THE PRESIDENT: I am told that if the interpreters use the words "question" and "answer" before the question and answer it assists the shorthand writers and the press. Therefore, the interpreters can continue to say "question" and "answer" before the question and answer is given. That only makes it more obvious that the real remedy for the difficulties which arise is in counsel and witnesses pausing after the question has been asked and after the answer has been given, and it seems to the Tribunal that counsel and witnesses ought to be able to hear when the translation of the question has been given, and the witness then give his answer. And when the translation of the answer has been given, which counsel can hear, he should then put a further question. Is it clear what I mean? QUESTIONS BY DR. LATERNSER: slavia. If I understood you correctly, you said that this attack had to be carried out before the Case Barbarossa was made operative, as in any other case there would have been a serious threat to the flanks. Did I understand you correctly? was thecause for Hitler's attack on Yugoslavia. Do you know where these plans for that attack existed before the revolution in Yugoslavia? Do you know, furthermore, that particularly the plan of attack against Yugoslavia came at a very inconvenient moment, which was the reason that a delay of the attack against the Soviet Union occurred?
A That is exactly what I said yesterday. It caused a postponement of the attack, which had originally been planned for the middle of May, if weather would permit, and this delay became necessary.
Q But then there is a sort of controversy here, isn't there? You say the attack against Yugoslavia took place in spite of the fact that the question of the attack came into play?
A I don't see any contradiction in that. As far as I saw the situation, it was that the old Yugoslavia government had made an agreement which placed at the disposal the railway line from Belgrade to Nisch, and that after that agreement was concluded a revolution took place in Yugoslavia which made a policy of a different kind probable.
Therefore, one would come to the assumption that this plan of attack would be necessary to eliminate that danger. In other words, I do not see that the decision to attack Yugoslavia, and the consequence that Barbarossa would be delayed, -does not contain a contradiction. I merely see that one is a condition for the other. in February, 1941? Soviet Russian troops was estimated at 100 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry divisions, and 30 mechanized divisions; that that strength was reported by major General Halder?
A I cannot recollect that at all. Nor am I sure whether Colonel General Halder was actually present during that conference.
Q But witness, such a conference must have been an unusual one? was present the impression that there was a very strong concentration of troops on the Eastern front? you OK-1? the tasks of that service department to make positive suggestions regarding military operations; is that correct? but when I was in that Department 1 I did not get that task as part of my job. The operational department was not under my control but immediately under the control of the Chief of the General Staff. The General Staff Department, first of all, gave me the task of running the training department and then the organization department, and that was in Autumn 1941. There fore, it was not part of my sphere of activities to make suggestions to the Chief of the General Staff regarding operations which were in progress.
I merely had to carry out the tasks which he gave me. prisoners of war were treated in the Soviet Union? has been made, which led to the suicide of so many German officers at Stalingrad -- officers and men -- on that question. I felt it my duty -
THE PRESIDENT: Cross examination is the questioning on questions which are either relevant to the issues which the Tribunal has to try or questions relevant to the credibility of the witness. Questions which relate to the treatment of prisoners in the Soviet Union have nothing whatever to do with any of the issues which we have got to try, and they are not relevant to the credibility of the witness. The Tribunal, therefore, will not hear them.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I give a reason why I ask that question? May I make a short statement?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put that question for the reason that I could ascertain whether, in fact, treatment of prisoners of war -- how it was actually handled, so that a large number of German families, who are extremely worried on that subject, could in that manner be given information on the subject, so that their worries would decrease.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of opinion that that is not a matter with which the Tribunal is concerned.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions to ask the witness. QUESTIONS BY DR. FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritsche):
Q Witness, do you know the Defendant Fritsche? he was with your Army? with the OKW, which I believe you remember having been brought up. One of the imprisoned commissars of the Russian Army had to be shot. Are you aware of that order?
A Yes. It came to my knowledge. in the East, became aware of or got knowledge of that order; that he made a proposal to you and your second in command, according to which that order should be canceled as far as your sphere of activity was concerned?
A I cannot recollect that incident. I think it is perfectly possible that Mr. Fritsche did discuss that question with the Supreme Command of the Army, but when I took over that army on the 20th of January, 1942, that order was not carried out in my zone. As far as I know, this order, which in practice did not become operative, was in fact canceled later on. tion: Do you recollect, perhaps, that Fritsche suggested to to you or your 1-C officer to distribute pamphlets with a corresponding content in Russia?
A I certainly can't recollect that, but I consider it perfectly possible that such a discussion with the 1-C officer, who was responsible for that sort of thing, took place.
Q Then one last question: As far as you know the type and character of the Defendant Fritsche, would you consider it perfectly feasible and probable that he did make such a proposal? QUESTIONS BY DR. SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Organization of the Political Leader Staff): in spite of the fact that you knew the full truth that aggressive war was conducted. How far could the political leaders know of this?
A I can't give you an answer on that question, merely because I had no knowledge of it.
Q What do you understand, are the political leaders?
A May I ask another question in return? What does the Defendant's Counsel understand by political leaders, since you want me to understand your question?
Q Witness, the organization of the Party doesn't seem to be clear to you. There is an organization of political leaders which is indicted in this trial. They are meant to be declared criminal; that is, the Reichsleiter and Blockleiter, which may be punished because of their participation in the conspiracy to all the acts which are being tried here. That organization of political leaders is composed in such a way that 93 percent are local group leaders with their staff and subordinates.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you can ask this witness about this. He doesn't know anything about it. He is not concerned with the charge against the political leadership. I don't think that is proper cross examination at all.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I was going to ask him how far these political leaders might have had knowledge, and then I was going to ask a second question, whether he would be aware that he, as a witness, in his capacity, has contributed materially that these people, political loaders, supported Hitler because they believed in that body which he himself -
THE PRESIDENT: He has already answered you "I had no knowledge of the state of knowledge of the political leaders."
DR. SERVATIUS: In that case I have another question. I am; also appearing for the Defendant Sauckel, who was responsible for the labor. in Russian armament industries?
A I have no authentic or personal information on that subject. The prisoners of war whom I have seen myself were in camps where I myself was detained, and they worked for the immediate requirements for the camp or in the near vicinity of the camp. They worked in agriculture or in the forest on forestry, and I have gained knowledge of the fact that German workers who volunteered and had formed groups were working in industry, and that they were proud of the result of their work. But in particular in which branches of industry these people worked, that I am afraid I have no knowledge of.
DR. SERVATIUS: Thank you. I have no further questions to put to this witness.
QUESTIONS BY DR. KUBUSCHOK(Counsel for the Reich Government): discussed once more today, namely, how far the knowledge of individual members of the German government regarding decisive resolutions would go, I gathered from your reply that the Reich government did not, as far as their individual personalities were concerned -- could not be regarded as one homogeneous, whole body. In this trial the difficulties repeat themselves regarding the fact that normal conditions are presumed. In particular, one is continuously under the impression that most important political and military decisions are, as is usually the custom, made by the body of the whole of the government or originate from the whole of the highest military departments, that is to say, that they are made by a number of high ranking persons who decide these resolutions.
Is that, witness, on the strength of the knowledge which you have gained in your high military rank, also applicable to the government of Adolf Hitler? In his personality, has he ever discussed questions like that politely? Is he not a man of an unusual type, and has he not employed a completely different procedure? Is it right to say that he always made his own decisions independently, or that, if anything, he made these decisions in consultation with very few immediate assistants, and that, consequently, we have here a case where leading personalities of a political and military nature had no knowledge of impending events?
A This is the way I shall answer it: As far as my military employment is concerned in the General Staff of the Army, it would be wrong to say that that gave me an inside into procedure of the German government. I just didn't have such an inside. On the other hand, I imagine that under the what you call "Gremium of Reich Government", I imagine that to be a group of people who, no matter what the head of the state decides to use as methods, would be feeling responsible towards the people for what is being decided by the head of the state, so that even if the head of the state in such a case even exceeds his own brutal way of deciding on them, they would concur with whatever decisions he makes, and that they would not, as they should, take counter-measures for the welfare of the people. That should have been done at the latest at a time when the whole world must have been aware that such a government was a criminal one and heading for world disaster.
Q Mr. Witness, you belong to the second, circle of people which I mentioned. It is an established fact that that second circle had interfered. In that connecti on, there must have been important reasons which were the cause. I believe that it would be better if, as far as other personalities are concerned, you would not pass judgment, but answer my questions as far as actual facts are concerned. military position, but also according to the knowledge which you gained in an exposed and leading position -- whether this was right or wrong is unnecessary for establishing the fact -- you knew that the methods in military and political matters were such or whether they were not. Were resolutions made by using a large body of military and political personalities who met and passed these resolutions, or were decisions made and these resolutions passed, in a very much smaller circle of people, probably sometimes only Hitler alone? which, as I have already said, is unknown to me. As I said in my previous reply, I have merely given you my basic conception regarding your question, and I thought that in that manner I had answered it. I cannot imagine that one man alone could have done everything that was done. After all, to exert his influence in a small circle he needed the cooperation of his immediate assistants. It was, in other words, quite impossible to act otherwise. believe that certain expert ministers, say, for instance, a labor minister, a man who was a trained expert, were asked by Hitler about plans for aggression?
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, the witness has already said it is a matter of fact he doesn't know how the decisions of the Reich Government were arrived at, and what he may think about is is really not relevant. He didn't know. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Have you, Witness, gathered the impression that plans for aggression were made by Hitler many years ago, many years previously, or are you of the opinion that they arose from the prevailing circumstances, the intuitive plans which he always stated he had?
A That is entirely outside my knowledge. My observations began on September 3, 1940 and continued from that time until January 1942, and what I observed during that period is something I explained yesterday. As far as the previous period is concenned, I have nothing to say. BY DR. HORN (Counsel for the defendant von Ribbentrop): which had the aim of keeping Germany away from disaster. My question is: What possibilities to carry out these intentions were at the disposal of yourself and the other members of that group? people. Not only after the events of a military nature, but also after the events of the 20th of July, we thought it our duty to make our conception of things known to the German people, our conception regarding the findings and the conviction we had since obtained. of those who were led by me at Stalingrad. There we experienced how, through orders of those military and political leaders who were appearing at the head of the State, more than 100,000 soldiers died in frost, cold, and snow. There we experienced the terrors of conquering war in large concentrations.
Q Did you have any other possibility apart from propaganda? and those newspapers which we had created, apart from that propaganda to the German people, we had no other facilities.
THE PRESIDENT: What has the Tribunal got to do with this?
DR. HORN: I merely wanted to ascertain what conclusions I could draw on the credibility of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: I can't see that it has any bearing on his credibility.
DR. HORN: It is perfectly possible that we have knowledge of other possibilities which were available which the witness has not mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that what the witness thought or did when he was a prisoner of war in Russian hands has got nothing to do with his credibility, at least so far as the questionsthat you have put are concerned, and they will not allow the questions to be put.
DR. HORN: May I have permission to ask the witness one more question?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. BY. DR. HORN: opportunity to place your military experiences in any way at the disposal of anybody else?
THE PRESIDENT: Then, I understand that concludes the cross examination.
Does the Soviet prosecutor wish to ask any more questions?
GENERAL RUDENKO: No, Mr. President. BY THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle)
Q. General, you said that when you became Quartermaster General of the Army on September 3 of 1940, you found an unfinished plan for an attack against the Soviet union. Do you know how long that plan had been in preparation before you saw it? but I would estimate that it lasted two days to three weeks. plan? OKW via the Supreme Command of the Army, and that the Chief of the General Staff had given them the same documents or the same information as myself.
Q. At the conferences on the Plan Barbarossa, how many members of the General Staff and High Command of the German armed forces were present unsually
A. The chiefs of the departments concerned, the Operational Department, the General Quartermaster, Supplies, and the Chief of Transportation. Those were generally the chief departments who participated in that tribunal.
Q. And how many members of the General Staff and High Command of the German armed forces knew of the orders end directions when they had been signed?
A. As time went by -- that is to say, I am now talking about December when the actual marching orders were dealt with -- more or less all General Staff officers had knowledge of the plan. Just how many knew previously, in the indicidual periods, is something which I cannot now give an exact answer to. BY THE TRIBUNAL (General Nikitchenko):
Q. Witness, did the General Staff of the German Army work out technical questions only; was it an apparatus which, worked out technical problems in detail according to the directions from the Supreme Command, or was the General Staff an institution which in itself and by itself prepared plans and presented to the Supreme Command its own considerations?
A. According to my own conception, there was a technically executive body existing. They had the task of carrying out existing instructions.
Q. And in your opinion then, the General Staff was a technical apparatus?
A. That is how it was in practice. The General Staff, as such, was an advisory organization to the Supreme Commander of the Army and not an executiv body.
Q. To what extent was the General Staff conscientiously carrying though the directives which it received from the Supreme Command?
A. I am afraid I didn't quite understand the first part of your question
Q. How conscientiously did the General Staff Carryout those directives which it received from the Supreme Command?
A. They carried out these instructions in their spirit.
Q. Were there any conflicts between the General Staff and the High Command?
A. That is a known fact, that certain differences of opinion did exist. I said before that I could not give that story in detail. At any rate, I know that my immediate superior had frequent differences of opinion with the Supreme Command of the Army.
Q. Were there people working in the General Staff, officers, who would not agree to the policies which were carried through by the Supreme Command?
A. Political questions did not come to the surface in that connection. Political questions were generally not discussed in the circle of persons in the Supreme Command of the Army.
Q. I am not talking about this in the narrow meaning of the words "political questions." I am talking about the policy of preparation for wars, the policy of aggression, of seizure. That is what I had in mind. occupied by Germans was supposed to be turned into.
A. I never did have any knowledge in detail. My knowledge is restricted to a knowledge of such plans as were contained in the so-called Green Folder for the exploitation of the country.
Q. What does it mean? What exploitation are you talking about?
A. I am talking about the economic exploitation of the country, so that by utilizing its resources one could continue to conduct the war in the West, and furthermore secure supplies in Europe in the future.
Q. And the character of the exploitation was different from the exploitation of the agricultural resources of Germany itself?
A. In that respect I have no personal impressions, since I only led that Army in Russia for three quarters of a year, and I was captured early in January 1943.
Q. Tell us what you know about the directives which were published by the government organs of Germany and also by the High Command, as to the relations between the German Army and the Soviet population.
A. I remember that instructions did appear, but I can't recollect the date at the moment.
In those instructions, the whole manner of conducting the war in the East, and certain directives were contained. I believe that this principal decree was actually contained in that so-called Green Folder, but there may have been separate and special orders. I believe it expressed the fact that no unnecessary consideration should be shown the population.
Q. What does it mean "not to pay great attention to it" -- or perhaps the translation is not quite correct.
A. That merely meant that only military necessities could be considered in conducting with all measures that were proposed. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Were there any divisions consisting entirely of SS troops under your command?
A. I had under my command no SS troops at all. During the time I led the Army, I have no recollection of any such case. Even at Stalingrad, where I had 20 German infantry and armored divisions and two Rumanian divisions, amongst them there were no SS units.
Q. I understand that the SA didn't form units, did they? The SA?
A. The SA? No. I have never heard of SA units, but of course that there were SS units is a known fact.
Q. And did you have any branches of Gestapo attached to your army?
A. No, I didn't. I didn't have those either.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, I did ask you whether you had any questions to ask and you said no, I take it.
GENERAL RUDENKO: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
THE PRESIDENT : Go on, General.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: Yesterday I stopped with the question connected with the relations between the Fascist aggressors and the Rumanian aggressors. It seems to me that now is the most opportune moment to make public the testimony of Ion Antonescu, which the Soviet Prosecution has at its disposal. The interrogation of Ion Antonescu was conducted in conformance with the law of the Soviet Union, and the record of the testimony is of exceptional importance in making clear the characteristics of the relationship between Germany and her satellites.
I present Exhibit USSR No. 153. I consider it necessary to make public most of the testimony, beginning with the second paragraph on Page 1 of the record. It is in the document book beginning on Page 63 and 64. I quote:
"Throughout the period when I hold power in Rumania, - Ion Antonescu army.
For this purpose I met Hitler several times.
"The first meeting with Hitler took place in November 1940, soon after I became the head of the Rumanian Government.
This meeting took place on my initiative, in Berlin, at Hitler's official residence in the presence of the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Hitler's "Discussions with Hitler lasted more than four hours.
"I assured Hitler that Rumania remained true to the previously concluded agreement regarding Rumania's adherence to the 'Tripartite pact'."In answer to my assurances of loyalty to the pact with Germany, Hitler declared that the German soldiers guaranteed Rumania's frontiers.
"At the same time, Hitler told me that the Vienna arbitration was not "Hitler and I agreed that the German Military Mission in Rumania should "To the question put to me as to whether my conversation with Hitler could "This fact Hitler had unquestionably in mind, when developing his plans "In January, 1941, I was invited to Germany through the medium of the time, in Berchtesgaden, when the following persons were present:
Bucharest - Kellinger. Besides these, there were also present representa "At the beginning of the conversations, Hitler, in introducing Kellinger "After this, Hitler in describing the military situation in the Balkans, "Having in mind that the passage of German troops through Rumania to the "Hitler, having reminded me that, at our first meeting in November 1940, "I expressed my fears that the passage of German troops through Rumania "Hitler stressed, too, that the information at his disposal showed that the "Satisfied with this declaration by Hitler, I agreed to permit the passage "Colonel General Jodl who was present at this conference, described to me "My third meeting with Hitler took place in Munich in May 1941.
"At this meeting, at which besides ourselves, there were present Ribbentrop and Hitler's personal interpreter, Schmidt, we finally reached "Hitler informed me that he had decided on a military attack on the Soviet Union.
Having prepared this attack, Hitler said, we must carry it out unexpectedly along the whole length of the Soviet Union's frontiers from the Black Sea to the Baltic.
"The unexpectedness of the attack," Hitler went on to say, "would give Germany and Rumania a chance to liquidate, within a short time, one of our most dangerous adversaries.
"On the basis of his military plans, Hitler made a suggestion that I should permit the use, of Rumanian territory for concentrations of German troops, and should be the same time participate directly in carrying out the military attack on the Soviet Union.
"Hitler stressed the point that Rumania must not remain outside this war, because, to have Bessarabia and North Bucovina returned to her, she had no other alternative but to fight on Germany's side. At the same time, he pointed out that, in return for our assistance in the war, Rumania would be able to occupy and administer other Soviet territories too, up to the liver Dnieper.
"As Hitler's offer to begin the war against the USSR jointly, corresponded to my aggressive intentions, I announced that I agreed, to participate in the attack on the Soviet Union and pledged myself to prepare the necessary number of Rumanian troops and at the same time to increase the deliveries of the oil and agricultural products needed by the German armies.
"Before I and Hitler took the decision to attack Russia, I asked Hitler whether he had any understanding with Hungary regarding her participation in the war. Hitler replied that the Hungarians had already given their consent to take part in the war against the USSR in alliance with Germany. When exactly the Germans had agreed on this with the Hungarians, Hitler did not tell me.
"On my return from Munich to Bucarest I began active preparations for the coming war."
Ion Antonescu finishes his testimony in the following way. I refer to page 67 in the document file. I am quoting the last paragraph of the testimony.
"After the invasion of Soviet territory, the Rumanian troops Signed--Marshal Antonescu."
testimony I present now under the number Exhibit 152. I shall not Ion Antonescu.
I shall refer only to several paragraphs. Please refer to page 1 of the Russian text and paragraphs 1, 2 and 5. This "In November 1940 Marshal Antonescu, accompanied by Prince Struza, "During the negotiations with Hitler, Marshal Antonescu signed the agreement for Rumania's adherence to the Tripartite Pact and received Hitler's promise for the subsequent reconsideration of the "This voyage of Marshal Antonescu was the first step towards against the Soviet Union."
1. The decision to send to Rumania a Military Mission of the 2. By November of the same year, Rumanian war preparations
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a good time to break off.
(A recess was taken until 14.00.)
GENERAL ZORYA: Mr. President, at a further stage in my statement I had intended to present to the Tribunal a statement of General Buschenhagen of the German Army. However, I do not intend to do that now as the Soviet Prosecution now wishes to examine this witness here and I would request you to allow me to call the witness for examination.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish to call him now?
GENERAL ZORYA: Yes, it would be convenient, in view of several technical questions.
(The witness took the stand on behalf of the Russian Prosecution)
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
THE WITNESS: Erich Buschenhagen.
THE PRESIDENT: Repeat this oath after me. pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(Witness repeated oath in German) DIRECT EXAMINATION BY GENERAL ZORYA:
Q Witness, will you tell the Tribunal when you were born?
Q Will you name your last military rank, please?
A I was General in the Infantry of the German Army. My last position was that of Commanding General of the 52nd Army Corps. statement in connection with a protest?
Q Are you confirming that statement now?