"Today my expectations center around a murderous battle......
cost of considerable losses. How many death sentences does my order of attack involve?
It is this idea that wieghs heavily on driven by unavoidable necessity.
How many of the strong and That is the reverse side of a military leader's job".These, therefore, are the facts:
How little have the leading men among the German generals been formed in accordance with the picture drawn of them by an envious, biased or uninformed propaganda in the world. To make this for once quite clear, is, I think, a by which I have to fulfill in this unique trial of historic importance;
Has the German Officer Corps, and in particular, have the German generals changed since 1933? Have they, under Hitler, become disloyal to their teacher, and drifted into a "militaristic" back water? Has the spirit of a Moltke, of a Schlieffen, of a Seeckt become extinct in them? Have the generals turned to a criminal Nazi plan and taken an active part in it? I believe that the facts speak a language of sufficient clarity.
The "common plan", the "conspiracy", with the object of an extension of power which was finally to lead to aggressive war, was at first and primarily, as the Prosecution emphasized again and again, aimed at the subjugation of their own nation, at the extermination of all elements of opposition in their own people. In this process, so the Prosecution alleges, the foundations and experiences required for the planned subjugation and extermination of other nations were to be gained. all circumstances by an inner agreement of the military leaders with these alleged objectives and principles.
What were the facts? Relations between the Officer Corps and the Party were anything but good. When the Party was entrusted with the leadership in all spheres of public life, as well as in the creation of a totalitarian control of trade end industry, the Officer Corps had been given no opportunity to express an opinion. The Officer Corps participated in no political decision. Excesses of high party officials, terrorist methods of the Party, action against the Jews, the political education of the young generation, and the anti-Church attitude adopted by the Party under the leadership of Hitler and Bormann were sharply rejected. The attempt of the SA to take the place of the Armed Forces, and that of the SS to constitute a second Armed Force besides the Wehrmacht, not with the strongest opposition. looked like: Where, then, was the ideological foundation which alone would have rendered common planning possible? Hitler's personality excluded every plan and every conspiracy below, besides, or with him. As regards the military leaders, there was no room, neither under the Constitution, nor in fact, for the pursuit and representation of political aims or political plans. Beyond that, warnings arose from among the indicted officers against the policy pursued since 1935, which later on proved to be a "va banque" policy.
The Chief of the General Staff risked his post and his person to call a halt to the fateful doings of a head of State, resolved to go to extremes. From among the same quarters, a coup d'etat was finally attempted right in the middle of the war. Is there anyone who can still seriously assert that the mentality of those non, their planning and their scheming, was directed only to war and to nothing but war, and to the assistance of a policy, having a war of oppression as its purpose? I believe to ask this question means at the same time to reply in the negative. If the Chief of the American General Staff, General Marshall whose sources of information were no doubt excellent, gives even in his reports to the American president, expression to his conviction that there existed no common plan between the General Staff and the Party, but that much oftener sharp differences had appeared between the two, this is certainly an important and conclusive testimony to which I have nothing to add. military leaders, as a whole, are said to have deliberately, consciously and treacherously committed the crime of planning and executing a war of aggression. crime under the Kellogg Pact, have so often been dealt with by the Defense, that I can refer here to the observations presented by then on the subject. I may, in particular, draw the attention of the Court to the arguments put forward by Professor Jahrreiss. I wish to emphasize, in this connection, only the fact that the whole of the personal represented by me are not politicians, not statesmen, not experts of international law, but merely soldiers. the preceding twenty years, the diplomats and legal advisors of the League of Nations were unable to achieve? A soldier bases his judgment predominantly on his surroundings. In at least three cases during the last decade, they noted that the alleged crime of a war of aggression was not persecuted. Neither after Italy's war against Greece, nor after the Abyssinian war, nor afte the war of the Soviet Union against Finland, were the soldiers of these countries indicted before a Tribunal.
aggression. The Prosecution admit themselves that the classification of a war has nothing to do with strategic defensive or offensive.
plans (including plans for an offensive), to carry them out, and, finally: To participate in a war. The classification of a war as a war of aggression is a purely political opinion. The planning of wars of aggression by soldiers is thus only possible when soldiers enter the political sphere. The decisive point, therefore, is that an officer participating in such planning know that he was concerned with the political plan for a definite plan of aggression: that this war of aggression was an unlawful one and that by his own participation he himself was committing an unlawful act. war present itself to the military leader? The conclusions to be drawn as to guilt or innocence, do not depend on how, after the war and defeat, these events are today clearly recognizable in their development, but how they were visible at the time to the typical German military leader. the longing for an eternal peace makes itself felt. This longing is strongest in the case of those who made the greatest sacrifices in the war. In the first World War, it was the German officers' families from whom the majority of the indicted military leaders originate. eager to sacrifice their own sons in a new war. And should precisely these men be inclined in their minds to start another war of aggression? attitude, a clean mind for honesty and comradeship, which was considered by the officer as his real task. of the German generals, but it was the obvious aim pursued by German policy as such. Reich Chancellor Bruening, who is certainly beyond suspicion, declared on the 15th of February, 1932, that "The claim for equality of rights and equality of security is shared by the whole German nation. Any German Government will have to put forward this claim." Those pages deal with the relative strength and questions of armament. I shall continue on page 39 at the top of the page.
on the course of developments, may, even they themselves were surprised by them. If in all these years, if Hitler's moves were tolerated by foreign countries and, at least, in fact recognized that the reason may be, as Justice Jackson believes, that those foreign countries had "weak governments", but the fact was and remained that there was international recognition. If even foreign countries did not already, at that time, recognize all these developments as the "beginning of the execution" of wars of aggression, how could the German military leaders, as a whole, possibly have been aware of such plans on Hitler's part? the military leaders removed when he looks into the military plans of that period, which contained nothing but directives for defense. In that respect, the final address made by Col. Gen. Book to a circle of high ranking officers on the conclusion of an operational task concerning the subject "War with Czechoslovakia" may be considered as characteristic. In this address, he spoke with great seriousness of the results of the proceeding studies, and stressed the fact that although Germany would be able to defeat the Czech Army within a few weeks, she would subsequently not be in a position to oppose any serious resistance to the French forces, which would, in the meantime, have crossed the Rhine, and invaded southern and central Germany, so that the initial success against Czechoslovakia would in its further consequences have developed into a formidable catastrophe for Germany, These arguments can certainly not be interpreted as indicative of the German generals' lust for war, nor for their approval of Hitler's possible plans of aggression. repeatedly and earnestly emphasized that German policy -- whatever its aims might be -- should never bring out a situation which would lead to a war oil two fronts. In view of the numerous mutual assistance pacts, guarantee obligations, and alliances between all the neighbors of Germany, this altitude excluded as a matter of principle any idea of waging a war of aggression.
History has justified the opinion hold by the generals. Hitler disregarded their warnings, and exclaimed in indignation: "What sort of people are those generals, whom I, as the head of the State, may have to drive into war?
If things were as they should be, I should be unable to escape from the generals' pressure for war:"
Only a man who doesn't want to see the facts, the truth, can neglect these facts. If over there was unanimity among the military leaders, it certainly did not exist with regard to the planning of wars of aggression, but -- based on the very realistic realization of the dangers and consequences of any war for Germany and the world -- agreement did exist in the rejection of such plans of the head of State. unsuitable as "participants" in his plans, and dismissed them. Nor did he consider any other officer from the so-called "Circle of Conspirators" as suitable to become the Supreme Commander, and the future participant in possible plans, but he personally assumed the supreme command of the Armed Forces, andthus became their immediate military superior. had the character of a military order, although representations were still possible, there was nothing left but the duty of the subordinate be obey, when the men who gave the orders held to his opinion. particularly used as a proof of the plans of the "criminal organization." I am referring to the so-called "Hossbach minutes" dealing with the meeting or the fifth of November 1937. What actually did happen?
It was not an "influential group of Nazi conspirators meeting Hitler to consider the situation", but Hitler,in his capacity as head of the State, had convened some military leaders and the Foreign Minister for a meeting. He developed his own ideas: He began by declaring that the problem of Austria and Czecheslovakia must be solved from 1943 to 1945; them he referred to the Poles as possible aggressors. There was no question of settling the Corridor problem, or of conquests to be made in the East, and similar subject.
As regards the reliability of these minutes, the Affidavit No. 210, made by General Hossbach, which I have submitted to the Court, clearly shows that Hossbach did not write down the actual text of the speech while it was being made, but made a written account of it from memory a few days later.
Everybody mows how easily mistakes occur which are liable to distort the actual events whenever records are made subsequently, using the writer's own words, or leaving gaps where his memory fails him.
The following at any rate is certain:
1. The Reich War Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army from England and France, referring at the same time to Germany's 2. Whatever may have been the meaning of Hitler's speech, none of the Hitler at that meeting.
Col. Gen. Fritsch did not even inform 3. But even if an individual officer had received knowledge of the subject of this conference, no conclusions can be drawn from this fact against the whole of the military leaders.
If Hitler contemplated war in six or eight years, this was no reason for uneasiness. In such a long period, numerous political solutions would have been impossible. Nor was it possible to realize Hitler's true ideas from this speech any better than from any of his other speeches.
4. The few officers present at the meeting were bound to draw from his speech at least the positive conclusion that Hitler himself contemplated only an absolutely peaceful development until 1943. Hitler's plans? attitude of the generals towards the whole plan from their reactions to the union with Austria and to the Czechoslovakian question. The special emphasis which is laid on the participation of some officers in the conference held betwee Hitler and the Austrian statesmen, on the Obersalzberg, in February, 1938, is particularly well illustrated by the words which Hitler spoke sometime later; "I selected my most brutal-looking generals to appear as mutes in order to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation to Schuschnigg." were a political action, the background of which was unknown to the generals. The officer saw only that then his troops marched into Austria, they were everywhere showered with flowers, and enthusiastically welcomed by hundreds of thousands, and that there was not a single shot fired.
The deployment plan "Gruen" against Czechoslovakia, to which the Prosecution refer, was not a consequence of the meeting of the fifth of November, 1937, but constituted, nothing but a precautionary measure contemplated in the event of a war with France, and was in the hands of the General Staff already on the first of October 1937, that is to say, as early as the meeting of the fifth of November. Although, even in this case, an agreement was reached which provided for the entry of the German troops, the Chief of the German General Staff, Col. Gen. Beck, warned, in a memorandum drawn up with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, against a policy which right lead to a warlike conflict.
In this memorandum, he emphasizes that any war launched by Germany in Europe must ultimately lead to a World War, with a tragic end for Germany. Col. Gen. Deck was dismissed. When Hitler turned directly to the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the Armies on the 10th of August 1938, with the obvious hope of overcoming the resistance of the older Commanders-in-Chief, with the help of the younger generation, the objections raised by these younger officers were such that he became even more suspiciou of the generals. Where, then, was the enthusiasm of the generals for Hitler's plans? Where was their participation in them?
Hitler's constantly changing utterances in the Sudeten question did not enable the military leaders either to realize that he might seriously plan a war. the Czech problem from 1943 to 1945.
On the 20th of May, 1938, he declared in a military directive: "I do not intend to smash Czechoslovakia in thenear future by military action without provocation." inwhich he said: "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future." On the 16th of June 1938, he said in another directive, "The immediate objective is the solution of the Czech problem by my own free decision." On the 24th of August1938, he specified that an "incident" in Czechoslovakia *---*t be the prerequisite of a German attack. at the frontier. But political negotiations were opened simultaneously. On the first of October 1938, the territories ceded were peacefully occupied in accordance with the political agreements. quence of a purely political action, the military leaders received only the order for a peaceful entry.
(OKW) ordered in 1938 that the Army was to devote itself until 1945 exclusively to the tasks of its organization and structure, and its training, and that it should abstain from any kind of preparations for a war, including preparations for the defense and safeguarding of the frontier, the military leaders gained the firm conviction that a peaceful development had been secured. Which of these events was to permit the conclusion that the military leaders had participated in a general plan directed to a war of aggression? In all cases, the military leaders did nothing but execute their purely military orders after political decisions had been taken. been sufficiently dealt with inthis trial. It is merely my duty to add an observation on how this development Evoked in the eyes of the military leaders. How were the relations between the generals and Hitler in that period? He was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. In other words, he was their immediate military superior. Their political objections had everywhere been refuted by events, not only in the case of the occupation of the Rhineland, but also in connection with the union with Austria, in the Sudeten problem, and on the occasion of the creation of the Protectorate. these facts, but in those days, the belief in Hitler's political ability was a tangible reality with the majority of the German citizens and soldiers. And he had achieved all his successes only by political means, not in a single case by war: To realize that he would risk a war, a war of aggression with Poland, the military leaders would have had to be crystal gazers. How were they to realize and recognize his aims? The foreign office was barred from informing then of the political situation. Neither as individuals nor as a group, were they able to participate in political decisions. The proposals made by the German Foreign Minister to the Polish ambassador in October, 1938, the conferences between Hitler himself and the Polish Foreign Minister, the discussions of the German Foreign minister in Warsaw, could only be judged by the soldiers as attempts at a political settlement of the Polish problems, butnever as an indication of an intended war of aggression.
more than the preparation for an "ev*---*lity." If a military leader summoned to his meeting.
When Hitler declared,in the course of his address, "I would have to be an idiot to slither into a World War on account of the lousy Corridor problem like the inefficient statesmen of 1914", and when, in military leaders whom he commanded.
When Hitler used the words in his speech "We have no other choice; we must act", he did not indicate how he intended to act.
At any rate, the military leaders were, by no means, under the i mpression that a war against Poland had been decided upon.
On the contrary; had gust been made with the Soviet Union, impressed all these present at the meetingwith the firm belief that he would find a diplomatic solution also in the Polish question.
Until then, Hitler had been a past master in seizing the right opportuni-
ties. Nobody ever used bluff with greater virtuosity than he. Bluff and military pressure, however, are permitted instruments of policy. It is quite wrong to conclude that a man, who practices or supports one or the other of those methods, thereby also approves of a war of aggression. If Hitler should really have conceived the plan for an aggression against Poland for some time past, the military leaders were not even able to realize this plan as such. In the last resort, they were, themselves, "bluffed".
But what were they do do once the die was cast? Were they to declare "We are not coming along", or were they to refuse to fall out?
They had to do their duty. They were in exactly the same situation as the Russian Army commanders, who entered Poland a few days later because of Stalin's orders. explained to his generals in these words:
"You must remember, gentlemen, that in war the value of obedience is higher than that of courage."
sible for the outbreak of the war, but also forits extension and for its conduct in general. and the shaping of the events of the war have been so often and so completely examined in this trial that I must refrain at this juncture -in view of the limited time which is at my disposal -- from reopening this matter in a general survey. World War presents itself clearly as the consequences of the conditions created by the Treaty of Versailles. This seemed to them, in the last resort, morally to justify the German action against Poland. When England and France declared war, this was certainly not a fact involving the responsibility of the German military leaders. The extensions which occurred during the further course of the war cannot be considered as a consequence of free decisions or of a preconceived plan.
The necessities of a struggle for victory or defeat, once a war has broken out, strictly prescribe even to nations, the read which they have to follow. In these circumstances, the soldier is nothing but the sword which must hit and the shield which must absorb the blows in order to prevent the death of their own nation.
The evidence produced in Raeder's case has made it clear beyond doubt by what considerations the group of officers were guided officers, who prepared the occupation of Denmark and Norway. We know that in this case Germany forestalled an allied action by a very narrow margin. If the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, himself, held the conviction that there was an absolute necessity for averting the most serious dangers from Germany, how could, in these circumstances, the troop commanders, who are members of the so-called "group", have held the opinion that there was no reason to fear these grave dangers? Would the Allied Chiefs of General Staffs and Field Commanders have had the right, or the possibility, to refuse to embark their troops, which took place for the same purpose-before the German action was undertaken? Moreover, only a limited numbe of military leaders had any knowledge of this action at all. All the other officers, covered by the indictment, only learned over the radio that the operation had been undertaken. How can they, therefore, be accused of taking part in planning aggression against these countries? campaign, have been discussed conclusively. The attitude which the General adopted in this case constitutes a particularly striking refutation of the assumption made by the Prosecution. The Army High Command, itself, sharply turned against Hitler's decision to launch an attack in the West, in particular, on account of the intended violations of neutrality. The clash with Hitler was so serious that in his address to the Commanders-inChief on the 23rd of November, 1939, he directed exceptionally bitter attack against his generals; reproached them with ignorance of foreign political questions, and referred to them as an "obsolete upper class which had already failed in 1914." The same evening, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army sent his resignation, which, however, was not accepted.
Thus, the Army High Command sharply opposed Hitler's plans. There wereserious clashes between Hitler and his generals, and, finally, the Commanding Chief of the Army resigned. What else could have been expected of the generals? If they had decided on munity before the enemy, even such action would completely have failed to produce any effect, owing to the strong position which the victorious Hitler occupied at that time in the German nation. Beyond that, the Army High Command, still hoping that there might be any possibility of peace, delayed the beginning of the attack unt the Spring of 1940. Although from the legal point of view the advance through Belgium and Holland constitutes an objective violation of neutrality, the military leaders were bound to consider this action as necessitated by the requirements of war, and justified by the information which they had received concerning the threat of violation of neutrality on the part of the Allies. This was all the more true as they had no general knowledge of the political situation, and no influence at all on the decisions to invade these countries. Greece have been sufficiently cleared in the collection of evidence from Goering, Keitel, and Jodl. The war against Greece was a logical consequence of the action which Italy had taken on her own: the war against Yugoslavia was a consequence of the sudden coup d'etat at Belgrade. As to the military leaders, they had not even considered a war in the Balkans in the orbit of their studies and considerations, not alone have any kind of responsibility for an outbreak. the military leaders had not contemplated it in any way when the war began, nor did they make any preparations for such a case. The Army High Command did not even possess the necessary maps! When Hitler, subsequently, caused them to make such plans, he justified this by the necessity to forestall a threatened intervention by Russia in the war. The Russian action against Finland, the Baltic states, and Bessarabia appeared to confirm the wellfoundedness of this opinion. Reliable information about strong Russian troop concentrations were to thema further indication of a threatening danger The evidence given by Field Marshall von Rundstedt and General winter shows that the German attack ran into strong Russian preparations for deployment, which contributed substantially to confirming in the minds of the military leaders the conviction that Hitler had been right in saying that they were engaged in a genuine preventive war.
close to the frontier, that this fact alone necessarily led to the conclusion that the Russian intention to attack must have been a certainty. 10,000 Soviet tanks, 150 Soviet divisions, and an increase from 20 to 100, in air fields in Eastern Poland alone, were reverted at the time. If the military leaders considered in these circumstances that Hitler's decision to wage a preventive war was justified from the military point of view, their participation in this war in the execution of their duties as soldiers, can never have been a crime.
The military plan known under the code word "Barbarossa", which the Prosecution considers as the planning of a war of aggression, had been contemplated until the last moment as a pure eventuality, as a precautionar measure in case the Soviet Union changed her attitude. Even after February, 1941 -- apart from the high ranking officers of the Armed Forces, High Command (OKW), the Army High Command (OKH) and the Commander-In-Chief of the Air Force -- only 18 out of the 129 indicted military leaders had heard of this plan at all, and only as a plan to be used if the need arose. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, had given a warning also in respect to this eventuality, by referring to serious military objections; but the majority of the officers concerned, only received knowledge of it immediately before the beginning of the war, when the die had already been cast. And they received this knowledge only by the fact that they were given certain orders successfully opposed Hitler's intentions? The reasons indicated by Hitler justified the war. To wait until the Soviet threat became a real attack would necessarily have led to the destruction of the Reich as far as could be judged from the main point of view. The ether military leaders had no possibility at all of rejecting Hitler's decision.
discussed already. War was declared without the opinion of the Supreme military leaders being previously asked. If even the Army High Command (OKH) learned only the accomplished fact, how can the ether military leaders have had any knowledge of Hitler's intention to begin this war? As regards the Navy, which could only play a part in waging this war as long as the land or air forces of the United States did not intervene in Europe or Africa, it is a fact that hostilities had practically been opened before the declaration of war by Roosevelt's firing order, although the German forces strictly respected the 300-mile limit, which was not justified under International Law. Evidence in the case of Raeder and Doenitz had clearly shown that all directives emanating from the High Command of the Navy were intended to avoid a conflict with the United States under all circumstances, I am now coming to the conclusion of this Chapter:
What responsibility have the 129 indicted officers as a group in the extension of the war? borne by every soldier who fights in a war for his country on the spot where he is ordered to fight.
I now come to the chapter, "Crimes against the rules of war and against humanity". The accusation that the military leaders concerned took part in 1. The planning, 2. The execution of a criminal, total war, in particular also in crimes against enemy armies and against prisoners of war as well as against the population in the occupied territories, hits the German generals particularly hard. Those generals are not concerned with minimizing any possible guilt of their own, but with finding the historic truth. Anyone who desires to form a just opinion of the terrible events of the last world war must realize that actions and omissions of individuals and nations are not merely the outcome of a free will or of a bad or good faith. Such actions and omissions arose, on the contrary, from the mental background of our epoch, and nobody can avoid these influences. face the problem of power in all its forms. The various doctrines, the materialistic conception which generally prevailed after the second half of the nineteenth century, and, finally the excessive Nationalism noticeable on all continents, were phenomena which -- irrespective of whether they were good or bad -- did not remain without influence on the attitude and actions of the nations. Although those ideas did not necessarily have to lead to the results with which we are faced today, they are, in the last resort, the intellectual starting point from which the second world war and its consequences originated. There is another aspect which must not be overlooked in may just appreciation of the general trend of events, in particular, as regards the formidable sacrifices of human lives. That is the devaluation of men, which is due to development noticeable in all civilized nations, and which has been called "massification". The more the nations multiplied, the lower, unfortunately, sank the value of the individual man. But, above all, technical progress has contributed considerably to this devaluation. If modern technology supplies man with the means of destroying tens of thousands of human lives in one blew, if air raids cause 200,000 deaths in one single night, as at Dresden, if one or two atom bombs are sufficient to kill a hundred thousand men, the value of men must necessarily sink. The some phenomenon made its appearance in the first World War, as well as in the Russian Revolution and in the Spanish Civil War.
The German military leaders struggled against this development, but as children of their epoch it was just as impossible for them to avoid the influence of the spirit of that epoch as it was for the soldiers of the ether countries. but besides, in its effects even predominantly, an ideological war. In any clash of ideologies the struggle becomes a struggle of annihilation -a total war. Ideological wars have always demanded streams of blood and were accompanied by unimaginable atrocities. The religious wars and the sacrifices and cruelties of the great revolutions are examples of this theory. Thus, the second World War, as a conflict of ideologies, was conducted on both sides with such vigor and perseverance that it finally led to the full utilization of human resources and material resources of nation. In other words, it produced "total war" in the truest sense of the Word. If, beyond that, the torn "total war" was extended by the politicians on both sides to mean the total destruction of the enemy ideology, this already shows what on ideological conflict involves.
What was the attitude of the general to this problem? The group of generals covered by the indictment consisted exclusively of men who had chosen the profession of the soldier as the mission of their lives. They were mature men, with an experience of life, who had not put on a soldiers uniform only under the National Socialist Regime; but the mature man has a stronger sense of tradition, justice and law, than the young man. instance that the military leaders did not in any way agree with Hitler's revolutionary ideas on the methods of warfare and refused to make the these ideas their own. The generals were firmly resolved to conduct the war according to the old traditions, which implied a strict observation of the rules of warfare. The reproach addressed to the generals by Hitler in warfare 1939, on account of their "obsolete conception of chivalrous warfare", speaks a clear language. That this attitude of the generals did note change subsequently is shown by the fact that, in the later course of the war, a great number of the indicted generals were relieved of their functions on account of this attitude in spite of their military successes.
Did anyone gain the impression that these men were criminals and had committed crimes against the rules of war and against humanity? These officers know from their experience during the first World War that any violation of the rules of war ultimately always turns against the soldiers of their own army. Until the last moment, they conducted the war against the Armed Forces of the enemy in accordance with the rules of war. Field Marshal Alexander himself confirmed that the German troops fought "decently and like gentlemen." has only one interest, namely, that everything is quiet in his back. This alone will induce him to avoid anything that may cause uneasiness among the population. He knows only too well that all unnecessary measures of compulsion only lead to hostile reactions and that these, in turn, bring about intensified reprisals which can only produce rebellion. If one has no faith in the conception of soldierly honor and in the Christian mentality of the military leaders, one should at least believe that sound reason caused them to treat the population of the occupied territories in accordance with International Law, to spare their private property and to assist then within the limits of their possibilities in their peaceful work. be tolerated and that in such cases also the military leaders took the corresponding counter measures, is obvious. The threat of severe punishment by the Allied military governments in the case of any rebellion or possession of arms in Germany, even now after the end of the struggle, prove it also. the military on the one hand, and the ideological on the other -- the conduct of the war, from the highest levels immediately below Hitler down to the lowest executive organs, was sharply separated. The Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) was concerned only with the purely military conduct of the war, while anything connected with the parallel ideological and political struggle was entrusted to political agencies and their executive organs.