The major crimes such as the extermination of the Jews and the killing of political opponents in concentration camps are not crimes against humanity in the sense of the Charter, and the miner measures of spying for election frauds are insignificant in themselves in this proceeding, provided that they were not carried out with the aim of being crimes against international law, crimes against peace, and war crimes as set down in Article 6 of the Charter. meeting any contradiction. In order to support this opinion, I should like to refer to the Supplementary Berlin Agreement to the Charter of 6 November 1945. Here we are concerned with an agreement of the four signatory powers to the Charter, the sole point of the agreement being the changing of a semicolon to a comma. Through this agreement, we have the correction of the text of Article 6 (c), which had been separated into two parts by the semicolon in the English and French texts. The result had been that crimes against humanity could have been prosecuted without being related to crimes against peace or war crimes which are under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. without a connection to war does not now apply after Article 6(c) has been drawn up in accordance with the Russian text. the Tribunal. tried to establish the connection of crimes against peace with the war crimes by proving a conspiracy in connection with all of their allegations. Leaders? circle of individuals which is to be declared criminal as an organization or as a group. Here the charge is made against the Corps of Political Leaders, according to National Socialist terminology. organization did not exist. It was prohibited through a directive from the Deputy of the Fuehrer in the Party, Hess, on 27 July 1935 -- Document Number PL 12 -- which expressly prohibited the designation chosen, "Political Organization", for the some circle of individuals.
The reason given there for was that there could not exist within the Party any special organization. exist within every party as leading and executive organs. because of their titles, must be defined as political leaders. It is not a group which united, for one could not eater the circle of political leading of one's own accord, but only through an act of sovereignty, through an appointment which took place without any effort on the part of the appointee. The situation in law is comparable to that of every official who through his appointment enters the circle of his colleagues.
How is it that this circle is being narrowed down as a special group? which was connected with it; in addition, we have the oath, but this was nothing special, for all officials and soldiers had to take if in the same way. Leaders, however, are completely varied according to their kind and significance. There were political leaders who were active in associations like the German Labor Front and the National Socialist Peoples' Welfare Association, and who in the practical administrative work were the uniforms for decorative reasons only. These are the members of the various affiliated associations who deliberately are not included in the charges of the Prosecution. apparatus. These were the Hoheitstraeger, the functionaries, and the members of the Political Staffs, who are characterized as top leaders or main leaders by the Prosecution. that under the Corps of Political Leaders they mean only those individuals. They are enumerated from the Reichsleiter to the Blockleiter.
insofar as they were active in the political staffs which grouped themselves around the Hoheitstraeger, the functionaries. group, in that we have a connection through the relationship of subordination, discipline and business matters. to be about 600,000, according to the number of offices existing in the year 1939. As the document used as basis -- Document 2958-IS -- shows, the offices in the staffs are not included. The figures show in addition to the Hoheitstraeger, the functionaries, including the Cell and Block Leaders, there were still about 475,000 of these offices which were filled by political leaders. In this way, the number of political leaders in the political staffs for the year 1939 is increased to perhaps 1,000,000. turnover of personnel in the period of twelve years, the figure is increased one and a half times; that is, to about two and a half million. In this connection, the fact is taken into account that the number of offices was only half that number. about one and one half million remains. who were not appointed Political Leaders und those who during the war were changed on an honorary basis with the activity of political leaders in subordinate positions; above all, they were the Cell and Block Leaders during the war. According to the testimony given by witnesses, their number may be estimated at 600,000. If, Like the Prosecution, you include these individuals in the circle of political leaders, then the entire figure of the individuals involved rise to 2.1 million. This figure rises still more because there were other office holders in the political staffs who were not appointed political leaders. tricted to political leaders, a part of the people in the political staffs are not included. They were these who were not appointed political leaders even though they head office.
place subsequently without detriment to those so involved, since the possibility of an application for a legal hearing was not given them in the first publication by the Tribunal. fined is to be declared criminal, the admissibility under international law of the charges must be discussed. collective punishment of the population is admissible only when the population is considered jointly guilty for individual deeds. This is an exceptional regulations which serves solely for the protection of the occupying power. reasons. You may not punish a group just because the guilt for a war is imputed to its members, or because you hold them responsible for moral resistance. You can not arrest all political commissars or Jews and sen tence them because of their political attitude. This prohibition of the Hague Rules on Land Warfare is based on the penal, individual principle of democracy, which has not lost its prestige. Charter has made Article 50 of the Hague Rules on Land Warfare invalid-that has to be examined officially. whether the participation in guilt of the group can be considered proved. How such a proof is to be produced neither the Hague Rules of Land Warfare nor the Charter indicate.
We can follow two principles: either that of justice or that of expediency. sentencing of a group is to be rejected, "even if there is only one just man among them." The principle of expediency admits the possibility of the document ones being included, but one prefers to punish the guiltless rather than to let the guilty ones go unprosecuted. only to punish the guilty ones and not to set a trap for the guiltless ones or to catch them, too, in one not.
request itself to characterize the group as criminal rests on speculations of expediency. This apparent contradiction can be solved only by requesting the verdict of the Court as a means of procedure to answer an emergency. people were incorporated. However, in subsequent proceedings they should have all the right to make objections, as Justice Jackson has stated. stipulating the procedure for the taking of evidence, expressed itself in a sense which might make possible a determination for the decision itself. The final influence in regard to the later individual proceedings, however, has not taken place. The decision of the Tribunal in this regard must depend essentially on the results which its verdict will have. is of the utmost importance. It appears from the text of the law that more membership in an organization or a group which has been declared criminal will necessitate punishment. If that were the case, the inclusion of the guiltless ones in the present proceedings would constitute a severe break with the guilt principle which forms the basis of modern penal law. Charter. Through its Article 10 declares the objection that an organization was not criminal as inadmissible, it admits to anyone the objection that he was not acquainted with the criminal character. contemplated only in the case of participation in the criminal activity. The informed press and the radio have expressed themselves in the Some vein. the group which are decisive for its judgement. The position of the Tribunal can be learned from its ruling of 13 march 1946. The essential factor is the participation in the conspiracy. This presupposes the formation of a group for the commitment of an act which has been declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter.
Such a formation, however, in the case of every conspiracy is based on the concrete knowledge of the contemplated crime. obviousness or the comprehensive information available to the political leaders. as general tendencies. The criminal excesses emerging from there were not known.
The following is important in this connection: The thing that matters is not the obviousness of facts but the obviousness of motives. As far as we are not concerned with genuine war crimes, the motive of the aggressive war must be known; the acts must be recognizable as the first stage of an aggressive war. Only by that can the participation in the criminal conspiracy be carried out. the people concerned on the basis of the doctrine of National Socialism. There, it is claimed, the aims were given which of necessity led to aggressive warfare. Therefore, the building up of the Party and the soliciting of members, as well as the seizure of power, become criminal, based on the active of aggressive war.
unagressive war or for the commitment of war crimes.
Is such a conclusion correct? "Mein Kampf". opponents, but it had not been objected against by any foreign sources. In 1924 the high Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission in Coblentz had approved of it for the Rhineland and later the League of nations had done likewise for Dantzig. The Party was permitted including its philosophy as expressed in the book "Mein Kampf". Besides it was generally known that Hitler had declared that his book was out of date in many points. and it is also true that a war which aims something which infringes on the property of someone else, must include the attack on such property.
But the slogans "Lebensraum" (Living Space) and "Los von Versailles" (Off with Versailles) were not bound to lead to aggressive war, just as little as the slogan "Workers of all countries unite" must lead to aggressive war. There is the method of negotiations by appeals to reason. Just as in the interior of a state strike, uprisings, and revolutions may be justified for workers in their struggle for existence, so in the life of nations it may happen that war will ensue. But the normal way is that of negotiations. If it weren't so every member of an opposition party could be prosecuted for high treason. obviously transgressing the technical concept of opening the hostilities has been doubted in the earlier part of the proceedings by many of the main defendants and with many important reasons. other states took it without condemning the principle which supposedly as a "law of life" is the basis of the aggressive war. The archives of the world remain closed.
an aggressive war, but rather whether the political leaders knew of it and whether this was obvious to them. aggressive intentions, because to every political leader Hitler's offer to disarm down to the last machine gun must have been impressive, and also this repeated declaration that the misfortune of other peoples could not bring good fortune to the own people, but rather that the welfare of all should be the basis of international life. Impressive must have been the naval agreement with Great Britain, the declarations given Franco of not having the intention to raise further territorial claims, the Munich Pact, and finally the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. Particularly the latter caused a wave of rejoicing because it seemed to be about peace with that adversary which had been there to fare called the worst enemy. Just that treaty at the same time proved how impossible it is to derive from the book "Mein Kampf" any directives for the actual practice. concerned, the outstanding factor is Hitler's repeated declaration that the "Buendnisfaehigkeit" (ability to conclude agreements) could be established only by the equality of armaments. The extent of the rearmament was not recognizable an relation to the strength of the adversary and Hitler himself had declared it to be fully that a small state should challenge all the world.
The cornerstone of all political leaders' conviction that no war was planned, however, was the fact stressed again and again that Hitler himself had been a soldier on the battlefront of the First world war. Therefore, it was not to be expected that he should bring about the suffering of a new war. directed exclusively to the political leaders he literally stated:
"During these long years we had me other prayer than 'Lord, give to our people domestic peace and give it and maintain external peace! In our generation we had so much of fighting that it is understandable when we long for peace.
... We desire to plan the future of the children of our people, we wish to work for the future to safeguard not only their future live but to make them easier too. Behind us is so difficult a fate that we have only one request that we can address to the merciful and benevolent providence spare from our children that we had to suffer: We desire nothing but peace and tranquillity for our work." leaders are hit by the indictment. policy of peace. For all those who fought for Socialism and who believed in the realization of peace plans, the fact that Hitler himself had been a worker was standing in the foreground. The elimination of unemployment appeared as the greatest accomplishment of peace; a success which was convincing for everyone who regained employment. It was not Hitler's demonic magic which brought seven millions of unemployed and the some number of partially employed people with their families to his ranks, but the fact that he gave them again work and bread, that was the thing that conquered the masses. the more existence and that his social standing was raised. when war broke out the universal old-age insurance system, a big social undertaking was in the process of being built up. To the political leaders that did not look like aggressive war. of the occurrences and their motives; it is the system of secrecy. secrecy. I would like to stress another point of view which aided in a peculiar manner that system of secrecy; it is the confidence which Hitler enjoyed. which he had accumulated by the elimination of that unemployment which had brought the people to the brink of ruin. One had to add to that the success in the field of foreign policy which had been recognized by foreign powers, too.
emphasizing that tradition. These are both factors which have much influence on the people. foreign policy which the French prosecutor has called "naivite". This frankness established domestically the conviction that Hitler would not instigate anything secretly. That picture was rounded out for the millions of followers by the facade of respectability and dignity which was kept up by that circle around Hitler from which one could have expected first criticism and warning. gain knowledge of the aggressive intentions. the plans had been given seems to be untenable on the basis of the evidence submitted during this trial. That assumption of the prosecution presumably rests on the original theory that it was a part of the normal business routine to inform all Hoheitstraeger while it has been established by now that only a very small circle was initiated.
The situation is different in regard to the war crimes. Here the thing that matters is not the proof of the motives of known happenings, but the knowledge of the facts themselves. It is certain that the war crimes due to their abominable motives were kept secret as a matter of course. The Tribunal has learned in the course of the taking of evidence of the circle of silence which was drawn around the most horrible atrocities. Other war crimes which have been made part of the indictment are individual cases which were not publicly known. In connection with the individual points we shall dwell on these accusations. basis of the Charter cannot be considered crimes. seizure of power, and the maintenance of power. These are facts that have not been denied, as a general rule. The creation of a dictatorial state and the prohibition of other Parties is a home policy measure which every state may take according to its judgment.
that they are therefore criminal is an unnatural construction of facts. Any proof for such an assumption is lacking. building up of Socialism as well as for a war of aggression. Thus, the orientation of economy can serve good as well as evil.
The British prosecutor has shown us another point of view. He has stated that intervention against their own government is possible in order to protect Nationals. This conclusion he draws from the fact that even war should be waged out of humanitarian reasons. been stated in the beginning. Even International Law does not recognize a right of intervention upon moral grounds.
Crusades are not permissible. is because the misuses are being connected with the crimes in the charter. concerning the pressure exerted upon voters.
The most important one is Document D-43 of the year 1936. It concerns inquiry of the Minister of the Interior of the Reich as to which officials did not fulfil their obligations to vote. The Ortsgruppenleiter are asked to comment upon this. This is a letter of the Kreisleitung (the Kreisleiter office) in Bremen. Another Kreisleiter, the witness Kuehl, declared before the Commission (Record page 1907) that he did not receive such an inquiry. The general character of this inquiry is thus put in doubt. importance. It originates from the SD Sector Koblenz, and mentions the statement of the District Manager (Kreisgeschaeftsfuehrer) about the reasons of the bad election results due to quarrels of a personal nature. Both documents deal with the results of the election after the vote. exchanged between the lowest offices of the SD in Erfurt and concern election control. The closest cooperation with the Ortsgruppenleiter is advised. it is shown that the commanding agency of the party in no way enters into action.
These are merely individual measures of other agencies. No general practice or knowledge can be deduced from that. of the 1940 edition, in which it is said that the Blockleiters should report anyone spreading dangerous rumors. In this connection the household card indexes were established which, in the Gau Cologne, contained extensive measures of surveillance. Leaders in this manner and whether it was done in conformity with the instruction of the Party agencies.
contrary. See Decree No. 127 of the 5th of October 1936 In the orders of the Fuehrer's Deputy (Document No. P.L. 34). that these instructions were followed and that the indexes they knew of were not of a spying nature. It is thereby proved that the system of the Gau Cologne was not generally followed and that it was not valid for all Gaus. witness Dr. Kuehn who, as the counsellor of the Superior Provincial Court (Oberlandesgerichtsrat) was competent for the Heimtueckegesetz in the Ministry of Justice.
The witness declared in the interrogation of 10.7.1946 that proceedings were generally taken up upon the denunciation of inimical neighbors or others, and only very rarely upon the instigation of Political leaders. The only concrete testimony of spying submitted by the prosecution is Document D-901, in which a Blockleiter and janitor of the Assembly Hall reports a secret meeting of the members of the Confessional Church in his building. camps as coupled with the count of spying. State and taken into custody seems to be a custom adopted by politicians. It is based upon reciprocity and represents retaliation for the losses in the political struggle.
A connection with war of aggression is not established. The count of indictment of the prosecution will, therefore, be directed rather against misuses incurred through excesses and atrocities. SD of 10.3.40, Document P.L. No. 100, arrests were made solely by the Gestapo. Any intervention on the part of Political Leaders was strictly forbidden (P.L. No. 29). In this manner secrecy was assured from the beginning.
the political leaders through the fact that even after their release the political prisoners and their families had to remain under surveillance, and that this order was carried out. This is Document P.L. No. 100, which created such astonishment in court today. The witness, Count von Roedern, testified before the Commission concerning the knowledge of the conditions in the concentration camps. He said that in the beginning of 1943 the county group leaders of the Foreign Organization had visited the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen, and had gained the impression on that occasion that the rumors about the concentration camps circulating abroad at that time were without foundation. (Commission record page 1897).
The witness, Sieckmeier, states in affidavit P.L. No. 57 that in the Spring of 1939 he visited the concentration camp Buchenwald with 150 American guests, and the witness Wuensche states in affidavit P.L. No. 57B that in June of 1938 he visited the concentration camp Sachsenhausen with a class of the Berlin Zollschule (School for customs officials). Both state that the quarters and the food of the prisoners were in conformity with the regulations. Thirty five further statements of political leaders who had visited such camps are contained in the collective affidavits. They are all of the same effect.
14,763 statements summarized in Affidavit P.L. No. 57 show that these political leaders knew nothing of the conditions in the concentration camps, and that upon inquiry they received no answer in seven cases,and that satisfactory answers were received in 102 cases. the prosecution. of these measures, and that they had no general knowledge of them.
Document 630-PS, a letter of Hitler's of the 1st September 1939 proves that it is a so-called special secret order, which was given directly to the Reichsleiter without portfolio Bouhler, and Dr. Brandt. Neither the Reichsleiters nor the Gauleiters were told of such special secret orders (Document 59A, Affidavit Hederich).
According to Document D-906, No. 3 and 6, the medical commission concerned seems to have taken up contact with the Gauleiter or Kreisleiter in individual cases.
It is noteworthy, however, that just in the last document it is noted that the Hoheitstraeger (Bearers of Sovereignty) are not involved since the regulations do not contemplate this.
Confirmation of these facts is given by the collective affidavits P.L. 59 of Karl Richard Adam, who states that 7,642 political leaders executed affidavits to the effect that they had received no orders, and had not been involved in carrying out of such measures.
Great precautions had been taken to keep these facts a secret; but nevertheless some knowledge was gained of them,and rumors were circulated. This is borne out by special notes recommending secrecy in the incriminating documents. The witness Meyer-Wendeborn stated before the Tribunal that upon his inquiry he was told that these were but rumors. Two medical men, Dr. Engel (P.L.59B), and Kreisleiter Dr. Dietrich (P.L.59C) confirmed the official denial of the mercy killing.
Were these measures in any were connected with the conduct of the war? borne out in document M-152. this idea from the viewpoint of "Natural selection "(Zuchtwahl) and which pointed out the custom in ancient Greece of exposing and abandoning the unfit. though a member of a Gautabe defines mercy killing in case of war as war measure in Document D-906.
I now come to the events which appeared openly: smashing of the unions, persecution of the churches and persecution of the Jews.
The "smashing " of the free trade unions was well know. It was a revolutionary act. It was admissible or inadmissible, like any revolution. It was an event which happened only once-- for which the responsibility is clear. The Political Leaders did not have a direct part in its execution, but they knew the event and approved it. other reasons were decisive.
The 150 large and small unions, which included 30% of the workers, were already at the end of their strength before they were dissolved. Economically, the majority of them were facing collapse; the many years of unemployment had depleted their treasuries, but increased the demands upon them. The political parties which dominated unions had been helpless in the face of the economic crisis; they had been powerless against Hitler, and so resigned. Mass withdrawals which took place at the end of 1932 and at the beginning of 1933 had thus made the unions merely shadows. On the other hand the workers transferred to the NSBO, thereby aligned themselves with the idea of labor peace and of community which was recognizably ably preparing the way for the solution of the economics crisis.
In a similar way the employers' organizations were compelled to maintain in labor peace, and were dissolved. The purpose of the elimination of all organizations was to reach a settlement between labor and capital; the class struggle was replaced by the duty to care for the workers on the one side, and the duty of loyalty on the other side, as keys to the elimination of the economic distress. That the projecting was so understood and approved by the workers is shown by the circumstances of frictionless cooperation; thus the economic-political proceeding was justified after the event. Then there is the incriminating question of the church question. That the churches were at variance with National Socialism is well known. That the cruses of this quarrel were that the churches were opposed to an intended war of aggression is unknown. After power-political differences at the beginning it was later reasons of Christi morals which increasingly called the Church to fight against national Socialism. Generally, the churches were indifferent to the foreign policy of States according to the principle, "To the State that which belongs to the Stat." Conflict with the Church was contrary to the Party program, and Hitler himself never preached it. He would probably have preferred to win over the churches. He tried to do so through the Concordat and had successes through the proclamation of the Fulda Conference of Bishops and the proclamation of the Austrian Bishops after the Anschluss. The propaganda against the Church was limited and was directed against the Members of the clergy who interfered in politics. There was no real organized fight against the Church. The separation of Church ad State was demanded in order to overcome the splitting of the people by the various Confessions. Thus, Hitler in 1933, immediately after the seizure of power told the witness Count Wolf-Matternich that it was inexcusable if the Christian Church was combatted (affidavit P.L. No. 62 c.), and the witness Theology Professor Fabricius confirms this attitude. (Affidavit P.L. No. 62 a.). For the Political Leaders this conviction manifested its If in the fact that even before 1933 some theology students, theology professors, and churchmen had joined the Party. After 1933 there was a strong movement for rejoining the Church among those who had left the Church under the influence of Marxism; there were many retroactive marriage and Christening ceremonies, which is shown by Affidavit P.L. 62a and 62b - Prof.
Fabricius and Theologian Buth. The witness Shoen confirms an affidavit, P.L. No. 62, that of 500 Political Leaders whose statement ha examined 42% simulataneously held Church offices. The witnesses Wegscheider and Kaufmann, who were examined before the Tribunal, also testified that numerous Political Leaders held a Church office. The Bishops Dr. Groeber and Dr. Berning were appointed to the State Council (Staatsrat) that is the affidavit Count Wolf-Metternich, P.L. 62 c. witness Schoen (P.L. 62) who, in the examination of 21, 131 affidavits, noted that in the individual Ortsgruppen (Local group) church life remained undisturbed and that the Party participated in Church life occasionally officially, and, in some cases, in uniform. Thus, in the individual local groups there was a good relationship with the clergy, and this was expressed publicly at celebrations. activities and statements are in contradiction to the general Party line. The leader of that group was Bormann.
Of 23 documents which were submitted by the prosecution against the Political Leaders on the church question, no less than 9 documents are statements of opinion by Bormann. Seven documents concern the SS as well as the SD and the Gestapo. Four documents deal with three local occurrences, and one document consists of the personal opinion of Gauleiter Florian. There follows a quotation from the "Mythos", and a document with directives for the RAD. (Reich Labor Service) All these documents do not show that the Political Leaders on the whole participated in the elimination of the Church. I comment on the individual documents: The document containing the most serious charge is the secret decree of Bormann to the Gauleiters on "National Socialism and Christianity". On this subject there is an affidavit by the witness Haderich, according to which Bormann issued this decree independently and Hitler instructed him to recall and destroy this circular. The witness Gauleiter Kauffmann confirmed before the Tribunal here that this decree was recalled. The same thing is shown by the testimony of the witness Hoffmann before the Commission on 3 July 1946. In affidavit P.L. 62 b the witness Buth states that the defendant Rosenberg likewise rejected the decree and prepared an objection. A Document 098-PS is a letter of Bormann to Rosenberg and deals with a so-called National Socialist Catechism. It is a personal opinion of Bormann. There is no answer of Rosenberg at hand. In this letter a meeting of the Reichsleiters is suggests. The affidavit of the witness Hederich states that such a meeting never took place. There follow a number of documents which show Bormann's constant personal urging towards the separation of Church and State. Document 070-PS regarding school devotions lies in this direction; as also document 840-PS. admission of theologians into the Party; end 107-PS, directives for the participation of the RAD in church ceremonies. The following documents, 100-PS and 101-PS. are letters of Bormann to Rosenberg expressing the wish for their own literature for soldiers: Rosenberg is here attacked because of the attitude which he took in favor of a book in a religious vein by Reichsbischof Mueller. This proves Bormann's purely personal activity.
In the same field there is Document 064-PS again a letter of Bormann to Rosenberg. It demands comment on an inclosed letter of Gauleiter Florian of 23 September 1940, who had objected to a religious writing by General Rabenau. It is a personal opinion which is not typical of the general attitude of the Political Leaders. A further action of Bormann is shown by document 116-PS, a letter to Rosenberg of 24 Jan 1939 on the curtailment of the theological faculties. Here Rosenberg is not instructed to execute curtailment as the prosecution erroneously assumes; but another letter is merely sent to him for his information, in which a curtailment of the faculties was welcomed. The continuation of Rosenberg's efforts of spreading his opinion is shown by a letter of Bormann of 17 May 1939 to Rosenberg. Here Bormann sends a plan of the Reichs Education Minister on the limitation of the theological faculties. Likewise only with a request for his opinion, and not, as the prosecution assumes, for the immediate execution of the measure under consideration. Then the Political Leaders are charged with the activities of the Gestapo on the basis of the files of a conference of church specialists of the Gestapo. This cannot be taken as evidence of proof of the anti-church attitude of the Political Leaders. Nor did the Political Leaders have any direct connection with the confiscation of church property. The submitted Document R-101 (correspondence of the RSHA) shows confiscation by the Reich Governor and Gauleiter and by the Eastern German agriculture Company, (Ostdeutsche Landwirtschaftsgessellschaft GmbH) 22 Aug A LJG 22-1 Meehan in the Warthegau.