and October 3, 1942, which appeared in the Verordnungsblatt in Belgium.
I submit to the Tribunal the ordnance of March 30, under No.36. restricted to elsewhere. I present an ordnance of the Reichscommissar for the territories of occupied Holland, 15 of March, 1943. I submit it to the Tribunal under No.37. This ordnance presents a double interests. First it offers precise information which emphasizes the method with which the German services executed their recruiting plan.
submit to the Tribunal accusing the accused Seyss-Inquart. Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart. The ordinances and compulsory labor in Holland have all been rendered under the responsibility of Seyss-Inquart, whether it bears, directly or not, his signature. I ask the Tribunal to note this. enterprises deprived thousands of workers of their jobs. the unemployed to work in behalf of Germany. They threatened the unemployed to do away with their unemployment compensation. This threat was made on several occasions by the local Feldkommandants in Occupied France. I find the proof by the protest made March 8, 1941, by General Doyen, representing the French authorities with the German armistice commission. The document is 232, which I submit to the Tribunal under the number 38. I read the first page, third paragraph:
"Moreover, the occupation authorities foresee that the workers who refuse to work will see their right suppressed for unemployment compensation and will be susceptible of being prosecuted by the war tribunal for sabotage of Franco-German collaboration." central office for labor gave them instructions to continue this policy. The proof is furnished by the directive of Dr. Mansfeld, dated January 29, 1942, which I have just submitted to the Tribunal under the No. 26, in which instructions were given that unemployment compensation should be utilized to force workers to go Germany.
The directive of Dr. Mansfeld shows that the blackmail of the NationalSocialist leaders was not only exercised over the control of unemployment compensation, but also in the issuing of ration cards. territories to leave for Germany by increasing their difficulties in finding food. The proof of this desire is given in the transcript of the session of March 1, 1944, of the Conference of the Four Year Plan. This document I referred to a short time ago as No. 30.
This is a passage which has not yet been read, which the Tribunal will please permit me to read. I read from page 5 of the French document. "Melch" is a misprint. It should be milch, m-i-l-c-h.
"Wouldn't the following method be better: The German administration should concern itself with the feeding of Italians and say to them: 'No one shall receive food except he who works in a protected factory or who leaves for Germany. ' "Sauckel:
Is it true that the French workman in France is better fed than the German workman? The Italian workman, even if he doesn't work at all, is better fed in the part of Italy which we occupy than if he worked in Germany." I end my quotation here. economic order--economic-social--which the National-Socialist authorities took to force workers in the occupied territory to accept labor contracts offered by the German authorities. This indirect duress was strengthened by direct pressure which was simultaneously put on the local governments and the employers and on the workers themselves. facilitated by the local authorities; that is why they tried to make the pseudo-governments of the occupied territories guarantee or indorse the fiction of voluntary enrollments. I submit to the Tribunal an example of the pressure which the German authorities placed on the Vichy Government to that purpose. disseminate a directive to all Prefects. It is the directive of March 29, 1941. The German authorities were not satisfied with this directive. They were conscious of the illegality of their recruiting methods and they wished to justify them by an agreement with the de facto government of France. They required that this agreement be made known by public statement. The negotiations were carried out for this purpose in 1942. The violence of the German pressure is substantiated by the letters concerning it addressed by Dr. Michel, Chief of the Administrative Section to the General Delegate for Franco-German Economic Relations. I refer especially to his letters of the 3rd of March, 1942, and May 15, 1942, which constitute Documents 39 and 40.
I read first to the Tribunal the letter of 15 May, which is under the number 40:
"Paris, 15 May 1942.
"Purpose: The Recruiting of French Labor for Germany, "As the result of the conversations of January 24, 1942, and after repeated appeals, the first project of the French government concerning recruiting was presented the 27th on the German side and was accepted with slight modifications and in written form on the 3rd of March, on the condition that attention might be directed at the time of its transmission to the organizational committees, and that attention might be drawn to the fact that the French Government approved expressly the acceptance of labor in Germany.
"On the 19th of March, it was recalled that a project for the memorandum to the organizational committees should be submitted. The project was afterwards submitted on the 27th of March. On the 30th of March a proposal for modification was delivered to M. Terray, who should take it up with M. Bichelonne.
I skip the two following paragraphs, and I will read the last paragraph: "Although no reason appears which explained the not habitual delay, the project was not presented until that day. More than two months had passed since the first request for the presentation of the memorandum. It is requested that this document be edited anew and presented the 19th of May.
"For the Military Commander:
"Chief of the Administrative Staff "Signed, Michel."
The Tribunal undoubtedly has observed that Dr.` Michel required not only a widespread diffusion of the publication. He also required that the text of this statement be officially transmitted to the organizational committees. The pressure which occupation authorities put upon French industrial enterprises to stimulate them to facilitate the departure of their workers to Germany was brought about, in fact, through the medium of the organizational committees. The German offices for labor acted directly upon the organizational committees. They ordered conferences in the course of which they dictated their will to the leaders of these committees.
They also required that the organizational committees be informed of all the measures which the French authorities were led to take. The committees might then be associated with these measures in the interests of German policy.
The correspondence of Dr. Michel offers numerous examples of the constant preoccupation of the German authorities to act upon the organizational committees. I have just offered an example to the Tribunal. I now offer another. 29, 1942, addressed to the Prefects regarding the recruiting of laborers for Germany, should be officially transmitted to the organizational committees. The occupation authorities obtained satisfaction through a circular of the 23rd of April, which. I submit to the Tribunal under No. 41. The terms of this circular did not receive the approval of the German authorities, and on May 28, 1941, Dr. Michel protested in violent terms to the General Delegate for FrancoGerman Economic Relations.
This protest constitutes Document 522 in the French Archives. I submit it to the Tribunal under the No. 42, and I shall read:
"Paris, 28th of May, 1941.
"Purpose: Recruiting of Workers for Germany.
"From your explanations I gather that after the reception of my letter of the 23rd of April a project for a directive for the organizational committees was established and sent on April 25. This directive does not seem to me, nevertheless, adequate to bring about in an efficacious manner the recruiting of workers effected by Germany. That is why I consider that it is necessary that in another directive attention may be drawn to the points which were particularly mentioned on April 23.
"I request you to submit to me as soon as possible a corresponding project. The contribution which has been furnished from Germany for the creation of a favorable atmosphere, which was considered by you at the time of our conversation of 24 May, is a prior condition for the success of forced recruiting of workers for Germany. That is why I do not wish to make a mistake. I hope that you will communicate to the economic organizations a reform which will be of such a nature as to transform into collaboration, as far as the liberation of workers is concerned, the expected attitude which French economy has observed up to here. I then expect that you will submit to me your proposition with all possible promptness." workers themselves.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you reading from the document now?
M. HERZOG: No. I am resuming the text of the brief.
Moral pressure at first. The replacement operation, tried in France in the Spring of 1942, is characteristic. The occupation authorities promised to compensate for the sending of French workers to Germany by a liberation of prisoners of war. The return of a prisoner was to take place upon the departure of a worker. This promise was fallacious, and the reality was quite different. I quote in this connection, the report on compulsory labor and the deportation of workers, which I have submitted this morning to the Tribunal under the number 22.
I quote page 51, and, from the French original 22. In the French original it is the third paragraph; the German translation, first paragraph:
"If the press, inspired by the occupying power, pretends in its commentaries to applaud the replacement postulates of one prisoner for one worker, it is undoubtedly upon order and through calculation. Also, it seems, because until June 20, 1942, the day before the pre-quoted speech, a speech of the Vichy de facto government, it is indeed this proportion which the Germans Michel and Ritter had pretended to accept in their reports to the French administrative services. The proportion, in fact, of one against five, appears to have been to these latter a surprise of which the press never spoke." Here I end my quotation. pressure. I said that the fiction of voluntary enrollment could not hold water, in view of the arrests by the German police. I refer again, and submit a document to the Tribunal which furnishes a characteristic attitude of the Germans in their mentality and the method utilized by National Socialist authorities. This is a document in the French Archives, It is No. 527, which I submit to the Tribunal under the number 43. This is a letter from the delegate of the Reich Labor Minister in the French department of Pas de Calais. This Officially enjoins a young French workman to depart for Germany as a free agent under penalty of unfavorable consequences. I read the document from the third page:
"Sir:
"The 26th of March last I told you at Marquise to go to work in Germany for your profession. You were to leave with the c onvoy of the 1st of April towards Germany. You have taken no consideration of this summons. I warn you that you must repair yourself, furnished with your baggage, next Monday, April 28, before 19 hours, at 51 Street of the Rue de la Pomme d'or at Calais. I declare it will be as a free worker that you leave for Germany; that you will work there in the same conditions and that you will earn there the same remuneration as German workers. In the event that you do not present yourself, I must tell you that unfavorable consequences may very well follow.
"Delegate for the Labor Ministry of the Reich:
"Signed: Hannerann" on the workers of the occupied territories to bring about their alleged voluntary enrollment may be continued. The National Socialist authorities have not only imposed labor contracts filled with threats of violence to foreign workers. They have themselves deliberately failed to honor these contracts. the duration of the enrollments made by foreign workers. This proof is based on several documents. The first is an ordinance issued by the defendant Goering in his capacity as Delegate to the Four Year Plan. Others by the defendant Sauckel. I now call the attention of the Tribunal to order of Sauckel's, dated 22 March 1943, which I submit to the Tribunal; it is March 29, 1943, No. 44, Document No. 44, page 5:
"The General Plenipotentiary for Labor decrees: The regular disposal of the enterprise for that period.
Nevertheless, it sentences, or because of internment in a corrective camp -- "
THE PRESIDENT: Are you reading from a document: Will you read that again.
M. HERZOG: The regular accomplishment of the provisions of the contract with a stipulated duration made by the foreign worker necessitates for the Whole duration of the contract that the workman should be at the disposal of the undertaking with all of his full physical forces. Nevertheless, it happens that some foreign workers as a result of idleness, or laziness, or delays, when they come back to work they expiate all present penalties of internment in a corrective camp.
"-- or for other reasons remain absent from their work for an elapse of time, which is more or less long.
In such cases in Germany represents only the well defined period of time."
the foreign workers were neither voluntary workers nor free workers. I think the exploitation of the methods of German recruiting will show the Tribunal the fictitious character of the voluntary enrollment on which it was supposed to be based. The foreign workers who agreed to work in the factories of the National Socialist war industry did not act through free will. Their number, however, remained limited. The workers of the occupied territories had the physical courage, the ethical courage to resist German pressure. This is proved in an admission of the defendant Sauckel, which I take from the minutes of the meeting of March 3, 1944, of the conference of the Four-Year Plan. This is from an extract which has already been read by my American Colleague, Mr. Dodd, so I will not read it again to the Tribunal. I merely wish to recall that the defendant Sauckel admitted that out of five million foreign workers which came to Germany, there were only to hundred thousand who came in a voluntary fashion. The resistance of the foreign workers surprised the defendant Sauckel as much as it irritated him. One day he expressed his surprise to a German general who replied: "Your difficulties come from the fact that you address yourself to patriots who do not share our ideals." Indeed, only force could constrain the patriots of the occupied territories to work in behalf of the enemy. The National Socialist authorities resorted to force. of force on workers whose particular status guaranteed enrollment and apparent submission: The prisoners of war. From 1940 on the German Military authorities organized labor Kommandos who had been put in the service of the agricultural economy, and of the war industry. The importance of the work required from war prisoners is substantiated by the Report on Forced Labor, and the Deportation of Workers which I have filed with the Tribunal under No. 22, on page 68 of the French Text, and Ferman, the following estimates: many. 987,687 had been alloted as work Kommandos, and, only the surplus, that is, 48,632 prisoners remained unemployed. a distant phenomena which can be disassociated from the gerneral plan for the recruiting of foreign workers; it is, on the contrary, an integral part of this plan.
The National Socialists have always considered that the obligation to work applied as much to war prisoners as to the civilian workers of the occupied territories. They have on many occasions expressed such a belief.
I refer the Tribunal especially to two documents. The first is the decree of the appointment of the accused Sauckel which I have filed with the Tribunal at the beginning of my explanatory remarks. The second document to which I wish to draw the attention of the Tribunal is the first decree of Sauckel, which I submitted sometime ago under No. 17, This decree formulates the principle of the obligation to work, and applies to war prisoners according to the terms of its Article 8. war were to be subject to work in the same degree as civilian workers. This is found in the letter which he wrote to the defendant Rosenberg on April 24, 1942, some days after his appointment to explain his project to him. This is Document 016-PS, which my American Colleague, Mr. Dodd, has already submitted to the Tribunal. I present it as Document No. 45, but I shall not read from it. I find beginning on page 11 of the German Text that the problem of compulsory labor is treated in the general heading entitled, Prisoners of War and foreign Workers." These documents bring a double proof to theTribunal, first of all, they reveal the will of the National Socialists to force prisoners to work in behalf of the German war economy, within the general frame of their recruiting policy. prisoners of war was not due alone to military authorities; this utilization was ordered and systematized by a civilian organization, that of the Arbeitseinsatz. As well as the responsibility of the defendant Keitel it entails also that of the German leaders who conducted the labor policy; the defendant Sauckel, the defendant Speer, and the defendant Goering. which prisoners of war may be forced to work. The Hague Conventions formulated rules which were clarified by the Geneva Convention in Articles 27, 31 and 32.
"ARTICLE 27:- Belligerents may use as workers healthy war prisoners according to their rank and their attitudes with the exception of officers and assimilated officers. Nevertheless, if officers, or those of assimilated rank ask for suitable work it will be procured for them as far as possible. The non-commissioned officers who are war prisoners can only be forced to work as supervisors unless they expressly request a remunerative occupation.
"ARTICLE 31:- the work furnished by the prisoners of war ---"
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will take judicial notice of these Articles.
M. HERTZOG: These rules of positive international law, rather calculated international law determine the legal powers of the Power and Custody of prisoners of war. It is legal to force prisoners of war to work during the duration of their captivity, but this includes three legal limits:
1. It is forbidden to require non-commissioned who are prisoners to 2. War prisoners must not be used for work which is dangerous.
3. Prisoners must not be associated with the enemy war effort. The National Socialist authorities systematically neglected these imperative provisions; they have exercised violent constraint on non-commissioned officers held in captivity, to force them to join labor crews; they have integrated war prisoners as workers in their factories, and in the work yards, without considering the nature of the work imposed upon them. The utilization of war prisoners by National Socialist Germany took place under illegal and criminal conditions. This I declare, and I wish to prove this to the Tribunal.
M. HERZOG: Mr. President, Your Honors. officers to force them to engage in productive work for the Reich war economy. This pressure, after the failure of propaganda methods, took the form of reprisals. Abstaining non-commissioned officers were the object of ill treatment; they were sent to special camps, where they were subject to a disciplinery regime. Some incurred penal sentences because of their refusal to work.
and Refugees of the French Government, Document UK 1782, which is, in my document book, number 46. The document is in a white file. I shall read from page 18 of the French original, page 10 of the German translation.
Page 18, at the bottom of the page:
"Work of the Non-Commissioned Officers.
"On this subject the Geneva Convention was formal and absolute. Noncommissioned officers who were war prisoners cannot be subjected to surveying work except on express request, with a remuneration. In conformity with this article, a certain number of non-commissioned officers refused to work from the beginning of their captivity.
"The force of the imprisoned non-commissioned officers was, at the end of 1940, about 130,000 and represented later a very important source of labor for the Reich. The German authorities tried, therefore, by every means, to induce the greatest number of refractories possible, during the last months of 1941 to this effect: The non-commissioned officers who did not volunteer for the work were, in most camps, subjected to alternate regimes. For a few days they were subjected to punishments like diminution of food rations, obligation to undergo physical exercises for several days; during another period they were promised work in conformity with their wishes, and other material advantages, for example, special regulations on insurance, extra letter provisions, and wages.
"These methods led a certain number of non-commissioned officers to accept work. The non-commissioned officers who persisted in their refusal to work were subjected to a disciplinary regime, a very severe disciplinary regime, and of painful physical exercise." of war for dangerous work. The French, British, Belgian and Dutch prisoners were used to transport munitions, to load bombs on planes, for the reconstruction of aviation camps, and for the construction of trenches. tions and for the loading of bombs on planes is furnished by the affidavit of repatriated French prisoners of war. These affidavits have been assembled in the report of the Ministry of Prisoners, which I have just quoted, and which I shall quote anew. translation. It is the same document as that which I have just quoted, Document 46.
Page 27, (b):
"The requisition of prisoners for the construction of fortifications for the transport of munitions is very often in the close vicinity of the line of fire. 1944, at being employed on Sundays in the construction of anti-tank trenche "On 2 February, 1945, the prisoners of Stalag 2-D, evacuated before the advance of the Russian Army, worked, as soon as they arrived at Statzlitz, at fortification works, anti-tank works in particular, around the city.
"At the moment, falling back from Stalag 3-B, the war prisoners were engaged, to the end of April, in doing ditch work, digging trenches, and in transporting aviation bombs.
"Kommando 553 at Label was obliged to carry out work in the front lines under the fire of Russian artillery.
"Numerous comrades, drawn back at Firchtenwald, were employed in loading bombs on German bombadiers.
"In spite of their protests to the International Committee of the Red Cross of Geneva and to the colonel commanding Stalag 3-B, very bad hygiene, insufficient food, the latter answered that he was obeying superior orders of the OKW to dig trenches, ordering the prisoners to dig trenches." used French and British prisoners of war for military work on airdromes exposed to allied bombardment. I offer in proof two memoranda, the first by the OKH to the War Prisoners Section of the Wehrmacht, and the second by the Wilhelmstrasse to the German representative at the Wiesbaden Armistice Commission. 549. I lodge it with the Tribunal under Number 47, the French documentation and I read it in full:
"The protest of the French Delegation shall be considered as unfounded. The lodging of war prisoners in camps situated in the vicinity of aviation fields is not in contradiction with the rules of the rights of peoples.
"According to Articles 9 and 4 of the Convention on the treatment of war prisoners - of 27 July, 1929 - no prisoner of war must be exposed to the fire of the combat zone in the sense of this regulation. It must be understood as the space or area in which normally a battle between two armies is carried on, or a depth of about 20 kilometers starting from the advance line.
"On the other hand, it is possible that the areas exposed to aerial attacks do not belong to combat zones. At this period of air war there no longer exists any sure shelter.
"The fact of using war prisoners for the construction of a camp and for the placing of camps in destroyed spots does not seem to lend itself to any controversy. According to Article 31 of the Convention quoted here above, war prisoners must not be used in works directly related to war activity. The construction of shelters, houses, and camps is not directly a war act. It is recognized that war prisoners may be employed in the construction of roads.
"According to this, by this example, their utilization for the reconstruction of aviation camps that have been destroyed is permissible. On the roads pass trucks, tanks, ammunition cars, and on the aviation fields there are planes. There is no difference, consequently, between them.
"On the other hand, it would be illegal to use war prisoners in loading bombs, munitions, etc., on bombers. Here a work directly related to war activity would be involved.
"By reason of the juridical situation expounded here above, the OKH has rejected the idea of the suggestion of withdrawing French prisoners of war employed in work in the aviation camps." I draw the attention of the Tribunal to this document. It emphasizes the ill faith of the leaders of National Socialist Germany, which was two-fold. recognizes that it is illegal, that the loading of bombs is forbidden by the Convention. character of the work effectuated on the aviation fields. Now, the note of the Wilhelmstrasse to which I shall now refer, and which I submit to the Tribunal under Number 48 - this note recognizes, on the contrary, that prisoners submitted to work on an aviation field incur grave danger because of the military purpose of this work.
note dated February 14, 1941, Document 48, in the French Documentation Book:
"Article 87 of the Convention of 1920, Prisoners of War, provides that in case of difference of opinion on the subject of the interpretation of the Convention, the protecting powers shall offer their services to settle the dispute. To accomplish this, any protecting power may propose a meeting of representatives of the belligerent powers. France assumes, by herself, the responsibilities of protective powers in questions on prisoners of war."
I shall pass on from this quotation to page 2 of the same document:
"As to the point in dispute, it is well to call attention to the following:
"The French conception, according to which prisoners of war may not be quartered near air fields and may not be employed in repairing plane runways, cannot be based on the textual content of Articles 9 and 31; but on the other hand, it is certain that French prisoners of war quartered and employed under these conditions are in a particularly dangerous situation because the air fields in occupied territories are used exclusively for military purposes and thus constitute a special objective for enemy aerial attacks.
"The American Embassy in Berlin has likewise made a protest against a similar use of British prisoners of war in Germany. Thus far no answer has been made to it because a rejection of this protest might result in German prisoners being employed in military work." substantiated by Document 828-PS, which I file with the Tribunal under number 49 in the French documentation. It is a letter of September 29, 1944, addressed by the Chief of the First Army Corps to the OKW to give an accounting of the work accomplished by 80 Belgian prisoners of war. I quote:
"In conformity with the teletype quoted, by way of reference, it is pointed out that in the territory of Stalag 1-A, Stablack, Einsatzbereich 2-213, Loten, Bei Ragnit, there are 140 Belgian prisoners of war; in Lindbach, Bei Neusiedel, 40 prisoners of war who were also Belgians were employed in fortification labor."
in Reich armament factories were associated with the enemy war effort. To this end I first offer Document 1206-PS. This document is a memorandum dated November 11, 1941. It is a resume of a report made November 7, 1941, to the Aviation Minister by the Reichsmarshal. The document, consequently, establishes the direct responsibility of the Defendant Goering. It regulates, in a general way, the use of Russian war prisoners, but in relation to this work it deals also with prisoners from Western countries. documentation, and I read:
"Berlin, November 11, 1941.
"Notes on outlines laid down by the Reichsmarshal in a meeting of 7 November, 1941, in the Reich Ministry for the Air.
"Subject: Employment of laborers in war industries."
THE PRESIDENT: Has that already been put in by the United States?
M. HERZOG: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then perhaps you could summarize it.
M. HERZOG: I think, Mre. President, that it waspresented by the United States Prosecution. I shall, therefore, simply quote an extract, the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the first page, concerning the employment of French and Belgian war prisoners in individual employment in the economy of armament. to a common plan. It has the effect of a systematic policy. The administrative offices for labor have deliberately assigned to armament factories all war prisoners who seem capable of carrying, out a specialized work.
I quote, in this connection, Document 3005-PS. It is a directive addressed, in 1941, by the Ministry of Labor to the Directors of Personnel Procurement concerning the respective use of French and Russian prisoners of war. The document has been submitted and commented upon by my colleague, Mr. Dodd, I shall, therefore, not read it. I simply point out that this circular deals with the employment of all French war prisoners in the armament factories of the Reich.
the hands of the Germans -- they were not called prisoners of war, but rather, persons under military jurisdiction -- were forced to work. of September 28, 1943, Document 657-PS, which I submit to the Tribunal under number 52.
The Italian military internees were placed in three categories; some ask to continue the struggle beside the German army; others desire to keep a neutral attitude; others have turned in their arms against their former allies. The military internees of the second and third categories must, in the terms of the circular, be forced to work. I read:
"Circular No. 5543 G.R.S. Secret State document concerning the treatment and the recruiting of Italian military internees.
"The OKW, in connection with the general directive for the utilization of labor, has regulated the treatment and the putting to work of Italian military internees. The chief directives of the ordinances of the OKW are the following." Page 2 of the French translation:
"The Italian internees, who, at the investigation, do not declare themselves ready to continue the struggle under the German command, are put at the disposal of the General Plenipotentiary for the Utilization of Labor, who has already given the necessary instructions for forced labor to the Chiefs of the Regional Recruiting Offices.
"It is to be noted that Italian military internees must not be utilized together with the British and American prisoners of war."