On the other hand, we also know from the summary collection of affidavits that the notorious SA leader, who had the nickname "Schweinebacke", pig's check, was expelled from the SA for blackmailing a Jew, and sentenced to along term of imprisonment. The testimony given by Burgstaller and Juettner make it clear that the SA did not adopt an extremists attitude in the racial question; because otherwise, it would have been impossible for baptized Jews to be admitted to the SA in Berlin, and that Jews were baptized in the presence of uniformed SA men. The testimony given by Diels shows that the SA of Berlin was not anti-Semitic.
He emphasizes that anti-semitic propaganda was Dr. Goebbels' business. We have also Dr. Menge's testimony according to which Jewish businesses at Hanover were protected by SA detachments, the Jewish shopkeepers supplying the members of the SA in return with purchase coupons supplying the members of the SA in return with purchase coupons (Affidavit General SA No. 1). We furthermore see from the summary collection of affidavits that in other cities as well houses and businesses of Jewish citizens were protected by SA members from looting. The witness Juettner told us that the attitude adopted by the supreme SA leadership in this matter coincided with that of the well-known Jewish professor Karo who criticized the Eastern Jewry. These manifestations of hostility to Eastern Jewry are the consequences of the first World War, when innumerable Jews from Galicia infiltrated into Germany. most essential incriminating points for the SA. The alleged report of the leader of the Kurpfalz Brigade plays an important part in this connection. It results from the circumstances in which this alleged report on the execution of instructions (1721-PS) was made that the whole document can only be a fake, and a bad one at that. To prove this we mentioned the witnesses Lucke and Fust, who could not be transferred to Nurnberg in spite of the endeavors of the Secretary General extending over a period of several months, although the defense had indicated the camps where they are interned. In point of detail the following may be said: -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Boehm, that is an improper observation, or suggestion, for you to make. Every effort has been made by the Secretary General to obtain all the witnesses whose names have been given, and there is no evidence that the witnesses were in the camps that you are referring to.
DR. BOEHM: In point of detail the following may be said: -- and I am here defining my attitude toward Document 1721-PS:
1) It has never happened in the correspondence of the SA that a report on the execution of orders repeated the order in its substance;
2) The order of the Fuehrer of the Kurpfals Gruppe reads, according to the Prosecution, "By order of the Gruppenfuehrer". If an order had been given, it would have read:
"It is ordered", or "The Gruppe orders"; in no case, however, can it be "By order of the Gruppenfuehrer".
3) The expression "Jewish Synagogues" does not exist in German. Nor does this expression "Jewish Synagogues" exist in official party intercourse. The term "Jewish" is embraced in the word "Synagogue". The term "Aryan" in this connection is likewise out of place. If the order were authentic, then in contradistinction to "Jews" at this point it would have spoken of "German compatriots".
4) "Riots and looting are to be avoided", it continues. The conditions in Germany in 1938 were such that no one, and certainly no Fuehrer or a Gruppe or a Brigade, would have thought of such disturbances, much less of using these words in an order in this connection.
5) "Report on completion of a mission by 8:30 o'clock to the Brigade fuehrer or Local Office", it says in the ostensible order. the Brigade, which is receiving the order, but only to the Gruppe. Logically, it should have said "to the Gruppenfuehrer".
6) It is equally imprebable that the Fuehrer of the Brigade did not pass on the order or give orders to the Fuehrers of the Standarten on his own initiative, but only "Immediately informed the Standartenfuehrers and gave them exact information". existed in the SA.
7) It says in the report, "And execution was immediately begun." This formulation is also completely improbable. The Fuehrer of the Brigade reports in the preceding sentence that he immediately informed his Standartenfuehrers. It would then have been a matter of course, which no SA Fuehrer would have mentioned in his report on the completion of the mission, that the carrying through -- not the carrying out -- of the order was immediately begun. the document by alleging that the stamps on the Juettner letter (1721-PS) and on the report of the Gruppe (1721-PS) were identical. These two documents were presented under the same PS number. It was established, however, that the written notations were by different persons.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we break off?
(A recess was taken.)
DR. BOEHM: Mr. President, Your Honors, I Just spoke of the points which were presented, to refute the generalness of the document 1721-PS. I continue. the Gruppenfuehrer of the Kurpfela Gruppe, Fust, and the member of the Gruppe staff Zimmerman, who was present at the the, which testify that such an order as the Prosecution contends was never given. If such an order was never given, then there can be no report on the completion of the mission. But it is, in addition, proved, on the basis of affidavits of the collective digest, that no order in the sense which the Prosecution contends was issued, to the Standarten of Brigade 50.
This we learn from the Standarten 115, 221, 186, 168 and 145. All these standards were part of Brigade 50. None of them received such ominous orders as the prosecution has claimed. By the evidence given by the former Obergruppenfuehrer Mappes, it has been proved that Lutze issued counter orders against the order of the 9th of November 1938 of Dr. Goebbels. Thus it has been proved that the Supreme SA leadership prohibited the participation in the undertaking started by Goebbels. It has been proved that without any doubt that counter order reached the following groups: East Prussia, Mitto, Hochland Hessen, Niedersachsen. (Affidavit General SS No. 71.) As shown by the testimony of Siebel, Lutze prohibited, as a consequence of the happenings of November 9, 1938, the carrying out of future orders of the political leadership. He issued that order because he realized that various SA Sturms or SA members had been abused at the occasion of November 9, 1938. (Affidavit SA No. 80). they render no tools for the sentencing of the SA as criminal. Since we have the counter order of Lutze, those events do not find themselves within the framework of the SA.
From the sworn evidence of Edgar Stelzner (Affidavit General SS No. 89), we learn that individual SA leaders detested those occurrences. By that, many SA units kept their records clean. There are whole districts in which nothing took place. that the following synagogues were protected by members of the SA: Bebra, Hoechstedt, Weilburg, Saubern, Grossumstadt, Bueckeburg. Furthermore, attempts to save the synagogues were made in Marburg, and in Giessen by SA members. It must be added that the largest part of the rural districts had neither synagogues nor Jews. In those districts no persecution of Jews was carried out. Therefore, the rural SA without further ado is to be excluded from this point of the indictment. It appears superfluous to me to emphasize that those excesses were rejected by the overwhelming majority of the SA members. from the differences we spoke about which the SA leadership had with the editors and the Eher Publishing House in regard to these articles in the "SA Mann" when it opposed them but lacked the power to prevail.
This position in regard to the Jewish question is completely clarified by the fact that in various grups the SA leadership had, expressly prohibited the "Stuermer." This was the case, for instance, in the group Nordmark (Evidence Klaehn, and Juettner). in regard to the church question. The evidence given by Generalvikars Dr. David, Pastor Burgstaller, and Konsistorialrates Dr. Rathke demonstrates that the prosecution charged the SA without justification with religious intolerance. The by far overwhelming majority of all SA members still belong to one of the Christian churches.
Protestant clergymen served within the ranks of the SA; for instance, the Bishop Sasse of Thuringia. From that, one may conclude that the SA leadership did not exert any pressure to have people leave the church. This fact is unmistakably proven by many affidavits. I may recall that Cardinal Count Galen was accompanied on his trips through the dioceses by SA members, and that in many territories an order had been issued prohibiting SA service during church times and in the neighborhood of churches. It is also a known fact that the SA held divine service in the field. In 1933 the SA furnished the guard of honor when the holy frock was exhibited in Trier (Testimony of Dr. Davis). In the cross examination of the witness Dr. Davis, the defense has proved that in the famous case in Freising when the sermon of Cardinal Faulhaber was to be monitored, the SA leadership initiated proceedings to punish these who were guilty of these excesses. camp guards or the police and assistant police troops, the prosecution mentions only a few cases. By that, the SA is excluded even through the indictment of the charges, of having had any connection with the large concentration camps of Auschwitz, Maidanek, Bolsen, Dachau and Buchenwald. In the case of Vogel the guilty person was punished. The misunderstanding created by the affidavit Schellenberg was cleared up by the affidavit of Gontermann (Affidavit General SA No.16). Shcellenberg in London confused the concentration camp and police service with the employment of the town and country guards.
policemen and auxiliary policement were employed for various purposes. They were taken from the ranks of the SA.
a) Because it was desirable to have a certain political proof of reliability:
b) Because among the many unemployed in the SA, there were to be found candidates for the profession of policeman or the work of auxiliary policeman.
As far as the respective SA members selected a new occupation; for instance, that of the policeman, these were only men who actually carried out that vocation. As far as they worked temporarily as auxiliary policemen, which was the case frequently when they served on probation before being definitely employed as policemen, they were not any longer subordinate to the SA but to the competent police office. At times they stillwore the SA uniform; but only because there were not enough uniforms; and therefore they were an arm band "Auxiliary Police." They received an identification card issued by the police, the Landrat, or other authorities. For the duration of such employment, they received furloughs from the SA by which the SA externally separated itself from them and deprived itself of the possibility of issuing orders to them. In tsuch cases the individual, therefore, never acted as SA man. The uniform which he kept wearing with the arm badn was the sole exclusively external connection with the SA, which cannot alone prove decisive. This adoption of the uniform of an organization for a purpose and service alien to the organization occurred frequently in the SA and other organizations; for example, as Wehrmacht affiliates or as Volkssturm. The arm band gave the uniform, or even civilian clothing according to recognized international law, the sole mark of the new service, deviating from the original purpose of the SA. police, and auxiliary police service, can deal only with such purely superficial matters, which can be unjustly charged against the SA only on the basis of the uniform. For the orders were issued, not by the SA leadership, but by the state. of Juettner by introducing documents which were to prove that the SA had participated, in the atrocities in the occupied territories and in the concentration camps and forced labor camps.
to set up SA units in the so-called Reichskommissariat Ostland; that is Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Prosecution is confusing here the SA Gruppe Ostland which was set up in East Prussia with the later Reichskommissari Ostland. Moreover, the Prosecution has already charged another organization with the Schaulen, Kovno, and Vilna cases. District Commissars, Provincial Commissars, and officials of the Reichskommissariat Ostland were no more under the supreme SA leadership than the SA Obergruppenfuehrers, Killinger and Kasche who were engaged, as ministers. The defendant Ribbentrop has explained this clearly. The affidavit of the defendant Frank has solved the Ilkenau case in favor of the SA. so-called abuse of justice, which Sir David emphasized. It is not the affair of the SA but rather of the competent ministers. Hoehnstein. In reexamination it could be proved that this concentration camp was not a concentration camp for political opponents alone. Old political fighters were inmates of it. Moreover the affair of the Concentration Camp Hohenstein came to be prosecuted by the officials of the Ministry of Justice through information supplied by SA Obergruppenfuehrer Killinger, when he was still in charge of the SA Gruppe Sachsen. It is a curious thing to charge the SA with cases that they themselves reported for punishment. It is interesting in this connection that the Prosecution submitted an incomplete document in which theletters of Lutze and Hess are lacking, from which the SA defense might have been able to derive something favorable according to the information which it received. Prosecution obtained affidavits from former political opponents of the NSDAP. Among them are the affidavits of the Minister President Dr. Wilhelm Hoegner, and Advocate General Dr. Staff von Braunschweig. They were deposed on order of the military Government, as can be seen from the affidavit of Dr. Staff.
The two latter ones were submitted by the Defense. It has already been established before the Court that Dr. Hoegner was frequently mistaken. His description of the March on Coburg is completely wrong. witness Juettner and the affidavit of Zoeberlein (Affidavit General SA No.a):
A German Association, the "Schutz-und Trutzbund" Was obliged by the Town Administration to hold a closed session. The NSDAP stressed the right of freedom of assembly which was guaranted to all by the constitution. Therefore, a protective group went to Coburg. When leaving the railroad station, it was attacked on the street by members of Leftist organizations who were equipped with lead tubes, nails, wooden boards, etc. Above all, it has been proven, too, that the observations of Dr. Hoegner that the SA was trained by the Reichswehr were incorrect. The Munich Reichswehr General von Lessow frustrated the success of the Hitler Putsch. As Witness Juettner has testified, the collections of arms which had been opened with the permission of the Inter-allied Commission were opened to oil other organizations with the exception of the SA. It is equally wrong when it was contended that Ludendorff was chosen to unleash a national war against France at a time when Communist outbreaks were raging in Saxonia and when Ludendorff had already tried in 1921 to reach an understanding with France, which led around the end of 1923 to the so-called Foch Plan. When we consider the source of arms in Munich, Dr. Hoegner claimed that the SA had had a share in the persecution of the Jews while the witness of the prosecution, Diels, stressed that the SA was not anti-semitic. Dr. Hoegner puts himself also in contrast to Pastor Burgstaller who had emphasized the indifference of the SA in racial matters. Without any qualification, it can be admitted that excesses did occur when the "Munich Post" was occupied.
But such things occur during any revolution; we should only remember some of the things that happened between 1913 and 1920. davit of Dr. Staff, Braunschweig. There it is stated; the SA behaved in a manner which from the legal standpoint of a civilized nation must be called illegal, but it did not result in any excesses going beyond these illegal measures.
I submitted also an affidavit of Dr. Prioso as Number General SA 82. It shows that Dr. Prioso as a member of the Communist Party of Germany is active as an expert of the de-nazification court, and that he testified with the approval of the Minister for political clearances. His judgment says that the SA could not be considered a criminal organization in the sense of Article VI of the Charter. so-called uniform unit of the NSDAP *roke into pieces even more than it had been the case before that date. Part of the German populace entered the SA who had nothing to do with the aims and purposes of the SA. Communists were incorporated in large numbers. The collection of affidavits shows that this was also the case in other cities. It is also necessary in this connection to refer to the incorporation of all evangelical youth organizations in the Hitler Youth in 1933, which were later transferred to the SA, Generalviker Dr. David declared that this was also the case among many of the Catholic youth. The idea which loading personalities had in their minds when this transfer was made become clear from the quotation from the Akademischen Monatsblaetter of June 1933 (SA Document 317), which reads as follows: "Having recognized this it is up to us to take a hand in order to creat new and better things and to prevent the worst. In common honest work with all constructive forces of our nation, and with a sincere conviction. For this reason we want to place all our Catholic property of Christian conservative ideas and our Christian evolutionary forces into the new Germany to help in the formation and deepening of its spirit from our spirit."
would also involve these men who were not in the least concerned with the spirit of the National Socialist Party, and many of whom were to act as a brake against the extremists of the movement. to the SA of the Stahlhelm according to orders in 1933 and 1934. The original so-called Tradition-SA had had only 300,000 members as this was stated some time ago. The Stahlhelm, on the other hand comprised more than one million members who distinguished themselves considerably from the SA men of the fighting period both as regards their general attitude and their conception of life. moved to except among others the SA reserve from the declaration of criminality.
By an order of the supreme leadership (Hitler) dated November 6, 1933, the SA-Reserve 1 was formed from members of the Stahlhelm between 36 to 45 years of age. The SA-Reserve was subsequently placed under the command of SA-Gruppenfuehrer in accordance with a directive issued by the same authority on January 25, 1934. It was transferred to the SA under the designation SAReserve No. 1 (Exhibits No. 13 and 17 of the Document Book Stahlhelm-SA). Part of the SA-Reserve 1 was maintained up to the end of the war and has thus been excluded from the declaration of criminality. A further part of this SA-Reserve No. 1, was attached in the shape of small reserve groups to active SA-Stuerme in the course of the last few years. The remainder was gradually incorporated in the active SA after 1934. Such re-groupings were carried through either in accordance with lists or under specially issued orders. The reason for these transfers were partly due to technical considerations, like local re-groupings; above all during the war, when SA-Stuerme shrank as a consequence of inductions of their members into the Armed Forces. In many cases these re-groupings were also made in order to improve control with the SA.
It would thus be unfair and incomprehensible to give this latter group a different treatment than the former, make coincidence the judge over the fate of the members if the Stahlhelm who remained in the SA up to the end of the war. ler in 1933-1934 were transferred to the SA cumulatively. For that reason alone and according to the decision of the Tribunal on the 13th of March, 1946, under 6-a 2, and 6-b, they cannot be declared criminal. With reference to this I draw your attention to the plea of my colleague Attorney Klefisch on the 15th of August, 1946. ization involuntarily belonged to the circle of guiltless followers and that it is to be assumed of them that they did not desire to support the aims and activities of the organization. The accusation of guilt cannot apply to them, therefore, even if an early resignation of their membership had been possible for them.
The above-mentioned transfer took place as follows: On the 27th of April, 1933, the entire Stahlhelm was placed under Hitler's orders by the leader of the organization, Seldte. On the 21st of June, 1933, the Jungstahlhelm and on the 4th of July, 1933, the entire Stahlhelm was subordinated to the Supreme Command of the SA by order of Hitler. According to the decree of the 4th of July, 1933, the Jungstahlhelm and the Sports Units, later called Wehrstahlhelm, i.e., Stahlhelm members up to the age of 35 years, were included in the active SA (Exhibits 1, 6, 7). The transfer of the original Stahlhelm, i.e., members of the ages of 36 to 45 years, took place as I have mentioned on the 25th of January, 1934. This transfer and inclusion both in the case of the Wehrstahlhelm as the original Stahlhelm took place without the members's being asked partly through accouncing the orders on parade, partly by handing over nominal roles and partly by delivery of pre-dated membership books of the SA. This is proved by the affidavits which I have presented and the testimony of Von Waldenfols, Hauffe, and Gruss.
The instructions issued by Hitler of the the 1st of December, 1933, (the law regarding the uniformity of the State and the Party) are without doubt to be regarded as lawful instructions. The proceeding orders and instructions in practice have a similar character and were sanctioned by law of the 1st of December, 1933, as well as later instructions and executive orders.
The transfer of the Stahlhelm did not take place without friction. In the case of many members there was the picture of coercion. Large circles of the organization did not agree with the subordination of the Stahlhelm or the cooperation of the Stahlhelm in the seizure of power. Duesterberg objected particularly, who must be regarded as the head of the opposition to Seldte's policy. His arrest was the result of the attitude he adopted as well as were numerous arrests of Stahlhelm members carried out by the State Police in the spring of 1933, particularly in Brunswick. forced by organs of the State to do duty and were occasionally punished (Affidavit 1, 3, 2, and testimony Hauffe, V. Waldenfols.) through the influx of people with, the greatest variety of aims, so this also applies to the Stahlhelm because of the events of the year of 1933, which had such serious and dreadful consequences for the German people. The Stahlhelm disintegrated. For some of its members it had been of importance that at the time of the transfer they had been expressly assured of a certain amount of independence under their own leaders and with their existing uniforms, as well as further connection with the Stahlelmbund. This is shown by nearly all documents, affidavits and testimonies. When these assurances were not put into practice the resistance of the opposition group against Seldte increased. The national socialist leaders of the State considered this group to be politically unreliable and reactionary. particularly the newspaper reports which I have submitted which represent only a small portion of similar reports. Evidences: Exhibit 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 48 51, 53, 54, 55; In the National Socialist paper "Rheinfront" the statement appeared on the 27th of July 1935 "in its innermost character the Stahlhelm was never National Socialist."
Another newspaper wrote on the 30th of July 1935, "with certainty the Stahlhelm could always be found wherever were the opponents of the movement." Another newspaper on the 8th of August 1935 described the Stahlhelm as the "boiling not of oppositional and reactionary forces". transferred to the SA retained their membership in the Stahlhelmbund or the later so-called NSDFB. According to the decrees of 14 July 1933 and 27 January 1934 (Exhibit Nos. 8 and 18) members, transferred to the SA, were expressly permitted this dual membership. Finally, I draw your attention to Exhibit No. 21. According to this the Press Department of the supreme SA command announces on the 25th of April 1934:
"That members of the former Stahlhelmbund, who have already been to be taken off the strength of SA-Reserce I." the SA, drawn together by common ideals, who regarded the events of the time with the greatest distrust.
Opposed to them there, was a group of Stahlhelm members and farmer Stahlhelm leaders, headed by Labor Minister Seldte, who affirmed the national revolution and who had furnished sixty high and higher SA leaders, but who nevertheless disallowed perpetrations and excesses in the severest possible manner. Two spokesmen of those two Stahlhelm groups have been heard before this Tribunal, namely, the witnesses Gruss and Juettner. One witness stood in the midst of the SA, the other was not an SA member. One member of the Stahlhelm affirms the SA which he knows intimately, the other, placed outside the SA, regards it with a negative attitude. The latter is the expoment of that section of the Stahlhelm which, until the end of the Third Reich had toyed with oppositional thoughts.
element of opposition to the so-called "Old Fighters " of the SA. The above mentioned affidavits, Exhibits and testimony are irrefutable proof of this. important points, differs from national socialism. Politically speaking majority of them disagreed with the totalitarian claims of any political party and the Fuehrer principle. As before, they remained in constant touch with their own Bund which, until its boin dissolved in 1935, continued to exist under the name of the NSDFB (Stahlhelm). Even after it was dissolved homogenous groups formed themselves who held together firmly and had meetings of comradeship all over Germany. In many of those groups the hope of a political reaction continued to live for a long time. particularly Marxists, joined the ranks of the Stahlhelm. So, for instance, the Stahlhelm at Brunswick joined the Reichsbanner (D-947). caused its being dissolved. adopted a negative attitude regarding the commission of crimes under Article 6. As ex-servicemen they disliked war, most of all, aggressive war. ation that it took place at a time when there were arguments with, and a weakening of, the SA, and at a time when the task of the SA connected with the seizure of power had already been completed, and not at a time when Hugenberg, Schacht and Hitler had formed the so-called Harzburg front. The completion of this transfer to the SA took place at a time when the SA was totally without significance. that based on coercion, i.e., an order, 500,000 members of the Wehrstahlhelm, and approximately 500,000 members of the Kernstahlhelm were transferred. There remained a further half million of Stahlhelm members over 45 years of age who did not reach the SA at all because an order for this transfer was lacking.
Only in very few districts were these older-age groups also transferred to the SA because of independent orders issued by subordinate SA agencies. the so-called NS Reiterkorps. In accordance with the definite results of the taking of evidence the NS-Reiterkorps possessed, during the period of its existence, far reaching organizational independence. The aims, purposes and activities of the NS-Reiterkorps were not political, but were limited to athletics with horses, the breeding of horses, and the care of horses. secution did not succeed in showing the participation of the NS-Reiterkorps in any crimes against peace or humanity. limit myself to summarizing the essential points before the Tribunal. power by the NSDAP does not concern the NS-Reiterkorps at all because it was created only after the seizure of power. The NS-Reiterlorps did not grow out of the storm troops of Adolf Hitler, but out of hundreds of so-called rural rider associations, which were popular throughout all Germany up to 1933 as entirely unpolitical athletics and breeding associations. When the rural rider associations were incorporated into the SA after the seizure of power in the course of the so-called "coordination", this was not done voluntarily. It was carried out in accordance with decrees of the authorities against the inner resistance of most members of these associations. That decree by the authorities resulted from negotiations between the Chief of the rural rider associations and the Chief of Staff of the SA, which took place upon request of the Reichsministry of the Interior in the summer of 1933. Those rider associations which resisted the decree were threatened by dissolution and if they actually did resist, were dissolved as a matter of fact. the associations obeyed the decree under the compulsion of circumstances. until the very end its independent character of an organization. The former rider associations which now called themselves SA rider storms formed jointly the NS-Reiterkorps, headed by the so-called Reichs Inspector fuer das Reit und Fahrwesen, Litzmann, in Berlin.
the taking of evidence has shown that it counted approzimately 200,000 members. Eighty to ninety per cent of them are farmers who held horses. After the seizure of power in many cities the riders clubs joined the NS-Reiterkorps, clubs which had up to then, led an entirely unpolitical existence devoted only to sports. and breeding tasks. Service consisted in riding and driving and the training in those fields of knowledge relating to horses. In the center of activities stood for the units in towns, the carrying through of hunting and of tournaments as they are staged by riders clubs everywhere in the world. As a rule riding was done not in uniform, but in civilian clothes. The wives and children of the members participated in it. In rural areas the activity limited itself mainly in training the farmers in regard to all problems important to the horse, as driving and the medical treatment of ill horses. Therefore, the members of the NS-Reiterkorps considered themselves everywhere in Germany first of all, as riders, and not as SA men. support. It did not spread political propaganda nor give any political training. It never was a political fighting group.
There were in the NS-Reiterkorps practically no "old fighters". Political fanatics and activists were not tolerated by eliminated. Decisive for the position of leaders and the promotion in the NS-Reiterkorps was not political activism but exclusively the capabilities as rider and the noble character. participated in any crimes against humanity. It did not have a share either in the excesses against churches, Jews, labor unions, foreign laborers, or prisoners of war. No, members of the NS-Reiterkorps have even in many cases, taken an active part in favor of those who were politically persecuted.
anti-Semitic attitude. In the country close business relations with the Jewish horse-traders existed for a long time after 1933. The NS-Riding-Corps was always religious-minded. It is a significant fact that the non-Aryan Fuldauer, as is shown by his affidavit (No. 20), was a co-founder of the NSRiding-Corps at Wiehl/Rhineland, and that he belonged to the Riding-Corps there for quite a long time after the seizure of power as a leading member. The Jewish direction of the firm Tietz in Cologne even granted prizes for SA-Riding-Tournaments to the NS-Riding-Corps in view of the existing good relations. haven for the politically persecuted in many areas of Germany. Numerous freemasons, non-Aryans were members of the NS-Riding-Corps, and tried to protect themselves by pointing out their membership in an NS-organization. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the NSDAP, as has been shown by the presentation of evidence, regarded the NS-Riding-Corps with the utmost suspicion. Members of the NS-Riding-Corps were refused membership in the NSDAP because their activity in the NS-Riding-Corps did not give proof of their political reliability. Riding-Corps did not participate even in a crime against the peace. Riding-SA to secure riders from the new generation for the German armed forces. The Prosecution supports itself here above all on certain propaganda material which has appeared by an unknown author in the journal "Der SAFuehrer". All witnesses who have been heard with regard to the Riding Corps have testified that the contents of the editorials were in glaring contrast to the actual conditions. It has been repeatedly determined in the course of these proceedings that the party-leadership permitted itself to be directed solely by propagandistic viewpoints. The Prosecution has not succeeded in showing even one actual case where the NS-Riding-Corps in more than 10 years of its existence ever planned or carried out any activity, which can be considered as a preparation or support for an aggressive war.
of World War II, the well-known Lieutenant General Guderian, has taken an unequivocal stand on this question. I quote:
"No military collaboration existed between the German armed forces and the NS-Riding-Corps, neither in a tactical nor a strategical respect. The cavalry of the armed forces trained the next generation of riders itself and was not dependent on the collaboration of the NS-Riding-Corps. Relations to the NS-Riding-Corps in this direction were neither sought for nor engaged in by the armed forces.........." connection:
"Whereas in 1935 18 cavalryregiments were still in existence, only one cavalry brigade existed at the outbreak of war which later in the course of the war was increased to a cavalry division. The armored force had taken the place of the cavalry, already expressed by the fact that 40% of the armored officers came from former cavalry-regiments. In view of this development, an incorporation of units of the NS-Riding-Corps into the armed forces was not intended, not did it ever take place." tasks was practiced. At no time and in no part of Germany were cavalry maneuvers ever carried out by the Riding-Corps in the sense of the Cavalry of the armed forces. The activity was rather limited to the breeding of horses, important for the peasants, and the riding-sport which is practiced in all countries of the earth. Certificate. According to its text, the Riding-Certificate gave its owner the right to be allowed to serve with a mounted unit in the army. This Riding-Certificate, however, could be obtained by any sportsman, even if he was not a member of the NS-Riding Corps. This corresponded to the comprehensible wish of every passionate rider to be assigned to amounted unit in case he is conscripted for service in the army, just as an enthusiastic mountain-climber or ski-driver will give his first preference for his service in the army to the mountain-units. In practice, however, this wish was considered by the armed forces only on the rarest occasions because the armed forces, after all, were almost completely deactivating their cavalry since 1933.
Therefore, most of the holders of Riding Certificates were in reality assigned to infantry or motorized units at the time of their induction. sports-activity of members of the NS-Riding Corps, but obtaining the RidingBadge which was worn by every rider with pride. This badge has been submitted to the Tribunal in its original form and it probably is the only insignia of an NS-unit without the swastika.
The militaristic spirit was not nurtured in the NS-Riding Corps. The large mass of the NS-Riding Corps consisted of peasants. It is well-known that the peasant by nature is not a friend of war. The urban units of the RidingCorps engaged in close international relations with all countries practicing the riding-sport until the outbreak of war. of the NS-Riding Corps. At the outbreak of war general consternation reigned. Socialist Riders' Corps were of the opinion that the SA, to which the NSRiders' Corps was not attached until after 1933, had no criminal character. In so far as excesses occurred within the General SA, the members of the NSRiders' Corps must have perceived that these excesses by individuals were not in accordance with the program of the SA and they heard with satisfaction that the SA-Leadership disavowed these questions and tried to avoid repetitions. any kind of relationship with the NS-Riders' Corps. No member of the NSRiders' Corps played a leading political part during the National Socialist regime.
Justice demands the exeneration of the NS-Riders' Corps of the charges raised, for the mere reason that both of the other large sports organizations of the Party, the National Socialist Motor Corps and the National Socialist Flying Corps, were justly not indicted, because of their sporting aims. Thanks to the political influence of their leaders in particular the NS Motor Corps and the NS Flying Corps succeeded in achieving complete independence from the SA.