cing declaration of guilt for each individual member of the organization. If the individual is not indicted later, he receives no punishment, it is ture; but he is nevertheless a criminal according to legal decision. The character of criminality does not affect the organization as such, but in reality -- since the organization as such no longer exists -- exclusively its former members. Before you, Your Honors, the main trial against each individual one of these members is proceeding. The issue is the establishment of his punishable action, "membership". The most important declaration of guilt is made against each individual. The concept of guilt, however, in all civilized states of the world, is always, within the meaning of the law, connected with the individual feed of a person. There has never been guilt of organizations. No one could object to declaring the aims and purposes of an organization criminal if individuals were not affected thereby. But as soon as the declaration of criminality of the organizations is to be the indirect condemnation of individuals one must conscientiously examine and establish the individual guilt of each individual.
One comes to this conclusion for another reason as well: What does the concept of organization include ? That an organization is a union of people is clear. That this union, at least in general outlines, pursues unified aims and purposes and has a corresponding constitution should also be clear. Whether it includes the characteristic of voluntariness is, on the other hand, extremely doubtful. No one will deny that the German Wehrmacht was an organization although there can be no question of voluntariness, not even in the majority of the cases. One may think further of occupational groups, schools, or oven compulsory guilds, in which there is no voluntariness of joining, but which are certainly organizations. The Klefisch Memorandum as well as the basic decision of the Tribunal of the 13th of March, 1946 (Paragraph 6, No. 2) introduced the characteristic of voluntariness into the terminology. In my opinion, quit, correctly. But why ? Fundamentally only because otherwise the aftermath of declaring the organizations criminal would appear unjust in view of the consequences for the indivi dual members.
What follows from this ? Very much. One sees here quite clearly that in reality it concerns not the organization but the members. The decision of 13 March 1946 considers relevant only the question of whether membership was in general voluntary; it therefore takes into consideration that involuntary members will be affected. In view of the consequences of Law No. 10, this is not reconcilable with the idea of justice. whether on a voluntary basis or not -- are criminal if they fulfill the conditions of Article 6; that is, if they were aimed at crimes against peace, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. In connection with No. 6 of the Charter are to be carefully examined here. One should ask, for example, were the constitution, aims, purposes, or activity of the SS aimed at the planning, preparation, inauguration or execution of a war of aggression at the violation of the rules of warfare, or at murder, extermination, enslavement, and so forth ? are punishable only if they were committed in execution or in connection with another crime punishable under the Charter; that is, in connection with crimes against peace or war crimes. This is how the author of the Charter, Justice Jackson, explained it in his statement, which is added to the text of the Charter in the "Department of State Bulletin" of 12 August 1945 on Page 228. I ask you read the English text. "Crimes against humanity when associated with attacks on the peace of the international order." the Prosecution in connection with Article 6 of the Charter the judgment must adapt itself to the time of the program point in question or of the ostensibly criminal act. question of whether the organization, as such is to be designated as criminal will depend on how many or -- in proportion to the millions of members -
how few SS members took part in these crimes. Did an organization really act or did only relatively few members act, who perhaps - in order to establish the paradox- frequently had not even joined the SS voluntarily ? took place the High Tribunal has already affirmed in its decision of 14 January 1946. If at all, then it is quite possible that the organization or a part of it was criminal only at certain periods of time. Forms that were once cast could perhaps appear criminal only through later misuse, although they were originally not destined for it. an axe which if sorged never knows when it leaves the anvil whether it will perform useful service for humanity or will one day be misused, as a murder instrument, if only -to follow the metaphor through -- with its detached wooden handle. is shown by the following examples: The indictment says on Page 5 that between 1933 and 1935 unsuitable members were expelled. I may add that these were about 50,000 or one-sixth of the membership, who -- this is shown by the most varied testimony and affidavits -- on the basis of their previous political attitude had only sought camouflage, also previously convicted persons and other unreliable elements. consequences of the declaration. Such a grotesque result cannot possibly be be desired.
Finally according to No. 6 a (3) of the decision of 13 March 1946 the evidence will have to be examined to see how far the knowledge of the individual members reached. This question will be decisive for the judgment on the masses of the SS. organization, is formally indicted, the indictment is nevertheless, in effect, directed against each individual member. If new the criminal character of the organization is to be proved through criminal acts of the members, then the member who is supposed to have committed this specific crime, must have an opportunity to answer to you, Your Honors.
If he cannot do this, then the Court cannot form an objective picture of whether the accusations are true. Then how will the proceedings be carried cut in an indictment according to the Angle-Saxon group penal law ? The leaders and the members were heard in detail on the specific accusations made against them -- the Court does not judge on the basis unfavorable testimony of witnesses without the leaders' and members' of the organization who are personally affected by this testimony having an opportunity to common on it. witnesses without in concrete cases also hearing the accused person or persons is shown by the astonishing experiment which I undertook with the witness Israel Eizenberg on 7 August 1946 (Please lock at the English Transcript Page 15283/84). I showed him two pictures from a Prosecution document PS 867 in polish, Exhibit SS Nos. 2 and 3, from which I cut off the captions under the pictures. The witness called the two men pictured SS men and named their SS ranks. He deduced these ranks exclusively on the basis of the epaulettes and an insigne on his sleeve.
The witness Morgen, when I examined on 8 August 1946, immediately recognized as an expert that the men pictured were not wearing SS uniforms, and were not SS men: he pointed out that these photographs showed the epaulettes of the police, and on the sleeve the insignia of the police. In the photograph Exhibit SS No. 3, which is in the hands of the Tribunal, the police insignia can also be clearly seen on the cap: the eagle completely enclosed in an oval wreath of oak leaves. Nowhere your Honors, is the SS insignia to be seen. All other photos in this book also show only Police uniforms and police insignia, But all of this did not strike the witness; he consider these men "SS men". That was only a miner example of the powers of observation of the witnesses with regard to uniforms. of the SD and that of the SS -- only a small SD rectabgle on the sleeve -- and that non-members of the SS were this uniform (compare the testimony of Dr. Best and Reinecke before the Commission), that precisely in the rear army area it was the police who were employed, while the SS was at the front, that the mass suggestion of the guilt of the SS distorts the memory of the witnesses; they, your Honors, you will be able to realize the true value of the testimony of non-German witnesses who arbitrarily give "the SS" as the perpetrators of any crimes in the occupied countries. the first time in the long history of law, is based particularly on the difficulty of taking testimony for the accused organization in a fair manner. This difficulty arises of necessity from the peculiar nature of the proceedings, particularly from the fact that it is technically hardly possible, or possible only through proceedings lasting for years, to clear up every concrete charge in a satisfactory manner by hearing the specifically affected members of the organization, and to establish whether each charge is justified or unjustified. we produce each individual member of the organization who is impeached by prosecution witnesses or documents, and to have him make a concrete statement as well as to hear further witnesses on this case, this trial remains incomplete and unsuited for a just finding.
cution and the defense passed each other without being able to give the Court a picture of the true state of affairs in large fields of the charges. Only thus could the grotesque picture arise that we experienced repeatedly during the defense case; a defense witness described his activity and the units and SS men under his command. It covers sectors as large as possible in regard to subject matter and territorial extent, since the Court permitted only a minimum number of witness in proportion to the total membership, and any individual testimony of a little man was inadmissable according to the decision of 13 March 1946. The Prosecution would not have had to attempt to break down the testimony of the witness in cross-examination. The surest and simplest method for this would have been to throw doubt on the credibility of the witness by showing, for example, that he himself had committed a crime or that such things had been done by people under his command. of all the allies, which records had existed for months, yes, for years, and although these 29 witnesses before the Commission and before the Tribunal had held middle, high, and highest positions, the Prosecution could not prove any such thing against them. Is not this fact already the best refutation of the contention of the criminal character of the SS? Is it not symptomatic if the Prosecution did not succeed in accusing or convicting one of the highest generals of the fighting Waffen SS, a very high fuehrer of the General SS, at the same time Higher SS and Police Leader and police President -- an extremely rare case -- of the third largest German city, a staff officer of the administration of the Waffen SS who was repeatedly in service at the front, and two high SS judges, of committing or tolerating crimes?
Later on I shall discuss the case of the witnessSievers, the only case which was different. Thus the Prosecution had only one recourse: it consciously brought forward documents or affidavits which were to prove that crimes had been committed, but with which, even in the opinion of the Prosecution, these SS witnesses themselves had had nothing to do. Nevertheless, the Prosecution asked the witnesses whether they know of the events described therein. Were they thus seeking to discover the truth for which this taking of evidence was intended, or was further evidence merely to be introduced at a time when the case of the Prosecution had already been closed? These documents are for the most part government reports on investigations which have not yet led to any trial or judgment -- particularly in the partisan territory in Jugoslavia, which is very difficult to judge. Their evidential value must be very slight. numbers make it possible for the Court to answer objectively the question of whether the deeds actually took place, and thus whether the SS is criminal? Would not the Court have to hear the accused, that is, the SS men who were mentioned by name in the documents or members or officers of the accused SS units? After the experience with the ability of the witness Eizenberg to distinguish uniforms, I ask, is it convincing that those people say, "They were SS men"? Or were they police or SD and Gestapo members? In part such errors arise obviously from the documents. But I cannot and do not wish to deny that according to a few documents terrible crimes have been established, and that they are numerous. Should not the Defense have an ample opportunity to comment on these documents and affidavits with as much preparation as for the evidence which the Prosecution presented in November, December, and January? Should it not be given a few months' time? I do not fail to realize that my demand would mean a prolongation of the trial for months, insofar as the case against the organizations is concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann, the Tribunal has already ruled that the trial has got to conclude now, and therefore any argument that you would have three more months is entirely irrelevant and can't be listened to. The Charter lays it down. It is for the Tribunal to say how the individual is to be represented, and we have laid it down to the best of our ability.
DR. PELCKMANN: But if for these reasons the judgment cannot be delayed that long, then it must be passed now; but since the now evidence of the Prosecution cannot be taken into consideration, it can consist only in rejecting the applications of the Prosecution.
I must add something. I asked myself whether I should deal with the Erhardt affidavit, D-973, from the Neuengamme Camp. It is necessary because it was typical of the evidence of the Prosecution in this last stage of the trial. It is necessary at the last minute, and when it is no longer possible for the defense to carry on investigations on the spot. Compare the decision of the first of August 1946, which does not permit visiting camps, in contrast to the Prosecution, whose administrative machine goes into all camps.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann, if you are proposing to deal with the rules which the Tribunal has made with reference to the hearing of individuals, the Tribunal will not hear that. The Tribunal has done the best it can to enable individuals to be heard, and the Tribunal does not propose to listen to you criticizing what the Tribunal has done.
DR. PELCKMANN: I believe there is a misunderstanding, Your Lordship, I am not criticizing. I am dealing with this Erhardt affidavit, the evaluation of this testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Go on.
DR. PELCKMANN: This affidavit cannot shake the value of the affidavits of the SS members. It refers only to the interrogatory, which does not come from me, and the answers -- there are altogether only 40,00 -- which I do not utilize. summarized then. The methods described by Erhardt could not be used in them. As evidence of this, I should like to ask you not only to read the summary but also a few of the very conscientious and descriptive affidavits themselves. and exaggerations. Erhardt was an SS man and is now the servant of the British authorities. Of course, he does not went to lose his position. Therefore, he has every reason to make himself popular. the actual and psychological reasons for which are so doubtful, shake the value of 135,000 detailed statements; No, Your Honors. This attempt of the Prosecution to shake the value of the whole legal hearing guaranteed by the Charter can remain only on attempt. It lies in the nature of the Defense in this trial that it unfortunately does not have the possibility of ascertaining such mistakes in the obtaining of mass material by the Prosecution and of criticizing it.
I am of the opinion that the result of the Prosecution's evidence insofar as it may so considered, in view of want has just been said, forces the Defense to the conclusion that crimes in considerable extent were committed by members of the SS, but not that the whole SS organization is criminal. indictment immediately in this discussion of procedural and evidential questions that there are only two judgments, concerning the inhumane fighting methods of the SS, for example by shooting prisoners, against SS General Kurt Keyer (Normandy front) and SS General Sepp Dietrich, and 73 officers and non of his army. That, Gentlemen of the Tribunal , is the result of the most energetic efforts on the part of all the Allies for more than a year, which understandable in the interests of the contentions of the Prosecution.
Must one not conclude there from that in spite of this long period of time the Allied Prosecution was not able to establish more crimes through judgment? The death sentence against Meyer, with which I am acquainted, was commuted. The trial of Sepp Dietrich and his men, the transcript of which I was not able to obtain, ended with 43 death sentences, but it is striking that the highest leaders did not receive this punishment. This must bring us to the conclusion that there were no such criminal orders from them, and consequently no criminal system, and the Defense brings forward some noteworthy objections against the methods of investigation and evidence.
I should ask you to note the following, High Tribunal: Those happenings occurred in the last half year during the most violent part of the war, and concerned only very few members of the Waffen-SS. by witnesses and affidavits, which the defense procured also for this particular point of the indictment (The training for and the carrying out to prove that from such occasional excesses in battle, one cannot conclude upon a criminal system). the evidence which to my mind must be the basis of the estimating of the evidence in those proceedings: Where any doubts may arise, whether the individual charges are proven by the evidence, the weakness of which I have just made apparent, particularly where doubts arise, whether proved individual crimes may be said to be typical and that, therefore, the entire organization, that is, all its members, can be considered criminal; where, therefore, one counter proof, or circumstantial evidence, is given ten or one-hundred proofs of circumstantial evidence of the Prosecution -- in that case I believe that the Tribunal cannot draw any conclusions which are sufficient for a condemnation in the sense of the indictment. proceedings. From the tremendous evidence at its disposal, the Prosecution has chosen and charged some incriminating facts, and then made the assertion that those were typical cases, that it had been everywhere like that, that that these actions were typical for the SS, etc.
As already stated, it is the sale responsibility of the defense to furnish exonerating evidence. And this is where the difficulties for the defense of the organizations, particularly of the SS, begin. The organizations have been dissolved; they exist no longer. When we established the evidence most of the members of the organizations, and all their leaders were in custody and many of then still are. all personal acts, correspondence, Decrees and orders. It is true that we have been able to speak to most of the prisoners, but after so many years, and particularly, in detailed questions, the information was bound to be incomplete, and was given only in April and May, due to the progress of the trial. We could not always reach the competent persons. In connection with the question of the legal hearing, I would ask you to consider that we have no evidence at all from SS men from Austria and the Soviet-Russian zone of Germany. Out of reasons of security we could not be granted to conduct a research in the Allied document centers in which the confiscated documents are classified according to the subject they pertain to, and thus we were not able to obtain a reliable view based upon documents. We could not counter this deficiency by an approximate indication of the documents based upon certain assumptions, because a specified indication was demanded. As things stand the counter proof is considered successful if the Prosecution succeeds in establishing but a shadow of a proof for their assertions. with the charge of the participation of the SS in the pogrom of the 19th of November 1938. The next four pages deal with that, which I must also skip for lack of time, Pages 33 to 38. I ask you to read them.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann, you say that you have gotten only to Pages 32 and 33?
DR. PELCKMANN: I want to start on Page 36 now. Is Your Lordship's copy longer? I can farther on.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not have a copy at all; but I do not understand how you are proposing to finish your speech, if your speech is, as I am told, about 100 pages long.
general topics which are very familiar to us were topics which you might just as well pass over, and you said "Very well; I am going to shorten my speech, I have taken steps to shorten it". you have not gotten any farther than Page 33. All I want you to understand is that you will not be allowed were than a half day.
How, will you go on, please?
DR. PELCKMANN: In the pages which I am skipping, I have dealt with the events of November, 1938. Then I add that in the arrests, which were purely a political matter and were up to the Gestapo, some officials may have had black uniforms on. This would be a typical erroneous generalization which can be traced back to the fascination of the black uniform and of the SS insignia, and whose falsifying influence been truth and recollection must not be underestimated for the entire proceedings against the SS. and auditory means, was not only dangerous in the past through its publicity value, because in the German it aw romantic historical feelings by the doubling of a Germanic rune, but even today after the destruction of all one myths surrounding it, it has the peculiar power of preventing any clear conception as to its nature. This word "SS" is so easily pronounced, without being accompanied of any clear conception as to its real meaning. like any other such myths is based upon the ignorance of the facts, or, even worse, upon a semi-knowledge of those facts. We, who combat the Hitler myth wherever we can, -- we have done so in the evidence before the Tribunal -- do not wish that a myth should be formed around a group of people under the slogan "SS", around the guilty and innocent alike. We do not want to help to create so-called "martyrs" in the interests of a nee-fascist propaganda.
That is why we must ask a definite question and give the answer: "What is the complete meaning of SS?" essential spheres of activity of Himmler's, are considered as activities of the SS.
Without heed to the origin or tasks of the many agencies and units under Himmler's command, without heed whether there ever existed any organized bunds, the indictment assembles the general So, Waffen SS, the SD, the Police, the Concentration Camp system, the affairs of the Reich Commissar for the consolidation of German Nationalims, the activity of the Chief of the Prisoners of War system and others, in one great imaginary unit, the SS. The indictment must proceed from such a unity in order to create a basis for the evidence that within the frame of an alleged conspiracy, all sectors of the public life in the State, in the Party, and in the Wehrmacht, were permeated with this SS, which had spread its tentacles over Germany and Europe.
That Himmler's activity was identical with the activity of the SS is only true for the period until 1933 or 1934. Only until then did an organized unity in the SS exist and the prosecution has taken over this idea of the unity of everything which is called SS from this time, thus falsely interpreting the true development of the system. That was the SS as a part of the SA and therefore a section of the NSDAP. supreme and superior state positions were filled with Party leaders. From this time on, Himmler goes his own way at the side of the SS. First -in comparison to other high Party members -- extremely cautiously and them ever more dominantly.
It was mainly Heydrich who directed Himmler's inquest for State affairs, to the field of policy power, Himmler, like many of the SA leaders, had become Police President in Munich in 1953. Soon he was made Chief of the Political Police in Bavaria, and then in the other counties of Germany, with the exception of Prussia. Here, Goering was still Chief of the Gestapo. But seen Himmler became his Deputy and Heydrich the leader of the Secret state Police Office in Berlin. Himmler's ambition for the widening of his power in the State, which the SS could not offer him, now became ever more obvious. His goal was the ministry of the Interior. Already in 1936 he gathered the entire police power of the Reich, which until then had been the affair of each County, in his hands, in his capacity as Chief of the German Police. Thus he had become the highest superior not only of the Secret State Police and of the Criminal Police, which one jointly names the Security Police, but also of the entire ordinary Police in Germany.
Only now did he hold a position of power which was of the greatest importance, and it was given to him by Hitler and not by his SS, and not through the SS or for the SS. I ask the Tribunal to consider that these Police Officers have existed independently besides the SS, before Himmler became their Chief. Nationalism and was thus assigned a now task, the transfer back of populations, etc. every, but every, new task, he gained tie personal confidence of Hitler and thus extended his personal position of power within the Reich. It was peculiar to this Reich that Hitler should have united an almost inestimable number of officers and tasks in one single person who had his confidence. As an example, I point out Goering's person. In the measure that Goering continued to lose Hitler's confidence, Himmler's power rose meteorically. But this position of power he had rained owing to his personality and without his SS, and quite independently from the fact that he was their Reichsfuehrer. The witnesses, Grauert, Reinecke and Pohl, have amply testified to this effect. course of time, taken an individual and quite independent development, owing to the great number of the entirely different sections which began to take shape. Unfortunately the briefness of the available time does not permit me to describe here this development in detail, although it is of the greatest importance to the entire defense. But I have added the necessary explanations, always in regard to the furnished proofs, as annexed to my plea, and I would ask the Tribunal to take note of these arguments in the verdict. General SS was the basis upon which all the other organizations had been established. The fact alone that almost a million men have at one time been in the Waffen SS whereas the General SS had only counted 250,000 members, refutes this statement. In the aforementioned annex, I have shown how the individual organizations have been built up, added to and developed, according to their own rules.
The General SS is not the source of life for the other organizations, but an ancient vestige which at first succeeded to keep alive, but which during the war was already dissappearing, because it had to disapp for lack of any special task. (Witnesses Eberstein, Hinderfeld, Juettner, Pohl).
But the indictment did not mention the most important aspect. To my mind, this is an aspect which is particularly suited to bring life into the obscurity of the imaginary unity of the SS; where lay the executive power in the state. For an alleged conspiracy, only such an instrument may have been suitable, which controlled some means of the State authority, which had executive power in the State. Neither the General SS nor the Waffen SS were such organizations. At no time of their existence, did a leader or a simple member of the General SS, have more extensive rights in the legal public and especially police field, than any other German citizen. He could and did never carry out arrests or house searchings without incurring punishment. (Witnesses Reinecke, Eberstein). the seizure of power, changes nothing. They were at once successfully combated as testified by the witness Grauert. No member of the Waffen SS had ever had more extensive rights than any member of the Wehrmacht. (See Witness Hauser). Indeed the executive power in the State was alone in the hands of the police, the state police, the criminal police, combined as security police, and the ordinary police. A policy of power in the sense of an alleged conspiracy could logically have reposed only upon them. circle around Himmler, is particularly revealing for the question which activities of the SS are to be considered connected with the executive power. This testimony is nothing special as far as the information is concerned that Himmler was informed of the affairs of the Waffen SS by an Adjutant of the Waffen SS, and of Police Affairs by the Police Adjutant, while the General Secretariat had to inform him of the other affairs of the General SS.
departments becomes very clear. The essential point here is that all matters concerning the concentration camp system and the totally different sphere of the SD were not dealt with and reported on by the SS Adjutant, but rather by Himmler's own Police Adjutants. In this way the testimony given by the Witness Reinecke, is again being reaffirmed, who testified as to the judicial basis for the separation into five independent spheres of influence under Himmler in the sense of the indictment, into General SS, Waffen SS, SD Concentration Camp system, and Police. raised under the indictment and for a just evaluation of this case. In the beginning of its development, Himmler was on the side of his SS and had risen to the top. After the police power of the entire Reich has been transferred to him alone, the only thing he concerned himself with was this one sphere, the sphere of executive power. He played a leading role in the rapid development of Germany into a police state. Very soon he let every last vestige of regard for any and every legal consideration go by the boards. On top of that he continued to follow the path he had chosen for his organizations, General SS and Waffen SS, and withdrew behind a heavy curtain of secrecy, hiding himself and the excesses of his police activity from these organizations as well as from the entire nation. It is quite impossible to understand all of this if one does not make sure of and appreciate the fact that Himmler had a Jekyll and Hyde personality. On one hand he preached and fostered ethical values, such as decency, manliness and courtesy. Here he used the instrument of his organizations, the General SS and the Waffen SS. On the other hand, he exploited his tremendous power by issuing the most uncompromising orders and measures of a police state nature. At this point I should but like to refer to concentration camps, mass executions without trial, and the Einsatzgruppen. Here and here alone he used the instrument of the executive power in the Reich. A deep abyss opens up between these two. It wasn't surprising, therefore, that in the few speeches he made during the war in which he showed his obsession with his state police troops of the future, that he met with opposition among the leaders and the troops of the Waffen SS; for these men were soldiers and were fighting the enemy.
It is quite understandable that the Prosecution would consider one side of Himmler's nature to be but a whitewash for the other. But nothing could be more wrong than an assumption like that. It is not coincidence either that the defendant Seyss-Inquart from his complete knowledge of developments, and the witnesses Hausser and Reinecke, who, because of their former high positions and their present knowledge have an overall picture of events, describe Himmler as a man who had two totally different faces. And when they say that, they are in good company; for on the strength of his many conferences with Himmler, Count Bernadotte says exactly the same thin in his book, "The Curtain Falls", which has been quoted frequently.
Himmler, therefore, is not the SS. The fact that he is referred to as the "Reichsfuehrer SS" in all laws and directives which gave him new missions to accomplish does not alter this situation in the least. As the witnesses Reinecke and Kubitz have stated quite correctly in this regard, his official position and title, to all practical purposes, had replaced his name in public life. Specialized departments, like the Police and the Reichscommissar for the Consolidation of German Nationalism (Volkstum) or the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Reserve Army, and the Chief of the Prisonerspf-war system, did not become concerns of the SS just because they were transferred to the person of the "Reichsfuehrer SS", that is, Himmler. to support their position, they state further that as seen as Himmler took over new offices he immediately started to infiltrate them with members of the SS. That is equally wrong. The witnesses Zupke and Bader have confirmed that some of the members of the Ordnungspolizei were taken over into the General SS and not vice versa. An infiltration of the police therefore never took place. As far as the security Police is concerned we can see from Himmler's decree of the 23 June 1938 (document 1637-PS) that the officials and employees of the Security Police were taken over by the SD, and received police ranks commensurate with their SS ranks and not vice versa. They never served in the general SS for even one day.
Commissions on the 20 of May 1946, (SS affidavit #82), prove that roughly twenty different categories of members of the Ordnungspolizei became formal members of the SS when on the strength of ministerial directives they were granted ranks in the SS commensurate with their Police rank. This so-called "Coordination of Rank" does not establish true membership, for the Policemen involved did not take the SS oath, did not pay dues, did not perform SS functions, did not serve in the SS, had no privileges or advantages of any kind because of their rank, and did not even wear the SS uniform. Their Police service rems ned constant are unchanged.
Everywhere else in public life the same procedure was followed. It hasn't that the 38 filled key and other essential positions but rather that the men holding such positions were taken ever into the SS as honorary leaders by Himmler.
The affidavits deposed by Mr. Fuehrer,SS No. 63 and by Mr. Wunder, SS No. 42, describe the appointment of honorary leaders; SS No. 49 and Bethke SS No. 48, show that the Kreis and Ortsbauernfuehrer were taken ever as a group by the SS in that way, and the affidavits SS No. 98 and SS No. 97, describe the taking ever of the leaders of the Reich Veterans Society.
Therefore, it was not true that the SS infiltrated into 26 Aug A LJG 16-1b Perrin the State, on the contrary elements foreign to the SS were taken ever by its organization.
The bulk of the membership remained what it was, a unit of farmers, mechanics, students, workers, and representatives of all the professions. The tasks of the general SS were not changed in any way because of it. fact there is for the assertion made by some of the defense counsel on behalf of individual defendants and organizations to the effect that during the war, the SS, exercised all the powers of Government in Germany. Many witnesses and affidavits prove that the activity of the general SS, which must be described as typical Club-life, began to decrease at the beginning of the war and disappeared altogether during the course of the war. The Waffen SS was fighting at the different fronts, receiving more and more draftees into its ranks. It was under the supreme command of the Wehrmacht. These two branches of the SS therefore could not rule Germany during the war. As I shall demonstrate labor the WVHA, which concerned itself with concentration camps, belonged to the SS only nominally, and had no administrative authority over any other institutions in Germany. arrests and the putting of individuals in concentration camps, but that was not a matter of any branch of the SS organization, but rather of the ministry of the Interior of the Police and the RSHA (Gestapo). change my statements either, for the name is in fact misleading. They had no authority to command over the Police and the Waffen SS. Only in the most infrequent cases, such as in the person of the Reichsfuehrer SS in whom were combined the State and Police position, for instance, Police President, were they authorized to give orders to the Police, but only because of their State position, not because of their position as SS Leaders. This may be seen even more plainly in the occupied Eastern territories, 26 Aug A LJG 16-2b Perrin for there was no general SS there.
The higher SS and Police Leaders there did not have any authority of command in the Waffen SS, so that the higher SS and Police Leaders exercised only the public Police functions. I am referring to the testimony given by the witness von Eberstein, to the affidavits SS -86, No. 88, and No. 87.
Then we see the following: Himmler's power increased tremendously during the war, but the power of the SS was not increased. He received this power not because of his position as Reichsfuehrer SS and he could not exercise this power through the SS, but he received it solely through State organs, which meant the entire Police.
Competing with Himmler's authority, were other power factors not of the State, but of the Party and exercised by the Party (Reichs, Gau, Kreisleitung, etc.) power between Himmler and Bormann. following: firstly, we cannot consider the organizations comprising the SS to be a unified instrument of a conspiracy. Secondly, the Court can only examine the question of criminal character for each separate branch of the organization. afraid I cannot occupy myself in detail -- increased in seriousness as we approached the time of the war and finally the collapse. I shall now have to concern myself with the accusations raised, although because of lack of time I shall have to limit myself to the most salient points. against the SS has been included in the term "Germanization."