions with other nations, and when this did not work out Germany re-armed. Consequently, Germany counted on the fact that it would have to have military force in the air also, and for that an airforce had to be created which would be sufficient for the defense of Germany, That manifested itself first in the establishment of fighters and then artillery. defensively, consisting of four Luftkreise, which should be imagined by a cross over Germany. There was northwest, northeast, southwest, and southeast. The strength of the Airforce, such as it was organized, was not planned for an aggressive war or a large war as such. Besides fighter planes there were also bombers, but these bomber formations were always called the air defense. That is to say, if possible they should avoid that any of the neighbors of Germany start a war against Germany.
Q Which were the relations, how were the relations of the German Air Force to the air forces of a foreign country after 1935?
A In the first years after 1935, Germany had no air force; one could not call it that. The first units, the first largest schools that were established -- and also during these years, the industry was established; before, the rearmament industry had been very small. I happen to know that the number of workers in the entire airforce industry, at the time of the seizure of power by the National Socialists, was about 3,000 to 3,500 men -- constructors, technicians and administrative personnel. were started in 1937 and at that time, in January 1937, an English Commission under Air Vice Marshal Courtney with three other officers. He was the chief of the intelligence service of the British Air Force, and they came to Germany. I was with that Commission, myself, during these days and was guiding them, caring for their requests concerning what they wanted to see, that is to say, they were the first units which we had established -- first our training unit, in which all new models were tried out. Furthermore, we showed them industries, schools, and what were the gentlemen wanted to know. At the end of our conferences, the English Vice Marshal suggested an exchange of plans from German and English sides. I got the agreement from my commanding officer, as I received it at that time, at the time we submitted to the British side the plans for '37, '38 and I believe '39, and we received from the English side also the figures in question. We agreed that also in the future, that if changes in plans should occur or new units should be established, that again an exchange of the material should take place, and that was the beginning of further contacts as representative of my commander in chief, I was invited to Belgium to a visit of the Belgium Air Force; then in July -
Q How was this visit in Belgium; can you tell me some more about that?
A It was a very cordial reception. I made the acquaintance of the War Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister, and also His Majesty the King and the officers of the air force who, of course, were there also. There was a very friendly conference in which the Belgians assured them of their feelings of friendship for Germany.
Q Was there also an exchange of material?
Germany, what we had, when the Chief of the Air Force, General De Vivier, returned the visit, made his return visit. Then there was a large international meeting in the summer in July 1937, at the air meeting in Zuerich. At this meeting we have shown our unit models and fighters, bombers and Stukas and also our newest models of motors and anything that would be considered interesting from an international point of view. There was a large French, Italian, Czech, Belgium Delegation besides the Germans, and on the basis of the material which we displayed to the British Officer's Commission, wanted to take part in the English thing, I went to the French, the British, and to the other nations, and we have displayed and shown the material in a friendly way. There was for instance, the Messerschmidt fighter 109 with all improvements, which was flown until the end of the war, with varied improvements; the newest Dornier bomber type, the newest Stuka, Daimler, by Junker, likewise motors, Benz 661, and Junker.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think that this amount of detail is of any interest to the Tribunal. BY DR. STAHMER: French Government, also to visit the French Air Force. The visit was in a very friendly manner. A short time after, there was a visit to England, a return visit for the visit of Marshal Courtney. Here, also factories, organizations, schools were shown, also industry; the Shadow (?) industry, and industry which created peacetime goods in order to be able, when the war started, to start creating war materials. There was also visits with Sweden, and I think that concludes it.
Q Did you take part in the Fuehrer meeting on the 23 May 1933?
Q In what function? Reichsmarshal was not there.
Q Do the remember the details of this meeting?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, did we get the date rightly? The date we got was the 23 May 1933.
DR. STAHMER: 1939.
BY DR. STAHMER:
Q 1939; that was the meeting which you have mentioned.
Q Do you remember the course of this conversation? army, navy, and air force, and the chiefs of staff. There were several other persons present. The main contents were, that Hitler declared he had decided to solve the question of the Corridor across the Corrido in one way or another and in connection with that, he discussed the possibility of conflicts which could start as a consequence in the West. It was mainly a speech, not a discussion or a conversation.
Q Was anything else discussed or presented; do you remember other details? thinking that France would keep quiet -- whether the West would do something about it.
Q Was there any question of the attack on Poland? problem; but, of course, I have understood it to mean that it had to be solved at any rate. First, of course, one would think of negotiations but if these negotiations would not lead to a solution, then a military solution would be the only one.
Q Were there any more discussions about it? bidden; it was forbidden for me to inform the Reichsmarshal who was not there. It was declared that he would do that himself, that Hitler declared that he would give him the information himself. I remember that at that time also the same order was issued or was mentioned, which is known as "Fuehrer Order No. 1 and had to be displayed in every office, that nobody had to say anything any sooner than it was necessary, and that one had to say only as much as the other was supposed to know.
Q Then you did not inform the Reichsmarshal about this discussion?