In this connection, I offer in evidence EC 369, US Exhibit No. 631, consisting of a memorandum from the Reichsbank Directorate, signed by Schacht, to Hitler, dated 7 January 1939. I wish to read the last paragraph of the first page:
"From the beginning the Reichsbank had been aware of the fact that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the reconstruction of the German aremd forces. It (the Reichsbank) therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility to finance the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was the necessity, which pushed all other considerations into the background, to carry through the armament at once, out of nothing and furthermore under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy possible."
It is clear that the quote "successful foreign policy", which Schacht thus attributed to rearmament, included the Austrian and Czechoslovakian acquisitions. I offer in evidence EC 297A, US Exhibit 632, being a speech of Schacht's in Vienna after the Anschluss in March, 1939. I quote from the third page and the second full paragraph:
"Thank God, these things could after all not hinder the great German people on their way, for Adolf Hitler has created a communion of German will and German thought. He bolstered it up with the newly strengthened Wehrmacht, and he then finally gave the external form to the internal union between Germany and Austria." in evidence, as US Exhibit No. 622, being a speech by Schacht.
THE PRESIDENT: EC --?
LT. BRYSON:EC 611. But I mil not read it sir--being a speech by Schacht on 29 November 1938, shortly after the Munich settlement. I have earlier read the pertinent remark attributing Hitler's success at that conference to the rearmament made possible by Schacht's financial and economic measures. with respect to territorial expansion, and justifies the conclusion that he allied himself with Hitler because of their common viewpoint.
knew Hitler planned military aggression, for which he was creating the means. He had numerous discussions with Hitler from 1933 to 1937. He knew that Hitler was intent upon expansion to the east, which would mean war, and that Hitler felt he must present the German people with a military victory. I offer in evidence US Exhibit 633, consisting of an excerpt from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht on 13 October 1934, and I read from the second page at the end of the second question:
"Q. What was there in what he (meaning Hitler) said that led you to believe he was intending to move towards the east?
"A. That is in 'Mein Kampf'. He never spoke to me about that, but it was in 'Mein Kampf'. "
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this is meant for the 13th of October?
LT. BRYSON: This is the 13th of October, the second page, and at the end of the -
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have it.
LT. BRYSON: (quoting) "What was there in what he (meaning Hitler) said that led you to believe he was intending to move towards the east?
"A. That is in 'Mein Kampf'. He never spoke to me about that, but it was in 'Mein Kampf'.
"Q. In other words, as a man who read it, you understood that Hitler's expansion policy was directed to theeast?
"A. To the east."
I also offer in evidence EC 458. To continue from the interrogation of 13 October:
"Q. And you thought that it would be better to try to divert Hitler from any such intention and to urge upon him a colonial policy instead?
"A". Quite." affidavit of Major Edmund Tilley under date of 21 November 1945, with respect to an interview of Schacht on 9 July 1945. I read the second paragraph:
"During the course of the discussion Schacht stated to me that he had had numerous talks with Hitler from 1933 to 1937. Schacht stated that from these talks he had formed the impression that in order to make his hold and government secure, the Fuehrer felt that he must present the German people with a military victory." war to Europe. I refer the Tribunal to EC 451, which I have already submitted in evidence as US Exhibit 626, consisting of an affidavit under date of 15 November 1945, by Messersmith, American Consul General in Berlin 1930 to 1934. I wish to read from the first page, third paragraph, last sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: You have read it already.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, there is a little more there which we have not read, which I should like to read.
THE PRESIDENT: You read the whole paragraph. At our invitation you read from the third paragraph down to the bottom of the page.
LT. BRYSON: I should like to read the first sentence of the fourth paragraph on page 1.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
LT. BRYSON: (quoting) "while making these protestations, he nevertheless showed by his acts that he was thoroughly an instrument of the whole Nazi program and ambitions, and that he was lending all his extraordinary knowledge and resourcefulness towards the accomplishment of that program."
THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Bryson, speaking for myself and for some other members of the Tribunal, we think it is a far better way to deal with a document -- to deal with it, if possible, once and for all, and not to be coming back to it. It not only wastes time by the fact that the Tribunal have got to turn back and forth, back and forth, to the document, but you get a much fairer idea of the document if it is dealt with once and for all, although it may cover more than one subject.
I say that, for it may be impossible for you to do that now, in consonance with the preparations that you have made, but these who follow: you may be able to alter their course; if it is possible, when you get a document with a variety or a number of paragraphs in it which you want be quote, that you should quote them all at the same time, if possible. Do you follow what I mean?
LT. BRYSON: I follow you, your Honor. To have so organized our materials that we have directed our evidence to Specific points, and since the points are separated, we have to separate our quotations.
THE PRESIDENT: I realize that it may be difficult for you.
LT. BRYSON : In September of 1934. Ambassador Dodd made a record in his diary of a conversation with Sir Eric Phipps at the British Embassy in Berlin. If the Court please. I will pass over this document, because in response to a question from the Tribunal, I read an excerpt from the document which covers the same point that I was about to direct myself toward. in September, 1954, his knowledge of the war purposes of the Nazi Party, and we had already shown that in 1935 Schacht had stated that Germany would, if necessary, acquire colonies by force. He must then have known to what length Hitler was prepared to go. Berlin, Schacht must have known that Hitler was contemplating war. Your Honors may recall, as has been earlier shown, that at this meeting the Defendant Goering, who was very close to Hitler, stated that all measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging of war, and that waiting for new methods is no longer appropriate. I refer the Tribunal to 1301-PS, from which I will not read, as the quotation is already in evidence in US Exhibit No. 123.
of von Blomberg's letter to the Defendant Goering. I refer the Tribunal again to 1301-PS, previously submitted in evidence as US Exhibit 123, and read from the middle of page 19 of the document. The page numbers, if the Court please, on this document are found in the upper left-hand corner.
"According to an order of the Fuehrer, the setting up of all Air Force units is to be completed on 1 April 1937. Therefore considerable expenditures have to be made in 1936 which at the time that the budget for 1936 was made were planned for later years only." Schacht the closeness to war which Hitler must have felt.
I also offer in evidence EC 416, US Exhibit No. 635, consisting of minutes of the Cabinet meeting of 4 September 1936, which Schacht attended. I read the statement by Goering found at the ton of page 2 of this document.
"The Fuehrer and Reichskanzler has given a memorandum to the Colonel General and the Reich bar Minister Which represents a general instruction.
"It starts from the basic thought that the showdown with Russia is inevitable."
Schacht thus knew that Hitler expected war with Russia. He also knew of Hitler's ambition towards the east. It must have been plain to him, therefore, that sucha war would result from Russian opposition to German military expansion in that direction; that is, Schacht must have know that it would be a war of German aggression.
In January, 1937, the Tribunal will recall, Schacht stated to Ambassador Davies in Berlin that he had "been authorized by his government" to submit certain proposals to France and England, which, in fact, amounted to a bid for colonies under threat of war.
If Schacht was acting under instructions from Hitler, he was necessarily familiar with Hitler's aggressive intentions at that time. Austria and at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia and that Hitler also had designs on the Polish Corridor. I refer the Tribunal to L-151, already in evidence as U. S. Exhibit No. 70, this being a letter containing a memorandum of a conversation between Schacht and Ambassador Bullit dated 23 November 1937. I quote the last paragraph on Page 2:
"Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany, and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present momen he was not vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor, and in his (Schacht's) opinion it might be possible to maintain the Corridor provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany". as well as for Hitler.
We have seen from his speech of 29 March 1938 in Vienna his enthusiasm for the Anschluss after the event. He was even then working hard for its achievement. In this connection, I refer the Tribunal to Pages 506 to 507 of the transcript for evidence of Schacht's having subsidized the Nazis' preliminary agitation in Austria. take into consideration the fact that to such a man as Schacht the events of the period certainly bespoke Hitler's intention. Schacht was a close collaborator of Hitler and a member of the cabinet during the period of the Nazi agitation in Austria, the introduction of conscription, the march into the Rhineland, the overthrow of the Republican Government of Spain, the ultimate conquest of Austria, and the acquisition of the Sudetenland by a show of force. During this period the Reichs debt tripled under the stress of mounting armament. The expenditure rose from three-quarters of a billion Reichsmarks in 1932 to eleven billion Reichsmarks in 1937 and fourteen billion Reichsmarks were spent on armaments.
It was a period in which the burning European issue was the satisfaction of Germany's repeated demands for additional territory. Hitler, committed to a policy of expansion, was taking great risks in foreign policy and laying the greatest stress upon the utmost speed in preparation for war. fact that he was assisting Hitler and Germany along the road to armed aggression.
We turn now to our last line of proof, with respect to Schacht's loss of power in the Hitler regime. In November 1937 Schacht resigned his offices as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy. At that time he accepted the appointment as Minister without Portfolio, and he also continued as President of the Reichsbank.
Our evidence will show (a) this change in position was no more than a clash between two power-seeking personalities, Goering and Schacht, in which Goering, being the closer to Hitler, won out; (b) their policy differences were concerned only with the method of re-arming and (c) Schacht's loss of power in no sense implies an unwillingness to assist armed aggression. concerned only with the method and not the desirability of war preparations. Schacht emphasized foreign trade as a necessary source of re-armament material during the transitory period until Germany should be ready to strike. Goering was a proponent of complete self-sufficiency. Hitler supported Goering, and Schacht, his pride wounded and bitterly resenting Goering's intrusion in the economic field, finally stepped out. U. S. Exhibit No. 123, containing notes of a conversation between Schacht and Thomas on 2 September 1936. These are found on Page 21 of the document, from which I quote:
"President Schacht called me to him today at 1300 and requested me to forward the following to the Minister of War:
"Schacht returned from the Fuehrer with the greatest anxiety, since he could not agree to the seconmic program planned by the Fuehrer.
"The Fuehrer wants to speak at the Party convention about economic policy and wants to emphasize there that we now want to get free with all our energy from foreign countries by production in Germany.
"Schacht requests urgently the the Reichminister of War warn the Fuehrer from this step."
And three paragraphs down:
"If we now shout out our decision abroad, to make ourselves economically independent, then we cut our own throats, because we can no longer survive the necessary transitory period". few days later in Nurnberg, and, against Schacht's wishes, Goering was named Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan. on 16 October 1945, being US Exhibit 636. I wish to read beginning near the bottom of Page 9 of the document:
"Q And the Four-Year Plan came in when?
"A It was announced in September '36, on the Party Day.
"Q Do you say that from the time that the Four Year Plan came in in September 1936, you were allready to rid yourself of your economic duty?
"A No. At that time I thought that I might maintain my position even against Goering.
"A That he would not interfere with affairs which I had to manage in my Ministry.
"Q. As a matter of fact, his appointment was not met with favor by you?
"A I would not have appointed a man like Goering who didn't understand a bit about all these things." jurisdiction. On 26 November 1936 Goering issued a directive regarding raw and synthetic material production. I offer in evidence EC 243, Exhibit No. 637, consisting of a copy of this directive. It shows that Goering's office for raw and synthetic materials pre-empted control over large economic areas previously in the hands of Schacht. As an example, I'll quote from Paragraph 5 on Page 4 of the document:
"The planning and determination of objectives, as well as the control over the execution of the tasks which must be accomplished within the framework of the Four Year Plan, are the responsibility of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, which supersedes the authorities which have heretofore been in charge of these tasks." offices in the Ministry of Economics to accept instructions from him alone. I offer in evidence EC 376, US Exhibit No. 638, consisting of a circular from Schacht to all supervisory offices under date of 11 December 1936, and I quote from the second paragraph:
"The supervisory offices are obliged to accept instructions from me only. They must answer all official inquiries of the Office for German Raw Materials in order to give any information at any time to the fullest extent."
And a little further down:
"I herewith authorise the supervisory offices to take the necessary measures for themselves. In case doubts should result from requests of the above offices, and these doubts cannot be removed by oral negotiations with the specialized workers for that office, I should immediately be informed. I will then order in each case the necessary steps to be taken."
The military sides with Schacht, who had re-armed them so well. I offer in evidence EC 420, US Exhibit 630, consisting of a draft of a memorandum by the Military Economic Staff, dated 19 December 1936. I wish to read from Paragraph No. 1.
"(1) The control of war economy in the civilian sector in case of war is possible only for that person, who, in peace time has made preparations for war under his own responsibility.
"Upon recognizing this fact, a year and a half ago, Reichbank President Dr. Schacht was appointed Plenipotentiary General for War Economy and an Operations Staff was attached to his Office."
And then from Paragraph No. 2:
"(2) The Military Economy Staff does not deem it compatible with the principle laid down in No. 1, Paragraph 1, if the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy is now placed under the Minister President Colonel General Goering's command." praising Schacht's re-armament. Without reading it, I offer in evidence EC 383, US Exhibit 640, containing this article, a pertinent quotation from which already appears in the transcript for 23 November at Page 296. by temporarily refusing to act in his capacity as Plenipotentiary. I offer in evidence EC 244, US Exhibit 641, consisting of a letter from Von Blomberg, the Minister of War, to Hitler under date of February 22, 1937. I read the second paragraph of this letter as follows:
"The President, Dr. Schacht, has notified me that he is not acting in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for the time being since in his opinion there is existing a conflict between the powers conferred upon him and those of Colonel General Goering. Because of this the preparatory mobilization steps in the economic field are delayed." lever.
THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Bryson, does the defendant Schacht admit in his interrogation that the reason for his giving up his office was the difference of opinion between him and the defendant Goering?
LT. BRYSON: He does, Sir, and the defendant Goering so states in his interrogation.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court will be satisfied that this was the cause of Schacht's resignation-
THE PRESIDENT: If they both say so-
LT. BRYSON: And the cause was not his unwillingness to go along with the aggressive intentions of the Nazis at that time, I'll be perfectly satisfied to confine our evidence to interrogations of Schacht and Goering.
THE PRESIDENT: Does he suggest that in his interrogation? That that might have been the reason?
LT. BRYSON: Not to my knowledge, Sir, but our case against Schacht is premised upon conspiracy.
THE PRESIDENT: If the defendant Schacht wants to set up such a case as that, you could apply to be heard in rebuttal.
LT. BRYSON: Well, we'll be satisfied then to eliminate a number of our items of evidence, including the controversy between Goering and Schacht, and satisfy ourselves with the interrogations.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, we are almost at the time of the break. Perhaps during the break we can arrange our evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we will adjourn for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken from 1120 to 1130 hours.)
PROFESSOR HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): We agree that the question of the disagreement between Goering and Schacht is not to be discussed at this time. But we shall come back to the question as to what extent this disagreement affected the plan of aggressive war.
THE PRESIDENT: Go ahead.
PROFESSOR KRAUS: To what extent this disagreement affected it -concerned the plan of a war of aggression; to that question we shall refer extensively later.
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: If the Tribunal please:
We have eliminated part of our proof. I would simply like to put in a letter from Goering and an interrogation of Schacht, which will finish up on the question of the disagreement. Goering, who replied with a twenty-four page letter on 22 August, 1937. Goering's letter reviews their many differences in detail. I offer it as EC 493, US Exhibit No. 642, and I Wish to read simply one statement, found in the middle of page 13:
"In conclusion I should like to refer to remarks which you made in a paragraph of your letter entitled 'The Four Year Plan' about your general attitude"-
THE PRESIDENT: Is this EC 493?
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: 493, sir, page 13, in the middle of the page.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: "In conclusion, I should like to refer to remarks which you made in a paragraph of your letter entitled 'The Four-Year Plan' about your general attitude toward my work in regard to the economic policy. I know and am pleased that at the beginning of the Four-Year Plan you promised me your loyal support and cooperation and that you repeatedly renewed this promise even after the first differences of opinion had occurred and had been removed in exhaustive discussions. I deplore all the more having the impression recently, which is confirmed by your letter, that you are increasingly antagonistic toward my work in the Four-Year Plan.
This explains the fact that our collaboration has gradually become less close." 1937, but subsequently again fell into disagreement, and Hitler finally accepted Schacht's resignation as Minister of Economics on 26 November, 1937, simultaneously appointing him as Minister with Portfolio and later Schacht's resignation was extended to his position as Plenipotentiary for War Economy. Without reading it, I offer in evidence EC 494, US Exhibit No. 643, as proof of this fact. Schacht, under date of 16 October 1945, US Exhibit 636, and I wish to read from page 12 of the document near the bottom:
"A. It may amuse you if I told you that the last conversation --" this is Schact speaking -- "the last conversation I had with Goering on these topics was in November 1937, when Luther for two months had endeavored to unite Goering and myself and to induce me to further cooperate with Goering and maintain my position as Minister of Economics. Then I had a last talk with Goering, and at the end of this talk Goering said, 'but I must have the right to give orders to you'. Then I said, 'not to me, but to my successor.' I never have taken orders from Goering, and I would never have done it because he was a fool in economics and I know something about it, at least.
"Q. Well, I gather that was a culminating, progressive personal business between you and Goering. That seems perfectly obvious.
"A. Certainly," ghtest suggestion that Schacht's withdrawal from these two posts represented a break with Hitler on the ground of contemplated military aggression. Indeed, Hitler was gratified that Schacht would still be active in the Government as Presi dent of the Reichsbank and as Minister without Portfolio. I offer in evidence L-104, U.S. Exhibit No. 644, consisting of a letter to the United States Secretary of State from Ambassador Dodd, under date of 29 November, 1937, enclosing a translation of Hitler's letter of 26 November 1937 to Schacht.
I quote the last two sentences of Hitler's letter, found on page two of the document:
"If I accede to your wish it is with the expression of deepest gratitude for your so excellent achievements and in the happy consciousness that, as President of the Reichsbank Directorium, you will make available for the German people and me for many years more your outstanding knowledge and ability and your untiring strength.
Delighted at the fact that in the future, also, you are willing to be my personal adviser, I appoint you as of today a Reich Minister." Hitler's aggressive purposes. He was still President of the Reichsbank at the time of the taking of Austria in March, 1938. In fact, the Reichsbank took over the Austrian National Bank. On this point I refer the Tribunal to Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Part I, page 254, and ask that judicial notice be taken thereof. Further, Schacht even participated in the planning of the absorption of Austria. In this connection I introduce into evidence EC-421, US Exhibit 645, consisting of excerpts from minutes of a meeting of the Staff of General Thomas on 11 March, 1938, at 15.00 hours. I quote therefrom as follows.
"Lieutenant Colonel Huenerm reads Directive of the Fuehrer of 11 March concerning the 'Action Otto' and informs us that 'The Economy War Service Law' has been put in force. He then reads Directives 1 and 2, and gives special orders to troops for crossing the Austrian borders. After that, according to a suggestion by Schacht, no requests should take place, but everything should be put in Reichsmarks on an exchange basis of two shillings to one Reichsmark." asked also to take judicial notice of Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Part I, page 405. approval by Schacht of the Anschluss in his Vienna speech of 21 March, 1938, and your Honors will also recall Schacht's pride in Hitler's use of the rearmed Wehrmacht at Munich, as expressed in his speech of 29 November, 1938.
Both speeches were subsequent to the Reichsbank in January, 1939.
The reason for this development is quite clear.
Schacht lost confidence in the credit capacity of and bring on inflation.
In this attitude he ceased to be useful to submitted in evidence as US Exhibit No. 631.
This document is a inflation.
The seriousness of the situation may be seen generally from the entire text.
I wish to quote several of the more crucial "We are, however, faced with the fact that approximately three billion Reichsmarks of such acceptances cannot now be paid, though they will be due in 1939."
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say page four? It is page five, I think, on our copy.
LT. BRYSON: In my copy of the document it is the bottom of page three, using the numbers at the bottom of the page, the last paragraph, the second sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had been reading the part, "We are convinced" -
LT. BRYSON: We are coming to that, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, on page three.
LT. BRYSON: It will be unnecessary to read it again, I take it?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. BRYSON: I quote from the upper half of page four:
"Exclusive of the Reichsbank there are approximately six billion Reichsmarks 'Mefo' acceptance bills which can be discounted against cash payment at any time at the Reichsbank, which fact represents a continuous danger to the currency."
And I quote finally from the concluding paragraph of the memorandum:
"We are convinced that the effects on the currency caused by the policy of the last ten months can be mended, and that the danger of inflation again can be eliminated by strict maintenance of balanced budget. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, himself, has publicly rejected, again and again, an inflation as foolish and fruitless.
"We therefore ask for the following measures:
(1) The Reich as well as all the other public offices must not incur expenditures or assume guaranties and obligations that cannot be covered by taxes or by those funds which can be raised through loans without disturbing the long-term investment market.
(2) In order to carry out these measures effectively, full financial control over all public expenditures must be restored to the Reich Minister of Finance.
(3) The price and wage control must be rendered effective. The existing mismanagement must be eliminated.
(4) The use of the money and investment market must be at the sole discretion of the Reichsbank."
It is clear that Schact's fear was genuine, and is a complete explanation for his departure from the scene. He had good reason to be afraid. In fact, the Finance Minister had already recognized the situation in September 1938. I refer the Tribunal to EC 419, U.S. Exhibit No. 621, which I have already submitted in evidence and which consists of a letter under date of 1 September 1938 from Krosigk to Hitler, in which Krosigk warns of an Impending financial crisis. I quote from the bottom of page two :
THE PRESIDENT: Isn't that really cumulative of what you have already read?
LT. BRYSON: We will be glad to slap it, sir; it is cumulative. that he personally would be held responsible for it. I offer in evidence an affidavit of Emil Puhl, a director of the Reichsbank and co-worker of Schacht, dated 8 November 1945, designated as EC 438, U.S. Exhibit No. 646, and I read therefrom, beginning on the bottom of the second page:
"When Schacht saw that the risky situation which he had sponsored was becoming insoluble, he was more and more anxious to get out. This desire to get out of a bad situation was for a long time the 'leit motif' of Schact's conversation with the Directors of the bank." from the Presidency of the Reichsbank. I offer in evidence U.S. Exhibit No. 647, consisting of excerpts from an interrogation of von Krosigk under date of 24 September 1945, and I wish to read several statements beginning at the very bottom of the second page:
"I asked Mr. Schacht to finance the Reich before the ultimo of the month the sum of one hundred or two hundred millions. It was this quite usual procedure which we had used for years and years, and we used to give back this money after a couple of days.
Schacht this time refused and said that he was not willing to finance a penny because he wanted that, as he said, it should be made clear to Hitler that the Reich was bankrupt. I tried to explain that this was not the proper ground to discuss the whole question of financing because the question of financing very small sums for a few days during ultimo never would bring Hitler to the oncviction that the whole financing was impossible. As far as I remember now, it was Funk who told Hitler something about this conversation, then Hitler asked Schacht to call upon him. I do not know what they said, but the result certainly was the dismissal of Schacht."
THE PRESIDENT: Just give me the reference to that document again that you were reading from.
LT. BRYSON: This is the interrogation of von Krosigk under date of 24 September 1945. I wish to read further, continuing on page three:
"Q. Now, did Schacht ever say anything to you to the effect that he wanted to resign because he was in opposition to the continuance of the rearmament program?
"A. No, he never said it in this specific form, but in some conversations he certainly said several times in his own way that he had conflicts with Goering so that in answer to that I didn't take these things very seriously.
"Q. Well, let me put it this way, and please think carefully about this. Did Schacht ever say that he wanted to resign because he realized that the extent of the rearmament program was such as to lead him to the conclusion that it was in preparation of war rather than for defense?
"A. No, he never did.
"Q. Was Schacht ever quoted to you to this effect by any of your colleagues or by anybody else?
"A. No.
"Q. Now after Keitel took over the position of Chief of the Wehrmacht, there were still meetings between Schacht and yourself, with Keitel in place of Blomberg?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Did Schacht ever say anything at these meetings to indicate that except for the technical question of the financing through the Reichsbank directly, he was opposed to a further program of rearmament or opposed to the budget of the Wehrmacht?
"A. No, I don't think he ever did." Tribunal to the interrogation of Goering under date of 17 October 1945, this being U.S. Exhibit No. 648. I read from the interrogation of Goering on 17 October 1945, from the lower half of the third page:
"Q. I want to ask you this specifically. Was Schacht dismissed from the Reichsbank by Hitler for refusing to participate any further in the rearmament program?
"A. No, because of his utterly impossible attitude in this matter, regarding this advance which had no connection with the rearmament program," Hitler dismissed Schacht from the Reichsbank on 20 January 1939.
Without reading, I offer in evidence EC 398, U.S. Exhibit No. 649, consisting merely of a brief note from Hitler to Schacht announcing his dismissal.
From all of the foregoing, it is clear that Schacht's dismissal in no sense reflected a parting of the ways with Hitler on account of proposed aggression. This fact may also be seen from EC 397, U.S. Exhibit No. 650, consisting of Hitler's letter to Schacht under date of 19 January 1939, the text of which I wish to read:
"On the occasion of your recall from Office as President of the Reichsbank Directory, I take the opportunity to express to you my most sincere and warmest gratitude for the services which you rendered repeatedly to Germany and to me personally in this capacity during long and difficult years. Your name, above all, will always be connected with the first epoch of the national rearmament. I am happy to be able to avail myself of your services for the solution of new tasks in your position as Reich Minister." 1943.
I wish to conclude by saying that the evidence shows first, Schacht's work was indispensable to Hitler's rise to power and to the rearmament of Germany; secondly, Schacht personally was favorably disposed towards aggression and knew Hitler intended to and would break the peace; and third, Schacht retired from the scene for reasons wholly unrelated to the imminence of illegal aggression.