21 Aug M LJG 11-3 Karr deposed by Major General Hesselbach, and from which it may be seen that at the beginning of the war the equipment and weapons were not on hand in full strength to correspond with the units set up for mobilization. As far as the rest of the contents of this document is concerned, I shall merely refer your attention to it. submitted document 143, GB 23. From this document allegedly the intentions of the Luftwaffe are to be seen. I should like to refer to the contents of affidavit 101 of the then Chief of the Colonel General Staff Stumpf who expressly testifies that this was a private organizational study set up by General Kammhuber.
As far as the contents are concerned, I should like to refer to affidavit 102 to 152. Through details of the most various sort we can see that on the part of the military leadership, as far as the carrying through of rearmament is concerned, aggressive wars were not seriously considered. affidavits 181 to 205, from which we can see, as is corroborated by many details, that German officers participated in certain manoeuvres; that the situation, was always marshalled but for defense and that the war college which existed for the training of general staff officers had a training course which dealt almost exclusively with matters of defense. leaders in wars of aggression is concerned, the Prosecution has been trying to prove that the military leaders in plenty of time had been advised and informed of Hitler's plans and in this connection they produced the Hoszbach document of 5 November, number 3686-PS, USA 25. I should like to refer to the affidavit of the author of this record, General Hoszbach, dealing with the background and the origin of this document. to me, expressly states that he did not take notes at the confer once and that he wrote down this document several days later. This document has been translated.
THE PRESIDENT : Does it say in this affidavit whether he was shown a copy of the notes or whether he had any comments to make on them?
DR. LATERNSER : Dr. President, I must state quite frankly that I cannot give you this information because of the wealth of material on hand in any event I would have asked for a recess at this point. I shall check on these matters and I she able to tell the tribunal after lunch. I should like to make a few condensations which I an sure will be very profitable.
THE PRESIDENT : Very well.
( A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The afternoon session reconvened at 1400 hours, August 21, 1946.)
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, may I say something about the speeches of the organizations ? I hand over a list after a brief consultation with my colleagues. The political leaders and Gestapo speak on Thursday or Friday.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: And Monday, SS, SD; Tuesday, General Staff, Reich Cabinet; and Wednesday, the SA. In the second column I have indicated when these documents can be turned in for translation; and in the last column I have given the time when the speeches could presumably be held. If there is no session on Saturday, Friday could be filled with the speeches for the political leaders and the Gestapo.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean Friday this week?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Friday of this week could be taken up with the political leaders?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, and in the afternoon the Gestapo. If there is no session on Saturday, the SS could be in on Monday so that there will be no interruption. This difficulty is in the translation division, whether it wall keep up with this tempo.
THE PRESIDENT: I suppose that the difficulty in the translating division is partly due to their having nothing to translate.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the Court wanted information as to whether on the basis of the Hoszbach documents orientation took place. As to the document, it shows Hoszbach told Hitler of the existence of this record and gave it to him twice to read; but Hitler refused. General Hoszbach does not recall whether he presented the record to Generaloberst von Fritsch; but he certainly did give it to Beck. He then says further that this record was not signed by the participants in the conference.
THE PRESIDENT: It was initialed by Blomberg, I see he says.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, initialed but not signed. May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, certainly.
DR. LATERNSER: From the Affidavits 213 A, B, and C, it is shown that the most important agencies were not informed of this conference on the 5th of November, 1927. Numerous officers discussed this group and that equipment and training of the Wehrmacht made impossible any thought of the war of aggression which is shown in Affidavit 223 to 225, 220 and 277. The contradictory judgment of the situation by the Wehrmacht, on the one hand, and Hitler on the other hand was in Affidavit 211. Field Marshall von Weichst, in Affidavit 215, weakens the opinion of Field Marshall von Blomberg in his Affidavit 3, USA Exhibit 536. Field Marshall Sperrle was in Affidavit 237 and 237-A, in which he reports that he and Reichenau did not know the purpose of their visit to the Berghof at the Schuschning conference in February, 1938. Only later did Hitler comment on this event. improvise, as is shown by Affidavits 238 to 242. The same is true of the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia, Affidavits 246 to 252 and 254. General Warliment in Affidavit 217 states that up to the day of the attack on Poland a peaceful settlement of the dissension had been expected. The same is shown by Affidavits 227, 246 and 255 to 257. As concerning statements of Hitler which confirm his generals in these opinions, there are statements 219, 211, 212 and particularly 277. The surprise which the order to march against Poland caused is shown from Affidavits 228 to 231, as well as 255, 256 and 257. political leaders had assured him clearly that in the next few years there would be no hostilities. That is shown by Affidavit 315 of Rear Admiral Katzenberg. The German battleship Gneisenau at the beginning of the war had written orders that no hostilities were to be expected. It was on a training trip at the Canary Islands.
That is shown from the statement of Admiral Forste, number 3114. inadequate production preparations, in August of 1940, there was a lack of torpedoes for the slight number of U-boats which were available at that time. paign. This is shown by affidavit 259, and from statements in 263, 264, 266, 267, abd 269. These affidavits show statements of Hitler's that he did not want to rish a war on two fronts. Unfortunately, owing to lack of time, I cannot quote the exhaustive material. references. According to the reports available, which were given to the generals, it was presented as a preventive war. This is shown from affidavit 270-A and 270-M, as well as from 271, 272, 274, and 275. book. The reference is sufficient. in the following order.
1. Connections with Einsatzgruppen.
2. Commissar Order.
3. Partisan warfare.
4. Treatment of prisoners.
5. Destruction.
6. Treatment of civilian population.
7. Jurisdiction in the East.
8. The Commando Order.
9. Deportation of laborers.
10. Crimes against rules of warfare and against humanity. under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, and has referred to:
1. The testimony of Ohlendorf.
2. The testimony of Schellenberg.
3. Document L-180.
4. Affidavit 16 of General Roettiger.
5. Affidavit 18 or SS Fuehrer Rode. are not conclusive. I shall offer a counter-proof that the alleged relations did not exist and that the crimes committed by the Einsatzgruppen cannot be charged against the persons represented by me. and 703-A of General Woehler, which have been translated, and which refute the testimony of Ohlendorf on the points of the charge. I should like to call the attention of the Court particularly to the fact that General. I should at that time was Chief of Staff of the 11th Army. The witness Ohlendorf is alleged to have negotiated with him in the sense of the charge. The affidavits of General Woehler completely refute the testimony of Ohlendorf. the witness Schellenberg, USA Exhibit 557. I should like to call the attention of the Court to this fact, that it is based on an assumption. I cross-examined the witness Schellenberg before the Commission, which this Court will find on pages 3524 to 3554 of the Commission transcript. I should like to ask expressly that the Court refer to this, because this cross-examination shows that the witness was not in a position to give facts on which he could base his assumptions. Fuehrer Heydrich existed whereby the Einsatzgruppen in the operational area were completely under the Commander-in-Chief. concerning General Wagner, who lost his life in connection with the 20th of July, 1944. The Judge spoke with him about this point and received a clear statement that the Einsatzgruppen were not under the military command but only under the Reichsfuehrer SS.
secution, at pages 99 and 100 of my document book 1. Under the number 2-b, it is shown clearly that the Reichsfuehrer SS -- that is, Himmler -- in the operational area of the Army, had special assignments; and, in connection with this assignment, he operated independently and on his own responsibility. That is shown at pages 99 and 100 of my document book, in a document which the prosecution itself submitted. of Eanzergruppe IV, under Generaloberst Hoeppner, with the Einsatzgruppen. I should like to call the special a Mention of the Court to the way in which the testimony of this point came about. During his examination by the prosecution, the report of Einsatzgruppe A was handed to the witness. From this report the witness Schellenberg got this close cooperation for his own knowledge, and then used this knowledge in his affidavit. For this reason I should like to quote a part of the cross-examination before the Commission.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, what you are now doing is argument, is it not? We don't want a hear argument at this stage. I mean, you are referring us now to the case of the prosecution, and you are arguing upon the affidavits which, you are producing, that they are satisfactory answers to the prosecution, Well, that is not necessary now.
DR. LATERNSER: I believe, Mr. President, I was misunderstood. I am contrasting assertions of the prosecution with proofs of the defense, so that the Court may see the reason why I am presenting this evidence.
THEE PRESIDENT: You have done that already, and you have done it, if I may say so, very satisfactorily. You have given us ten different categories of those individual points, and you are now drawing our attention to your evidence which deals with the Einsatzgruppen. Well, that is all we need; we don't need to have references or argument, at any rate, upon the prosecution's evidence with reference to Einsatzgruppen. If you would continue to give us the references to your affidavits which deal with the Einsatzgrupgen, that will be sufficient for us
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I regret that I must say one more thing, but I must give evidence; in weakening the prosecution's evidence, I must give evidence to the contrary.
In this case I want to show the Court that the affidavit of the Witness Schellenberg -- which was presented by the prosecution and in which the witness speaks of the particularly close cooperation between the Einsatzgruppen and Heeppner -- I want to show that that was within the knowledge of Schellenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand that. I have got down here that Ohlerdorf and Schellenberg are the witnesses for the prosecution who state that the High Command was concerned with and actually commanded the Einsatzgruppen. That is a fact you are contesting, and you are referring us to the evidence which you say contests it. You don't want to give us the prosecution's evidence. You have told us what it is: Ohlendorf, Schellenberg and 1-180.
Will you continue?
DR. LATERNSER: May I quote a brief passage from the testimony of Schellenberg?
THE PRESIDENT: No.
DR. LATERNSER: That is evidence, Mr. President, which I brought out before the Commission, and now I just want to present it to the Court via a short quotation.
THE PRESIDENT: But, you see, that comes as argument; it isn't a more comment. We want to confine it to a more comment so that you may explain your evidence. Once you begin to comment upon the evidence of the prosecution, in the opinion of the Tribunal it becomes argument.
Well, you may refer to this passage if you can do so shortly; it is suggested that it is your evidence.
DR. PELCKMANN: It is very brief.
"Q You have no misgivings to used documents which have just been given to you in your testimony?
"A Dr. Laternser, what do you mean by used?
"Q You made this report the subject of your testimony?
"A Yes, under oath. I had to comment on it." witness Schellenberg on this point was not his own knowledge. The witness then, in his affidavit 12, said, that he reached the conclusion that in the Wagner-Heydrich conference the further activities of the Einsatzgruppen of the planned mass exterminations were presumably discussed and established. To this point I want to refer you to the cross examination, pages 35 to 33, 35 to 34, and 35 to 36. It is quite clearly shown there that the witness Schellenberg is under the assumption that Wagner and Heydrich in this discussion planned the mass exterminations; that he formed this assumption only in the year 1935. I.C. conference which lasted several days, and that he was present only at one of those conferences. He then says, in his affidavit, that presumably, in the following discussions, the intended mass exterminations were announced to the IC officers. Also, in this affidavit he adds the further assumption that the commanders-in-chief were informed through these presumably informed I.C. officers. I can now prove to the court that both assumptions which Schellenberg stressed are in contradiction to the truth. available in translation. In affidavit 701 a participant at this IC conference, it is General von Gersdorff, says that planned mass exterminations were lot mentioned and the same fact is concerned with in General von Kleikamp statement which is also given under oath. In cross examination I showed one of whose affidavits to Schellenberg and I questioned him as follows, I quote from page 3332. That is one of the few quotations which I should like to mal because of its importance.
THE PRESIDENT: What is that you refer to? Cross examination before the Court?
DR. PELCKMANN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Before the Tribunal or what?
DR. PELCKMANN: Before the Commission, Mr. President. I shall dispense with reading it. I only refer the Court to page 3552 of the transcript before the Commission which is in special connection with this point.
Affidavit 16 of General Roettiger, USA Exhibit 560. As the cross examination before the Commission can no longer be used by the Prosecution in the sense desired by then, I shall not quote it although I would like to quote it, and refer the Court to pages 3318 and 3324. In regard to the testimony of SS Fuehrer Rode, USA Exhibit 563, whom I unfortunately could not cross examine, I point out that the witness himself begins with the words "As far as I know one Einsatzgruppen were completely subordinate." As counter evidence I have 52 affidavits on this point, numbers 701 to 752. Affidavits 704, 705 707, 710 to 752 make it completely clear that there was never any subordination of the Einsatzgruppen. commander of an Army Group, on a more rumor that Jews were being murdered, immediately took stops, calling the Higher SS and Police Chief to him and telling him that he would not permit excesses against the Jews. This SS Fuehrer assured him that no excesses against the Jews took place, and that he had no orders to that effect. I refer the Court to affidavit 709 which indicates that General of the Panzer Troops, Freiherr von Schweppenberg, when a leader of an Einsatz Commando came to him and said that he was entrusted with the political matters, immediately had him removed free, the operational area. Fuehrer arrested because he wanted to have 50 to 60 Jews shot who, according to the statements of confidential agents, were anti-German and had the intention of clearing up acts of sabotage against the German troops. In this connection one piece of evidence seems of special importance; that is affidavit 16370 of General Kittel. According to this affidavit, a national German in the area of Marinka, because of crimes committed against a Jewess, was condemned to death by a court martial and shot.
How could this sentence be explained if the military leaders had ordered and permitted the murder of many thousands of Jews? Commission who testified that the Einsatzgruppen were not subordinate to the Wehrmacht. Now, on the Commissar order. Colonel von Boniehn, according to which this order was valid for all units of the Eastern Army. But the same affidavit shows that the Commanding General of the 47th Panzer Corps, General Lehmeisen. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you are commanding upon evidence of the Prosecution. You are commenting upon USA affidavit 565. At least, so I understand it.
DR. PELCKMANN: Mr. President to I believe I was misunderstood. I was only referring to a part of this document to which the prosecution did not refer.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the affidavit is in evident I suppose, and it is in evidence for the prosecution, and you are commenting upon it and that is not want we want you to do. We want you to present your evidence. Go on
DR. LATERNSER: Very well. Refutation of the charge in regard to the Commissar order I supplement by a further affidavit. I turned over 82 to the Commission, numbered 301 to 373. I should like go to into this point in more detail, but in consideration of the haste, I shall dispense with it and only refer to special points which I absolutely must point out. against the order when it was drawn up in the OKW and OKH and the unsuccessful attempt to prevent it. The Chief of the General Staff of tie Army, Generaloberst Hoeppner, immediately protested to Hitler against this order. It is thanks to him that the order was rescinded. That is shown by document 302-B. I ask what I may be allowed to quote are paragraph from this important document, 301-B.
THE PRESIDENT: 302-B, I thought. Which is it?
DR. LATERNSER: I believe that the he is a mistake in the list which the President has. This document has been numbered 301-B.
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.
DR. LATERNSERL I quote: "After I took up my duties as Chief of the Army's General Staff, I had a private conversation with Adolph Hitler, and a very plain and outspoken one regarding this command, and I explained matters in detail from all angles. Adolph Hitler was, at the time, as I remember, very much impressed by it. That struck me, because he otherwise never changed his opinion in such matters and out short any person if such matters were referred to. For that reason I referred to it several times, and I believe I altered his opinion." I dispense with the rest of the affidavit.
I should like to refer particularly to Affidavit 315. This shows that Generaloberst Hoeppner, the Commander in Chief of Panzer Truppe 4, acted in the some way as the other commander in chief. That is, he did not carry out the order.
Then I refer to affidavit 324-A, B, and C. With these documents I refute the Russian prosecution on page 4401 and on Page 1 of the Document USSR 62. General of the Panzer Troops confirms expressly in this affidavit the order was not carried out in his jurisdiction. This testimony is confirmed by affidavit 336.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Laternser.
DR. LATERNSER: The testimony of General Major Pape, in affidavit 333, refutes this. It is the some division which Field Marshal Model commanded at one time. It refutes the Russian charge under USSR 62 and is based on the testimony of the soldier Trest. In this division, at the time when Field Marshal model, then in a lower rank, commanded this division, the order was never carried out. was opposed in the Navy, which had only subordinate importance. But among the Allied troops no action for treatment of Russian commissars contrary to international law took place, as proved by the testimony of Lt. Col. Felmer regarding the 13th Rumanian division and for the area of the Italian expeditionary corps. the did not receive the order to pass on, and he did not pass it on. fully because the total shows that the order was not carried out. I would certainly have been in a position to present further evidence on this point if I had had more time.
THE PRESIDENT: You refer to 75. I think that perhaps is sufficient. I say you have already referred to 75 affidavits.
DR. LATERNSER: On partisan warfare, the Prosecution contends that in the East in particular, this fight was carried on contrary to international law. As evidence for these assertions, the Prosecution has referred to Affidavit 15 of General Roettiger, USA Exhibit 559, to Affidavit 20 of General Houseinger, USA Exhibit 564, to Affidavit 17, USA Exhibit 562, and to the testimony of the witness von dem Back Zelewski before the Commission. I crossexamined Hauesinger and Roettiger, and I ask the Tribunal to take notice of this transcript. General Roettiger, which is affidavit No. 15, USA Exhibit 559, had raised an especially severe charge. examination before the Commission concerning this point. General Roettiger had asserted that there were orders of the Commander in Chief of the army to take the most sever measures; furthermore, that only a few prisoners were taken; furthermore -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we have pot to consider, not these individual details, but we have got to consider the criminal character of the organization charged. First of all, whether it is an organization within the meaning of the charter, and, second whether it is a criminal organization. Here you wanted to draw our attention to individual details about partisan warfare in your cross examination of one witness before the Commission. As I have pointed out, we have nearly 3,000 affidavits to consider. If you would only give us the numbers of the affidavits which you say relate to a particular topic, then we shall know what relates to that tonic and we shall be able to consider it.
DR. LATERNSER: But the Prosecution presented these details and they are an especially serious charge and - want to prove -
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, they did, and I have a reference to them. They were presented in the US affidavits 559 to 564, and I am perfectly well aware that you have cross examined the witness. What I want to know is what affidavits you want to draw our attention to in reply to the case of the Prosecution on partisan warfare.
Dr. LATERNSER: I draw the attention of the Court to pages 3519 to 3523 of the Commission transcript. The result of the cross examination is that the affidavit of General Roettiger presented by the Prosecution was completely refuted. saw uprising, to affidavits 1501 to 1507. In detail, statements 901 to 905 contain general agreement on the partisan warfare in all theaters of war. Especially significant is affidavit 908, Fieldmarshal von Weichs. Affidavits 906 to 931 give examples of the methods of fighting of the partisans. 906 to 920 describe special atrocities committed by the partisans. Affidavits 921 to 924 prove the actions contrary to international law of the bandits. Affidavits 925 to 930 deal with the extent of sabotage against railroads.
That the Germans fought according to the rules of international law, is proved by affidavits 932 to 970. They show that the partisans were treated like prisoners of war. leadership to combat partisans and destroy Jews or Yugoslavs, there was no question of this at the Front. commander-in-chief of the 18th Army, that on the 30th of October 1942 he ordered that all partisans were to be shot without distinction. In this connection, I refer to the affidavit of Generaloberst Lindemann also. He was the commander-in-chief of the 18th Army. This shows that such an order was never given, because the entry in the war diary of the Wehrmacht operational staff, 1786-PS, is incorrect. This affidavit 1033 is available in translation. partisan undertaking; in spike of an application of Army Group North to the OKH that the Army should be entrusted with the execution of this action, the undertaking was carried out under Himmler's leadership by General von Dem Bach Zelewski. This affidavit refutes the testimony of von Dem Bach Zelewski, who calls himself "an agency for the collection of information." To prove that this assertion by the witness von Dem Bach Zelewski is incorrect, I further refer to the testimony of the witness Hauesinger before the Commission; concerning the suppression of the Polish uprising in Warsaw, affidavits 1501 to 1507, the treatment of Generaloberst Guderian, 1501 in particular, certify that Police General von Dem Bach Zelewski was entrusted with suppressing the uprising. Second, that he was appointed to this task by Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and was directly subordinate to Himmler. Thirdly, that he received his orders from Himmler; that is, not from the OKH nor from Army Group Center nor from the 9th Army. Fourth, that the troops employed in Warsaw were SS and police troops, including the SS Brigade Kaminsky. Fifth, that the special atrocities in Warsaw against the population were carried out by the SS Brigade Kaminsky which consisted of Eastern peoples and that this Brigade, to prevent further mischief, was removed from the battle and its leaders were punished.
Sixth, that the 9th Army took special care of the population escaping from Warsaw.
I will not point out any more details of this affidavit 1501. As further proof that the army agencies had nothing to do with the battle in Warsaw, I present the testimony of General von Vormann, affidavit 1504 -document USSR 128 -- on pages 161 and 162 of my document book 2, which also shows that the Wehrmacht had nothing to do with the destruction of Warsaw which was apparently intended in 1944.
I should like to refer particularly to partisan warfare in Italy. The prosecution has presented two orders by the commander Fieldmarshal Kesselring and sees in them violations of international law. I refer to the testimony of Fieldmarshal Kesselring before the Commission, page 2087 to 2124 of the Commission transcript. In this examination, the witness testified expressly that to suppress the uprising he had to take those temporary measures and that he thus succeeded in mastering the situation. This testimony of Fieldmarshal Kesselring is confirmed by affidavit 3004 of Roettiger.
Treatment of prisoners. The prosecution charges the military leaders with planning, permitting or committing crimes against prisoners of war which they are said to have committed in all theatres of war. The Russian prosecution, in particular, contends the special atrocities. I shall not mention them in detail. The accusations in so far as they affect the circle of persons whom I represent, I can refute by affidavits. I refer to affidavit 1101 of Fieldmarshal von Kuechler, which deals with the principles of the treatment of prisoners of war. Lt. Col. Scheder testifies in affidavit 1102 that in November 1941 in Oscha he participated in a discussion between the Chief of the General Staff, General Halder and the Chief of the three army groups on the Eastern Front, at which the feeding of prisoners was discussed. Army Group Center and South, who had particularly many prisoners asked who approval in case of an emergency to reduce the German troops' rations and be allowed to use army supplied to give the prisoners more to eat In this connection, I/refer to the affidavits 1103, 1104, 1104-A, 1105-A to C and 1106 to 1109, inclusive.
A very particularly important affidavit is affidavit 3146 of General Girke. General Girke, from August 1930 to the end of the war, was chief of the transport system in the OKH. He describes that the transports of Soviet prisoners of war were treated exactly like the transports of other prisoners of war. They were carried through in closed freight cars. Orders deviating from this were never issued. Open flat cars, as contended by the prosecution, were used only very seldom and only on transports on short stretches, because there was a great scarcity of this type of car. In no case were transports made intentionally in the winter in open cars in order to lot the prisoners freeze to death. That is shown by affidavit 3146. prosecution in the field of the treatment of prisoners. On page 4337 of the transcript, it is contended that on the island of Portizza on the Dnieper corpses of Rod Army men were found.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal has already said that it intends only to listen to you for half a day end unless you shorten or unless you have in mind the shortening of your address, it doesn't look as if you will be able to do it. If you can't do it, then we will have to take your documents as they are without any further reference. It seems to me that with reference to prisoners of war, all you have got to do is tell us what are the numbers of the affidavit which deal with it and say "I particular refer to" such end such an order or such and such an affidavit and then we shall know that you attach particular importance to those affidavits but to deal with it in detail like this is simply wasting our time. Anyhow, what I mean is, that at the end of half a day your address on these topics will cease.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I must have on opportunity to answer the accusations made by the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: You are having that opportunity at the present moment and you have had since twelve o'clock.
DR. LATERNSER: On page 4337 of the transcript it is asserted that on the island of Portizza on the Dnieper, corpses of Red Army men were found, whose hands had been out off and whose eyes had been put out, whose stomachs had been cut open, and so forth.
This is refuted by the affidavit of Fieldmarshal von Kleist, 1115, who was commander-in-chief of those groups. There were no German troops employed on this island. The Hungarian Corps was fighting there. That is shown by 1115. of the transcript, prisoners are said to have been driven before the attaching German troops of the field. This is clearly refuted by the testimony of the former commander-in-chief of the 18th Army, Generaloberst Lindemann. Affidavit 1116-A; these testimonies are confirmed by the affidavit of Colonel Nolbe, No. 3159. on page 4360 to 65 of the transcript contains the examination of General von Gestreich, containing especially serious charges in the field of treatment of prisoners. As counter evidence I present an affidavit No. 1117 which proves that the action in May 1941 was reproduced completely falst by Oestreich. In particular it refutes the assertion that orders were given that fleeing prisoners should be shot or prisoners incapable of work should be poisoned. numerous prisoners are said to have been killed by intentionally poor treatment. This contention is clearly disproved by the testimony of the army doctor of the 11th Army, Generalstabsarzt Rosse, in his affidavit 1118.
According to page 4338 of the transcript, on the 4th of September -- or December, 1943, three railroad trains full of prisoners of war are to have been taken from Kerch to Sevastopol and burned or drown there. This assertion is disproved by the testimony of Generals Deichmann and Roettiger who were both at that time in the Crimea given in affidavits 3140 and 3007. The Russian Prosecution attempts on page 4394 of the transcript to say that the fighting in the quarries near Kerch was bestial on the part of the Germans According to the testimony of a woman who apparently counted them, there were exactly 900 prisoners who were mistreated or shot. The testimony of the commanding general, General Mattenklot is in contradiction to this affidavit 1121. 4, 400 to 4,401 of the transcript, according to which on the orders of Field Marshal model and General Nehring, no prisoners were to be taken. This is refuted by affidavits 1222 A to F, that is, by six affidavits on this particular point. On pages 4455 and 4456 of the transcript, mistreatment of prisoners in Norwegian Camps. Generaloberst von Falkenhorst in affidavit 112 proved that these prisoners were not under the military but under the SS. where treated like our own wounded. From various theaters of war there is testimony that the enemy himself recognized the good treatment. I submit statement 1161 and 1162, the latter recognition by the American General Storm. 1165 is a letter from the newphew of the English King, and 1166, that is from the PAF officers to the Commandant of the Air Corps Camp at Oberursel for the chivalrous attitude. Affidavit 1168 shows that the commander of the Fourteenth Division, General Heim, in October 1942, ordered for the German troops at Stalingrad, even though there was a scarcity of food for our own troops, that the Russian prisoners were to be fed. Further example of the chivalrous treatment of the captured enemy is given by the statement 1170 of Generaloberst Student, when there was infantile paralysis amongst the English prisoners on Crete, a transport was sent to Berlin for the necessary special serum. Oberstabsarze, Dr. Schaefer, in affidavit 1172, indicates that the Mountain Rescue Service in the Alps saved approximately 350 enemy flyers from death.