Assuming that the organization in question actually had and carried out aims which were contrary to the general law of ethics or to world order, this does not of itself establish for the member of the organization the recognition of guilt through becoming a member or continuing to be a member. An organization can be criminal; its activities can be criminal and nevertheless the individual member who joins or remains - even though he may have knowledge of it need not under all circumstances take upon himself the burden of guilt resting upon those who set the criminal goals and who were active in carrying them out. This becomes particularly evident in the case of an organization whose purpose was originally legal and subsequently established for itself and pursued a goal partly or entirely illegal. A member which than continues to remain may do so because of a variety of motives, not necessarily immoral. It is quite conceivable that such a member resolves to main in the organization because he believes that in so doing he may be able to influence the execution of the illegal goals, either in the hope of preventing them totally or partly, or at least to attenuate them. As regards the criminality with which he is charged, such a member is not aware of a criminal or even a moral wrong arising from the mere fact of membership in the organization. He can judge his membership in one organization merely in the light of the law which was in force at the time his action was committed. This can only be the law of his own country. A member can be incriminated only on the basis of what the laws and legislation of his country have established in terms of criminal responsibility arising from membership in organizations. I therefore must confine myself to discussion of that which so far formed part of the abstract knowledge of a German national about the law and verdicts in connection with that question. membership in an organization. In his speech of 28 February 1946, Mr. Justice Jackson discussed these laws. All these Laws always govern only individual trials of a member.
The established opinion of German jurisprudence and adjudication of paragraphs 128 and 129 of the penal code and other similar provisions of law dealing with the question of membership provide that formal membership is not sufficient to establish the facts involved in a case of criminal law but rather a continued activity for the illegimate purpose of the organization. The member must prove his membership through his deed, and he must consciously advance the prohibited purposes through his actions. It is not deemed sufficient that the member who has knowledge of the illegimate aims of the organization outwardly displays them thus expressing outwardly his approval of the purposes endorsed by his membership but he must participate in the carrying through its goals through his own activity in the organization. Therefore, according to German law, it is immaterial whether by outward appearances his membership can be construed that he approves of the goals of the organization and that he thus supposedly enhances the reputation of an organization before the world in any measure whatsoever. Thus it eliminates all cases where proof of the knowledge of criminal goals or even active participation by the member in the execution of these goals has not been obtained; but going further it particularly eliminates cases in which the member disapproved of the goals and di all in his power to prevent execution of the goals or in any case tried to attenuate them. unobjectionable reasons to enter or leave an association, rely on this abstract German legal principle. A retroactive law which make simple membership punishable can therefore in no case find its justification sought by the prosecution in the case of individual defendants. we here have no infraction against a general legal disposition or general moral principles which makes one conscious of the illegality of one's conduct. Such a violation is, insofar, as only the reasons for entering or remaining are not morally objectionable, not established.
In order to establish to concept of "criminal organization" underlying its judgment - the Court must take into consideration the knowledge and activity of the individual members.
It must be established that through his membership in the organization the member approved of its criminal purpose and actually advanced it through his own activity. crimes of Paragraph 6 of the Charter concern forbidden war, that especially the crimes against humanity, Paragraph 60 must be connected with the planning or execution of such a war. An organization can be declared criminal only if all of the individual members conceived a common plan for an outlawed war, or if they joined in a war from which the crimes of the Charter would arise as anticipated by the planners. The individual members not only must have joined the organization with such knowledge but they also must have consciously advanced these purposes by participation.
28 Aug M LJG 3-1 Perrin I do not ignore that the Tribunal faces a very difficult task on account of this legal argumentation. In my deduction I started from the Prosecution's concept that the proposed statement comprises also the question of guilt of the individual member, and that in later proceedings this member can restrict himself merely to the objections which refer to the fact of the membership itself. An absolutely necessary sequence of this concept is that the Tribunal has to restrict its decision to the number of cases of the individual members, in order to avoid that the decision issued now, contains already also the verdict of guilt of all individual members without an individual examination of the question of guilt having been carried through for each individual, and consequently to avoid also that the innocent in fact are declared accomplices indiscriminately, without having been heard. In order to avoid this the only means would be that a modified verdict would merely establish objective historic events without thereby at the same time taking a decision as to the individual member and his subjective guilt. It is clear to me that such a modification would face legal scruples with regard to the law of he Control Commission. We can approve of such a solution only if the Court can eliminate these scruples and actually secure thereby that in later proceedings the case of the individual member is examined to the extent which I have mentioned. If one starts from the presumption that the organization finally represents the bulk of the individual members, it leads to the conclusion that the shaping of its purpose presupposes a general training of the will of all members. Without the totality of the members, a change in the purpose of an existing organization cannot be realized. All members must at least know the now aim and must be determined to sponsor it. Should otherwise, of this now aim be a criminal one, the previous legal organization would be split into two, one with legal tendency and another with a criminal one. It would then be impossible for the entire organization to be a criminal one.
28 Aug M LJG 3-2 Perrin sufficient for the definition of a criminal character of an organization, that a further criminal purpose is added to a hitherto legal one. Here also the previous conclusion should be considered that the definition "criminal" must comprise the total aim of the organization as a body. Should the criminal purpose be only a part of the aim and should it be sufficient for the purpose of declaring the whole of the organization a criminal one, the legal aim would be at the same time discredited by this general definition. Must not these acts then, which were committed for the purpose of the fulfillment of the legal aims be illegal ones as acts of an entirely criminal association? In respect to the case of the Reich Cabinet it seems impossible to me to declare this institution as such, is indubitable criminal, if at the same time there can be no doubt that at least the legal acts were valid. This legislation of the Heidi Cabinet since 30 January 1933, which comprises all State administrations, has still today its predominent legal force. It would be an absurdity to consider these legislative acts as valid, If the aim of the Cabinet was an unrestricted criminal one. A voluntariness which must not only be present at the joining of the organization but particularly at the changing of the original aim, also when remaining in the organization. It must therefore be actually examined just as must be the spontaneous remaining in the Cabinet was always guaranteed or whether the legal and real conditions have abolished them at least from a certain date onwards. Finally the question to be examined as to whether there existed as permanent cohesive connection between the persons who are charged as members of the Reich Cabinet. Such a connection only would justify the consideration of any acts, the Reich Cabinet is charged with to have been committed by the community. This problem is already evident, because the Prosecution, which also, from its own point of view, considers a cohesive collaboration of the members of the organizations that has legally obtained the right to take part in the Cabinet sessions together with the body designated as Reich Cabinet, as necessary.
As these Cabinet sessions were discontinued in the course of time, it remains to be examined whether afterwards, in their stead, the members were bound in the same way by any other tie during the performance of the activity under consideration by the Prosecution. Starting from these general considerations dealing with the organizational problem as such, and the special problem of the case of the Reich Cabinet, the result of the evidence must not be examined in order to establish whether the requirement for a sentence exist as argued. defendants. The Prosecution starts from the right to participate in the Cabinet sessions. They thereby suppose that the criminal activity assumed by them took place within the framework of the personal connection quaranteed by the sessions. They thereby overlook, however, that a number of persons mentioned by them in appendixes A and B of the Trial-Brief, were merely entitled to participate in those deliberations of the Cabinet sessions which concerned their administrative sphere. If the Prosecution obviously aims at collecting the decisions of all the participants, particularly in question of general politics, those members who had the right to attend the conferences only occasionally and in part, must, as a matter of course, be excepted from the community in question. I therefore refer to appendixes A and B where the Prosecution stated the extent of their right of participation for each of the persons mentioned by them. in-Chief of the Wehrmacht branches, that is, Fritzach, Brauchitsch, Raeder, and Doenitz, were only entitled to participate in cabinet meetings on the basis of the Fuehrer directive of November 25, 1938, that is to say, not generally. with reference to the question of law in the case of Keitel, I refer to Doctor Nelte's plea. Also Shirach had only the right to participate when his sphere of activities was involved. Appendix B shows this fact correctly in the case of Axmann; it has however, been overlooked in the case of Shirach. In this respect, therefore, we have to supplement the list in appendix B with reference to Fritzach, Brauchitsch, Raeder, Doenitz, Keitel, and Shirach.
From the above conclusions, I believe that Reich Commissioner Gerecke's right of participation was also restricted. Moreover, this case seems equally worthy of mention because Gerecke had already resigned in April, 1933. of participation in the Cabinet session but had no right of voting and were only present for information. This is the case of Chief of the Press Dietrich and State Minister Meissner. ment cannot be answered uniformly. For the question of voluntary entry into the Government, these cases will have to be particularly considered, in which State Secretaries who previously did not belong to the circle of the persons included by the Prosecution were, through the resignations of their superior Ministers, immediately charged with the conduct of ministerial affairs and thus entitled to participation in the Cabinet sessions. These have to a certain extent become organized in their official career in their new posts.
The question of a member's permanence in the Cabinet is for the moment to be judged differently. Legally, the following must be borne in mind in this respect. According to Article 11 of the Reich Minister Act of 27 March 1930, the Reichsminister could request their discharge at any moment. An alteration of the legal position could already have occurred in virtue of the ministers Allegiance Act of 17 October 1934, which is document No. 22. According to this, the Ministers were to answer fidelity and obedience to Hitler. A breach of fidelity and obedience could be assumed from a letter of resignation and therefore considered legally inadmissible. The question can however actually remain undecided, the legal consequence deriving from the Ministers oath is in any case expressly and legally established by the German Civil Service Act of 26 January 1937 -- 2340 PS put into effect on the 1 July 1937. By this law, the Reich Minister Act of 27 March 1930 is cancelled. By its Article 161, it is now stipulated that the Reich Ministers can now be discharged by Hitler alone.
possible since the 1 July 1937. It will be objected that cases nevertheless exist where Cabinet members have obtained their discharge. The cases of Gerecke, Hugenberg, Papen, Schmitt and Eltz von Ruehenach which are anterior to this time must in this respect be excluded. obtain their dismissal. They have mostly failed, as we have heard on many occasions in the depositions of the individual defendants. Many only succeeded in being discharged from their department but were vest all over again with a new title or a new function, Whereby they subsequently fall under the category of the persons implicated by the Prosecution. Darre was relieved from his official functions and even expelled, but could not obtain his official dismissal as Minister. Schacht had for this reason been preparing to break with Hitler for a long time; State Minister Popitz was executed as participant in the plot of 20 July 1944.
So we see that in spite of the legal situation, there was actually no possibility of a member of the Cabinet resigning against Hitler's will. a cohesion cooperation of the members must be established so as to consider the Reich Cabinet as an organization or group with in the meaning of the Charter. It means that this cohesion association must be guaranteed by the Cabinet meetings and the circulating procedure. I shall show by the following, that a collective cooperation of the members of the Cabinet did not exist, that moreover in its development even an absolute division of the Cabinet resulted. According to the evidence it results that that factors which overlap, have brought about the splitting of any internal cohesion of the Cabinet. These are the three factors which follow:
1.) The carrying through of Hitler's undivided way, which increases more and more up to an absolute dictatorship.
2.) The establishment of upper and lower ranks among the Cabinet ministers having equal rights within the Cabinet itself, through the authority to use orders of the General Plenipotentiary, Special Delegate etc.
3.) A carefully guarded secrecy, which closed to the individual Minister any view beyond his Department, and which accordingly precludes every possibility of a super-departmental coordination. In this relation it is necessary to consider the resulting development historically and to exhibit its principles. One could be inclined to assume With the Reich Cabinets until 1932 a "Cabinet solidarity". At that time Cabinet meetings were continuously talking place, where all bills and also differences of opinion on questions which effected the sphere of several ministers were submitted for consideration and decision. Majority of votes settled the decision. And, nevertheless, already for the situation of practice and science of that period, a collective responsibility of Ministers was rejected. In the authoritative "Book of reference of German constitutional Law" (Handbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts) by Anschuetz and Thoma, well-known lecturer on Constitutional Law, Freiherr Marschall von Biberstein wrote in 1930 on page 529: "General principles threw a most doubtful light upon the affirmation of collective responsibility for majority decisions, as, altogether, in jurisprudence the point of responsibility can only be in regard to rational beings.
A firm State practice in the sense of such in affirmation cannot be proved for the Reich; on the contrary: The competent ministers make themselves personally responsible.... Above all, German political practice does not know the principle of "Cabinet Solidarity" as it is acknowledge abroad, above all in England, with the consequence of a collective guarantee for all individual actions..." responsibility of minister to the Reichstag, but also in the proceedings before the State Tribunal, where the ministers could be indicted and sentenced for their activity - largely patterned after the English impeachment. of decisions by the Cabinet and thus on the free decisions of the ministers: in the right of the Reich Chancellor to determine policy, for which he then bore the sole responsibility. Chancellor; they were binding for the ministers. Biberstein wrote about this in his thesis, page 528: "Otherwise, in the encroachments which ... his (the minister's) free decision endured, through the inviolability of the Chancellor's directives. Since it was his duty to conform therewith, he stood in a position similar to that of a subordinate in the hierarchy of authorities in regard to the decrees of a superior: the individual test of the compliance with duty of his conduct was thus ... taken away from him, and, as far as this was in effect, his solo responsibility was, whether he had acted according to orders, and not whether he had acted correctly. For that, the responsibility was shifted to the one giving the orders." impeachment. democratic German form of state and practice of state that "Cabinet solidarity" did not exist, in spite of regular Cabinet meetings, and that the Ministers certainly did not work in cohesive cooperation when the Reich Chancellor in the Cabinet meeting utilized his right to determine policy.
will further have to be considered that the government authority had slowly devolved upon the person of the Reich President on the basis of the application of the law concerning emergency regulation. Already at that time we see the formal factor of legislation, the Reichstag, only legislatively active to a diminishingly little extent; the decisive laws are being issued through the law concerning emergency regulation of the Reich President. The ministers, therefore, are still only advisers of the Reich President. It is a symptom of this development, that the Papen Cabinet had already purposely been established by Hindenburg as a Presidial Cabinet, that this Cabinet was composed of people in whom Hindenburg confidedn, which the latter had appointed as special ministers (Fachminister). The position of the Reich Chancellor, therefore, was considerably raised in importance, because neither the ministers nor the Reich Chancellor had been appointed as exponents of the parties, and as the result of this confronted the parties more independently, than was the case previously. The Reich Chancellor was the liaison man of the Cabinet with the Reich President. It was this position in particular which gave him a clear superiority over the other ministers.
It is in this situation that Hitler becomes Reich Chancellor. His Cabinet also, in its early stages, is again a Presidial Cabinet, which depends on the confidence of the Reich President and the latter's law concerning emergency regulation. Until the decreeing of the enabling act (Ermachtigungsgesetz) of 24 March 1933, all laws were issued by way of emergency orders (Notverordnung) and therefore were subject to the responsibility of the Reich President.
The Enabling Act (Ermaechtigungsgesetc) formed the decisive factor for further development. The legislative powers were now transferred to the Reich Cabinet. These were not directed to Hitler personally but to the Reich Cabinet. I do not claim that the Reichstag of that time already regarded Hitler as the Reich Cabinet. But doubtless the Reichstag was influenced by Emergency decrees which constituted the government policy for a long time. Therefore this new emergency legislation of the Reichstag intended only to legalize this state for a future emergency. Thus the authorities adjusted themselves to a Reich Cabinet of such inner structure, kind and method of work, as it was formed during the time of the President's Cabinet. Certainly the solo responsibility was not transferred to Hitler which was assumed by the Reich President when the Emergency Decree was proclaimed.
But to a certain extent he filled the gap which had now opened by the elimination of the Reich President. Outwardly this become apparent inasmuch as his (the Reich President's) - right to issue laws was transferred to him. To this was added his right as Chancellor to determine the basic guiding principles of the policy. Both factors together resulted doubtlessly in a considerable strengthening of Hitler's power position in the Cabinet over his Ministers. The seed for his later autocracy had been planted.
In The Cabinet's working method, this was not at first clearly manifest. True, a decision is no longer reached but objections by the Ministers are taken into consideration which lead, in individual cases, to the withdrawal of radical legal drafts or to their medevation. Nevertheless, the Reich Chancellor's right to set the principles of political directives is already mere manifest. Hitler lays claim to this right for himself and points out the responsibility that is entrusted to him alone. More important, however. than this development within the Cabinet are the influences introduced from the outside. The Party sets to work and runs everything that the Government purposely does not take hold of. The boycott against the Jews and the destruction of the trade unions are measures taken by the Party. The ideas of the Party take hold of the masses. The latter carries out what the Party is prone to refer to with the slogan: "Revolution". The witness Gisevius has summarized this development in his book, pages 141 to 143, in these terms: "It is not individuals that rush to National Socialism, no, the manses as masses get into movement. Because nobody wants to lag behind the events, all strive together to precede the revolutionary development by the length of half a nose. It is only from these versatile impulses, from these irrational movements of the soul of the masses that the whole political coordination can be understood which takes place in this early summer of 1933 with a sudden intensity really but still voluntarily and spontaneously anyhow ...... As masses, they create a new volition, force a new movement."
This movement also affected the old political parties. They dissolved themselves voluntarily.
Moreover, they also make the vow to Hitler that their former members will loyally collaborate with the National Socialist State; they would summon their former members to do so. The Bavarian People's Party cleared the way "for every former member of their party to collaborate in the construction of the new Germany under Adolf Hitler's direct leadership." The Catholic Party (Zentrumspartei) by its dissolution enabled its supporters to put their abilities and experience unreservedly at the disposal of the national front under the leadership of the Reich Chancellor for positive collaboration in the sense of the consolidation of our national, social, economic and cultural relations and for the collaboration on the reconstruction of a legal state order." Even the Social Democratic Party partly followed when the Provincial committee of the Social Democratic Party of Wuerttemberg suggested to the holders of mandates "to carry on their activity in a sense which leaves no doubt as to their national conviction nor of their good will to support Germany's new political structure according to the plans of the national revolution." The attitude of the masses, similarly influenced, is reflected in the result of the Reichstag election of 12 November 1933 in which over 90% of the voters voted for the NSDAP. I am aware of the fact that the correctness of these election results are called into doubts. Whatever may have happened in regard to influencing and falsifying the election, one thing cannot have been doubtful for any objective observer of the then prevailing conditions: that the result of such manipulations can hardly have been of such importance that it could by itself have created an overwhelming majority. It cannot be denied that under the then prevailing circumstances the majority of the voters, hoping to bring about a change of the existing difficult situation, put their trust in the party in which they believed they already saw the partial success of its economic measures. If one considers how the concept of the party then had carried the day with the masses and that the idea of the party culminated in the personality of Adolf Hitler, that kind of voting and public opinion was the confirmation of the leadership idea in itself. The vote was a carte blanche for the supreme party leader of the Cabinet, the Reich Chancellor.
By this development Hitler's claim to power was strengthened on the one hand and, on the other hand, most of the Cabinet members did not consider themselves able to prevent such a development. These reflections may also have been influenced by the idea that they could not effectively oppose Hitler's seizure of power. One restricted oneself, therefore, fundamentally to avoid a radical development and, azs far as possible, mitigate the severity resulting from the changes made externally by the State apparatus. Thus we see the legislation clear up a situation, created from without, giving it legally a more moderate orderly form. If, accordingly, one reproaches the members of the Cabinet for modering illegal conditions and at the same time giving them a legal basis, such reproaches are to be directed to a greater extent against the men from the middle-class camp in the Cabinet. They who according to the intentions at the formation of the Reich Cabinet were appointed to restrict the National Socialist influence, and had subsequently not apposed the disastrous development by all means.
They should have warned and opposed the influenced irrational masses and finally should have resigned from office under alarming protest. It is superfluous to examine the question whether the attitude of these men politically right or not, whether they were weak men who believed perhaps that they could thus avoid hopeless resistance. From the criminal consideration of the things the only essential point of view is whether it was descernible at that time that the development was a preparation for what happened later and accused by the Charter. If, with the formation of the Cabinet the outbreak of a real revolution, a civil war was avoided, they were entitled to believe that they have thus made at least partial sacrifices to the general mood in order to avoid a dangerous reaction of the incited masses. Rationally speaking, the hope could still exist that the development would find it in the framework of its legal limitations. Politically, this was doubtless a wrong idea. The radical tendencies of these who later kept pushing everything to extremes were underestimated. It should, however, to be considered that the very Cabinet members who come from the middle-classes, could not rid themselves of the idea that in the practical sense of a responsible leader of the State the limit of the development will be found. development with diminishing success. Its attempts grew the more unsuccessful when the authority of the Reich President, the weight of the bourgeois conservatives and also the position of the Reichswehr creased to form a counter-balance. Hitler understood how to use Hindenburg for his own purpose. The burgeois conservatives did not form a closed united front anymore, large parts divided and went over to the National Socialists. The parties dissolved themselves, and their followers were now robbed of their cohesion. Blomberg became a follower of Hitler. The Ministers under consideration therefore did not have any support from the other side. Toward them Hitler expounded his appointment by the people and his sole responsibility toward the people. An open protest practically proved itself as impossible. The pub lication of the Marburg speech of Papen was prohibited, his departure from the Cabinet as the result of this just served to make the circle of Ministers dissatisfied with the development only still smaller and thereby less influential.
Every Minister who considered the question of his resignation had to count on the fact that his position would be occupied by a new man, who did not hinder, but only furthered this development. A Minister who was really soldily with his Department did not like the idea of transferring his field of work into such now hands. It is clear that these who were confronted by this question did not want to endanger that which they had achieved by hard labor hindering and correcting in their fields of work in the execution of the laws, in the personnel policy and also in other respects, and that they wanted to continue their work in this sense in the future also. final mark under the previous development. The law is a Cabinet Law. Hitler demanded the consolidation of his office with that of the Reich President. According to his declaration this consolidation was not to be the final solution, only the momentary situation was to be considered, that he personally would not recognize a new Head-of-the-State over himself, and, on the other hand, however, he could not give up his office as Reich Chancellor. He pointed out that a decision of the people, which was to be demanded after the death of Hindenburg, would bring the sanctioning of this measure. In this state of affairs the Cabinet did not consider itself able to oppose the demand of Hitler. The results of the public voting were clear from the very beginning. Hitler would have achieved his aim to decree the law under all circumstances, even with the refusal of the Cabinet. The Cabinet Law of 1 August, 1934, therefore practically represents nothing else but a prepared law, which in any case could be achieved and was also achieved through public voting. The legal sanctioning of the dictatorship, therefore, was only a confirmation of the previous relationships of power and a consequence of the overwhelming will of the people which existed at that time. politically but also with regard to state law. The law represents the complete accomplishment of the monocratic principal on the state sector.
Hitler consolidated the right of the Reich President in his person, especially the law emergency regulations (Notvererdnungsrecht) with the rights of the Reich Chancellor, to decide the fundamental lines of policy. As Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces he finally received the strongest factor of power in the state into his hands. its this, therefore, practically every state agency became dependent on his will and had to follow his directions. The Reich Cabinet also is no exception from this. Outwardly this becomes wtill especially apparent through the law concerning the oath of the Reich Ministers of 16 Octber 1934. The new oath for the Ministers corresponds to the general oath of the officials and soldiers, and shows that the position of the Minister has changed to that of a top state official bound to directives. Cabinet and the importance of the Cabinet Sessions also undergo a change. Insofar as foreign political decisions were concerned, Hitler announced his decisions, mostly in one long monologue on the general political situation. Later on he only informed the Cabined of the accomplished facts. He informed the Cabinet of the occupation of the Rhineland after the troops had already entered it. In the case of fundamental domestic, political measures, for example the Nuernberg Laws, the Cabinet as such was not previously consulted. The majority of the Ministers were surprised when the law was suggested in the Reichstag Session of the Nuernberg Party Day. In the drafting of minor laws of administrative importance only the completed draft and the reasons for it were stated. In order to avoid the expression of departmental misgivings in the Cabinet Session, the drafts were previously made "ripe for the Cabinet" in accordance with a directive of Hitler, i.e. the specialist Ministers were giver the opportunity in a preliminary discussion to voice their departmental misgivings to the departmental Minister responsible for the initial draft. Only after these misgivings were allayed did the draft reach the Cabinet Session. Therefore, no allowance was made for a consultation in the Cabinet Session. General, political considerations, therefore, which were affected by these drafts, were subject to the sole decision of Hitler.
If, therefore, a general political question did arise, in which Hitler's point of view was not known, then the departmental discussion was postponed until his directive had been obtained. By this the Cabinet sessions did not only lose every political significance, but also a practical purpose. Hitler therefore convoked the Cabinet only in constantly growing intervals, until finally after a last session in February 1938 which was merely destined to receive a statement by Hitler, no Cabinet sessions whatsoever were hold any more. culation proceedings. The acting minister submitted the drafts of bills to the other members of the Cabinet to enable them to raise objections in their own fields. It stands to reason that these political basic questions and political measures which Hitler decided as he saw fit never were subject to the circulation proceedings. As is shown by the presentation of evidence, most of the ministers were informed of the important political events in no other way than any other person. In most cases they learnt of the facts afterwards by press or radio, unless occasionally something leaked through to them through secret channels prohibited for them, too. These may have been more numerous in the sphere of the minister than elsewhere. These occasional information, however, could not afford a comprehensive and authenticated total picture of the actual situation. Only the few direct confidants of Hitler were really comprehensively and authentically made acquainted with the events. This granting of confidence, however, had no connection with the persons in question being invested with the office of a minister of state. The overwhelming majority of the ministers who did not belong to this closest circle learned for example of the march into Austria, the setting up of a Protectorate and the starting of the individual war measures only after the measures had become effective and had been publicized. the ministers. Even though, as a rule, the drafts were submitted as a rule to all ministers, -- this was not always done as shown by Schacht's evidence -
this did not mean a joint collaboration elaboration of all the ministers. This was only done to enable each minister to examine whether the interests of his administrative department might be affected by the draft. the individual minister thereby was more strictly limited to his particular department. It was his only task to submit the objections of his department and to see to it that this department was not harmed nor its competence infringed. The interests of the department are special interests and the restriction to them excludes general aims and purposes. proceedings had to and were thought to avoid a close cooperation of the ministers as can be concluded from all evidence. and openly becomes also evident. The taking of evidence has shown that his ministers, were not allowed to reach him and that all efforts of the ministers to this end were in vain.
Various ministers attempted to institute Cabinet session again in order to provide thereby opportunities for expressions and information. Hitler refuse this with the remark that he wanted to have nothing more to do with this defeatists' club. He even forbade a personal reunion of the Ministers arranged by Lammers in the form of an evening beer party. held the authoritative conduct of the State in their hands and will fully directed its whole policy towards a contemplated, reprehensible war, then this is contradicted by the fact of the disintegration of the Cabinet as a cohesive whole and the evolving of a single directing head in the person of Hitler. But further proof that there was no functional cohesion between the Ministers can be furnished by other facts. Between Hitler's directives and their execution by the departments of the individual ministers, superior offices were created which, in their turn, had authority to issue directives to each individual Minister. The departmental Minister is therefore further removed from the headquarters of the decisive authority; he is, furthermore, the executive agent of two successive directive headquarters. The "Commission for the Four-Year-Plan", the "Minister-Councillor for National Defense", the "General Plenipotentiary for Labor Assignment" and similar institutions were created by Hitler himself and provided with full legislative powers by him personally. It is even possible for most of these headquarters not on to compel the departmental Minister to issue specific administrative directives and ordinances, but what is more, they could issue these themselves and, disregarding the Ministers, have recourse directly, to the latters' subordinate offices. This dismemberment was obviously brought about by Hitler intentionally. The Cabinet as an agency for the execution of his legislative proved too extensive, too complicated and too obstructive, and the position of the Minister still too independent. Therefore, he delegated legislative power to isolated or minor groups who, as men enjoying his special trust, ensure the prompt execution of his wishes. By the creation of these new subordination positions, he restricts the power of the department. Due to the confusion of the manifold relations of subordination and authority, the difficulty of defining competences and authorities, Hitler's orders are the ultimate issue, the sole reliable directive.