(OKW) ordered in 1938 that the Army was to devote itself until 1945 exclusively to the tasks of its organization and structure, and its training, and that it should abstain from any kind of preparations for a war, including preparations for the defense and safeguarding of the frontier, the military leaders gained the firm conviction that a peaceful development had been secured. Which of these events was to permit the conclusion that the military leaders had participated in a general plan directed to a war of aggression? In all cases, the military leaders did nothing but execute their purely military orders after political decisions had been taken. been sufficiently dealt with inthis trial. It is merely my duty to add an observation on how this development Evoked in the eyes of the military leaders. How were the relations between the generals and Hitler in that period? He was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. In other words, he was their immediate military superior. Their political objections had everywhere been refuted by events, not only in the case of the occupation of the Rhineland, but also in connection with the union with Austria, in the Sudeten problem, and on the occasion of the creation of the Protectorate. these facts, but in those days, the belief in Hitler's political ability was a tangible reality with the majority of the German citizens and soldiers. And he had achieved all his successes only by political means, not in a single case by war: To realize that he would risk a war, a war of aggression with Poland, the military leaders would have had to be crystal gazers. How were they to realize and recognize his aims? The foreign office was barred from informing then of the political situation. Neither as individuals nor as a group, were they able to participate in political decisions. The proposals made by the German Foreign Minister to the Polish ambassador in October, 1938, the conferences between Hitler himself and the Polish Foreign Minister, the discussions of the German Foreign minister in Warsaw, could only be judged by the soldiers as attempts at a political settlement of the Polish problems, butnever as an indication of an intended war of aggression.
more than the preparation for an "ev*---*lity." If a military leader summoned to his meeting.
When Hitler declared,in the course of his address, "I would have to be an idiot to slither into a World War on account of the lousy Corridor problem like the inefficient statesmen of 1914", and when, in military leaders whom he commanded.
When Hitler used the words in his speech "We have no other choice; we must act", he did not indicate how he intended to act.
At any rate, the military leaders were, by no means, under the i mpression that a war against Poland had been decided upon.
On the contrary; had gust been made with the Soviet Union, impressed all these present at the meetingwith the firm belief that he would find a diplomatic solution also in the Polish question.
Until then, Hitler had been a past master in seizing the right opportuni-
ties. Nobody ever used bluff with greater virtuosity than he. Bluff and military pressure, however, are permitted instruments of policy. It is quite wrong to conclude that a man, who practices or supports one or the other of those methods, thereby also approves of a war of aggression. If Hitler should really have conceived the plan for an aggression against Poland for some time past, the military leaders were not even able to realize this plan as such. In the last resort, they were, themselves, "bluffed".
But what were they do do once the die was cast? Were they to declare "We are not coming along", or were they to refuse to fall out?
They had to do their duty. They were in exactly the same situation as the Russian Army commanders, who entered Poland a few days later because of Stalin's orders. explained to his generals in these words:
"You must remember, gentlemen, that in war the value of obedience is higher than that of courage."
sible for the outbreak of the war, but also forits extension and for its conduct in general. and the shaping of the events of the war have been so often and so completely examined in this trial that I must refrain at this juncture -in view of the limited time which is at my disposal -- from reopening this matter in a general survey. World War presents itself clearly as the consequences of the conditions created by the Treaty of Versailles. This seemed to them, in the last resort, morally to justify the German action against Poland. When England and France declared war, this was certainly not a fact involving the responsibility of the German military leaders. The extensions which occurred during the further course of the war cannot be considered as a consequence of free decisions or of a preconceived plan.
The necessities of a struggle for victory or defeat, once a war has broken out, strictly prescribe even to nations, the read which they have to follow. In these circumstances, the soldier is nothing but the sword which must hit and the shield which must absorb the blows in order to prevent the death of their own nation.
The evidence produced in Raeder's case has made it clear beyond doubt by what considerations the group of officers were guided officers, who prepared the occupation of Denmark and Norway. We know that in this case Germany forestalled an allied action by a very narrow margin. If the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, himself, held the conviction that there was an absolute necessity for averting the most serious dangers from Germany, how could, in these circumstances, the troop commanders, who are members of the so-called "group", have held the opinion that there was no reason to fear these grave dangers? Would the Allied Chiefs of General Staffs and Field Commanders have had the right, or the possibility, to refuse to embark their troops, which took place for the same purpose-before the German action was undertaken? Moreover, only a limited numbe of military leaders had any knowledge of this action at all. All the other officers, covered by the indictment, only learned over the radio that the operation had been undertaken. How can they, therefore, be accused of taking part in planning aggression against these countries? campaign, have been discussed conclusively. The attitude which the General adopted in this case constitutes a particularly striking refutation of the assumption made by the Prosecution. The Army High Command, itself, sharply turned against Hitler's decision to launch an attack in the West, in particular, on account of the intended violations of neutrality. The clash with Hitler was so serious that in his address to the Commanders-inChief on the 23rd of November, 1939, he directed exceptionally bitter attack against his generals; reproached them with ignorance of foreign political questions, and referred to them as an "obsolete upper class which had already failed in 1914." The same evening, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army sent his resignation, which, however, was not accepted.
Thus, the Army High Command sharply opposed Hitler's plans. There wereserious clashes between Hitler and his generals, and, finally, the Commanding Chief of the Army resigned. What else could have been expected of the generals? If they had decided on munity before the enemy, even such action would completely have failed to produce any effect, owing to the strong position which the victorious Hitler occupied at that time in the German nation. Beyond that, the Army High Command, still hoping that there might be any possibility of peace, delayed the beginning of the attack unt the Spring of 1940. Although from the legal point of view the advance through Belgium and Holland constitutes an objective violation of neutrality, the military leaders were bound to consider this action as necessitated by the requirements of war, and justified by the information which they had received concerning the threat of violation of neutrality on the part of the Allies. This was all the more true as they had no general knowledge of the political situation, and no influence at all on the decisions to invade these countries. Greece have been sufficiently cleared in the collection of evidence from Goering, Keitel, and Jodl. The war against Greece was a logical consequence of the action which Italy had taken on her own: the war against Yugoslavia was a consequence of the sudden coup d'etat at Belgrade. As to the military leaders, they had not even considered a war in the Balkans in the orbit of their studies and considerations, not alone have any kind of responsibility for an outbreak. the military leaders had not contemplated it in any way when the war began, nor did they make any preparations for such a case. The Army High Command did not even possess the necessary maps! When Hitler, subsequently, caused them to make such plans, he justified this by the necessity to forestall a threatened intervention by Russia in the war. The Russian action against Finland, the Baltic states, and Bessarabia appeared to confirm the wellfoundedness of this opinion. Reliable information about strong Russian troop concentrations were to thema further indication of a threatening danger The evidence given by Field Marshall von Rundstedt and General winter shows that the German attack ran into strong Russian preparations for deployment, which contributed substantially to confirming in the minds of the military leaders the conviction that Hitler had been right in saying that they were engaged in a genuine preventive war.
close to the frontier, that this fact alone necessarily led to the conclusion that the Russian intention to attack must have been a certainty. 10,000 Soviet tanks, 150 Soviet divisions, and an increase from 20 to 100, in air fields in Eastern Poland alone, were reverted at the time. If the military leaders considered in these circumstances that Hitler's decision to wage a preventive war was justified from the military point of view, their participation in this war in the execution of their duties as soldiers, can never have been a crime.
The military plan known under the code word "Barbarossa", which the Prosecution considers as the planning of a war of aggression, had been contemplated until the last moment as a pure eventuality, as a precautionar measure in case the Soviet Union changed her attitude. Even after February, 1941 -- apart from the high ranking officers of the Armed Forces, High Command (OKW), the Army High Command (OKH) and the Commander-In-Chief of the Air Force -- only 18 out of the 129 indicted military leaders had heard of this plan at all, and only as a plan to be used if the need arose. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, had given a warning also in respect to this eventuality, by referring to serious military objections; but the majority of the officers concerned, only received knowledge of it immediately before the beginning of the war, when the die had already been cast. And they received this knowledge only by the fact that they were given certain orders successfully opposed Hitler's intentions? The reasons indicated by Hitler justified the war. To wait until the Soviet threat became a real attack would necessarily have led to the destruction of the Reich as far as could be judged from the main point of view. The ether military leaders had no possibility at all of rejecting Hitler's decision.
discussed already. War was declared without the opinion of the Supreme military leaders being previously asked. If even the Army High Command (OKH) learned only the accomplished fact, how can the ether military leaders have had any knowledge of Hitler's intention to begin this war? As regards the Navy, which could only play a part in waging this war as long as the land or air forces of the United States did not intervene in Europe or Africa, it is a fact that hostilities had practically been opened before the declaration of war by Roosevelt's firing order, although the German forces strictly respected the 300-mile limit, which was not justified under International Law. Evidence in the case of Raeder and Doenitz had clearly shown that all directives emanating from the High Command of the Navy were intended to avoid a conflict with the United States under all circumstances, I am now coming to the conclusion of this Chapter:
What responsibility have the 129 indicted officers as a group in the extension of the war? borne by every soldier who fights in a war for his country on the spot where he is ordered to fight.
I now come to the chapter, "Crimes against the rules of war and against humanity". The accusation that the military leaders concerned took part in 1. The planning, 2. The execution of a criminal, total war, in particular also in crimes against enemy armies and against prisoners of war as well as against the population in the occupied territories, hits the German generals particularly hard. Those generals are not concerned with minimizing any possible guilt of their own, but with finding the historic truth. Anyone who desires to form a just opinion of the terrible events of the last world war must realize that actions and omissions of individuals and nations are not merely the outcome of a free will or of a bad or good faith. Such actions and omissions arose, on the contrary, from the mental background of our epoch, and nobody can avoid these influences. face the problem of power in all its forms. The various doctrines, the materialistic conception which generally prevailed after the second half of the nineteenth century, and, finally the excessive Nationalism noticeable on all continents, were phenomena which -- irrespective of whether they were good or bad -- did not remain without influence on the attitude and actions of the nations. Although those ideas did not necessarily have to lead to the results with which we are faced today, they are, in the last resort, the intellectual starting point from which the second world war and its consequences originated. There is another aspect which must not be overlooked in may just appreciation of the general trend of events, in particular, as regards the formidable sacrifices of human lives. That is the devaluation of men, which is due to development noticeable in all civilized nations, and which has been called "massification". The more the nations multiplied, the lower, unfortunately, sank the value of the individual man. But, above all, technical progress has contributed considerably to this devaluation. If modern technology supplies man with the means of destroying tens of thousands of human lives in one blew, if air raids cause 200,000 deaths in one single night, as at Dresden, if one or two atom bombs are sufficient to kill a hundred thousand men, the value of men must necessarily sink. The some phenomenon made its appearance in the first World War, as well as in the Russian Revolution and in the Spanish Civil War.
The German military leaders struggled against this development, but as children of their epoch it was just as impossible for them to avoid the influence of the spirit of that epoch as it was for the soldiers of the ether countries. but besides, in its effects even predominantly, an ideological war. In any clash of ideologies the struggle becomes a struggle of annihilation -a total war. Ideological wars have always demanded streams of blood and were accompanied by unimaginable atrocities. The religious wars and the sacrifices and cruelties of the great revolutions are examples of this theory. Thus, the second World War, as a conflict of ideologies, was conducted on both sides with such vigor and perseverance that it finally led to the full utilization of human resources and material resources of nation. In other words, it produced "total war" in the truest sense of the Word. If, beyond that, the torn "total war" was extended by the politicians on both sides to mean the total destruction of the enemy ideology, this already shows what on ideological conflict involves.
What was the attitude of the general to this problem? The group of generals covered by the indictment consisted exclusively of men who had chosen the profession of the soldier as the mission of their lives. They were mature men, with an experience of life, who had not put on a soldiers uniform only under the National Socialist Regime; but the mature man has a stronger sense of tradition, justice and law, than the young man. instance that the military leaders did not in any way agree with Hitler's revolutionary ideas on the methods of warfare and refused to make the these ideas their own. The generals were firmly resolved to conduct the war according to the old traditions, which implied a strict observation of the rules of warfare. The reproach addressed to the generals by Hitler in warfare 1939, on account of their "obsolete conception of chivalrous warfare", speaks a clear language. That this attitude of the generals did note change subsequently is shown by the fact that, in the later course of the war, a great number of the indicted generals were relieved of their functions on account of this attitude in spite of their military successes.
Did anyone gain the impression that these men were criminals and had committed crimes against the rules of war and against humanity? These officers know from their experience during the first World War that any violation of the rules of war ultimately always turns against the soldiers of their own army. Until the last moment, they conducted the war against the Armed Forces of the enemy in accordance with the rules of war. Field Marshal Alexander himself confirmed that the German troops fought "decently and like gentlemen." has only one interest, namely, that everything is quiet in his back. This alone will induce him to avoid anything that may cause uneasiness among the population. He knows only too well that all unnecessary measures of compulsion only lead to hostile reactions and that these, in turn, bring about intensified reprisals which can only produce rebellion. If one has no faith in the conception of soldierly honor and in the Christian mentality of the military leaders, one should at least believe that sound reason caused them to treat the population of the occupied territories in accordance with International Law, to spare their private property and to assist then within the limits of their possibilities in their peaceful work. be tolerated and that in such cases also the military leaders took the corresponding counter measures, is obvious. The threat of severe punishment by the Allied military governments in the case of any rebellion or possession of arms in Germany, even now after the end of the struggle, prove it also. the military on the one hand, and the ideological on the other -- the conduct of the war, from the highest levels immediately below Hitler down to the lowest executive organs, was sharply separated. The Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) was concerned only with the purely military conduct of the war, while anything connected with the parallel ideological and political struggle was entrusted to political agencies and their executive organs.
had been conquered by the Armed Forces, were, as a matter of principle, withdrawn from the territorial control of the Commander-in-Chief immediately after occupation, and placed under the authority of the representatives of the political leadership. Therefore, any thing in the nature of possible crimes winch may have been committed in territories not under the territorial control of the indicted group of persons must be excluded in this trial when the responsibility of the so-called "group" is to be ascertained. and Northern France, the remainder of occupied France, Luxembourg and Alsace-Lorraine, Croatia, Yugoslavia and Greece, Slovakia, Hungary and Italy, were not placed under the territorial authority of the military leaders. soon limited by Hitler's order as narrowly as possible, and therefore comprised only the territory within immediate roach of military operations until, finally, territorial control was limited to the immediate combat zones, that is to say, to the area roughly 10 lea, behind the first front line. Outside this strip of land the territories were placed under their administrative authority of political agencies.
Reproaches directed against the "military commanders" or "Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber" appointed in the individual countries and territories are irrelevant in this connection because those officers are not included in the indictment. distrust for the military leaders on account of their attitude to the questions of warfare and humanity, had quite consistently on trusted the execution of the ideological and political struggle to the political agencies and their executive organs. only insofar and as long as any particular area in enemy territory was part of the area of operations, and consequently their responsibility is limited in the same way.
with operational events were with drawn from the influence of the Wehrmacht and had been transferred to the responsible execution by completely independent political agencies. This includes, for instance, all measures of apolitical and police character, the economic exploitation of the occupied territories, measures pertaining to the realm of culture, and man power problems. There remained therefore for decision by the Commanders-in-Chief, apart from the purely military operations at the front line, only military security and the establishment of local administration within the areas of operation. the tasks connected with the conduct of the operations, the supply of their troops and with military security, so that it was hardly possible for them to concern themselves with other tasks.
It was their duty to be with the units under their command in the area of operations. Their planning and their care had to be devoted, in the first place, to the unceasing struggle and to their troops. These facts supply the simple explanation why it was possible to keep so many things and measures connected with other non-Army agencies a secret, even in the area of operations and why they did not come to the knowledge of the military commanders. Wehrmacht as combat units, exclusively as regards their fighting service, and their supply. Both as regards organization and personnel, discipline and judiciary, the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler alone had authority to give orders. (Einsatzgruppen), police SD, Organization Todt, etc., received their instruction and directives exclusively from their own superior authorities, and not from the Command-in-Chief of the Operational Sector. limited the Commander-in-Chief to the conduct of the troops under his command in the area of operations. military commanders, I now propose to turn to some special cases, and by way of introduction, I may say concerning the documents used by the Prosecution that extracts from German directives, torn from their context, often do not reveal the real meaning of the directives, and lead to wrong conclusions. Other documents, in particular some of those presented by the Russian Prosecution, represent findings of certain Commissions. Nobody can check up the figures contained in those documents, for instance, concerning murders, particularly, as all specifications concerning the exact time when these crimes were committed, and other substantial data, are missing. The exact figure of dead does not, in itself, prove that these dead were murdered by Germans. ing away upon close inspection, particularly when we consider that these data were collected by numerous commissions in all countries, and from hundreds of witnesses, over a period of several months, and include events which occurred not in one small area placed under the authority of a Commander-in-Chief, but in vast territories, and over long periods.
collection of their evidence, I was able to submit to the Tribunal very comprehensive Defense evidence, together with observations and comments which I made so far as I was given an opportunity. me fully to exploit even part of this counter-evidence. I, therefore, propose to select only a few individual cases to which I attribute special importance. provided for the immediate shooting of political Commissars. When Hitler began by orally announcing this order, which he alone had planned, in March, 1941, he at once met with the strongest inner opposition on the part of all the generals present, which was due to the latter's soldierly and human attitude. After all endeavors made by the generals, the Army High Command and the Armed Forces High Command, to prevent the issuing of this order of Hitler had failed, and the Kommissar Order was issued some time later in writing, the Commandersin-Chief of the army groups, and Armies, either did not pass this order on to their troops at all, or they ordered on their own authority, that it should be eluded. They did so in full consciousness of the danger that they might be heavily published for open disobedience in war to an order of the Supreme commander. The order on the preservation of discipline issued by the Commander in-Chief of the army, in pursuance of the Kommissar Order, had the desired effect. It gave the Supreme Commanders at the front a loophole to act in accordance with their own conception. Thus, the military leaders achieved the result that the Kommissar Order was not generally executed within the Army groups and the Armies. Ultimately, it was rescinded upon the energetic representations of the Chief of the General Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any evidence in writing to that effect?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. That part of the evidence is contain ed in the affidavit which I have presented, and the last paragraph can be prove by document 301-B.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that there was, in writing, an order by Chief of General Staff Zeitzler rescinding that order?
DR. LATERNSER: I think I have seen misunderstood. The last paragraph which I just read came from General Epistler; the order was rescinded and this is true by means of document 301-B which I have presented to the High Tribunal. That document is available in a translation.
What more can be expected of the military leaders? The order did not emanate from them, they did not pass it on. The did not execute it; they endeavored to have it rescinded, and finally reached their objective. Here lies their common link and their unanimity, and precisely, the handling of the Kommissar Order is evidence of the most conclusive kind of the fact that the generals' attitude was beyond reproach. istration of military justice in the East, met with the opposition of the Commanders-in-Chief who were present when it was orally announced. It is due to the generals' negative attitude that Hitler gave up his original plan, which provided for a complete elimination of the administration of military justice in the Past, and limited himself to certain restrictions. Commander-in-Chief of the Army concerning the maintenance of discipline, is of the greatest importance. The Commanders-in-Chief of the Army groups and of the Armies, acted as a group in accordance with the provisions of this additional order, and took vigorous measures in all cases where members of the Armed Forces had committed offenses against the civilian population. In serious cases, they had death sentences rendered and executed. Even simple road accidents, in which Russian civilians were injured, were brought before military tribunals, and the persons responsible were taken to account. This is proved, among other things, by the evidence given by Field Marshal von Lieb. Here again, therefore, precisely the officers included in the indictment took steps to prevent the full execution of one of Hitler's orders, which was in contradiction to their inner conceptions.
The attitude which the military leaders adopted with regard to Hitler's Commando order, was so unfavorable from the very outset, that Hitler was not only compelled to draw up this order personally, but he also found it necessary to threaten with exceptionally severe punishment, if his order was not executed. ed the order immediately on receipt on account of his inner opposition to it. see to it that the order was not carried out, but eluded. The Commander-inChief Southwest, Field Marshall Kesselring, issued additional regulations, which secured that the Commando troops would continue to be treated as prisoner of war, As regards the eastern theater of war, the order was without significance any way. ways and means to prevent the execution of the Commando order, which was in contradiction to their soldierly conceptions. account in this connection, as they are concerned with individual acts, which have already been the subject of special investigations or will be investigated later.. But they do not, in any way, reflect the typical attitude adopted by the military leaders, which alone is relevant in this trial.
It seems to me that there is still the following question of importance: Could the military leaders not rely on the facts contained in this order being true? were they not bound to assume that the order had been examined in its relations with international law, before it was issued? Is this order at all inadmissible under international law? Does it still come under admitted reprisals? order of Hitler some importance in the case of the persons whom I represent. whether the Commanders-in-Chief, in execution of a common plan, ordered or negligently tolerated any kind of mistreatment of prisoners of war in the areas of operations.
of war could not be accommodated and fed in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva convention, this is exclusively due to the fact that certain difficulties are, at first, unavoidable when hundreds of thousands are taken prisoner. When, after the end of the war, even the Allies were faced with similar difficulties, when all of a sudden great masses of Germans were taken prisoner, the allies will certainly not now be willing to allow themselves to be accused of crimes against humanity. invalidated or refuted by counter-evidence from all theaters or war. The military leaders in all theaters of war forestalled possible excesses against prisoners of war by issuing appropriate orders,and calling to account the persons responsible for offences connected with the treatment of prisoners of war. They neither ordered nor knowingly tolerated any mistreatments, or even killing of prisoners of war. and I continue at the end of page 70. secution that the Commanders-in-Chief had full knowledge of the tasks and the activities of the special purpose groups (Einsatzgruppen), which were allegedly under their command, and that they not only tolerated, but even actively supported the execution of these ranking groups. In this, the Prosecution rely on elements given by the High SS leaders Ohlendorf, Schellenberg and Rode as well as on Document L i 80. Is this not highly doubtful evidence? Can this evidence really convey to the Tribunal the conviction that the generals of the German armed forces offered their assistance in these most abominable mass exterminations? My answer is in the negative, and I give it with the fullest conviction. thousands of Jews were murdered, has been refuted by General Woehler's evidence in all its essential points. Schellenberg, who occupied one of the most influential positions in the most notorious agency of Germany -- the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) -- one of Himmler's friends cannot supply any real facts, but gives us only assumptions.
informed in June, 1941, on the planned Mass Exterminations. When did this witness arrive at this incriminating assumption; towards the end of 1945, when he was taken into custody, and when he was on the lookout for his own advantages? Under cross examination, he is unable to indicate any facts from the year 1941, on which such an assumption might be based, but he nevertheless made the assumption, and for the first time in 1935. the course of the 20th of July, 1944, fighting against National Socialism, have reported nothing about this atrocious information to his direct superior, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, with whom he had particularly close relations for a great number of years, and to whom he had access at any time in his capacity of Quarter Master General:
von Brauchitsch confirmed in the witness stand. Ic-officers were informed about the functions of the special purpose groups (Ensatzgruppen) in connection with mass exterminations at a meeting held in June, 1941. But he adds the further assumption that these Ic-officers had informed the Commanders-in-Chief. This means that two of Schellenberg's assumptions linked together, furnish the proof that the Commanders-in-Chief had knowledge of these planned mass exterminations. made by him? Ic-meeting, in which General Kleikamp expressly declares that there had been no question of planned mass extermination, which must cause Schellenberg's structure of lies fall to the ground. two oaths. He, thereby, places his assumption to the contrary, which is a pure assumption founded on no facts -- because he was unable to indicate facts in cross examination -- on the same level as the positive statement made by one of those present at the meeting, according to which no information had been given on the planned mass exterminations.
That much, as regards Schellenberg's evidence I ask the Tribunal to take full cognizance of the minutes under cross examination of this witness before the Commission Wishes to make a charge. He asserts that the special purpose groups (Einsatzgruppen) were fully placed under the authority of the Commanders-inChief, but he restricts this statement by adding "To the best of my Knowledge". This deprives the evidence of the witness of all its value for the Prosecution. Chief of the Armoured group four, Col. Gen. Hoeppner, was to have entertained a particularly close cooperation with the special purpose groups.
as it only contains the views of its author ? Nor does it contain any indication as to the nature of this cooperation, or to the object to which it referred. The special purpose groups and Commandos, however, also had it carry out supervisory and reviewing functions, as it has been proved, and only these were known to the Commander-in-Chief. If there was any cooperation at all, it could never have been in connection with mass executions of Jews.
Col. Gen. Hoeppner, who also lost his life as a victim on the 20th of July, 1944, would have been the very last to lend his assistance to mass murder. Is it really believable that a general, who wants to remove a system of Government, surely because of his special objection to its methods, should previously have taken part in the mass murders committed by this very system? Hoeppner as witnesses, both of them had not conspired with this system, but against it, and both sacrificed their lives for this conspiracy. who easily truns ironical whenever the defendants invoke dead witnesses in their defense, uses itself, invokes the dead, in an endeavor to prove that the military leaders had knowledge of planned mass exterminations and participated in them, and the dead, unfortunately, are unable to defend themselves against such attempts. I have shown by numerous affidavits that 1. the special purpose groups (Einsatzgruppen) were not placed under special clarity by Prosecution Document No. 447 PS, 2. General Wagner clearly expressed this to General Judge Mentel and 3. the military leaders has not been informed of planned mass execucredence to the SS leaders Schellenberg, Ohlendorf and Rode, who are trying for the last time, with all their hatred, to craw the military leaders into their own disaster, than to the officers of whom the Tribunal was able to obtain itself a personal impression.