I am just given to understand I didn't understand your question. Are you stating about the guarding of those workers? Is it about the guarding?
THE PRESIDENT: The words I used were whether you contend that they had not assisted in placing and controlling the laborers who were brought to Germany under the forced labor program.
DR. SERVATIUS: If that was the question, then my answer can remain in the form I have given before.
THE PRESIDENT: You do agree that although you say they did not assist in the rounding up, I think that was the word you used, or the bringing up of the laborers to Germany, they did assist in the supervision and controlling of the laborers who had been brought to Germany?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, they had the supervision, the duties in that capacity for the labor employment. They had to control the question whether the Labor Front and the work Leaders were taking care properly of their duties. They had no direct responsibility, only an additional duty. On Sauckel's behalf, checking to see whether his instructions were being fulfilled.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you contending that they did not know the laborers came involuntarily?
DR. SERVATIUS: That I am not denying. I admit the Gauleiter had to know and probably did know that the workers came because they had been compulsorily called up.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. I think you got to the bottom of page 44 or near it.
DR. SERVATIUS: I was dealing with the question of lynching.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 44, in the English.
DR. SERVATIUS: Page 44, that is where I got. I said it remains now to clear up the question whether such war crimes were generally tolerated and approved of by the political leaders.
23 Aug M LJG Cumoletti 2-4 of the Fuehrer Hess, document 062-PS. It concerns a secret directive regarding the behavior of the population towards crashed airplanes and towards parachutists, and, with reference to the latter it contains a directive that they are to be either arrested or "made harmless". today, one has to firstly consider that we are here concerned with enemy soldiers who have been ordered to carry out a combat action. It is hardly possible for the civilian population to arrest them and we therefore have to understand the expression to mean that other methods for safety have to be taken in order to avoid damage. note that during the year of 1940, in view of the then prevailing air situation, one could only theoretically count on such happenings; it was a preventative measure which, according to the document itself, followed the French directives. The passage in the document asking for special secrecy can be perhaps explained by the fact that the civilian population received a directive which could cause them to be combatants. Actually no events originating from that time where a violation of international law was committed against flyers became known. Furthermore, the "Confidential Information of the Party Chancellory" of 4 December 1942, speaks clearly against such a measure. It firmly rejects any measures against flyers, as had been the practice in Japan. the war crimes, have to be judged differently. It is further necessary to examine the documents and to determine how far the political leaders had knowledge in general or were participants.
Himmler's order, dated August 10, 1943, Document R-110, is addressed to the higher SS and Police Chief. According to this, the competent Gauleiter had to be informed, but competent were 23 Aug M LJG Cumoletti 2-5 only those who held official functions, that is, Reich Defense Commissars and Reichstatthalter.
These functions had nothing to do with political activities. incitement. Thus the conclusion is to be drawn that not all Gauleiters had been informed and in any case no Kreisleiter nor any other subordinate party office. I draw your attention to the evidence of witness Hoffman during his testimony of July 2 1946. formed of Himmler's directives to the Police Officers only in that capacity as Reich Defense Commissar.
Bormann's circular of May 30, 1944 (Document Number 067-PS) was destined to inform all political leaders that they should tolerate the lynching of fliers.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not quite sure that I understand what your argument is there. Is your argument that in the Document 110, the competent Gauleiters does not include all the Gauleiters?
DR. SERVATIUS: Only those who were with the Reich Defense Commissars end Reichstatthalter. Only they give knowledge or instructions in their capacity as agents of the State. Other Gauleiters did not have that and they were not all involved. The Gauleiter in his capacity of a Reich Defense Commissar and Reichstatthalter did not inform his subordinate.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you say that the Gauleiters ceased to have control over their Gaus unless they were appointed Reich Defense Commissars end Reichstatthalter?
DR. SERVATIUS: Those agencies were separated, and instructions only reached some, nor the Kreisleiters. In the prescribed official channels -
THE PRESIDENT: That is not the answer to my question. What I asked you was are you saying that the Gauleiters who were not Reich Defense Commissars or Reichstatthalter had ceased to hold 23 Aug M LJG Cumoletti 2 -6 any authority in the Gaus of which they were Gauleiters?
DR. SERVATIUS: No. I only went to say that the service channel would mean the passing through of those instructions. I have quoted witnesses who testified that the Kreisleiters did not receive any knowledge of those instructions. It is that with which I an going to deal with next.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. SERVATIUS: It was caused by Goebbel's newspaper articles of the preceding day, in which he addressed the population directly. leaders cooperated, and whether these war crimes had been permitted everywhere with the consent and general approval of the Political leaders. This was certainly not the case. On the contrary three of the Gauleiters concurred by testifying before the Commission that they realized the possible repercussions of the circular, and that they did not forward it to the Kreisleiters contrary to the orders given them. That is by Witness Hoffman, witness Kauffmann, and witness Wahl. The same was testified by the Gauleiters of Mecklenburg, Weser-Ems, and Tyrol (Affidavits 61-C, 61-H and 61-G). decree, indicates that the same was done in other Gaus. So far as they received the decree, they did not translate it into practice, and did not forward it because of its dangerous nature. I quote the following witnesses: Meyer-Wendeborn, Kreis Oldenburg; Kuehl, Kreisleiter Ost-Hannover; Biedermann, Gauleiter office of Thueringen; Brueckmann, Kresileiter Hesson-Nassau; Naumann, Kreisleiter, Saxeny; Ever, Gau Westmark; Haus, Kreisleiter Wetzler. confirmed that they did not forward the decree. An announcement concerning the re-admissibility of lynching was made on the 25 February 1945, that is, nine months later. It is remarkable for the political leaders that this witness has hesitated such a long time before acting according to the desires of Bormann and Hitler. During his testimony before the Commission, the witness declared that he had withdrawn his draft, and that the announcement was made without his knowledge. In fact, in his Gau, the order has never been carried out, which is proved by affidavit of Karl Scholtis, Ortsgruppenleiter, PL-61A. remarked that only a few witnesses have been examined, and that only a few affidavits could be taken out of the mass of material available. However, it is no doubt established that in general the political leaders did not follow the criminal suggestions.
In spite of the embitterment, despair, and misery at the destruction of many human lives, violation of the rules of warfare were prevented.
Affidavit 61 includes approximately 11,000 individual statements. These statements not only bear witness to a passive rejection of dangerous methods, but in many cases confirm positive steps taken to protect the fliers against the excited population. of having worked through the foreign organizations of the NSDAP, as a fifth column abroad. Evidence for this has neither been produced during the hearing of witnesses before this Tribunal on the occasion of the hearing of the case of Defendant Hess, nor during the hearing of evidence before the Commission. The Foreign organizations merely served in drawing together of the party members of German citizenship, living abroad and it was meant to maintain in them the understanding for German Nationalism. It was expressedly prohibited for members of the Foreign organizations to make propaganda for the National Socialist idea amongst the inhabitants of the host countries, and to cooperate with political groups abroad even if those were representing National Socialist or Fascist ideas. For that reason, it was also forbidden for them to collaborate with the American-German union; this prohibition was in fact strictly observed. Comparing examination of witness von Roedern. the first World War, they were as testified by witness von Roedern on the occasion of his examination before the Commission against policy of expansion. They had no other goal, but that of maintaining peace with every means, and for that reason, it was out of the question that they were active in a fifth column. Members of the Foreign organizations were prohibited from any collaboration with the German Secret Service by order of their Chief Bohle. If individual members of the Foreign organization have infringed this order, then they did not do so on behalf of the Foreign organizations, but against its explicit instructions. This becomes apparent also from the fact that the foreign states concerned, for instance England, have never prohibited the Foreign organization in spite of such instances; to the contrary, the legal character of the Foreign organizations was repeatedly and expressly recognized by foreign states.
Finally, the fact that the Foreign organizations have never exercised activities as a fifth column becomes apparent from the fact that they remained operative in foreign countries until the end, even at a time when no difficulties of a diplomatic nature could have arisen for these states if they had prohibited the foreign organization. is what is the over-all picture that results? It is to be examined whether the cases investigated were individual occurrences, or whether they were held together by a mutual bond, and thus indicate the criminal character of the political leaders. expensive evidence. One must admit on the basis of the occupation of all of Germany, and the activity of the authorities, the last nook and cranny has been searched and the evidence has been brought here, but for that very reason the material surprises one on closer examination because of its scantiness; it is shown that it does not cover the field of the application of the prosecution. that occurrences which happened once at one place necessarily happened constantly in all other directions. The individual occurrences can be brought into a system only by the "Conspiracy" which demonstrates the criminal character, but it is a conspiracy which is to be proved by the incoherent facts. defense witnesses. they are all witnesses on their own behalf. hearing of the members, guaranteed by the Charter, would be void of meaning. The witnesses are not appearing on their own behalf, but as witnesses with a general knowledge of occurrences, and conditions which can only be cleared up through the members of the organizations themselves.
Their credibility must be shown by the uniformity of many testimonies. of the proceedings is to eliminate evidence on those points, and later proceedings. There every individual would be able to bring witnesses for the correctness of his testimony, but too late. If the testimony is to be untruthworthy, this must be proved in the individual case; that evidence can not, however, be given by having a witness draw conclusions which he can not draw correctly, because he lacks insight and knowledge. Only a few witnesses were heard before the Commission and the Tribunal. the criminal character of an organization. The witness can generally give little testimony about conditions as a whole, which are under examination, even if he has an extensive knowledge of things, and even his testimony can be only gragmentary.
Only a comprehensive inquiry con bring clarification. The Prosecution had a good opportunity for this in the camps, that all internees were examined is shown by the individual trials which were carried out as a result of this examination, but crime as a general phenomenon could not be established. through access to a sort of Enquete. In the proceedings before the Tribunal Enquetes were admitted in the form of Government reports. To prove general occurrences, they in fact do not seem superfluous.
The weaknesses of the Enquete are well known; their main danger lies in the choice of witnesses. In the present case, however, the circle of witnesses is limited to comp inmates. The affidavits of approximately 38,000 persons which were submitted are not a selection from the camps, but a digest. to check the statements, because of their extent. Under the prevailing circumstances, however, this checking is assured; the circumstances of all witnesses from the camps are know and confirmed through investigations. The statements of the witnesses can be checked at any time.
That such an examination is possible is shown by the establishment of De-Nazification Chambers. the affidavits in a lump, without having examined the real value, this procedure can not lead or turn to any real result.
value, then the uniformed picture is destroyed on which the prosecution has based their plea. the part of all political leaders, based on their position or based on their knowledge and approval, a joint responsibility can arise. jointly affected through occurrences in another local group in the city and whether someone who had been a political leader in 1930 is effected by events which have occurred during the war. The question is whether a Blockleiter will suffer the effects caused by the circumstance that on the basis of secret instructions human beings were removed by Coup de Grace. according to the statement of the prosecutor of the Soviet Union not be proved with certainty before the year of 1933. According to Appendix A of the Indictment of the Organizations, the Reichs Government is held responsible for a conspiracy only after 1934. Only one of the Documents used against the Political Leaders refers to the year 1933 (PS-374). It deals with a local anti-Jewish boycott.
All other documents concern events after 1938. The majority of Documents only deals with war-time. be decisive, but only events which at the time when they took place bore a general character. existence of the party, then I believe that this position is unattainable. to which the honorary Blockleiter is supposed to be equally responsible as a Reichsleiter or Gauleiter. Difference must be made according to the position held.
knowledge and experience is greater than that of a local group leader. The political leader, who is a professional, must be judged differently than one who is acting in a honorary capacity. the some level. But that conspiracy in particular is yet to be established. responsibility becomes evident. There are instructions given at the Higher level of which merely the smallest circle had gained knowledge; their are instructions meant only to be communicated generally to political leaders, which, however, did not pass through the entire channel of orders. There did not become known in other Gaus. There are measures carried out by the highest political leaders which only became known to them because of special state positions and which therefore did have no contact with the apparatus of the party. tion during their case against the political leaders and accordingly, the members of the local group staffs and the auxiliaries of the Zell and Blockleiters have been omitted from the proceedings. It is in accordance with this principle that over and above this the degree of responsibility on the part of the remaining groups must be examined. the proceedings, whereas members of the staffs of the local groups who held a similar or even higher rank are not included, is due to the fact that in the manual of organization they have been described as "Hoheitstraeger". the prosecution. The book was a theoretical work and has been described as such by the officials of the Reichs organization leader, Ley.
The designation "Hoheitstraeger" was given to Zell and Blockleiters for merely constructive reasons, because in that way they could be included in the territorial organization.
This construction led to it that a Black leader appears as an important Hoehitstraeger, whereas a Reichs leader lacks this same characteristic; on the other hand, the Blockleiter falls, as a Hoheitstraeger into the same category in the Reichs as the Fuehrer , Affidavit Hederich in which connection I draw your attention to P.L.No 27, Deputy Chairman of the Investigating Commission for N.S. Literature : Affidavit P.L.No. 25 Schmidt, head of the Chief Department of the Reichs organization Chief, affidavit P.L. -No. 26 Foertsch, Gau-Organization chief Munich-Upper Bavaria.
Accordingly, in the book of Chief Section Leader Dr. Lingg, entitled "Administration of the NSDAP" which appeared in 1940, Zell and Block leiters are not listed as Hoheitstraeters. The designation, Hoheitstraeger only goes down as far as the level of local group leader (Ortsgruppenleiter). 8th of October, 1937, does not induce the Zell and Blockleiters among the Hoheitstraegen(Document R.L. No. 2). There, only four Hoheits territories are mentioned and they end with the local group, Ortsgruppenleiter. regarding authority to enter damaged property after an air raid. There once again Zell and Blockleiters are not induced amongst the Hoheitstraeger.
Equally, the periodical "Der Hoheitstraeger", submitted by the prosecution as Document 2660-PS, for the purpose of proving the special character of the Zell and Blockleiter shows that the periodical was only dispatched to ranks up to and including local group leaders. (See Document P.L. No. 25)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, are your pages in the German the same as the English pages or not ?
DR. SERVATIUS: I haven't had time to check them, my Lord. They ought to be the same. I am now on page 54.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I want you to go back to page 53 for a moment. I didn't understand your argument at the bottom of page 53. This is what it says in the English :"The designation 'Hoheitstraeger' was given to Zell and Blockleiters for merely constructive reasons ...." I don't know what the word "constructive" means there; and it goes on : "... because in that way they could be included in the territorial organization.
This construction led to it that a Block leader appears as an important Hoheitstraeger, whereas a Reich leader lacks this same characteristic ... " What do you mean by "Reich Leader "? Is that the same as a "Reichsleiter"?
DR. SERVATIUS: Reichsleiter, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Then on the next page, page 54 you go on to say in the third paragraph : "In the same manner a decree of the party chancellery, dated the 8th of October, 1937, does not include the Zell and Blockleiters among the Hoheitstraeger (Document R.L. NO. 2). There, only four Hoheits territories are mentioned and they end with the local group, Ortsgruppenleiter.' Well, that is equivalent to saying, isn't it, that the Reichsleiters are Hoheitstraegers ?
DR. SERVATIUS: No. On the level of the Reich there is only one Hoheitstraeger and that is Adolf Hitler himself, the Fuehrer, whereas Reichsleiters are not Hoheitstraegers since they, themselves, had not allotted territories. That was the Fuehrer only, therefore, and from the point of view of structure, construction, organization, the point was that there was the Reich and Fuehrer and then comes the Gauleiters, Reichsleiters and Ortsgruppenleiters and there it ends.
I continue with the last paragraph. In addition, a further instruction and Zell leaders are not counted amongst Hoheitstraegers. (Document P.L.No.24) But not only from the point of view of form, also from the point of view of their activity, the Zell and Block leaders were not persons to whom special privileges and authority was granted; their activities have been described by witnesses examined before this Tribunal; it consisted in practical assistance. These political leaders were acting for the administration of the party or during war time to an ever-increasing degree carrying out social work in order to alleviate the distress after air-attacks to which was added practical assistance in resettlement and the prevention of damage during air raid alerts. It was a self-sacrificing and strenuous work which was demanded from these persons.
These political leaders did not occupy a predominant position. Interesting in this connection is Document P.L.No. 9, the Appendix to the announcement from the Deputy of the Fuehrer, dated 12 July 1940. It appears from this that contrary to the actual Hoheitstraeger, the political reliability of Zell and Block leaders had still to be established , if they desired to apply for a marriage loan or any other type of financial assistance. duties of a say is a certainty/
It also becomes clear that they had no tasks of political leadership; they were mostly ordinary people who lacked the time and the knowledge for such work. The fact that from certain more highly educated circles, individual persons were appointed as Blockleiters also shows that it was not their political ability which was to be used in this connection.
Particularly important in this connection is the Document P.L. No. 24 just mentioned, regarding "Hints for Leadership of the Party Chancellery" These "Hints for Leadership" are issued as is stated in the Document "For the Speedy Political Information of the Hoheitstraeger, that is, the Gau, Kreis and local group leaders, and for one Support of Leadership Work."
In order to inform the junior leaders of the Party and affiliated organizations, the Hoheitstraeger are in each case an in their territory, gau, Kreis, and local groups, to inform the corresponding organizations and units of these leadership hints. of such leadership hints, nor were local group leaders allowed to inform them of those. This proves that Zell and Block leaders were executed from the political instructions which was meant to be achieved by these leadership hints, and that they had no or very small tasks of the nature of leadership, and that it was not considered essential to support them by means of these leadership hints. leaders were simply appointed to their positions speaks against the political significance of their positions. such an office, also shows considerable pressure on the party of the party to accept such a position. It has become clear, on the other hand that the refusal did not take place because the tasks which had to be fulfilled were considered criminal; it was the additional effort and the work involved in addition to the considerable professional activities in war-time which were the cause for such refusals. a Zell or Block leader had had the power to issue orders, or institute disciplinary actions, or that he had powers similar to those of the police. See Official Party Information Document P.L.-29. It is furthermore not correct that he had the right to call upon the SA, SS, or the Hitler Youth for their support. The evidence taken before the Commission has established this fact. I draw your attention to the examination of Witness Hirt on 14th of April, 1946, the Witness Engelbert, the Witness Schenieder, and the Witness Kuehn. Additional affidavits confirm this fact. This corresponds to the official party instructions, documents PL No. 26 and PL No. 27.
the strength of his actual position; events which according to the indictment arc criminal furthermore, a general activity in that direction cannot be proved. greater than that of any party member. I draw your attention to Document PL 47. of any civil servant, see document PL No. 37. That there have been individual actions by political leaders, which a restrongly incriminating, is something which everyone knows who has lived in Germany, but it is equally well-known that this would not represent an action typical for the majority of all Block Leaders. examination. an obligation to the Party to comply with a request for the taking over of an office in the Party. of the Party and State on the first of December, 1933, this duty, until then of the nature of a private contract, tie duty to cooperate, became a legal obligation toward the state. In paragraph 5 of this law, the detention and arrest are threatened in the event of the violation of this duty and furthermore penalties which according to German law could not be imposed in the event of violations of local regulations. carrying out of the law on safeguarding of the Unity of the Party and the State, the statute of the NSDAP, was given a public-legal character. In that manner, also Paragraph 4, Sub-paragraph 2-B of the statute, was given publiclegal character, which paragraph had previously formed the basis for the obligation based on civil law regarding toe taking over of a function in the party. for the taking over of an office in the Party was a lawful duty, becomes argumentum e contrario, also from a specific statement contained in Paragraph 20 of the Reichs Labor Law dated 26 June, 1935, according to which members of the Reichs Labor service are entitled to refuse the acceptance of an honorary function in the services of the Party.
Special legislation would not have been necessary regarding the exception of Reich Labor Service members from the duty of taking over a function in the Party, if the duty of cooperating in the Party had not been a lawful one. In its practical effects, the duty to cooperate was equal to coercion. functions would, without doubt, have been ejected from the party by a party tribunal -- the documents PS 63, PL 64, and PL 8. Exclusion from the party would have been equal to the less of an existence with all its consequences -that is document PL 65. Apart from this, a party member who refused to accept such a function had to be prepared to be penalized with the loss of his liberty -- that is document PL 63. The coercion therefore to accept a function in the Party was simultaneously physical coercion. doing so for idealistic reasons. Anyone who was given a function after the seizure of power, probably excepted it in most eases without enthusiasm, particularly since he, as shown by the evidence, was only taking upon himself burdens and unpleasantness, without having any advantages in the process. Without doubt, however, all those who become Party officials, after the beginning of the war, accepted a Party function only on the basis of the existing legal regulations. Those men not called up into the armed forces were either physically unfit or professionally so over-burdened that they neither had the time nor the inclination to take over a function in the Party. This explains the fact that instructions from the Fuehrer and the Party Chancellery in which the service departments of the party were instructed to call upon Party members for their cooperation became more and more rigorous and even contained the request to proceed against anyone refusing to collaborate in the Party by employing the local system of the Party -- that is documents 61 and 62. During the war the legal and physical coercion regarding cooperation in the Party not only existed on paper; in fact this possibility was being made use of to the largest possible decree, which is proved by document No. 8. functionary and political leader during the war, this was regularly the outcome of the legal instructions and the result of the threat of being prosecuted by the legal system of the Party.
This applies in practice to all the Block and Zell leaders and members of the local group staffs appointed during the war. regarding collaboration in the party was merely the result of a voluntary entry into the Party. This would lead to the understanding that membership in the Party would already be punished; on the other hand, one cannot argue it has been done by saying that the Party members concerned could have avoided the coercion for collaboration in the Party, and that they ought to have accepted a position in one of the affiliated organizations, for instance the NSV, in good time. The incorrectness of this conception becomes apparent when one realizes that in this way collaboration in the Party is being recommended though in this case elsewhere. one must add the pressure exercised by the superior departments and interests. Compare documents 67, 68, 69 and 70. to collaborate in the Party. If a civil servant refused to comply with this request, then he would have to expect the worst possible consequences; he had to fear that disciplinary action would be started against him by his superior department which would lead to the less of his livelihood and which could lead to starvation for his entire family. all leaving the Party, he would likewise suffer the loss of his livelihood (see document No. 71). Civil servants found themselves in a particularly difficult situation therefore. as a freely constituted group of people. the importance of their position varied according to the periods.
power in 1933, must have been politically more active than those who accepted these positions at a time when only practical tasks could be fulfilled. During the war, persons who by reason of their age or their occupation had not been drafted, were employed in those offices as auxiliaries. It is obvious that these persons were not elite troops of the Party, destined to spread fear and dread, and who played at being little Caesars. town and country, you cannot conclude that these 1,200,000 persons included in this group were criminal. from the proceedings. Their point of view is presumably that these members in their capacity as honorary helpers of the Ortsgruppe, held a position of less importance. It would be well to examine whether the members of the Kreisstabs and Gaustabs can be excluded on the same grounds. Their connection with the influential Hoheitstraeger puts them under a more serious suspicion. The nature of this connection must be examined more closely. the propaganda office, the training office, the organization office, and the personnel office. Their personnel consisted mainly of officially paid persons.
The treasurer was another member of the staff. He was not responsible, however, to the Hoheitstraeger but to the Reichs Secretary of the Treasury.
The party administration of finance had created an independent cont*--* and accounting system which was a purely bureaucratic institution and of unpolitical nature. It comprised about 70,000 political leaders. leaders. There were the four following categories; One representative of the different sections of the NS Women's Association, NS Professorial Association, and the NS Student Association, a representation of the Welfare Associations, NSV and NSKOV, the leaders of the professional organizations for teachers, officials, technicians, physicians, and members of the legal profession. The representatives of the technical offices: DAF, industry and commerce, agrarian policy, etc.
In order to gain a correct impression of the dimensions of these offices, it must be pointed out that they generally had no staff of their own and very often no office rooms. Sometimes they were not even in the sane building as the staff but some distance away. Kreisleitung. A number of affidavits corroborate that these agencies were hardly ever visited by the Hoheitstraeger. This is affidavit PL 39. And they were not requested to work with them -- that is affidavit 48 to 50. During the war, some of these agencies were dissolved because they had become unnecessary, such as the Rechstamt, the Legal Office, in 1942, and the Office for Officials in 1944. The task of these offices was mainly technical, and their officials therefore received instructions not from the Hoheitstraeger, but from the competent superior agencies. Document PL 72. activity of these staff members. and the concentration camp atrocities. But these are not physicians of the Public Health Office. Agreements between the Reichs Minister of Justice and Himmler and Goebbels upon a special criminal law and extermination through labor have been mentioned. The Kreis offices and Gau Offices for justice are in no way connected with this. within the staffs, for this was their task, but here it is important to establish how far the political leaders were concerned, outside the official activity, in a conspiracy with aim to a war of aggression or the committing of war crimes. supposition that they might have had some knowledge of these facts. It is most important to verify the exactitude of this supposition now, and it must not be postponed until a later trial. condemnation of these men. It is to be feared that during the subsequent trials, the individual guilt may be too easily presupposed upon the assumption of their general guilt.