set up USA Document Number 778. This may be found on Page 25 of my document book. This list comprises 129 persons. I should like to submit Document Mil 4 in which three tables are shown. These tables are set up in accordance with USA 778.
First of all, turn to Chart 1. From this chart we can see first of all that on the first of March, 1933, only one of the leaders indicted was in a high position.
Point 2. On the first of March, 1938, there were only 70.
Point 3. On the first of September, 1939, that is at the outbreak of the war, there were 22.
Point 4. This is an important point as may be seen from Column 8. In November of 1934, the top figure was reached.
Point 5. Only 9 generals and admirals during the entire war were in one of the positions indicated.
Chart 2 is found on Page 25. It is a graphic presentation dealing with the duration of membership with the so-called group General Staff and OKW. You can see from column 2 to 5 that a long membership was something very special. You can see from column 9 that the top figure of 21 had a position for only 21/2 years. But, in total, they had 61 people for a period of less than one year. of columns 1 to 18, and Chart 3 found on page 26 of the document book shows, especially through column 4 and 5 that out of 129 generals and admirals, 100 served for less than two years in high positions. That is the large majority of the military leaders involved.
I should like to submit document Mil. 6. It is found on pages 27 to 33 of my Document Book 1. This document comprises a list of names of the various leaders involved. From this list we can see just how many of the military leaders at the time when important events took place were in important positions. first of March, 1933, that is at the time when the change in power took place, there was one general.
date in the indictment against the military personnel, there were only 6 generals.
On the first of September, 1939, there were 23 generals. Those men were in their respective positions. I must remark that above all it is remarkable that on the first of November, 1944, is when we were, in the main, concerned with the defense of our boundaries. The highest membership in this group was reached. In this case, we have 49 generals involved.
With document Mil. 7, a copy of which is found on pages 34 to 40, of Document Book 1, I should like to give you a different perspective of the people involved. The list on pages 36 to 40 shows the membership to the alleged group during certain periods and intervals. From the first column, we can see that before June of 1941, 33 generals had been placed in positions which the indictment covers. Only 21 of that group are still alive. Up until the fall of Stalingrad on February, 1943, that is in the period where offenses were still being carried out, 27 more generals were put into such positions as are covered by the indictment. From February, 1943, until the end of the war was the period of time in which strategic defensive -
THE PRESIDENT: You said something about only a certain number of them being alive. That is not shown by the chart, is it?
DR. LATERNSER: That will be seen from a later chart to which I will later refer. I was just saying that in the last period from February, 1943, onward, until the end of the war, an additional 69 military leaders have been placed in the position of coming under the indictment. With this document I should like to prove, first of all, that out of the 129 officers indicted, only 33, that is 25 per cent participated in the preparation of war, and were the only ones who could have done so. involved, cannot have participated in plans of aggression. the positions which are now under indictment when we were only concerned with the defense of our boundaries.
80 had formerly been members of the General Staff. However, 49 of them had net belonged to this party. I shall now turn to Document Mil. 8 which may be found on pages 41 to 18 of my document book Number 1. Through this document I should like to prove different and various things to the High Tribunal. First of all from the first three columns of list 3, which are found on pages 43 to 48, you will be able to see the number of dead, the number of those who are indicted individually or have been indicted, and you can see the number of those officers who were only charged with the leadership or the command of an army, and therefore, did not hold a position which exclusively falls under the indictment. The sum total of these three columns gives you the total figure of 56 which is set down on page 41, and in this way the number of 129 is reduced. And all the ramifications of a sentence could only concern itself with 73 people. who before the end of the war had been relieved of their positions either through an order, death, or because he was captured. figure of 129. And in this connection -
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it very much matters, but the last column which contains the reason does not seem to be in accord with the evidence which has been given us up to date. Perhaps it is a mis-translation. I do not know.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I shall explain these two columns further and tell the High Tribunal what is meant. I intend to put this explanation to the High Tribunal. I wanted to call the attention of the High Tribunal to the fact that we may see from the last two columns that 36 generals because of serious differences of opinion with Hitler and in part because of active resistance against Hitler were removed from their positions.
THE PRESIDENT: All I wish to say is that no such suggestion was made to Fieldmarshal von Braachitsch when he was in the witness box.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do believe that I can remember that serious differences of opinion between him and Hitler were mentioned by him.
THE PRESIDENT: It is an English word and it seems to be highly inappropriate. Go on.
DR. LATERNSER: In this figure, of 36 generals who were removed from their positions because of differences of opinion, as may be seen from the list, General-Oberst Hoeppner is found in the same list.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, I see that the same word is applied to the defendant Raeder, and my observation equally applies to him.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I please deal with this matter briefly once more after the recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Laternser. You can go on now.
DR. LATERNSER: I have just referred to the fact that in this list the name of General Hoeppner is mentioned, who, because of his participation on the 20th of July, had been sentenced to death. That may be seen from the last two columns, and I wanted to call the attention of the High Tribunal in this connection to the fact that this is the same general who, in the opinion of the author of Document 130, allegedly had a very close collaboration with Einsatzgruppe A. Pages 49 to 54 of the Document Book No, 1. I should like to refer only to the point that from this list we can see the names of those 31 officers who served less than six months in the positions which are included in the indictment. Most of these officers, as may be seen from this list as well, had not been appointed commanders in chief (Oberbefehlshaber), but they had been charged with the carrying on of affairs.
Now I shall turn to Document Mil 10. I should like to call the attention of the High Tribunal to this document. It rail be found on Pages 55 to 61 of Document Book NO. 1. From this document the High Tribunal will be in a position to see which ranks were held by the officers indicted at the time that various incidents took place, for instance, at the outbreak of the war. This compilation, therefore, permits of certain conclusions showing how far these officers had a decisive influence on the incidents.
The first column of List 5 on Pages 58 to 61 can be determined. The result will be found on Page 55 under Figure 1. On the 1st of September 1939 -- that is, at the beginning of the war -- of a total of 107 officers who rare still living, a total of 47 still had the rank of staff officers. They were majors or colonels, or thereabouts. A total of 48 were generals of a lower rank. And of this entire 107 who are involved in the indictment, only seven had the top ranks. Five were full generals, and there were two field marshals.
For five of them who are still alive we do not have any definite information. incidents figured out on Pages 66 to 73, I should like only to call to your attention to how this alleged group was composed. The permanent deputies of the Wehrmacht Staff, according to Affidavit No. 6 of Halder, USA 533, are all grouped together by the Prosecution. I should like to call your attention to the tasks and the significance of the decision of the cross-examination of Halder before the Commission on Page 3309 of the record. According to this, the incumbence of this position did not concern itself with the case in question and the deposition did not in any way correspond with the positions which are included in the indictment. In that way I shall have concluded my evidence dealing with the group as it was made up. consisted of a group in the nature of an organization. The affidavits submitted by the Prosecution to prove this point, No.1 of Colonel General Halder , USA Exhibit 531, and No.2, by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, USA Exhibit 532, did not have the meaning indicated to us by the Prosecution. In this connection, I should like to refer first of all to the cross-examination which I conducted of Colonel General Halder before the Commission, and I should like to ask the High Tribunal that one passage may be read by me from this record so that this point will be complete in the record.
On Page 3298 you will find the following statement:
"BY DR. LATERNSER:
"Q In Your affidavit No.1 you have used the word Group four times. Did this expression Group emanate from you?
"A No; it was contained in the text, which has been changed several times, in which I left this word.
"Q Had you used this expression 'Group' in a similar connection previously, in that you characterized the military leaders as a group?
"A No.
"Q What sense did you impute to this word 'Group' at the moment when you signed the statement?
"A When I used this word 'Group', I did not especially consider the concept of its being used for a number.
"Q You therefore mean several generals? Or did you mean a certain circle of people who had been grouped for a certain purpose?
"A A number of generals who perhaps night be characterized as leading generals.
"Q Subsequently the Prosecution is now interpreting this expression 'Group' as if an organization of military leaders existed. Was there an organization, or an organized group, like that?
"A No." Tribunal with regard to Affidavit No.2, about the fact that the front commander in chief were actually the consulting body for the High Command. The Prosecution has quoted USA Exhibit 537, affidavit No.5, by General Blaskowitz. I should did to refer to the affidavit which has been translated, General Staff No.55, in which Colonel General Blaskowitz, on my request, gives an interpretation of the affidavit. According to this affidavit which he gave me,the Oberbefehlshabers, the commanders-in-chief, were not a consultant body, but they were individual consultants in their own sphere, as is true in every army. The significance and the interpretation which the Prosecution gives to Affidavit No.5 is, according to that, not correct.
I further should like to refer to Affidavit No.1255,which also proves that the highest military centers did not form an organizationa-like group. I should like to have you give your special attention to Affidavits 1 to 4 which have been translated, but which I do not wish to quote. be seen from Affidavits Nos. 3145, 12 and 3097. Schniewind, Stumpf and Koller deposed these affidavits. And particularly from the affidavit No.3145 of Admiral Schniewind, the High Tribunal can see only these points which applied to the commanders-in-chief of the navy, and form an opinion of them. were heard before the Commission, who, to a man, all denied the existence of a group. And especially important, it seems to me,is the testimony of General von Butlar, which on Pages 11, 285 and 286 of the English text of the official record testified concerning how nominations were carried out to those positions which are covered by the indictment.
Mr. President, in this way I should like to conclude my evidence on the question of whether a group actually existed or not.
21 Aug M Marvin Keller 11-1 general attitude of the generals involved. given by Mr. Justice Jackson rests on rather unsure ground. Document 1947 was referred to by Mr. Jackson in this connection. This document, 1947-PS, which is of basic significance to his statement, an alleged letter of Colonel General von Fritsch is mentioned that he is supposed to have written on 11 December, 1938 to Bareness Schutzbar-Milching and in which he allegedly is supposed to have said that three battles would have to be won; first, against the workers; second, against the Catholics and third, against the Jews. a photostatic copy of this document. I was told that I would have access to it if and when it could be found. deposed by Baroness Schutzbar-Milchling, who in her affidavit states that the alleged letter by Colonel General von Fritsch was never received by her. of this proceeding -- I should like to emphasize it has not been submitted but it has been used up to now -- them, and this is something which I especially would like to apply for, that part of the opening speed, by Mr. Justice Jackson should be struck from the record, that is that part which refers to this document which after all has not been submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: If the document has not been proved the Tribunal will pay no attention to it. If it is not in evidence then it is quite unnecessary to produce the document denying its existence. We will take no notice of it.
What I understand you to be saying is that Mr. Justice Jackson referred to a letter. That letter has not been offered in evidence. If it has not been offered in evidence then the Tribunal takes no notice of anything Mr. Justice Jackson said 21 Aug M LJG 11-2 Karr about it in his speech and it is unnecessary for you to produce an affidavit denying the existence of the letter.
Is that clear?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but, Mr. President, it has been used. Mr. Justice Jackson -
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have pointed out to us new that it ought not to have been used because it is not in evidence. We wish to be strict in those matters and only to allow factual documents to be referred to which have been offered in evidence.
DR. LATERNSER: Dealing with the mistrust which Hitler brought to the military leadership, that is matter which has been stated and proven several times in this proceeding. deposed by Lt. General Engel, an officer who was in the closest proximity of Hitler and could observe the increasingly strong mistrust on the part of Hitler. I will not read from that affidavit. number 3182, deposed by General Warliment, who reproduces statements made by Hitler and in order to be brief I shall merely refer to these matters. party and its methods, I should like to refer only to affidavit 175, which has been translated and I would like to refer to it as an example. The officer who at that time was competent, Major General Seegers, describes the battle waged by the military against the removal of Jewish officers and I should further like to refer to the contents of the affidavits 160 to 177, from which many particulars dealing with the unpolitical attitude taken by the military leadership may be seen. refer to affidavit number 126, in which General Berlin testifies that the General Staff struck out matters dealing with heavy arti*lery, with the statement that Germany did not want to wage aggressive wars.
21 Aug M LJG 11-3 Karr deposed by Major General Hesselbach, and from which it may be seen that at the beginning of the war the equipment and weapons were not on hand in full strength to correspond with the units set up for mobilization. As far as the rest of the contents of this document is concerned, I shall merely refer your attention to it. submitted document 143, GB 23. From this document allegedly the intentions of the Luftwaffe are to be seen. I should like to refer to the contents of affidavit 101 of the then Chief of the Colonel General Staff Stumpf who expressly testifies that this was a private organizational study set up by General Kammhuber.
As far as the contents are concerned, I should like to refer to affidavit 102 to 152. Through details of the most various sort we can see that on the part of the military leadership, as far as the carrying through of rearmament is concerned, aggressive wars were not seriously considered. affidavits 181 to 205, from which we can see, as is corroborated by many details, that German officers participated in certain manoeuvres; that the situation, was always marshalled but for defense and that the war college which existed for the training of general staff officers had a training course which dealt almost exclusively with matters of defense. leaders in wars of aggression is concerned, the Prosecution has been trying to prove that the military leaders in plenty of time had been advised and informed of Hitler's plans and in this connection they produced the Hoszbach document of 5 November, number 3686-PS, USA 25. I should like to refer to the affidavit of the author of this record, General Hoszbach, dealing with the background and the origin of this document. to me, expressly states that he did not take notes at the confer once and that he wrote down this document several days later. This document has been translated.
THE PRESIDENT : Does it say in this affidavit whether he was shown a copy of the notes or whether he had any comments to make on them?
DR. LATERNSER : Dr. President, I must state quite frankly that I cannot give you this information because of the wealth of material on hand in any event I would have asked for a recess at this point. I shall check on these matters and I she able to tell the tribunal after lunch. I should like to make a few condensations which I an sure will be very profitable.
THE PRESIDENT : Very well.
( A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The afternoon session reconvened at 1400 hours, August 21, 1946.)
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, may I say something about the speeches of the organizations ? I hand over a list after a brief consultation with my colleagues. The political leaders and Gestapo speak on Thursday or Friday.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: And Monday, SS, SD; Tuesday, General Staff, Reich Cabinet; and Wednesday, the SA. In the second column I have indicated when these documents can be turned in for translation; and in the last column I have given the time when the speeches could presumably be held. If there is no session on Saturday, Friday could be filled with the speeches for the political leaders and the Gestapo.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean Friday this week?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Friday of this week could be taken up with the political leaders?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, and in the afternoon the Gestapo. If there is no session on Saturday, the SS could be in on Monday so that there will be no interruption. This difficulty is in the translation division, whether it wall keep up with this tempo.
THE PRESIDENT: I suppose that the difficulty in the translating division is partly due to their having nothing to translate.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the Court wanted information as to whether on the basis of the Hoszbach documents orientation took place. As to the document, it shows Hoszbach told Hitler of the existence of this record and gave it to him twice to read; but Hitler refused. General Hoszbach does not recall whether he presented the record to Generaloberst von Fritsch; but he certainly did give it to Beck. He then says further that this record was not signed by the participants in the conference.
THE PRESIDENT: It was initialed by Blomberg, I see he says.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, initialed but not signed. May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, certainly.
DR. LATERNSER: From the Affidavits 213 A, B, and C, it is shown that the most important agencies were not informed of this conference on the 5th of November, 1927. Numerous officers discussed this group and that equipment and training of the Wehrmacht made impossible any thought of the war of aggression which is shown in Affidavit 223 to 225, 220 and 277. The contradictory judgment of the situation by the Wehrmacht, on the one hand, and Hitler on the other hand was in Affidavit 211. Field Marshall von Weichst, in Affidavit 215, weakens the opinion of Field Marshall von Blomberg in his Affidavit 3, USA Exhibit 536. Field Marshall Sperrle was in Affidavit 237 and 237-A, in which he reports that he and Reichenau did not know the purpose of their visit to the Berghof at the Schuschning conference in February, 1938. Only later did Hitler comment on this event. improvise, as is shown by Affidavits 238 to 242. The same is true of the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia, Affidavits 246 to 252 and 254. General Warliment in Affidavit 217 states that up to the day of the attack on Poland a peaceful settlement of the dissension had been expected. The same is shown by Affidavits 227, 246 and 255 to 257. As concerning statements of Hitler which confirm his generals in these opinions, there are statements 219, 211, 212 and particularly 277. The surprise which the order to march against Poland caused is shown from Affidavits 228 to 231, as well as 255, 256 and 257. political leaders had assured him clearly that in the next few years there would be no hostilities. That is shown by Affidavit 315 of Rear Admiral Katzenberg. The German battleship Gneisenau at the beginning of the war had written orders that no hostilities were to be expected. It was on a training trip at the Canary Islands.
That is shown from the statement of Admiral Forste, number 3114. inadequate production preparations, in August of 1940, there was a lack of torpedoes for the slight number of U-boats which were available at that time. paign. This is shown by affidavit 259, and from statements in 263, 264, 266, 267, abd 269. These affidavits show statements of Hitler's that he did not want to rish a war on two fronts. Unfortunately, owing to lack of time, I cannot quote the exhaustive material. references. According to the reports available, which were given to the generals, it was presented as a preventive war. This is shown from affidavit 270-A and 270-M, as well as from 271, 272, 274, and 275. book. The reference is sufficient. in the following order.
1. Connections with Einsatzgruppen.
2. Commissar Order.
3. Partisan warfare.
4. Treatment of prisoners.
5. Destruction.
6. Treatment of civilian population.
7. Jurisdiction in the East.
8. The Commando Order.
9. Deportation of laborers.
10. Crimes against rules of warfare and against humanity. under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, and has referred to:
1. The testimony of Ohlendorf.
2. The testimony of Schellenberg.
3. Document L-180.
4. Affidavit 16 of General Roettiger.
5. Affidavit 18 or SS Fuehrer Rode. are not conclusive. I shall offer a counter-proof that the alleged relations did not exist and that the crimes committed by the Einsatzgruppen cannot be charged against the persons represented by me. and 703-A of General Woehler, which have been translated, and which refute the testimony of Ohlendorf on the points of the charge. I should like to call the attention of the Court particularly to the fact that General. I should at that time was Chief of Staff of the 11th Army. The witness Ohlendorf is alleged to have negotiated with him in the sense of the charge. The affidavits of General Woehler completely refute the testimony of Ohlendorf. the witness Schellenberg, USA Exhibit 557. I should like to call the attention of the Court to this fact, that it is based on an assumption. I cross-examined the witness Schellenberg before the Commission, which this Court will find on pages 3524 to 3554 of the Commission transcript. I should like to ask expressly that the Court refer to this, because this cross-examination shows that the witness was not in a position to give facts on which he could base his assumptions. Fuehrer Heydrich existed whereby the Einsatzgruppen in the operational area were completely under the Commander-in-Chief. concerning General Wagner, who lost his life in connection with the 20th of July, 1944. The Judge spoke with him about this point and received a clear statement that the Einsatzgruppen were not under the military command but only under the Reichsfuehrer SS.
secution, at pages 99 and 100 of my document book 1. Under the number 2-b, it is shown clearly that the Reichsfuehrer SS -- that is, Himmler -- in the operational area of the Army, had special assignments; and, in connection with this assignment, he operated independently and on his own responsibility. That is shown at pages 99 and 100 of my document book, in a document which the prosecution itself submitted. of Eanzergruppe IV, under Generaloberst Hoeppner, with the Einsatzgruppen. I should like to call the special a Mention of the Court to the way in which the testimony of this point came about. During his examination by the prosecution, the report of Einsatzgruppe A was handed to the witness. From this report the witness Schellenberg got this close cooperation for his own knowledge, and then used this knowledge in his affidavit. For this reason I should like to quote a part of the cross-examination before the Commission.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, what you are now doing is argument, is it not? We don't want a hear argument at this stage. I mean, you are referring us now to the case of the prosecution, and you are arguing upon the affidavits which, you are producing, that they are satisfactory answers to the prosecution, Well, that is not necessary now.
DR. LATERNSER: I believe, Mr. President, I was misunderstood. I am contrasting assertions of the prosecution with proofs of the defense, so that the Court may see the reason why I am presenting this evidence.
THEE PRESIDENT: You have done that already, and you have done it, if I may say so, very satisfactorily. You have given us ten different categories of those individual points, and you are now drawing our attention to your evidence which deals with the Einsatzgruppen. Well, that is all we need; we don't need to have references or argument, at any rate, upon the prosecution's evidence with reference to Einsatzgruppen. If you would continue to give us the references to your affidavits which deal with the Einsatzgrupgen, that will be sufficient for us
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I regret that I must say one more thing, but I must give evidence; in weakening the prosecution's evidence, I must give evidence to the contrary.
In this case I want to show the Court that the affidavit of the Witness Schellenberg -- which was presented by the prosecution and in which the witness speaks of the particularly close cooperation between the Einsatzgruppen and Heeppner -- I want to show that that was within the knowledge of Schellenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand that. I have got down here that Ohlerdorf and Schellenberg are the witnesses for the prosecution who state that the High Command was concerned with and actually commanded the Einsatzgruppen. That is a fact you are contesting, and you are referring us to the evidence which you say contests it. You don't want to give us the prosecution's evidence. You have told us what it is: Ohlendorf, Schellenberg and 1-180.
Will you continue?
DR. LATERNSER: May I quote a brief passage from the testimony of Schellenberg?
THE PRESIDENT: No.
DR. LATERNSER: That is evidence, Mr. President, which I brought out before the Commission, and now I just want to present it to the Court via a short quotation.
THE PRESIDENT: But, you see, that comes as argument; it isn't a more comment. We want to confine it to a more comment so that you may explain your evidence. Once you begin to comment upon the evidence of the prosecution, in the opinion of the Tribunal it becomes argument.
Well, you may refer to this passage if you can do so shortly; it is suggested that it is your evidence.
DR. PELCKMANN: It is very brief.
"Q You have no misgivings to used documents which have just been given to you in your testimony?
"A Dr. Laternser, what do you mean by used?
"Q You made this report the subject of your testimony?
"A Yes, under oath. I had to comment on it." witness Schellenberg on this point was not his own knowledge. The witness then, in his affidavit 12, said, that he reached the conclusion that in the Wagner-Heydrich conference the further activities of the Einsatzgruppen of the planned mass exterminations were presumably discussed and established. To this point I want to refer you to the cross examination, pages 35 to 33, 35 to 34, and 35 to 36. It is quite clearly shown there that the witness Schellenberg is under the assumption that Wagner and Heydrich in this discussion planned the mass exterminations; that he formed this assumption only in the year 1935. I.C. conference which lasted several days, and that he was present only at one of those conferences. He then says, in his affidavit, that presumably, in the following discussions, the intended mass exterminations were announced to the IC officers. Also, in this affidavit he adds the further assumption that the commanders-in-chief were informed through these presumably informed I.C. officers. I can now prove to the court that both assumptions which Schellenberg stressed are in contradiction to the truth. available in translation. In affidavit 701 a participant at this IC conference, it is General von Gersdorff, says that planned mass exterminations were lot mentioned and the same fact is concerned with in General von Kleikamp statement which is also given under oath. In cross examination I showed one of whose affidavits to Schellenberg and I questioned him as follows, I quote from page 3332. That is one of the few quotations which I should like to mal because of its importance.
THE PRESIDENT: What is that you refer to? Cross examination before the Court?