It will be necessary as I proceed to make reference to certain provisions of the Charter and to certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty between the United States and Germany restoring friendly relations, 25 August 1921, which incorporates certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and certain provisions of the Rhine Treaty of Locarno of 16 Ocotber 1925.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr.Alderman, is it notintended that this document book should have some identifying letter or number?
MR. ALDERMAN: I suppose it should have, sir. Yes. I don't know what the proper letter is.
THE PRESIDENT: Doesn't anybody know?
MR. ALDERMAN: "M", I am informed.
THE PRESIDENT: "M"?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. I do not offer those treaties in evidence at this time, because the British will offer all the pertinent treaties in their aspect of the case. World War I. Their modest origin and rather fantastic nature and the fact that they could have been interrupted at numerous points do not detract from the continuity of the planning. The focus of this part of the indictment on the theory that it was from 1933 to 1945 does not disassociate these events from what occurred in the entire preceding period. Thus the ascendency of Hitler and the Nazis to political power in 1933 was already a well advanced milestone on the German road of progress. stantial proportions. At that time their plans called for the acquisition of political control of Germany. This was indispensable for the consolidation within the country of all the internal resources and potentialities.
progress along this line of internal consolidation, the next step was to become disengaged from some of the external disadvantages of existing international limitations and obligations. The restrictions of the Versailles Treaty were a bar to the development of strength in all the fields necessary if one were to make war. Although there had been an increasing amount of circumvention and violation from the very time that Versailles came into effect, such operations under disguise and subterfuge could not attain proportions adequate for the objectives of the Nazis. To get the Treaty of Versailles out of the way was indispensable to the development of the extensive military power which they had to have for their purposes. Similarly, as part of the same plan and for the sane reason, Germany withdrew from the disarmament conference and from the League of Nations. It was impossible to carry out their plan on the basis of existing international obligations or of the orthodox kind of future commitments.
The points mentioned in this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the indictment are now historical facts of which we expect the Tribunal to take judicial notice. operation was preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of all participating forces. At the same time each point was part of a long prepared plan of aggression. Each represents a necessary step in the direction of the specific aggression which was subsequently committed. unnecessary laboring of the obvious. What I intend to say is largely the bring to light of information disclosed in illustrative documents which were hitherto unavailable.
referred to in this paragraph IV (F) 2 of the indictment are, first, the withdrawal from the disarmament conference and the League of Nations; second, the institution of compulsary military service; and, third, the reoccupation of the demiliterized zone of the Rhineland. Each of these stops was progressively more serious that the matter of international relations. In each of those steps Germany anticipated the possibility of sanction being applied by other countries, and, particularly, a strong military action from France with the possibl assistance of England. However, the conspirators were determined that nothing less than a preventative war would stop them, and they also estimated correctly that no one or combination of big powers would undertake the responsibility for such a war. The withdrawal from the disarmament conference and from the League of Nations was, of course, action that did not violate any international obligation. The League Covenant provided the procedure for withdrawal. However, in this case end as part of the bigger plan the significance of these actions can not be disassociated from the general conspiracy and the plan for aggression. The announcement of the institution of universal military service was a more daring action with a mere significance.
It was a violation of Versaille, but they got away with it. Then came the outright military defiance, the occupation of the demiliterized zone of the Rhineland.
Still in indictment paragraph IV (F) 2, which alleges that the determination of the Nazi conspirators to remove the restrictions of Versailles, the fact that the Nazi plans in this respect started very early is not only confirmed by their own statement, but they boasted about their long planning and careful execution. USA 23, Hitler's speech to All Supreme Commanders of 23 November 1939, I need not read it again. He stated there that his primary goal was to wipe out Versailles. After four years of actual war, the Defendabt Jodl, as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, delivered an address to the Reich and to the Gauleiters in which he traced the development of German strength. The seizure of power to him meant the restoration of fighting sovereignty, including consription, occupation of the Rhineland, and rearmament, with special emphasis on modern armour and air forces.
I have, if the Tribunal please, our document Number L-172. It is photostat of a microfilm of a speech by General Jodl, and I offer that photostat as Exhibit USA 34. I shall read, if the Tribunal please, only a part of that, but beginning with the beginning.
The speech is entitled "The Stategic Position at the Beginning of the 5th Year of War." It is a kind of retrospective summary by the defendant, General Jodl. "A lecture delivered by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (West) on the 7th November, 1943 at Munich to the Reich and Gau Leaders."
THE PRESIDENT: Are you reading from the document now?
MR ALDERMAN: I am reading from the English translation.
THE PRESIDENT: But in my copy of L-172, as far as I can see, it begins with the word "Introduction".
MR ALDERMAN: Yes, sir, I was just coming to the Introduction. On my copy-
THE PRESIDENT: There is another heading, too?
MR ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We haven't got that.
MR ALDERMAN: You have an index, I think. I don't have that on my copy. Page 3
THE PRESCIENT: Yes, but the Index doesn't give the heading; that is all.
MR ALDERMAN: I see, I am sorry.
THE PRESIDENT: It doesn't matter.
MR ALDERMAN: (Reading) "Introduction: ReichLeiter BORMANN has requested me to give you a review today of the strategic position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War.
"I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I undertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say openly what is. No-one-- the FUEHRER has ordered-- may know more or be told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your GAUS, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumours concentrate that try to find themselves a plan among our people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or--as they call it-- a political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use of to attack the natural sense of the people, that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to knew the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncoloured account of the state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by the force of arms but by the will of the whole people.
Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home. Italy suffered not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down internally. The result has :been not the peace she expected but --through the cowardice of the war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data concerning our own strength, you will tr eat these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the people.
"The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the danger which menaced us both fro from Poland and from the Western powers. Our further incursions into Scand inavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean and in that of Russia -these also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war so long as we were sucessful. It was not until more serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask itself whether perhaps we had not under taken more tan we could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for use in your own explanatory activities is one of the main points of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts:
"I A review of the most important development up to the present "II Consideration of the present situation.
"III The foundation of our morale and our confidence in victory.
"In view of my position as military :advisor to the Fuehrer, I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this way be giving expression only to one side of events.
"I Review "1. The fact that the National - Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge i this circle.
I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National - Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight -- "WEHRWILLEN"--; in nurturing fighting strength -- WEHRKRAFT"-and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent init, the numerically small REICHSWEIR would never have been able to cope wit this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Fuehrer aimed at -- and has so happily been successful in bringing about -- was the fusion of these two forces.
"The seizure of power--" I invite the Tribunal's attention to the frequency with which that expression occurs in all of these documents.
"2" The seizure of power in its turn had meant in the first place the restoration of fighting sovereignty." That is the German word "Wehrhoheit" a kind of euphemism there -- the "High-ness of defense ". I think it really means "Fighting sovere ignty".
"2. The seizure of power in its turn has meant in the first place restoration of fighting sovereignty -- WEHEHOHEIT"--(conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and re-armament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm.
"3. The Austrian "Anschlus'-- "Anschlus" means a locking onto I think. They latched onto Austria " -- in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected ina most menacing war right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers." worm-like form of Czechoslaovkia, which General Jodl calls a "wasp waist in the direction of France", and then he very accurately described what happened when Austria was taken by the Anschluss; the wasp waist was "now enclosed by pincers".
I am now resuming the reading:
"Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigour before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to arrive.
"This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the WEST WALL, which, in contra-distinction to the MAGINOT Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear cover for an active policy in the EAST.
"4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939--" That was the two phases on Czechoslovakia. "--and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favourable strategic premises." chart to see what those favorable strategic premises were.
"This brings me," said General Jodl, "to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland--in itself--unavoidable--was favorably selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in doubt since the opponent--after all, not inconsiderable in himself--collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the possibilities open to them of snatching the initiative from our hands. Concerning the course of the Polish campaign, nothing further need be said beyond that it proved in a measure which made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up till then had not been certain by any means; that is, the high state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Great Germany." this document. I can read on with interest and some enthusiasm, but I believe I have read enough to show that General Jodl by this document identifies himself fully with the Nazi movement. This document shows that he was not a mere soldier. Insofar as he is concerned, it identifies the military with the political, and the immediate point on which I had offered the document was to show the deliberation with which the Treaty of Versailles was abrogated by Germany and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was militarized and fortified.
In one of Adolph Hitler's reviews of the six year period between his ascendancy to power and the outbreak of hostilities, he not only admitted but boasted about the orderly and coordinated long-range planning. I bring up again, if the Tribunal please, L-79, which was offered in evidence yesterday, USA-Exhibit 27. That is the minutes of conference of the Fuehrer by Schmundt, his adjutant. In as large a staff as ours, we inevitably fall into a kind of patois or lingo, as Americans say. We also refer to this as Little Schmundt. The large file that I offered yesterday we call Big Schmundt. of that document which we call Little Schmundt. One sentence on Page 1. It is down below the middle of the page: (Reading) "In the period 1933 - 1939 progress was made in all fields. Our military system improved enormously." Then, just above the middle of the second page of the English translation: "The period which lies behind us has, indeed, been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims." is found in the Secret Document Reich Defense Law of May 21, 1935, which I offered in evidence yesterday, as Exhibit USA 24 and commented on sufficiently. I need not repeat that comment. The law went into effect upon its passage. It stated at its outset that it was to be made public instanter, but at the end of it Adolf Hitler signed the decree ordering that it be kept secret. I commented on that sufficiently yesterday. and for sometime a high ranking member of the German High Counsel, refers to this law as the cornerstone of war preparations. He points that, although the law was not made public until the outbreak of war, it was put into immediate execution as a program for preparations.
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of General Thomas' work, "A History of the German War and Armament Economy, 1923-1944," Page 25.
We have the volume here, in German, so that anyone may examine it that wishes to do so. I don't care to offer the entire volume in evidence unless the Court thinks I should. We do give it an exhibit number, Exhibit USA 36, but I simply should like to place it in the files as a reference work implementing judicial notice, if that is practicable.
THE PRESIDENT: You want it simply for the purpose of showing that General Thomas said that law was the cornerstone of war?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That has already passed into the record.
MR. ALDERMAN: I want to say to counsel for the defendants that it is here if they care to consult it at any time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: I should have identified it by our number, 2353 PS. time it was replaced by another secret defense law, revising the system of defense organization and directing more detailed preparations for the approaching status of mobilization, which I think was the euphemism for war. other sections of our presentation. They have been discussed by Mr. Dodd in connection with the economic preparations for the war. Number 2194, PS. I offer it as Exhibit USA 36. Reichs Defense Law, the Ministry for Economy and Labor, Saxony, Dresden; and 6 December 1939, TEL. I suppose, Telegraph. 52151. Long Distance. Top Secret.
THE PRESIDENT: Does this occur at the beginning of 2194 PS?
MR. ALDERMAN: It should, yes, sir, unless mine is different from yours.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think I have any letter here introducing it.
MR. ALDERMAN: Doesn't that start after that, "To the Reichs Protector in Bohemia and Moravia"?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that's right. I beg your pardon.
(Mr Alderman continuing):
"Transportation Section, attention of Construction Chief Counsellor Hirches, or representative in the office of the Reichs Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, received Prague, 5 September 1939, No. 274. Inclosed please find a copy of the Reichs Defense Law of 4 September 1938 and a copy each of the decrees of the Reichs Minister of Transportation, dated 7 October 1938, RL 10.2212/38, top secret, and of 17 July 1939, RL / LV 1.2173/39, top secret, For your information and observance, by order, signed Kretzchmar. 3 inclosures completed to Dresden, 4 September, 1939, signed Schneider 3 inclosures. Receipt for the letter of 4 September 1939, with 3 Counsellor Kretzchmar -- the whole point being that inclosing a second secret Reich Defense Law under top secret cover.
Now, next I refer to indictment paragraph IVF2a. That paragraph of the indictment refers to four points: (1) Secret rearmament from 1933 to March 1933; (2) the training of military personnel (that includes secret or camouflage training); (3) production of munitions of war; (4) the building of an air force. All four of these are included in the general plan for the breach of the Treaty of Versailles and for the ensuing aggressions. The facts of rearmament and of secrecy are self-evident from the events that followed. The significant phrase of this activity insofar as the indictment is concerned lies in the fact that all this was necessary in order to break the barriers of the Treaty of Versailles and of Locarno Pact and necessary to the aggressive wars which were to follow. The extent and nature of those activities could only have been for aggressive purposes, and the highest importance which the Government attached to the secrecy of the program is emphasized by the disguised financing, both before and after the announcement of conscription, and the rebuilding of the army, 16 March 1935.
Schacht dated 3 May 1935 entitled, "The Financing of the Armament program, "Finanzierung der Ruestung." As I say, it is not signed by the defendant Schacht, but he has identified it as being his memorandum in an interrogation on the 16th of October 1945. I would assume that he would still admit that it is his memorandum. That memorandum has been referred to but I believe not introduced or accepted in evidence. I identify it by our No. 1168-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA 37. court, I shall read the entire memorandum, reminding you that the German interpreter has the original German before him to read it to the transcript.
"Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler, identified by Schacht as Exhibit A, interrogation 16 October 1945, page 40. May 3, 1935," is the date of the memorandum.
"Financing of armament. The following explanations are based upon the thought, that the accomplishment of the armament program with speed and in quantity is the problem of German politics, that everything else therefore should be subordinated to this purpose as long as the main purpose is not imperiled by neglecting all other questions. Even after March 16, 1935, the difficulty remains that one cannot undertake the open propagandistic treatment of the German people for support of armament without endangering our position internationally (without loss to our foreign trade). The already nearly impossible financing of the armament program is rendered hereby exceptionally difficult.
"Another supposition must be also emphasized. The printing press can be used only for the financing of armament to such a degree, as permitted by maintaining of the money value. Every inflation increases the prices of foreign raw materials and increases the domestic prices, is therefore like a snail biting its own tail. The circumstance that our armament had to be camouflaged completely till March 16, 1935, and even since this date the camouflage had to be continued to a larger extent, making it necessary to use the printing press (bank note press) already at the beginning of the whole armament program, while it would have been natural, to start it (the printing press) at the final point of financing.
In the portefeuille of the Reichsbank are segregated notes for this purpose, that is, armament, of 3,775 millions and 866 millions, altogether 4,641 millions, out of which the armament notes amount to Reichsmarks 2,374 millions, that is, of April 30, 1935. The Reichsbank has invested the amount of marks under its jurisdiction, but belonging to foreigners in blank notes of armament. Our armaments are also financed partly with the credits of our political opponents. Furthermore, 500 million Reichsmarks were used for financing of armament, which originated out of Reichsanleihe, the federal loans, placed with savings banks. In the regular budget, the following amounts were provided. For the budget period 1933-34, Reichsmarks 750 millions; for the budget period 1934-35, Reichsmarks 1,100 millions; and for the budget period 1935-36, Reichsmarks 2,500 millions.
"The amount of deficits of the budget since 1928 increases after the budget 1935-36 to 5 to 6 millions Reichsmarks. This total deficit is already financed at the present time by short term credits of the money market. It therefore reduces in advance the possibilities of utilization of the public market for the armament. The Reichsfinanzminister, Minister of Finance, correctly points out at the defense of the budget: "As a permanent yearly deficit is an impossibility, as we cannot figure with security with increased tax revenues in amount balancing the deficit and any other previous debits, as on the other hand a balanced budget is the only secure basis for the impending great task of military policy"--I interpolate that evidently the defendant Schacht knew about the impending great military task to be made by Germany -- "for all these reasons we have to put in motion a fundamental and conscious budget policy which solves the problem of armament financing by organic and planned reduction of other expenditures not only from the point of receipt, but also from the point of expenditure, that is,by saving.
"How urgent this question is, can be deducted from the following, that a large amount of task has been started by the state and party"-it isn't just the state; it is the state and the party -- " and which is now in process, all of which are not covered by the budget, but from contributions and credits, which have to be raised by industry in addition to the regular taxes.
The existing of various budgets side by side, which serve more or less public tasks, is the greatest impediment for gaining a clear view over the possibilities of financing the armaments. A whole number of ministries and various branches of the party have their own budgets, and for this reason have possibilities of incomes and expenses, though based on the sovereignty of finance of the state, but not subject to the control of the Finanzminister (minister of Finance) and therefore also not subject to the control of the cabinet. Just as on the sphere of politics the much too far-reaching delegation of legislative powers to individuals brought about various states within the states, exactly in the same way the condition of various branches of state and party, working side by side and against each other, has a devastating effect oh the possibility of financing. If on this territory concentration and unified control is not introduced very soon, the solution of the already impossible task of armament financing is endangered.
"We have the following tasks:
"(1) A deputy is entrusted with," I suppose, "finding all sources and revenues, which have its origin in contributions to the federal government, to the state and party and in profits of public and party enterprises.
"(2) Furthermore experts, entrusted by the Fuehrer, have to examine how these amounts were used aid which of these amounts can in the future be withdrawn from their previous purpose.
"(3) The same experts have to examine the investments of all public and party organizations, to which extent this property can be used for the purpose of armament financing.
"(4) The federal ministry of finances is to be entrusted to examine the possibilities of increased revenues by way of new taxes or increasing of existing taxes.
"The up-to-date financing of armaments by the Reichsbank under existing political conditions was a necessity and the political success proved the correctness of this action. The other possibilities of armament financing have to be started now under any circumstances. For this purpose *** absolutely non-essential expenditures for other purposes have not ** take place and the total financial strength of Germany, limited as it is, has to be concentrated for the one purpose of armament financing. Whether the problem of financing, as outlined in this program, succeeds, remains to be seen, but without such concentration, it will fail with absolute certainty." sympathy with the defendant Schacht as he was wrestling with these problems.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to adjourn for ten minutes?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
(Whereupon the court at 1120 hours took a 10-minute recess).
MR. ALDERMAN: 21 May, 1935, was a very important date in the Nazi calendar. As I have already indicated, it was on that date that they passed the secret Reich Defense Law, which is our document 2261-PS. The secrecy of their armament operations had already reached the point beyond which they could no longer maintain successful camouflage and since their programme called for still further expansion, they made the unilateral renunciation of the armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty on the same date, 21 May, 1935.
I refer to Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on 21 May, 1935, our document 2288-PS. We have here the original volume of the "Voelkische Beobachter", (the "Popular Observer", I suppose is the correct translation) Volume 48, 1935, 122-151, May, and the date 22 May, 1935, which gives his speech, under the heading (if I may translate, perhaps) "The Fuehrer Notifies the World of the Way to Real Peace". number 2288-PS, as Exhibit U.S.A.38, and from that I shall read, beginning with the fifth paragraph in the English translation:
"The Treaty of Versailles was not broken ..."
I am starting with the words, "The Treaty of Versailles", in the fifth paragraph.
"The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the dictat of Versailles were violated and consequently invalidated by those powers who could not make up their minds to follow the disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament agreed upon by the Treaty".
I am sorry, I said the fifth paragraph .. this indicates on Page 3. It is after he discusses some general conclusions and then there is a paragraph numbered 1, that says:
"The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva Resolution of 17 May ..."
"The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the dictat of Versailles were violated and consequently invalidated by those powers ..."
I am sorry. May I look at the German original? If the court please, I don't want to read the whole volume of the "Voelkische Beobachter"...
THE PRESIDENT: If it is only a short document you are going to read, perhaps the document could be taken away from the interpreter, and he could follow you.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think I could find it ... I am not very fast in reading German but ...
THE PRESIDENT: If you read it in English, he will translate it.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, but I want the interpreter to have the German.
You will find "1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva Resolution of 17 May.."
"The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the dictat of Versailles were violated, and consequently invalidated, by those powers who could not make up their minds to follow the disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament as agreed upon by Treaty.
"2. Because the other powers did not live up to their obligations under the disarmament programme, the Government of the German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those articles, which are nothing but a discrimination of the German nation..." (I suppose "against the German nation.") "...for an unlimited period of time, since, through them, Germany is being nailed down in a unilateral manner, contrary to the spirit of the agreement." I don't necessarily vouch for the absolute truth of everything that he presents. This is a public speech he made before the world, and it is for the Tribunal to judge whether he is presenting a pretext or whether he is presenting the truth. aggressive war, there were various programmes for direct and indirect training of a military nature. This included not only the training of military personnel, but-also the establishment and training of other military organizations, such as the Police Force, which could be and were absorbed by the Army. However, the extent of this programme for military training is indicated by Hitler's boast of the expenditure of ninety billion Reichsmarks during the period of 1933 to 1939, in the building up of the armed forces.
I have another volume of the "Voelkische Beobachter", Volume 52, 1939, the issue of 2nd and 3rd September, 1939, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 39; and there appears a speech by Adolf Hitler, with his picture, under the heading which, if I may be permitted to try to translate, reads: