line through the line of conduct followed by pre-war "Therefore we National Socialists have purposely drawn a Germany in foreign policy.
We put an end to the per subject to her."
"Mein Kampf" is not to be regarded as a mereliterary exercise, nor as an inflexible policy or plan incapable of modification. throughout its pages. secret meetings to which the Tribunal proposes to make special reference because of the light they shed upon the question of the common plan and aggressive war. the 22nd of August 1939 and the 23rd of November 1939. purposes, which are quite unmistakable in their terms. ject to some criticism at the hands of defending Counsel. that they do not purpose to be verbatim transcripts of the speeches they was dated five days after the meeting hid taken place, and that the two record, that the document dealing with the meeting on the 5th November 1937, documents dealing with the meeting of August 22nd 1939 differ from one anther, and are unsigned.
of the opinion that the documents are documents of the highest value, and that their authenticity and substantial truth pre established. have been preserved as such in the archives of the German Government, from whose custody they were captured. Such documents could never be dismissed as inventions, nor even as inaccurate or distorted; they plainly record events which actually took place. 23rd November 1939, when Hitler called his Supreme Commanders together. A record was made of whet was said, by one of those present. At the date of the meeting, Austria and Czechoslovakia had been incorporated into the German Reich, Poland had been conquered by the German armies, and the war with Great Britain and France was still in its static phase. The moment was opportune for a review of past events. Hitler informed the Commanders that the purpose of the Conference was to give them an idea of the world of his thoughts, and to tell them his decision. He thereupon reviewed his political task since 1919, and referred to the secession of Germany from the League of Nations, introduction of compulsory armed service, the occupation of the Rhineland, the the denunciation of the Disarmament Conference, the order for re-armament, the seizure of Austria, and the action against Czechoslovakia.
He stated:
"One year later, Austria came; this step also was considered doubtful.
It brought about a consider able reinforcement of the Reich.
The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland.
This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign.
First of all, the western fortification had to be finished.
It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort.
It was satisfied with the Sudeten German territory.
That was only a partial solution.
The decision to march into Bohemia, was made.
Then followed the erection action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite order not to strike.
The decision to strike was always in me.
Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem.
Under pressure it was decided that the East was to be attacked first."
tions present from the beginning, puts beyond any question of doubt the character of the actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the war against Poland.
For they had all been accomplished according to plan; and the nature of that plan must now be examined in a little more detail. things accomplished; at the earlier meetings now to be considered, he was looking forward, and revealing his plans to his confederates. The comparison is instructive. 1937 was attended by Lt.-Col. Hoszback, Hitler's personal adjutant, who 1937 and signed.
compiled a long note of the proceedings, which he dated the 10th November and Raeder, in their capacities as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Reich Foreign Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy respectively, General von Blomberg, Minister of War, and General von Fritsch, the Commander-inChief of the Army. high importance that in other states it would have taken place before the Cabinet. He went on to say that the subject matter of his speech was the result of his detailed deliberations, and of his experiences during his four and a half years of Government. He requested that the statements he was about to make should be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament. Hitler's main theme was the problem of living space, and he discussed various possible solutions, only to set them aside. He then said that the seizure of living space on the continent of Europe was therefore necessary, expressing himself in these words:
"It is not a case of conquering people but of con quering agriculturally useful space.
Itwould also ations.
... The history of ail times - Roman Empire.
and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor."
He concluded with this observation:
"The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at the lowest cost."
the events which soon followed showed the reality of his purpose. It is Nothing could indicate more plainly the aggressive intentions of Hitler, and impossible to accept the contention that Hitler did not actually mean war; for after pointing out that Germany might expect the opposition of England and France, and analyzing the strength and the weakness of those powers in particular situations, he continued:
"The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk.
.. If we to reply to the Questions 'when' and 'how'. In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases."
The first of these three cases set forth a hypothetical international situation, in which he would take action not later than 1943 to 1945, saying:
"If the Fuehrer is still living then it will be his problem not later than 1943 to 1945.
The necessity sideration in Cases 2 and 3." The second and third cases to which Hitler referred show the plain intention to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in this connection Hitler said:
"For the improvement of our military-political advance westwards."
He further added:
"The annexation of the two states to Germany new armies up to a strength of about twelve divisions."
This decision to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia was discussed in some detail;
itself.
the action was to be taken as soon as a favorable opportunity presented now to be directed at the two specific countries, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Hitler actually meant to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, and that the purpose of the conference was only to put pressure on von Fritsch to speed up the re-armament of the Army. Blomberg, believed that Hitler actually meant war, a conviction which the defendant Raeder claims that he held up to the 22nd August 1939. The basis of this conviction was his hope that Hitler would obtain a "political solution" of Germany's problems. But all that this means, when examined, is the belief that Germany's position would be so good, and Germany's armed might so overwhelming, that the territory desired could be obtained without fighting for it. It must be remembered too that Hitler's declared intention with regard to Austria was actually carried out within a little over four months from the date of the meeting, and within less than a year the first portion of Czechoslovakia was absorbed, and Bohemia and Moravia a few months later. If any doubts had existed in the minds of any of his hearers in November 1937, after March of 1939 there could no longer be any question that Hitler was in deadly earnest in his decision to resort to war. The Tribunal is satisfied that Lt.-Col. Hoszbach's account of the meeting is substantially correct, and that those present knew thatAustria and Czechoslovakia would be annexed by Germany at the first possible opportunity.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: I will now ask M. Donnedieu de Vabres to continue the reading of the judgment.
The invasion of Austria was a pre-meditated agressive step in
M. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES: furthering the plan to wage aggressive wars against other countries. As a result Germany's flank was protected, that of Czechoslovakia being greatly weakened. The first step had been taken in the seizure of "Lebensraum"; many new divisions of trained fightng men had been acquired; and with the seizure of foreign exchange reserves, the re-armament programme had been greatly strengthened. did not intend either to attack Austria or to interfere in her internal affairs. On the 1st May 1936 he publicly coupled Czechoslovakia wit Austria in his avowal of peaceful intentions; and so late as the 11th July 1936 he recognized by treaty the full sovereignty of Austria...
Austria was in fact seized by Germany in the month of March 1938. For a number of years before that date, the National Socialists in Germany had been cooperating with the National Socialists of Austria with the ultimate object of incorporating Austria into the German Reich. The Putsch of July 25th 1934, which resulted in the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss, had the seizure of Austria as its object; but the Putsch failed, with the consequence that the National Socialist Party was outlawed in Austria. On the 11th July 1936 an agreement was entered into between the two countries, Article 1 of which stated:
"The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the 21st May 1935."
"Each of the two Governments regards the inner Article 2 declared:
political order (including the question of Austrian National Socialism) obtaining in the other country influence."
activities under cover of secrecy; and the National Socialists of Germany gave the Party active support. The resulting "incidents" were seized upon by the German National Socialists as an excuse for interfering in Austrian affairs. After the conference of the 5th November 1937, these "incidents" rapidly multiplied. The relationship between the two countries steadily worsened, and finally the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg was persuaded by the defendant von Papen and others to seek a conference with Hitler, which took place at Berchtesgaden on the 12th February 1939. The defendant Keitel was present at the conference, and Dr. Schuschnigg was threatened by Hitler with an immediate invasion of Austria. Schuschnigg finally agreed to grant a political amnesty to various Nazis convicted of crime, and to appoint the Nazi Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior and Security with control of the Police. On the 9th March 1939, in an attempt to preserve the independence of his country, Dr. Schuschnigg decided to hold a plebiscite on the question of Austrian independence, which was fixed for the 13th March 1939. Hitler, two days later, sent an ultimatum to Schuschnigg that the plebiscite must be withdrawn. In the afternoon and evening of the 11th March 1939 the defendant Goering made a series of demands upon the Austrian Government, each backed up by the threat of invasion. After Schuschnigg had agreed to the cancellation of the plebiscite, another demand was put forward that Schuschnigg must resign, and that the defendant Seyss-Inquart should be appointed Chancellor.
first refusing to point Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, gave way and In consequence Schuschnigg resigned, and President Miklas, after at appointed him.
to cross the border at dawn on the 12th of March and instructed SeyssInquart to use formations of Austrian National Socialists to depose Miklas and to seize control of the Austrian Government. After the order to parch had been given to the German troops, Goering telephoned the German Embassy in Vienna and dictated a telegram in which he wished Seyss-Inquart to send to Hitler to justify the military action which had already been ordered. It was :
"The provisional Austrian Government, which, after the bloodshed.
For this propose it asks the German Government at to send German troops as soon as possible."
Keppler, an official of the German Embassy, replied:
"Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but every thing is quiet."
After some further discussion, Goering stated:
"Please show him (Seyss-Inquart) the text of the well, he doesn't even have to send the telegram.
All he needs to do is to say 'Agreed'." Seyss-Inquart never sent the telegram; he never even telegraphed "Agreed." after 10 p.m., he called Keppler and told him to call up Hitler and ` transmit his protests against the occupation. This action outraged the defendant Goering, because "it would disturb the rest of the Fuehrer, Who wanted to go to Austria the next day." At 11:15 p.m. an official in the Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees."
telephoned the German Embassy in Vienna and was told by Keppler: "Tell Austria, and met with no resistance. It was announced in the German press that Seyss-Inqurrt had been appointed the successor to Schuschnigg, and the telegram which Goering had suggested, but which was never sent, was quoted to show that Seyss-Inquart had requested the presence of German troops to prevent disorder. On the 13th March 1938 a law was passed for the reunion of Austria in the German Reich. SeyssInquart demanded that President Miklas should sign this law, but he refused to do so, and resigned his office. He was succeeded by SeyssInquart, who signed the law in the name of Austria. This law was then adopted as law of the Reich by a Reich Cabinet decree issued the same day, and signed by Hitler and the defendants Goering, Frick, von Ribbentrop and Hess. Austria was justified by the strong desire expressed in many quarters for the union of Austria and Germany; that there were many matters in common between the two peoples that made this union desirable ; and that in the result the object was achieved without bloodshed. plainly prove that the methods employed to achieve to object were these of an aggressor. The ultimate factor was the armed might of Germany ready to be used if any resistance was encountered. Moreover, none of these considerations appear from the Hoszbach account of the meetings of the 5th November contrary, all the emphasis is there laid on the advantage to 1937 to have been the motives which actuated Hitler; on the be gained by Germany in her military strength by the annexation of Austria.
that the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Germany had been definitely decided upon. The only question remaining was the selection of the suitable moment to do it. On the 4th March 1938 the defendant Ribbentrop wrote to the defendant Keitel with regard to a suggestion made to Ribbentrop by the Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin, that possible war arms against Czechoslovakia should be discussed between the German and Hungarian armies. In the course of this letter Ribbentrop said:
"I have many doubts about such negotiations. In to M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that the developments then taking place in Austria would in no way have any detrimental influence on the relations between the German Reich and Czechoslovakia, and emphasized the continued earnest endeavour on the part of the Germans to improve those mutual relations. On the 12th March, Goering asked M. Mastny to call on him, and repeated these assurances. was absorbed was a typical manoeuvre on the part of the defendant Goering, which he was to repeat later in the case of Poland, when he made the most strenuous same day, the 12th March, the defendant von Neurath spoke with efforts to isolate Poland in the impending struggle.
On the M. Mastny, and assured him on behalf of Hitler that Germany still considered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak arbitration convention concluded at Locarne in October 1935. by the German Army on the 12th March, and the annexation of Austria on the 13th March, Conrad Henlein, who was the leader of the Sudeten German party in Czechoslovakia, saw Hitler in Berlin on the 28th March. On the following day, at a conference in Berlin, when Ribbentrop was present with Henlein, the general situation was discussed, and later the defendant Jodl recorded in his diary:
"After the annexation of Austria the Fuehrer Nevertheless, preparations for Case Gruen ( that is, the plan against Czechoslovakia) will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be gic position because of the annexation of Austria."
Hitler and the defendant Keitel with regard to "Case Gruen", showing quite clearly that the preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were being fully considered. On the 28th May 1933 Hitler ordered that preparations should be made for military action against Czechoslovakia by the 2nd October, and from then onwards the plan to invade Czechoslovakia was constantly under review. On the 30th May 1938 a directive signed by Hitler declared his "unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future."
from the files of the SD in Berlin, an elaborate plan for the employment of the SD in Czechoslovakia had been proposed.
This plan provided that "the SD follow, if possible, immediately after the leading troops, and take upon themselves the duties similar to their tasks in Germany ..." in certain operations. Special agents were to be trained beforehand to prevent sabotage and these agents were to be notified "before the attack in due time.. in order to give them the possibility to hide themselves, avoid arrest and deportation. . . " "At the beginning, guerilla or partisan warfare is to be expected, therefore weapons are necessary.
..." as follows: "To arrest" . . . "To liquidate" . . . "To confiscate" . . . "To deprive of passport" etc. country into larger and smaller territorial units, and considered various "suggestions", as they were termed, for the incorporation into the German Reich of the inhabitants and districts of Czechoslovakia. The final "suggestion" included the whole country, together with Slovakia and Carpathian Russia, with a population of nearly 15 millions. after the Munich Conference, but the fact that the plan existed in such exact detail and was couched in such war-like language indicated a calculated design to resort to force. by Jodl dated the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the question of defense 24th August 1938, concerning the timing or the order for measures.
This memorandum contained the following:
"Operation Gruen will be set in motion by means of an 'incident' in Czechoslovakia, which will tion.
The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importa nce."
Czechoslovakia had been planned in detail long before the Munich conference. with military leaders continued. In view of the extraordinarily critical situation which had arisen, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, flew to Munich and then went to Berchtesgaden to see Hitler. On the 22nd September Mr. Chamberlain met Hitler for further discussions at Bad Godesberg. On the 26th September 1938 Hitler said in a speech in Berlin, with reference to his conversation:
"I assured "him, moreover, and I repeat it here, Europe; and I further assured him that from the far as I am concerned I will guarantee it.
We don't want any Czechs.
" Hitler and Mussolini and the British and French Prime Ministers in Munich, the Munich Pact was signed, by which Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce In the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. The "piece of paper" which the British Prime Minister brought back to London, signed by himself and Hitler, expressed the hope that for the future Britian and.
Germany might live without war. That Hitler never intended to adhere to the Munich Agreement is shown by the fact that a little later he asked the defendant Keitel for information with regard to the military force which in his opinion would be required to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia. Keitel gave his reply on the 11th October 1938. On the 21st October 1938 a directive was issued by Hitler, and countersigned by the defendant Keitel, to the armed forces on their future tasks, which stated:
"Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.
become hostile towards Germany." Chvalkovsky came to Berlin at the suggestion of Hitler, and attended a meeting at which the defendants Ribbentrop, Goering and Keitel were present, with others. The proposal was made to Hacha that if he would sign an agreement consenting to the incorporation of the Czech people in the German Reich at once, Bohemia and Moravia would be saved from destruction. He was informed that German troops had already received orders to march and that any resistance would be broken with physical force. The defendant Goering added the threat that he would destroy Prague completely from the air. Faced by this dreadful alternative, Hacha and his Foreign Minister put their signatures to the necessary agreement at 4.30 in the morning, and Hitler and Ribbentrop signed on behalf of Germany.
the 16th March the German decree was issued incorporating Bohemia and On the 15th March German troops occupied Bohemia and Moravia, and on Moravia in the Reich as a protectorate, and this decree was signed by the defendant's Ribbentrop and Frick.
been discussed by Hitler at the meeting of the 5th November 1937, had been accomplished, The time had now come for the German leaders to consider further acts of aggression, made more possible of attainment because of that accomplishment.
On the 23d May 1939 a meeting was held in Hitler's study in the new Reich Chancellery in Berlin. Hitler announced his decision to attack Poland and gave his reasons, and discussed the effect the decision might have on other countries. In point of time, this was the second of the important meetings to which reference has already been made, and in order to appreciate the full significance of what was said and done, it is necessary to state shortly some of the main events in the history of German-Polish relations. Poland had been made at Locarno, providing for the settlement of all disputes between the two countries. On the 26th January 1934, a German-Polish declaration of non-aggression was made, signed on behalf of the German Government by the defendant von Neurath. On the 30th January 1934, and again on the 30th January 1937, Hitler made speeches in the Reichstag in which he peace.
On the 20th February 1933 Hitler made a third speech in the Reichstag in the course of which he said with regard to Poland:
"And so the way to a friendly understanding has into a sincere, friendly cooperation.
Relying on peace."
land, Hitler made the speech in Berlin which has already been quoted, and announced that he had informed the British Prime Minister that when the Czechoslovakian problem Has been solved there would be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. Nevertheless, on the 24th November of the same year, another OKW directive was issued to the German armed forces to make preparations for an attack upon Danzig; it stated:
"The Fuehrer has ordered:
(1) Preparations are also to be made to enable troops by surprise."
Danzig, Hitler, on the 30th January 1939, said in a speech in the Reichstag:
"During the troubled months of the past year, the of Europe."
"Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the course of a speech in Warsaw:
of their mutual relations." Germany on the 15th March 1939, which was a flagrant breach of the Munich Agreement, Great Britain gave an assurance to Poland on the 31st March 1939 that in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist With their national forces, Great Britain would feel itself bound at once to lend Poland all the support in its power. The French Government took the same stand. It is interesting to note in this connection, that one of the arguments frequently presented by the defense in the present case is that the defendants were influenced to think that their conduct was not in breach of international law by the acquiescence of other Powers. The declarations of Great Britain and France showed, at least, that this view could be held no longer. issued to the armed forces, which after referring to the question of Danzig made reference to Fall Weiss (the military code name for the German invasion of Poland) and stated:
"The Fuehrer has added the following directions to Fall Weiss:
(1) Preparations must be made in such a way that (2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has of the Armed Forces."
signed by Hitler and issued to the armed forces, and in one of the annexes to that document the "Quarrels with Poland should be avoided.
Should words occur:
Germany, "a final settlement" will be necessary, notwithstanding the pact with Poland.
The aim is of defense.
The Free State of Danzig will be incorporated France, and British rest Print as a result of this."
in the Reichstag on the 28th April 1939 in which, after describing the Polish Government's alleged rejection of an offer he had made with regard to Danzig aid the Polish Corridor, he stated:
"I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish Government.
, but that alone is not the decisive fact; the worst is that now Poland proceeding in anyway against Poland.
..The intention invented by the international Press.
.." May 1939, held the important military conference to which reference has already been made. Among the persons present were the defendants Goering, Raeder and Keitel. The adjutant on duty that by was Lieut.-Col. Schmundt, and he made a record of what happened, certify it with his signature as a correct record. the armed forces and their staffs of his views on the political situation and his future aims. After analyzing the political situation and reviewing the He admitted that the quarrel with Poland over Danzig was not the reason for course of events since 1933, Hitler announced his decision to attack Poland.
this attack, but the necessity for Germany to enlarge her living space and secure her food supplies. He said:
"The solution of the problem demands courage. The Circumstances must rather be adapted to.
This is attacks upon foreign property."
Later in his address he added:
"There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, at the first suitable opportunity.
We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair.
There will be war.
our task is to isolate Poland. The politics."
Lt.-Col. Schmundt's record of the meeting reveals that Hitler fully realized the possibility of Great Britain and France coming to Poland's assistance. If, therefore, the isolation of Poland could not be achieved, Hitler was of the opinion that Germany should attack Great Britain and France first, or at any rate should concentrate primarily on the war in the West, in order to defeat Great Britain and France quickly, or at least to destroy their effectiveness Nevertheless, Hitler stressed that war with England and France would be a life and death struggle, which might last a long time, and that Preparations must be made accordingly. held and directives were issued in preparation for the war. The defendant Soviet Union.