in the matter of: The United States of America, The French Hermann Wilhelm Goering, et al.
, Defendants, sitting at
MR. JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal. I should like to ask the Tribunal to note the presence and appearance on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Mr. A. I. Vischinski of the Foreign Office, and, Mr. K. P. Gorshenin, Chief Prosecutor of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics who has been able to join us in the prosecution only now.
MR. PRESIDENT: The Tribunal notes what Mr. Justice has said, and observes that Mr. Gorshenin has taken his seat with the Russian Delegation of the Chief Prosecutor.
MR. SIEMERS: In the meanwhile during the lunch hour I have seen the protocol. I should like to observe that I don't think it is very agreeable that the prosecution should stick to their point that the defense should not see the documents until late during the proceedings, or just before the proceedings, or at times even after the proceedings. I should be most grateful to the prosecution if it should be made possible in the future to let us be informed in good time, as to the documents -- excuse me -- yesterday a personal call was made about the documents that were to be presented today. I hesitate to say that the documents presented today were not contained in that list put before us yesterday. You will understand that through this the defense has a comparatively difficult task. In principle -- in principle therefore by today's declaration I can not give my consent to that interrogation, that should be read in order to facilitate matters. I should like to follow the suggestion of the Court, and declare myself -- to declare my consent that the protocol, that this protocol question should be ready, but I should like to make it clear, and I think that the prosecution has given its consent, that only such matters should be ready which refers to Document C-156, as I had no time to discuss the other points with the accused. As it is to the remaining points, I would prefer other documents that are cited. Moreover I request that part which refers to the book of Dr. Schuessler, that should be read in full, and I believe that the prosecutor agrees with this.
THE PRESIDENT: I understood from the counsel for Raeder that you were substantially in agreement as to what part of this interrogation you should read. Is that right Mr. Alderman?
MR. ALDERMAN: If I understand counsel correctly, he asked that I read the entire part of the interrogation which applies to the Document C-156, but I understood that he didn't agree for me to read other parts that referred to other documents. I handed the counsel the original copy of the interrogation before the lunch hour, and when he handed it in after the lunch hour, I substituted in his hand the carbon copy. I don't quite understand his statement about that document being introduced which had not been furnished to the defendant. We did file the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: This document is in the document book?
MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is that the document book contained all the document which is stated in this interrogation. It didn't contain the interrogation --
THE PRESIDENT: Then he is right to say that.
MR. ALDERMAN: He is right in saying about this interrogation, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You are in agreement with him then. You can read what you want to read now. It is not necessary to read that part to which he objects.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think I understand his objection to my reading anything other than the part consigned in C-156, but I anticipate that he might be willing for me to read the other part tomorrow. Document C-156, United States Exhibit -- what? -- 41, that the defendant Raeder identified as the Book, and explained that the Navy had to fulfill to the letter the Versailles Treaty, and at the same time make progress in Naval development. I refer to the interrogation of the defendant Raeder at the part we had under discussion:
"Q I have here a document, C-156, which is a photostatic copy of the work prepared by the High Command of the Navy, and covers the struggle of the Navy against the Versailles Treaty from 1919 to 1935. I ask you initially whether you are familiar with the work?
"A I know this book. I read it once when it was edited.
"Q Was than an official publication of the German Navy?
"A This Captain Schuessler indicated there was Commander in the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, which was an idea of those officers to put all these things together.
"Q Do you recall the circumstances under which the authorization to prepate such a work was given to him?
"A I think he told me that he would write such a book as he told us here in the foreword.
"Q In the preparation of this work he had access to the official Naval files, and based his work on the items contained therein?
"A Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons, and he would have had the files, which were necessary.
"Q Do you know whether before the work was published, a draft of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for comment?
"A No, I don't think so. Not before it was published. I saw it only when it was published.
"Q Was it circulated freely after its publication?
"A It was a secret object. I think the upper commands in the Navy had knowledge of it.
"Q It was not circulated outside of the Naval circles?
"A No.
"Q What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained in the work regarding the circumventing of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty?
"A I don't remember very exactly what is in here. I can only remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word of the Versailles Treaty, but wanted to have some advantages. But the flying men were exercised one year before they went into the Navy. Quite young non. So that the word of the Treaty of Versailles was filled. They didn't belong to the Navy, as long as they were exercised in flying, and the submarines were developed but not in Germany, and not in the Navy, but in Holland. There was a civil bureau, and in Spain there was an Industrialist; in Finland, too, and they were built much later when we began to act with the English Government about the Treaty of thirty-five to one-hundred, because we could see that then the Treaty of Versailles would he destroyed by such a treaty with England, and so in order to keep the word of Versailles, we tried to fulfill the word of Versailles, but tried to have advantages.
"Q Would the fair statement be that the Navy High Command was interested in avoiding the limited provisions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding the personnel and limits of armaments, but would it attempt to fulfill the letter of the treaty, although actually avoiding it?
"A That was their endeavor".
Mr. ALDERMAN: Now the rest of this is the portion that the counsel for the defendant asked me to read.
"Q Why was such a policy adopted?
"A We were much menaced in the first years after the first war by danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia and so we tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in this way, and so all our efforts were directed to the aim to have a little more strength against the Poles, if they would attack us; it was nonsense to them of attacking the Poles in this state, and for the Navy. A second aim was to have some defense against the entering of French forces into the ostsee, or East Sea, because we knew the French had intentions to sustain the Poles from ships that came into the ostsee Goettinger, and so the Navy was a defense against the attack by the Poles, and against the entrance of French shipping into an Eastern Sea. Quite defensive aims.
"Q When did the fear of attack from Poles first show itself in official circles in Germany would you say?
"A When the first years they took Wilma. In the same minute we thought that they would come to East Prussia. I don't know exactly the year, because those judgments were the judgments of the German Government Ministers, of the Army and Navy Ministers, Groner and Noske.
"Q Then those views in your opinion were generally held existing perhaps as early as 1919 or 1920, after the end of the First World War?
"A Oh, but the whole situation was very very uncertain, and about those years in the beginning, I can not give you a very exact thing, because I was then ten years in the Navy archives to write a book about the war, and how the cruisers fought in the first war. Two years, so I was not with these things."
MR. ALDERMAN: Likewise, the same kind of ending and purposes are reflected in the table of contents of a history of the German Navy, 1919 to 1939, found in captured official files of the German Navy. Although a copy of the book has not been found by us, the project was, however, written by Oberst Scherff, Hitler's special military historian. We have found the table of contents, which refers by numbers to groups of documents and notes in the documents, which evidently were intended as working material for the basis of the chapter to be written in accordance with the table of contents. The title of this table of contents fairly establishes the Navy planning and preparations that were to got the Versailles Treaty out of the way, and to rebuild the Navy strength necessary for a drastic war. I say the German typewritten table of contents. It is the projected work with a German cover, typewriting entitled, "Geschichte der Deutschen Marine, 1919-1939. History of German Navy. 1919-1939." We identify that as our series C-17, and are offered in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 42. This table of contents include such general headings --perhaps I had better read some of the actual headings.
"Part A (1919 - The year of Transition. Chapter VII. First efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit its effects. Demilitarisation of the Administration, Incorporation of Naval Offices in Civil Ministries, etc. Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime observation station and the sea-mark system in Heligoland and Kiel, of the Ems-Jade-Canal, etc. into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934; Noskos' proposal of 11.8.1919 to incorporate the Naval Construction Department in the Technical High School, Berlin; formation of the "Naval Arsenal Kiel".
"(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and guns. 1. North Sea (strengthening of fortifications with new batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control Commission - information, drawings, visits of inspection, result of efforts."
Referring to the group of number 85:
"2. Baltic. Taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pilau and Swinemundo; salvage for the Army of one-hundred and eighty-five movable guns and mortars there.
"3. The beginnings of coastal air defense.
"Part B (1920 - 1924, - THE ORGANISATIONAL NEW ORDER) Chapter V.
"The Navy "Fulfilment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty "Foreign Countries "(a) The inter-allied Control Commissions "(b) Defense measures against the fulfilment of the "1. Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand "2. Limitation of demolition work in HELIGOLAND.
"3. Atempt to strengthen personnel of the Navy, from "4. The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of formation of "sports" unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in naval recruitment) "5. Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat (Projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey, Argentine and Finland.
Torpedo testing) "6. Participation in the preparation for building of the Luftwaffe (preservation of aerodromes, aircraft construction, raid defence, training of pilots)."7. attempt to strengthen the mining branch.
Part C (1925 - 1932. REPLACEMENT OF TONNAGE) Chapter IV.
"The Navy, The Versailles Treaty, "(a) The activities of the Inter-allied Control Commissions (up to 31.
1.27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace Commission) "Independent armament measures behind the back of the "1. The activities of Captain LOHMANN (continuation) "2. Preparation for the re-strengthening of the German U-boat arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of LOHMANN in relationship to SPAIN, ARGENTINE, TURKEY:
the first post war U-boat construction of the German Navy in SPAIN since 1927; 250 ton specimen in FINLAND, preparation for rapid assembly; electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in SPAIN and FINLAND.
"3. Participation in the preparation for the recon struction of the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparations for Luftdienst CMRH; Naval Flying School Warnemunde; Air Station questions "Air Defence Journeys", technical development, DOX etc.
, catapult aircraft, arming, engines ground organisa "4. Economic re-armament ("The Tebeg" - Technical Advice capacity and other War economic questions.)
"5. Various measures. (The NV Aerogeodetic Company secret investigations.)
"(c) Planned Armament Work with the tacit approval of bodies (1928 to the taking over of power) "1. The effect of the Lohmann case an the secret prepara tions; winding up of works which could not be advocated; re "2. Finance question.
("Black Funds" and the Special Budget)."3. The Labour Committee and its objectives "(d) The Question of Marine Attaches (The continuation under disguise; open re-appointment 1932-1933)."(e) The question of Disarmament of the Fleet abroad (The Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931.
The League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932). "Part D (1933-1939). The German Navy during the Military Freedom Period," which goes beyond the period with which I am at the moment dealing.
A glance at the Chapter heading following that will indicate the scope of this proposed work. Whether the history was actually ever written by Scherff, I do not know. headings, just under this "Part D - The German Navy during the Military Freedom Period.
"I. National Socialism and the question of the Fleet and of "II.
Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist The main heading III in the middle of the page, "The Re-armament of the Navy under the Direction of the Reich Government in a Disguised Way."
The policy development of the Navy is also reflected from the financial side. The planned organization of the Navy budget for armament measures was based on a co-ordination of military developments and political objectives. Military political development was accelerated after the withdrawal from the League of Nations. German, headed "Chef der Marineleitung, Berlin, 12 May 1934," and marked in large blue printing, "Geheime Kommandosache" - "Secret Commando Matter" which is identified as our C-153.
It has the facsimile signature of Raider at the end. I assume it's the facsimile; it may have been written with a stylus on a stencil; I can't tell. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 43. It is headed with the title "Armament Plan (A.P.) for the 3rd Armament Phase." This document of 12May 1934, speaks of war tasks, war and operational plans, armaments target, etc., and shows that it was distributed to many of the high command of the Navy. It shows that a primary objective was readiness for a war without any alert period.
I quote from the third numbered paragraph:
"The planned organization of armament measures is necessary for the realization of the target; this again requires a coordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This organization of financial measures over a number of years according to the military viewpoint is found in the armament programme and provides
a) for the military leaders a sound basis for their
b) for the political leaders a clear picture of what at a given time."
One other sentence from paragraph 7 of that document:
"All theoretical and practical A-preparations" (I assume that means Armament preparations,)"are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert period." long before the outbreak of hostilities is illustrated in many other ways. Thus, in 1934, Hitler instructed Raeder to keep secret the U-Boat construction programme; also the actual displacement and speed of certain ships. Work on U-Boats had been going on, as already indicated, in Holland and Spain.
The Nazi theory was rather clever on that. The Versailles Treaty forbade re-arming by the Germans in Germany, but they said it didn't forbid them to re-arm in Holland, Spain and Finland.
negotiations with England. We have a captured document, which is a manuscript in German script, of a conversation between the defendant Raeder and Adolf Hitler, in June, 1934. It is not signed by the defendant Raeder. I might ask his counsel if he objects to my stating that the defendant Raeder, in an interrogation on 8 November 1945, admitted that this was a record of this conversation, and that it was in his handwriting, though he did not sign his name at the end. it in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 44.
It is headed, "Conversation with the Fuehrer in June 1934 on the occasion of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of the "Karlsruhe"."
"1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning displacement of D. and E. (defensive weapons).
"Fuehrer's instructions: No mention must be made of a displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton(ships). Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may be stated.
"2. C in C Navy expresses the opinion that later on the Fleet must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from 1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35 c.m. guns (Like the King George Class.)
"3. The Fuehrer demands to keep the construction of the U-Boats completely secret. Plebiscite also in consideration of the Saar." the Navy needed more funds than it had available; so Hitler proposed to put funds of the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy.
with Hitler, on 2 November 1934. Of this, I have a photostatic copy of the German typed memorandum, identified as our C-190. This one, again, is not signed, but it was found in Raeder's personal file and I think he will not deny that it is his memorandum.
I offer it in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 45.
It is headed: "Conversation with the Fuehrer on 2.11.34 at the time of the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the 'Emden'.
"1) When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available for the armed forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible that the Navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He considered it necessary that the Navy be speedily increased by 1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need, he will get Dr. Ley to put 120-150 million from the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy, as the money would still benefit the workers. Later in a conversation with Minister Goering and myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the Navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if the Navy was not able to safeguard the are imports from Scandinavia.
"2) Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have six U-Boats assembled at the time of the critical situation in the first quarter of 1935, he stated that he would keep this point in mind, and tell me when the situation demanded that the assembling should commence."
Then there is an asterisk and a note at the bottom:
"The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in the middle of June 35 according to plan." markets was a programme encouraged by the Navy, so that this industry would be able to supply the requirements of the Navy in case of need.
We have an original German document, again headed "Geheime Kommandosache" - "Secret Commando Matter" - a directive of 31 January 1933, by the defendant Raeder, for German industry to support the armament of the Navy.
I offer it in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 46.
"TOP SECRET "General directions for support given by the German Navy to the German "The effects of the present economic depression have led here and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an active participation of the German Armament Industry abroad, even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept.
There is no profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting. Furthermore,the view has been taken that the increasing "self-sufficiency" would in any case make such participation superfluous.
"However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the following contradictory corrective points:
"a) The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce "Though equality of rights in war politics is not fully "b) The consequent estimation of the duties of the German "It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily the deliveries to our own armed forces.
Its capacity must "c) Almost every country is working to the same and today, even restrictions.
Britain, France, North America, Japan, and for their armament industries.
The use of their diplomatic "d) It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions "e) If, however, the German Armament Industry is to be able to of its purchasers.
The condition for this is that secrecy for our own ends be not carried too far.
The amount of small.
I would like to issue a warning against the assumption solved there.
Solutions arrived at today, which may become or at any rate after the copy has been made.
It is of "(f) To conclude:
I attach particular importance to guaranteeing the continuous support of the industry concerned by the navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. If the purchasers are not made confident that something special is being offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up to the competitive battle aid therefore will not be able to supply the requirements of the German Navy in case of need." starting even before the Nazis came into power, is illustrated by a 1932 order of the Defendant Raeder, chief of the Naval Command, addressed to the main Naval Command, regarding the concealed construction of torpedo tubes in E-Boats. He ordered that torpedo tubes be removed and stored in the Naval Arsenal but be kept ready for immediate refitting. By using only the permitted number -- that is, permitted under the Treaty -- at a given time, and storing them after satisfactory testing, the actual number of operationally effective E-Boats was constantly increased. reading "Der Chef der Marine Leitung, Berlin, 10, February 1932. Our series number is C-141. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit, USA 47, the order for concealed armament of E-Boats. I read from the first paragraph of the text:
"In view of our treaty obligations and the Disarmament Conference steps must be taken to prevent the 1st E-Boat-Half-Flotilla, which in a few months will consist of exactly similar newly built (E)-Boats, from appearing openly as a formation of torpedo-carrying boats" -- the German word being Torpedotraeger -- "as it is not intended to count these E-Boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed us.
"I therefore order:
"1. S2 - S5, will be commissioned in the shipyard Luerssen, Vegesack without armament, and will be fitted with easily removable cover-sheet-metal on the spaces necessary for torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I."--a translator's note at the bottom says with reference to T.M.I., Inspectorate of Torpedoes and Mining--"in agreement with the NavalArsenal, for the Boat 'Sl' which will dismantle its torpedo-tubes, on completion of the practice shooting, for fitting on another boat.
"2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-Boats will be stored in the Naval Arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the torpedotubes will be taken on board one after the other for a short time to be fitted and for practice shooting so that only one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of temporary trials by the T.V.A."
I suppose that is not the Tennessee Valley Authority. The translator's note calls it the Technical Research Establishment.
"It should not anchor together with the other, unarmed boats of the Half-Flotilla because of the obvious similarity of type. The duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible.
"3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all E-Boats is intended as soon as the situation of the political control allows it." in 1932, was talking about as soon as the situation of the political control allows it. The seizure of power was the following year. preparation of auxiliary cruisers, under the disguised designation of Transport Ships O. The preparations under this order were to be completed by 1 April 1935. At the very time of construction of these ships as commercial ships plans were made for their conversion.
secret, identified by our number C-106, order from the Command Office of the Navy, dated 12 March 1934, and signed by draft by Groos. It has the seal of the Reichministerium, Marineleitung, over the draft signature. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit, USA 48. I think the defendant Raeder will admit, or at least will not deny that this is an official document.
"Subject: Preparation of Auxiliary Cruisers.
"It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35 (AGAufstellungsgliederung) a certain number of auxiliary cruisers which are intended for use in operations on the High Seas.
"In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations the ships will be referred to as "Transport Ships O". It is requested that in future this designation only will be used.
"The preparations are to be arranged so that they can we completed by 1.4.35." year by year, from 1927 to 1940 on the reconstruction of the German Navy, and in these notes are numerous examples of the Navy's activities and policies of which I should like to point out some illustrations. ship "Scharnhorst - Gneisenau" and "F/G"--whatever that is--was actually greater than the tonnages which had been notified to the British under the treaty. This document, our C-23, I offer in evidence as Exhibit, USA 49. That is a set really of throe separate documents joined together. I read from that document:
"The true displacement of the battleship "Scharnhorst - Gneisenau" and 'F/G' exceeds by 20 percent in both cases the displacement reported to the British. columns, headed "Displacement by Type", one column "Actual Displacement," and the other column, "Notified Displacement."
On the "Scharnhorst" the actual was 31,300 tons, the notified was 26,000 tons. On the "F", actual, 41,700, the notified, 35,000. On the "HI", actual, 56,200 tons, notified, 46,850' and so on down the list.
I need not read them all. English version, is the statement, "In a clear out programme for the construction, the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has set the Navy the task of carrying out the aims of his foreign policy." limitation, and with characteristic German thoroughness had prepared superficial explanations of pretexts to explain away those violations.
Following a conference with the chief of "A" section, an elaborate survey list was prepared and compiled, giving a careful list of the quantity and type of German naval armament and ammunition on hand under manufacture or construction, and in many instances together with a statement of the justification or defense that might be used in those instances where the Versailles Treaty was violated or its allotment has been exceeded.
The list contained 30 items under "Material Measures" and 14 items under "Measures of Organization." The variety of details covered necessarily involved several sources within the Navy, which must have realized their significance. As I understand it, the "A" section was the military department of the Navy. identified by our number C-32. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit, USA 50. It again is Geheime Kommandosache, and it is headed "A Survey Report of German Naval Armament after Conference with Chief of "A" Section, dated 9 September 1933," and There are three columns, one headed "Measure," one headed "Material measures, Details," and the most interesting one is headed "Remarks."
The remarks contain violations of the treaty.
They are numbered so I can "1. Exceeding the permitted number of mines."
Then figures are given.
"Remarks: Further mines are in part ordered, in part being delivered."
"Number 2. Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area for Baltic artillery batteries."
In the remarks column, "Justification:
Necessity for over-hauling.
Cheaper repairs."
Turning over to Number 6, "Laying gun-platforms in the kiel area."
And under remarks "The offence over and above fications are forbidded in the Kiel area.
This justifi cation will make it less severe; pure defence Measures."
"Number 7: Exceeding the calibre permitted for coastal batteries."
The explanation: "Possible justifi of guns is less."
"Number 8: Arming of mine-sweepers. The reply to any remonstrance against this breach:
the guns are taken installed only for training purposes.
All nations arm their mine-sweeping forces (equality of rights)." Here is one that is rather amusing.