THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Boehm, Dr. Servatius said no such thing to this Tribunal On the contrary, he said that he had been properly treated in the Russian Zone.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I have been to the Russian Zone, and by my wish, I have been able to visit two camps. In my final plea I have pointed out and asserted, according to the information that I have at my disposal, the announcements had taken place in all camps, and I had only had time to see two camps, which I, myself, had visited, and that is what I actually stated here in Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. BOEHM: In that case, the information which had reached me, I must have misunderstood quite wrongly, Mr. President.
(Going on with document) I should also like to emphasize the limitations sing for the Defense from the fact that, in spite of all efforts and indicate of exact addresses, part of the witnesses living in ether zones did not show up In particular, the witnesses Fust, Lucke, Alvensleben and Wallenhoefer are miss Because of the failure of appearance of these witnesses, the statistics of the and the relief fund are also lacking, which are necessary to form a judgment of events before the year 1933, which would have shown the terror against the SA. Moreover, a part of the documents, which were requested and which were approved by the Court, did not reach the hands of the Defense. can base its decision only on the fact that illegal actions wire committed only by a limited number of persons, or numerically restricted groups of person, which activities can no more place this stamp of "criminality" on die organization as a whole than a number of crimes to be found in any nation can characterize that nation as a criminal nation. raised against the organization SA as a whole, and affecting even the war dead, lacks basic, formal and material prerequisites, the neglect of which, involved any unfavorable decision of the Court cannot be reconciled with the "healthy po*--* lar feeling" or with the efforts of the United Nations which were born from pain ful experience "to restore confidence and fundamental human rights, and to create conditions under which justice and respect for international law can be maintain order to create the prerequisites of *--*ndmnation of a large part of the non-transferrable immediate perpetrators, as veil as to punish the moral accomplices.
Ac cording to the charges of the Prosecution, the supreme SA leadership -- to give the main charges -- must have done or tolerated the following:
(a) Prepared, or planned, or ordered a war of agression.
(b) Tolerated or carried out atrocities, or other crimes in the concentrate camps. to this effect by the supreme SA leadership, and that no misdeeds were tolerated 28 Aug A LJG 14-1 Saslow not to be found in most cases, is false.
people, but never 4,000,000, could have been concerned in this planning. The perpetrators of the Jewish persecutions, limited as to locality and time, are known, or at least traceable. Since the localities of the Jewish persecutions in November 1938 are known and the perpetrators can be established by witnesses or by documents as is proven by the present trials for the Jewish programs in 1938, for instance in Weissenburg and Hof, it is unnecessary to create an assumption through a declaration of criminality, especially since these actions were refuted by the majority of SA members. The localities where concentration camps were situated and the names of those responsible for the actions committed in those camps are weal known. This is borne out by the numerous trials against concentration camp commanders and military guards. Are millions of SA members, 70% of which were at the front, when during the Second World War those terrible happenings took place in the concentration camps, be made responsible for them, when even ministers declare that they had no knowledge of those events? It is the perpetrators who should be seized. A collective arrest, however, of 4,000,000 men is unprecedented and unique in the history of penal law. This measure is inhuman and is based upon the extending of the concept "Helper", which disregards all the legal security and the principle of all criminal codes. an organized group of persons, which, at the moment of joining, is already prohibited, is punishable. Upon their joining, the newcomers must therefore be conscious of the fact that they are committing an unlawful action. a subsequent proceeding against individual members possible, violates the principle "nulla poena sine lege". The International Control Council has expressly established this principle in its 28 Aug A LJG 14-2 Saslaw first law of Law Practice in Germany.
The International Tribunal cannot disregard a general legal principle of the inter-allied legislative organ, which is authoritative for Germany. would be violated. Through the recognition of the German State and thus of its leadership, through the constant participation of representatives, at noteworthy occasions, such also as SA maneuvers, through different agreements, the allied powers gave the example that they recognized the German leadership and its organizations as legal. The document which I cited, quoted, "SA 229", The political ordinance of the Inter-allied Rhineland Commission and its Application in the years 1920-1224", established that on the 21st of March 1925, the Rhineland Commission revoked the inhibition of the German Liberty Party (Freiheitspartei) and of the National Socialist Party. An affidavit from the Palatinate (Pfalz) (affidavit General SA Number 42), which was submitted by the defense, shows that all social functions organized by the NSDAP and the SA were approved by the French occupational authorities before the year 1930. The foreign policy of the Allied States must have had a better view of the entire political situation than millions of simple SA men who, considering the political situation, could not have had the impression of committing an illegal act by entering or remaining in the SA. contradicts the universally accepted legal principle: "nemo in factum proprium venire potest." This norm of Roman Law which is used as a rule of interpretation in international law, claims universal validity. over-simplifications concerning purpose, place, time, and cooperat ing personalities which alone enable the Prosecution to give a basis for the declaration of criminality. In other words: the Prosecution acts as if there had existed a uniform personality "the SA" that means one with an uniform leadership, responsibility 28 Aug A LJG 14-3 Saslaw common purpose, intention, membership, and uniform attitude.
Without such generalizations the Prosecution would never accomplish its aim; for instance, in the question of aggressive warfare and the persecution of the Jews. By doing so it abandons the original problem of mass liability which justly can be solved only by a great number of individual statements and the study of the agreement of action and aim in a majority of the members. In contrast to such an opinion, we cannot stress too strongly the factual split of SA concerning the aims of the leadership as well as the membership, and the limitation in time and space of the deeds which make the things which happened nothing but individual occurrences which took place within an organization of four millions during a period of existence lasting twenty years It would have been necessary for the prosecution to prove that the majority of the members of the SA held the design, had the inner will, possessed knowledge of the criminal purpose and of the facts as well as of the general consciousness of the unlawfulness.
As this is impossible, the prosecution put forward the theory that the facts and purposes were so obvious that everyone might have been aware of them. If all this had been so clear to millions of simple people why, then, did the Allies until 1939 maintain relations with, and made agreements with, this State which, it is alleged was supported by bands of criminals? The theory that the members of the SA would have been in a position to know and outhg to have known in these circumstances the criminal aims and deeds, involves the abandonment of any real examination of the question as to what the majority of the members did or did not know. design. In doing so it overlooks innumerable speeches which were made to cheat the German people, it forgets
1.) that quotations from foreign sources concerning the value of the National Socialist state appeared in the press;
2.) that in the course of there twelve years actual events were That, furthermore, design can only be considered in conjunction with concrete facts, to which I propose to refer later, is so obvious that it is unnecessary for me to say anything further. I merely want to point out that innumerable affidavits contained in the collective summary which I have submitted prove that ignorance of, and non-participation in, the following crimes: Persecution of the Jews, planning of a war of aggression or commission of atrocities of all kinds. between the main defendants and their actions and the membership in the SA. The SA can -- if at all -- be rendered responsible only for actions committed by persons in their capacity as members or leaders of the SA, but not for those committed by persons, for instance, in the capacity of Reich Ministers, Reichleiters, Gauleiters, Regional Commissioners, or other functions.
Apart from a short term of service in the SA before the 9th of November 1923, Goering played no part at all in this organization. His sunsequent rank was only that of an honorary leader. The same applies to the defendant Frank; the SA cannot be rendered responsible for his deeds as Governor General of Poland. He was not the leader of the SA formations which were composed of the German nationals or of the members of the German minority doing service in Poland. Rosenberg, Bormann, Schirach, Streicher, Hess, Sauckel had no associations with the SA. Bormann was, as the witness Juettner emphasized in his evidence, one of the most severe opponents of the SA. Streicher was the man who eliminated the SAObergruppenfuehrer Stegmann. a national socialist state in which the Party, the State and the Armed Froces on the one hand, and the Party and its organizations on the other, represent one uniform whole. In fact, there existed profound divergencies. If was just owing to these divergencies that Adolf Hitler had an unheard-of power over the persons and an unheard-of independence which he enjoyed, as it has only now become evident, with a limited number of these who had his confidence. I only wish in this connection to recall the divergent views held within the Party, that is to say, also as between the leading men like Goering, Goebbels, Himmler, Lutze, on the Church question and the Jewish problem. It was not easy to the average man and to average member of an organization to visualize and to find a clear line on the background of the variety of tendencies manifesting themselves among the various elements concerned. peace, were in regard to their solution a such that they might have been the object of a conspiracy.
Juettner's evidence as well as the affidavits submitted by Hoerauf and Freund point to the fact that the supreme leadership of the SA had close associations with British and French quarters up to the moment when it was politically eliminated and that it entertained these associations with a view to creating a Western Pact.
I have proved that financial assistance from abroad was given to the SA in connection with these negotiations; I have also shown that the leadership of the SA was actually engaged, in 1932, in negotiations with German government quarters for a coalition directed against Hitler. I have proved that from a political point of view there existed three tendencies as regards foreign policy. I also indicated that the Eastern and the Western tentency were in sharp contrast to each other. May I, in this connection, refer to the sentence pronounced by the British prosecution which is contained in the Minutes of the 31st of July 1946 and reads as follows: "If the German side could show that the British government had given economic assistance to the SA in order to bring it into power, subject to the condition that Roehm were placed in control, the defense would, indeed, have considerably advanced its own case. Because it is obvious that the government of 1946 could not join in the trial against the SA if it had supported the SA in 1934."
The affidavit submitted by Hoerauf shows very clearly and beyond doubt that the negotiations carried on between Anglo-French political quarters and the SA leadership in those days were, indeed, perfectly obvious. I have furthermore shown that the contacts which were established with Britain and French quarters represent a thread along which events developed in 1934. instrument in the hands of the conspirators. The best proof to the contrary are, no doubt, the events of the 30th of June 1934. Again and again the erroneous opinion is heard in connection with these events that it had been possible in these days to crush an SA Putsch or a Putsch of a small group intent upon seizing power. There can be no greater mistake than this theory; because the fact is that, as shown by Fruend's affidavit General SA-83, the SA practically lead a life of its own within the Party. It is clear beyond doubt that at the time of the Chief of Staff Roehm a great mass of the SA had little or nor contact with the Party. The situation in 1934 was such that every free expression of an opinion, particularly also in the Party itself, had been suppressed and regimentation had become almighty. Everything was under the influence of the Gleichschaltung tendency or Party enforcement in all spheres, coercion was triumphant and dominated public life completely. the Reich government had already been practically eliminated at that time. The Reichstag was nothing but a dummy and was of no positive value whatsoever. but it now realized that Hitler as the Chief of Staff put it, surrounded himself with demagogues and non-politicians and, instead of being a national leader, had become a dictator. The supreme leadership of the SA viewed this development with growing distrust because it involved the great, danger that the nation which had given unrestricted full powers to the Fuehrer was completely eliminated from the future development of the Reich and its policy. This danger and the conditions created by coercion brought about an untenable situation. Thus, there arose, at first strictly camouflaged, the opposition of the supreme SA leadership under the command of Chief of Staff Roehm. real government of the people supported by the active cooperation of the whole nation.
All the preparations, which were also mentioned by the witness Juettner at the meeting of the Commission, were made along these lines. It was shown that Roehm intended at the Kulmbach meeting to gather information on the situation of the workers as it had emerged from the dissolution of the trade unions by Ley. It must be emphasized in this connection that Roehm authorized the participation of members of the SA in the action connected with the dissolution of trade-unions merely because the organizations of the Left had kept arms in the labor union headquarters, and that it was to be expected at any moment that civil war might spread from those trade union headquarters to the nation in general.
Roehm intended to dissolve the SS. This is proved by the affidavit of the former SA Brigadefuehrer Fruend. Roehm's endeavor to achieve the consolidation of the Central European area by way of negotiations with the Western powers is connected with this now State which was to be created. It has been shown that these negotiations had been under way for a number of years. (Juettner's evidence, Fruend's affidavit.) explained in the affidavit of Brigade-leader Fruend. All the documents dealing with the defense-political aspects of the SA's indictment by the prosecution are related to this unsuccessful attempt made by Chief of Staff Roehm who believed, as the witness Juettner clearly testified, in the creation of a popular militia according to the Swiss model and based upon the framework of the SA as part of the great plan for the creation of a Western Pact. It is regrettable that it was impossible to produce some witnesses who might have given further information on this matter to the Tribunal. Roehm's attempt failed. In addition, differences with the Reichswehr also contributed to his downfall. The 30th of June 1934 is the result of this development. The first attempt at putting an end to Hitler's dictatorship had definitely failed. Here than 200 SA leaders were shot. Since that time Heinrich Himmler was uncrowned king in Germany. Germany and abroad as this would have seriously shaken Hitler's prestige and that of his government. This was the reason why the camouflage and smoke screening machinery of the press was set in motion on a large scale to divert the attention of the masses, and this was also the reason why so many were as hot, who were to be kept silent and could not speak anymore.
Among Party members it was forbidden to discuss the 30th of June 1934 at all. was participating, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Graf Holldorf. He was handed.
Since June 30, 1934, the SA had sunk to complete oblivion. After June 30, 1934, the SA was considered an unpleasant appendix. The SA was considered politically unreliable. Therefore, as shown by evidence given before the Commission, it was not charged any more with any tasks. The SA's destiny from that day on was nothing but the search for a task. Officially the SA was supposed to take in its hand the premilitary training and athletics. tasks. This attitude of the Party towards the SA became evidence in 1939, too. As Witness Juettner clearly stated, it was Bermann who sabotaged the decree of January 30, 1939, and who did not permit the carrying through of the premilitary training task of the SA. Witness Beck reported to us the preparation and the beginning of the premilitary and postmilitary training program. He also stated that this task of the SA was terminated. Only the events of the war brought the so-called War-SA-Wehrmannschaften. participate feverishly in the preparations of war. It is absolutely impossible that as the Prosecution claims 25,000 officers were trained in SA-schools. This claim was quite clearly refuted by the evidence given through the Witnesses Juettner and Bock. How unreliable the SA was in the eyes of Bermann shows the fact that the Volkssturm was not based on the SA.
We learn from submitted affidavit that the reason for this was the unreliability of the SA (General SA No. 67). The elimination of the SA is also demonstrated formally if they recollect that Worehm was Chief of Staff and Minister of the Reich, Lutze Chief of Staff and Reichsleiter, and Schepmann only Chief of Staff. ssion of the Wehrsport task of the SA. Nothing has been misunderstood more thoroughly than that. The SA has been described by the Prosecution as a semi-military organization of volunteers in spite of the fact that the tasks of the Armed Forces and the SA have been clearly separated. The misunderstanding resulted mainly from the fact that there is no adequate translation of the word "Wehr". Nevertheless that concept should be clarified; for the Prosecution itself submitted document 2471 PS. There it is said, "The SA, the carrier of the Wehrwille. The SA claims to be the carrier of the Wehrwille and of the Wehrkraft of the German people The stressing of these qualities might have led to misunderstandings abroad partly because foreign languages are unable to translate correctly the terms "Wehrwille" and 'Wehrkraft' but substitute for them the terms ' Kriegswille' or "Kriegskraft", while correctly 'Verteidigungswille' should be used. Because 'Sich wehren' is a linguistic deviation from Abwehr (Defense). The one who is defending himself in every case is the one who is attacked; and therefore, all allegations of military agressive intentions are perfectly lunatic. Ultimately the Wehrmacht is concentrated trained and conducted force of all men who are able to defend themselves. (Wehrfaehig). At no time the SA had to do anything with that technical military training given in the Wehrmacht. Therefore, the SA athletic badge has been misjudged by the prosecution. It is admitted that it was the purpose of the SA athletic badge to train into "Wehrhafte" citizens. Therefore, it is stated in the first document of February 15, 1935: "The new state demands a generation able to resist and a tough one." In the regulations concerning the execution of the document of March 18, 1937, the following is said :
"The combat training of the body is not a purpose in itself, but the means to strengthen the German men spiritually and physically, to increase their ability to perform and to make them employable and willing to be employed for the maintenance of the nations up into their high age." the Wehrmacht and the SA. The thought was that the SA would train German men to be a National-Socialist and political fighter, while the Wehrmacht would give him the character and technical training of the man bearing arms; it trains him for the defense of the country. However, it would be going too far to call the SA a military troop. At no time did the SA possess any military value. The SA was nothing but an association whose members counted millions and stepped the same step. It is true that from time to time there were conducted group games in the open but it was prohibited to use military situations as their basis. The SA man listened to an occasional lecture and, as it it usual in shooting clubs, once every fortnight they practiced with small calibre rifles. That does not permit us to consider the SA a troop, even if every storm should have had a maximum of five small calibre rifles, which, however, was not universally true. At no time did the SA have heavy arms or practice with them. The relationship of the SA to the Wehrmacht was corresponding. At no time was it recognized by the Whermacht. Rnak in the SA -- no matter how high-had not the slighest influence on rank in the Wehrmacht. On the contrary it often had the effect hindering promotion. Special training certificates of the SA, such as cavalry certificates, medical certificates, radio certificates were not recognized in the Wehrmacht. It is absolutely comical if we read in affidavits that SA men from engineer units were used in communications regiments and SA men from communications divisions were used in engineering units of the army. May I state in detail:
1) The SA uniform was the most unsuitable uniform imaginable for military purposes. In this connection I refer to the testimony of the witness Bock.
2) Aside from the small calibre rifles already mentioned, only dagger and pistol were permitted. Moreover, the dagger was introduced only after the year 1933. Only the Sturmfuehrers had pistols and only part of the Sturmfuehrers carried pistols, since only the customary conditions in Germany for the weapon certificate applied.
3) In the SA there were no means of transportation.
4) In the SA there was no storage ground of heavy weapons and no arsenal of hand firearms. Therefore, there could be no training with them/
5) The SA units did not correspond to the military units. The composition and activation was not carried out according to considerations of possible military employment with the exception of the "Standarte Feldherrnhalle", the SA man was not housed in permanent barracks. The competence of military service (military registry and military district) did not correspond with the assignments of the SA. A "Standarte" (Regiment) in the country, for instance, was split up in many small companies and platoons not fixed in number and not at all comparable to a military regiment.
6) Commands could not be passed on quickly.
7) Maneuvers of military units did not take place.
8) The SA special units did not have military tasks. They had no military equipment, no military value, and no military mission. The SA cavalry companies served the purpose of cavalry and driving sport. The en gineer companies served the purpose of emergency accident service. The signal companies had as their tasks the reading of signals with primitive old-fashioned methods without radio service. This was forbidden as can be seen from an affidavit. Moreover, they were working in the field of health service. They received their training in keeping with the Geneva Convention. (Testimony of Dock, Affidavit General SA-90)
9) The so-called Army units "Feldhernnhallel" were not subordinate to the supreme SA leadership as evidenced by the affidavit of the former Major-General Pape. (General SA-18) 10) The SA leadership was not chosen according to military consideration or ability.
(Testimony Book). The examination of the defendant von Schirach showed that the SA was unable to carry on military training.
During the war more than one draft of an agreement was submitted according to which the SA should turn over to the Hitler youth (HJ) persons for training of youth in the military efficiency schooling camps similar to the SS and the police. Documents of USA Exhibit 867 establish that the SA leadership did not grant this request. As reason for this the defendant von Schirach states that the SA was not capable of doing this. The concepts of "Wehrmannschaften" and "SA-Wehrmannschaften" were confused by the prosecution. In the occupied territories the Wehrmannschaften constituted a consolidation of loyal civilian authorities which were generally only concerned with administration, but it the rear areas should become endangered they were to be organized for their own defense. Furthermore, the term "Wehrmannschaften" in the occupied territories also signified local inhabitants such as Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians or White Ruthenians who also wanted to defend themselves against partisans. area which were to organize, above all, the SA men dismissed from military service of the Army in order to preserve their military efficiency. They were to be a certain substitute for the former veterans organizations. documents an article from the "SA Mann" from which it can be seen what is really to be understood by military training. Probably as a comparison to see whether the SA carried out military training it quotes those articles which deal with the training of the French, Russian, and Italian youth, but also that of the English Dominion youth, as well as that of the French youth. They indicate clearly that the supreme SA leadership did not carry on any such training. warfare was supposed to be a series of articles on the so-called Lebensraum, which the English Prosecution has meanwhile withdrawn, since this series of articles does not indicate what it contends. The articles quoted by the British prosecution on the colonial problem mention only a peaceful winning back of the colonies. As the proceedings before the Commission have shown, these articles showed no signs of any war-mongering spirit.
Therefore, the leap which the Prosecution makes in order to prove the bringing on of a war of agression by the SA is a leap into empty space. On the contrary, I have shown that the supreme SA leadership did everything possible to contribute to understanding among nations. This was shown clearly by the statements of the witness Oberlindober. I have also shown that at the Fuehrer schools of the SA only an ideological political training was given, but no military training. We see from affidavits that songs which might perhaps have indicated an aggressive tendency were prohibited by the supreme SA leadership. I have shown that individual SA men who tried to preach a war of vengeance were dismissed from the SA. Reich Party rally of 1939, which were contrary to possible war plans. We have also clarified this through the testimony of the witness Dr. Geyer, through the affidavits of Koch, and Zellenhoefer. Finally there came to our attention in the proceedings before the Commission an agreement between the SA and the Wehrmacht, which was to form a counter-balance to possible military aggressive tendencies on the part of Hitler, Himmler and Goebbels. (Affidavit General SA, No. 1.). throw political opponents with terroristic methods and thus make the way clear for an aggressive war is completely misleading. He who knows political conditions and looks at them without propaganda-clouded glasses wonders how one can arrive at such an opinion. The officially ascertained weapon depots of the KPD and the unequivocal attitude of the KPD speak an unmistakable language. (SA Document No. 287). What extent the political struggle of the KPD and the other leftist radical elements, which these, organizations carried into the streets, assumed, we can see from the testimony of the witness Bock before the Commission, who proved that the relief fund of the NSDAP had to be founded to care for the NSDAP-Victims resulting from the leftist radical terror. May I point out that it was the KPD that considered civil war, general strike, political mass strike necessary political fighting means, as indicated by the decision of the state court for the protection of the German republic, which I submitted the Tribunal in the Document Book (SA-Doc.
No. 286). That this political terrorism was carried on within the framework of world revolution, is also shown by a decision rendered by the State Tribunal for the protection of the German republic. This the witness Juettner indicated when he referred to the idea of a defensive Western pact directed against the endeavors to bring about a world revolution. It has been proved that this terrorism was, indeed, part of a world revolution. (SA-Document 286), in connection with which, according to their own admission, the Communist International and other agencies began revolutions in Finland, in Austria, in Hungary, in Bulgaria, and in Syria. It may well be said, without fear of exaggeration, that without the Marxists theory of the class struggle, and without the events which led up to it, the foundations would no doubt not have been created which required the protection of a spiritual movement by the SA. This is the view also adopted by the witness Gisevius, when he testifies: "The SA has its origin in that post-war period, where revolution either still was, or began again to be rampant in Germany. One might say that it was one of the last after-effects of the Spartakus upheavals in 1918. Red pressure produced Brown counter-pressure, and the latter's external expression is called after that: The SA. The Prosecution, for their part, have submitted unequivocal documents of the "SAMann" which, although it was not an official organ of the supreme SA-Leadership, it nevertheless contains in this case irrefutable proof showing that terrorism was no doubt practiced by the Communist Party. I do not propose to quote these articles in detail. I merely want to refer to Prosecution Document 3050-PS, which, by the way, reproduces articles from the "SA-Mann," in a distorted way, and torn from their context. (Compare evidence given by Klaehn and Beck before the Commission).
COLONEL POKROVSKY: My Lord, the attorney for the defense is trying to attribute to the prosecution, materials submitted as evidence which the prosecution never submitted. I object very definitely against such methods on the part of Dr. Boehm since such methods seem quite obviously meant to introduce falsehoods before this Tribunal. I plead with the Tribunal not to admit the the subsequent paragraph which in the Russian Translation appears on page 29.
It is the first paragraph. I would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal, My Lord, to the circumstances that there we have a very clear introduction of a falsehood. It is quite true that the document there mentioned was submitted by the prosecution, but it consisted of a bunch of newspapers for a number of years. In terms of previous decisions of the Tribunal, he should have, if he wanted to refer to that document or to any part of it, followed the example of the other attorneys by referring only to the particular part that he wants to draw their attention to instead of referring to the document as a whole. This he did not do. He attributes to the prosecution submission of material which was submitted only as a part of the document. It is quite different from the document's context. For that reason, I object.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not quite understand your objection, I have a translation before me which says: "The Prosecution also introduced documents taken from the "Associated Press", as was proved at the meeting of the Commission". I understand that was submitted by the prosecution. Is that right?
COLONEL POKROWSKY: Document 3050 PS, on the basis of the text I have, con sists of a collection of newspapers for the years 1934 to 1939. Part of the material that has appeared in these newspapers has been submitted by the prosecution. It appears to me that if the defense wants to use materials out of that collection which the prosecution did not submit, but which did appear in the same newspaper, then he should make a very clear distinction.
THE PRESIDENT: At the outset the Tribunal laid down a rule to cover this very situation. It is always the same.
COLONEL POKROWSKY: The prosecution does remember that decision of the Tribunal, My Lord, but we interpreted it in the way I have described here. Our point of view is strengthened by all the preceding work of the defense. Usually up to now when the defense cited parts of a document which were not cited by the prosecution, the defense made it very clear that the part of the document was not used by the prosecution. Dr. Boehm has not done so, although all other attorneys for the defense made that distinction very clear.
DR. BOEHM: May I define my attitude, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: No. secution. He expressly states to what he is referring. I do not consider it improper.
COLONEL POKROWSKY: It seems to me, My Lord, that such utilization of a document on the part of the defense is not correct. It has not been followed by any of the other attorneys. For that reason I repeat once more, it seems to me he should have stated clearly that he is either citing or not citing parts used.
THE PRESIDENT: The part of the document to which he is referring is a part which was not referred to by the prosecution. So what you desire has been done. Very well.
COLONEL POKROWSKY: Quite correct, My Lord. You are quite right, My Lord, in that case. Thank you.
MR. PRESIDENT: Go no, Dr. Boehm.
DR. BOEHM: Mr. President, in my brief I have merely referred to that part of the document not submitted by me, but my the prosecution, 3050. To take individual articles out of its contents would be equivilent to the work of at least a whole day as the Commission hearings have proved. There are a number of individual articles contained in Document 3050. But as far as I am concerned, there was no cause whatsoever to give them numbers because I did not present them. I do not think I have committed on act here which it was my duty to commit not commit.
May I carry on?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on.
DR. BOEHM: The prosecution also introduced documents taken from the "Associated Press", as was proved at the meeting of the Commission, in which the political struggle is described in connection with World revolutionary tendencies. I merely want to recall here the article entitled "The Red Danger in the East", and the cartoon under the caption "Stalin wants world revolution, Budjenny is already smelling the roast". This article was introduced by the Prosecution. Finally, I want to draw the Tribunal's attention to the street fighting regulations issued by the Communist Party.
by the Supreme SA-Leadership, which prohibits weapons of any kind in the SA, and threatens to punish any infringement on this regulation with expulsion from the SA. I may also be allowed to refer, in this connection, to the evidence given by the witness, Dr. Kurt Wolf, who explained that this prohibition to carry arms was the reason why the number of victims among the SA people was so unproportionately high. The witness also said that the number of dead on the part of the National Socialist Party was higher than the corresponding figure of the Communist Party. He also explained that the members of the SA, unlike those belonging to the radical left, were invariably searched for arms by the responsible leaders. I am also refer in this connection to the affidavits given by Freund, Zoeberlein and Hahn. They represent the political situation as it really was, beyond any doubt. That before 1933, civil war was imminent, was clear from many of the testimonies. The excesses which actually occurred in 1933 find their explanation in this atmosphere of Civil War. This is also shown by the evidence of the former States Secretary Grauert. Herr Gisevius says about this period, as I explained in the SA Document 301, "looking back on these events, one may say without fear of making a mistake that this first phase of the revolution cost comparatively few victims". If we look at Document SA 302, he also admits that "fundamentally it was only a very small clique which rendered itself guilty of excesses." In his testimony before the Tribunal, he consequently excepted more than once the great mass of the SA. It was quite clear, also, from various testimonies that the Supreme SA Leadership intervened when over excesses were brought to their knowledge. That this was actually the case, is clearly shown by the matter concerning Vogel, and above all, by the testimony on the former police president Habenicht on the camp near Wuppertal. In close cooperation between Grauert and the Supreme SA Leadership, elements committing excesses were eliminated. Herr Diels who is a Prosecution witness limits the number of those concerned in Berlin, in his affidavit on the SA, to the signal detachments which had grown out of Ernst Group Staff.