Statistics will prove that the mass of SS men did not read this book at all.
289 affidavits deal with the racial doctrine. 223 do not consider the training for racial hatred, for the destruction of other races, or for the creation of a master race. They see only a demand for a separation of the races from one another. 57 affidavits see in the doctrine the purpose of selecting the best among the people. Various affidavits say that the racial doctrine included respect for other peoples. The problem of colonization and Germanization is not mentioned in any affidavit as a problem of training. were trained as political soldiers. 20,010 affidavits are available on this subject. 15,461 ascribe no military character to the General SS. They give, for example, the following reasons: They never had any military training in the General SS. The ranks of the General SS were not recognized in the Wehrmacht. There were no arms, so-called tactical exercises. Tactical discussions were forbidden. Shotting was only with small calibre guns. There were not enough guns. 1,053 affidavits confirm the testimony of various witnesses here that during the war, service in the General SS occurred not at all, or only in exceptional cases; at the end of the war, not at all. Say that they did not think of war and did not believe in war. At the Junker schools various affidavits say rejection of war was taught, since it created a so-called negative selection. And in the Verfuegungstruppe, so-called field service, a more military service was taken up only when general military service was introduced. obedience. That is, no oath which according to its form would obligate the individual to more than in the Wehrmacht or in the civil service.
As for the training of SS men, 2,874 affidavits report. In 2,138 affidavits it is asserted that orders against humanity were not known to them and were certainly not given.
the members recognized as the actual aim of the organization. The Question means whether there was contradiction between the theoretical training and the actual actions of the leaders. 688 affidavits deal with the question of whether the power in Germany was to be achieved through supression of political opponents. On the question of whether the destruction of Jewry was an aim of the leaders, whether the SS members recognized this as an aim of the leaders, of the 1,637 affidavits which mention this problem, 1,593 state that the Jewish problem was not to be solved by killing, or by the so-called "final solution" and that they had no knowledge of those intentions of the leaders. They point out that the SS members were forbid on to undertake individual acts against Jews. Humorous members, for evidence, refer to the fact that numerous condemnations to death or to high penitentiary sentences were passed because of crimes against Jewish persons or Jewish property.
Another question was whether the SS members recognized as an actual aim of the leaders, rule of Europe through war. 12, 596 affidavits say that neither statements of the SS leaders nor statements of Hitler made plain that the conquest of Europe was an aim of the SS -- an important group of Roman numeral four -- it includes affidavits on the question of the participation of the SS members in the crimes asserted in the Indictment. The first question deals with participation in the concentration camp system. 2,866 affidavits have been made out on this subject. They are mostly from guards, a few from former concentration camp inmates and a few from kitchen and workshop personnel. The deal with the treatment of the inmates and with the conduct of the guards. They only show, of course, how the guards saw the concentration camp conditions and the life of the inmates from their point of view. They give a cross-section through almost all concentration camps and labor camps. They give a unified picture of the impossibility of obtaining an insight into conditions; even for people employed near the camps, they give a unified picture of the degree of ignorance of the picture in the camp and also the reasons for this; namely, the order for extreme secrecy. 2,385 affidavits say that instructions were constantly given about the conduct of the guards; examples are given for disobedience of these rules, especially for mistreatment. Significant is the statement in many affidavits that the relationship between the guards and the command personnel was not only cool but even tense. Prisoners themselves, whose affidavits are presented, state that the great responsibility for the conditions belongs to the Kapos and the prisoners themselves who were often criminals. The question of the participation of the SS members in so-called mass exterminations in extermination camps, which are to be distinguished from the concentration camps, is not mentioned at all in the affidavits. We have heard from various witnesses that these camps had quite a special life and only a few SS or men in SS uniforms were stationed there.
Now, I come to another point. A cross-section through all well-known divisions of the Waffen SS is given by 8,242 affidavits and on the question of illegal treatment of prisoners of war, 4,306 concern constant instruction On correct conduct before action. Affidavits give examples of especially send treatment of prisoners of war.
13,613 affidavits deal with the question of the civilian population in the Occupied Territories contrary to international law; there were no orders to do so. Constant instructions about correct conduct were given. The mass of SS members can report only of good relations with the civilian population in the Occupied Territories. In no affidavit is the participation of the SS in resettlement or in deportation for slave labor mentioned. A few statements say that labor commitment was not an affair of the SS. Only a very few affidavits touch biological experiments. They came from men who were in the concentration camp system. These few say that they had heard that the prisoners volunteered for experiments. 1,271 affidavits deal with the so-called Roehm Putsch. The General SS did not participate in these events; parts of then had been alerted but net armed and not employed on the 9th of November 1935. 4,407 affidavits form a cross-section of various units of the SS Abschnitte and Standarten of the SS in almost all cities of Germany and all districts. It said with special emphasis that the SS did not participate in these excesses.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann, I suppose what you are doing is reading out your summary of these 136,000 affidavits; is that right?
DR. PELCKMANN: Yes. Your Lordship -
THE PRESIDENT: I asked you whether you were reading it out verbatim.
DR. PELCKMANN: As soon as the translation is available it will be presented.
THE PRESIDENT: That is net an answer to my question. I asked you whether you were reading it out verbatim.
DR. PELCKMANN: No, I am only giving a resume, your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we better adjourn now.
(A recess was taken.)
DR. PELCKMANN: Your Lordship, I regret very much that the translation of the summary is not at hand. I am sure that the understanding and the grouping of this material would be considerably facilitated if the translation were at hand. ignorance of the bulk of the SS membership. 96,252 affidavits are at our disposal. They tell us that the majority of the members of the SS knew nothing about the crimes before the capitulation. They say that in general, and they make the statements in particular as well as when they deal with the various patterns of crimes concerned. One fact is especially significant in this connection and is being emphasized particularly. At the time when these crimes assumed larger scope, that is, namely during the war, the mass of the SS membership was fighting at the front; and for that reason alone, could not have any knowledge or receive any knowledge of incidents of that sort, for the horizon, the point of view, of the man at the front is, of course, limited.
The next group is Group Six. It deals with the assertion made by the Prosecution that the SS had been a unity. The first question reads whether the branch organizations formed an actual unit. 5,700 affidavits deal with this question. One half shows that knowledge was lacking for the banding together for the carrying through of the conspiracy. The other half refers to the fact that the Waffen SS was not basically recruited from the General SS. Therefore, it emphasizes the separation between the General SS. Therefore, it emphasizes the separation between the General SS and the Waffen SS. The second question reads whether the members of the various branch organizations knew of the activities carried out and carried on by the other branches. The significance of the question could not be recognized by the members of the SS without some explanation being given, and therefore few of the affidavits deal with this question. Those few affidavits that we have concerning that activity of the various main offices of the SS was set up separately and that a union of personnel existed only in the person of Himmler himself.
Severed affidavits refer to the fact that, for instance, and we are concerned with the manning of the concentration camps, these men were made up of the most various groups and components. Many affidavits emphasize the state of secrecy which had been decreed and resulted from the Fuehrer Decree Number One which has been quoted frequently, and also it came about because of special directives. And orientation of the various branches among the SS Were quite out of the question because of these directions and directives. In the other part of the affidavit it is said that the General SS, on one hand, and the police and the SD on the other hand, did not form a joint body or a unit. the Leibstandarte, 1934. Less than 10 percent of the members of this Liebstandarte were at the same time members of the General SS. A large part of this affidavit concerns itself with stating that during the war, practically speaking, the General SS did not exist. 342 affidavits deal with numerous affiliated groups or branches of the SS. In fact, they exercised special expert activities which were very, very much restricted. As far as the carrying through of the alleged SS activities, they were not concerned and had only a loose connection with the General SS. Among these groups we find the SS mounted units, the Reiter Stuerme, Reiter units which devoted themselves to riding motor units, SS female helpers, who were the the same as the Wehrmacht. Helpers were used during the war in intelligence and information service. The SS sport organizations, the Lebensborn, the medical units, or first aid, front units of the German Reichspost, and so forth. the attitude of the SS was toward the Church. 3,174 affidavits are on hand in this matter which, on the basis of their positive statements, conclude that according to their conviction, a persecution of the church by the SS leadership was not wanted.
which testify to the fact that many offices under Himmler had no connection with the SS and, further, that between Himmler and the SS, and especially in the ciurse of the war, an estrangement had arisen.
Under IX 435 affidavits are summarized. They deal with the behavior of our enemies during the war and after the capitulation. These affidavits, based on the experiences of the SS men, contain statements about actions contrary to international law which the enemy perpetrated in combat. Names of places are given, as are theatres of war, nationality of the enemy, and the kind of excesses that took place. The enumeration is intended to show that excesses of this kind can hardly be prevented during war and that for that reason you can not conclude that a system is present. They serve the purpose of showing that the German troop and especially the Waffen SS, if they are confronted with isolates eases of violations of international law which the affidavits say in part were punished, they cannot be charged with having acted according to or under a system.
The last group is X. It contains 57 affidavits which reproduce the factual personal impressions of foreigners about the SS. From the recognition given by these foreigners, which was known within the SS, the individual SS man concluded that the total behavior of the SS could not be criminal and that the activity was not objected to by general world opinion. Various personalities are mentioned. Americans, Englishmen and Russians are given, such as Daladier, Chamberlain, Lord Rothermere, and Chaim Weitzmann, and others.
detailed explanation, a statistical record, set up on the basis of a circular. affidavits and documents.
THE PRESIDENT : Are you next, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW) : First of all, I should like to submit the list of those 14 witnesses whose testimony I expect to use, as well as the transcripts dealing with, their interrogations. submitted to the Commissions, and I have submitted this list. It is contained in one volume, which has been placed before the high Tribunal in an English translation. It is the list which has been mentioned this morning by the president. I have supplied this list with an index, and I have set up the various branches according to subject matter. The number of the affidavit is given, as are the name of the deponent and a brief description of the contents of the affidavit. In this way, it is rather comprehensive and, in my opinion, especially valuable. highest Wehrmacht leadership, for this purpose I should like to submit document Mil. No. 2, which you will find on pages 12 and 13 of the first volume. From the diagram on page 13 we can see the actual method of subordination as it obtained in the highest Wehrmacht leadership. The submission of this document is required for my refutation of the draft submitted by the Prosecution. USA Exhibit 331 and 531 have been submitted by the Prosecution and are not correct in various points and have let again and again to misunderstandings.
of the war is concerned, I should like to submit Document Mil. 3. This contains a rather large diagram.
THE PRESIDENT : Are you dealing with the one on page 137. Oh, the bigger one. Is it the same thing as page 13?
DR. LATERNSER : No, My Lord, the diagram on page 13 shows the structure, and in that way I should like to show that restriction of responsibility between the military leaders and the other organs for the conduct of the war. From this diagram we se first of all, that the military leadership is separated, and responsibility has to be placed on the military leadership as distinct from the political leadership which was headed by Hitler and his various agencies. Now will find the markings in blue for the military leaders, and the sphere of the ideological and political leadership is marked in red. hence, of responsibility between military and political leaders. The factual distribution is shown in the tasks which the military leaders had ans is marked in red, and this diagram, further shows what tasks, oven though they were in the spheres of the military leaders, were carried through under the responsibility of other agencies and offices. In this way, we see an undermining of the authority of the military leaders in the operational zones and a distribution of authority according to areas, and therewith, a distribution of responsibility. That is another thing which may be seen from this diagram. Only the clearly defined operational areas were under the jurisdiction of the military leaders, and only for the time the operations obtained. In all other cases, the executive power was purely and solely in the hands of the political leadership, and these functions are indicate in red.
Just one were remark in connection with this diagram : The areas outlined in black and dealing with the responsibility of the Wehrmacht commanders in chief do not involve the circle of people accused, for they as not fall under the sphere of the Indictment. affirmed and sworn to by General Winter of the Wehrmachts Fuehrungsstab-- the Wehrmacht Operational Staff. leadership as a basic step, I shall turn to the circle of persons and its composition.
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal would like to know whether there are three colors indicated in this diagram; namely, blue for die armed forces, red for the political forces, and an indiscriminate color a mixture of red and blue and black-- for an indetermined body which is half political and half military.
DR. LATERNSER : Yes, Mr. President, that is quite true. The third color is supposed to be black, and these areas indicated in black show the areas of the Wehrmacht and military commanders in chief. They are not men who had their commands at the front, but rather commanders in chief who had a certain territorial power, and I added that this kind of commander in chief, such as is indicated in black, does not fall under the circle of persons accused.
THE PRESIDENT : Do you mean that in what you call black are included the static military commands, non operational? There is nothing political in the black?
DR. LATERNSER : No. But, Mr. President, those who had this power of command do not fall into the circle of people who are accused under the Indictment.
set up USA Document Number 778. This may be found on Page 25 of my document book. This list comprises 129 persons. I should like to submit Document Mil 4 in which three tables are shown. These tables are set up in accordance with USA 778.
First of all, turn to Chart 1. From this chart we can see first of all that on the first of March, 1933, only one of the leaders indicted was in a high position.
Point 2. On the first of March, 1938, there were only 70.
Point 3. On the first of September, 1939, that is at the outbreak of the war, there were 22.
Point 4. This is an important point as may be seen from Column 8. In November of 1934, the top figure was reached.
Point 5. Only 9 generals and admirals during the entire war were in one of the positions indicated.
Chart 2 is found on Page 25. It is a graphic presentation dealing with the duration of membership with the so-called group General Staff and OKW. You can see from column 2 to 5 that a long membership was something very special. You can see from column 9 that the top figure of 21 had a position for only 21/2 years. But, in total, they had 61 people for a period of less than one year. of columns 1 to 18, and Chart 3 found on page 26 of the document book shows, especially through column 4 and 5 that out of 129 generals and admirals, 100 served for less than two years in high positions. That is the large majority of the military leaders involved.
I should like to submit document Mil. 6. It is found on pages 27 to 33 of my Document Book 1. This document comprises a list of names of the various leaders involved. From this list we can see just how many of the military leaders at the time when important events took place were in important positions. first of March, 1933, that is at the time when the change in power took place, there was one general.
date in the indictment against the military personnel, there were only 6 generals.
On the first of September, 1939, there were 23 generals. Those men were in their respective positions. I must remark that above all it is remarkable that on the first of November, 1944, is when we were, in the main, concerned with the defense of our boundaries. The highest membership in this group was reached. In this case, we have 49 generals involved.
With document Mil. 7, a copy of which is found on pages 34 to 40, of Document Book 1, I should like to give you a different perspective of the people involved. The list on pages 36 to 40 shows the membership to the alleged group during certain periods and intervals. From the first column, we can see that before June of 1941, 33 generals had been placed in positions which the indictment covers. Only 21 of that group are still alive. Up until the fall of Stalingrad on February, 1943, that is in the period where offenses were still being carried out, 27 more generals were put into such positions as are covered by the indictment. From February, 1943, until the end of the war was the period of time in which strategic defensive -
THE PRESIDENT: You said something about only a certain number of them being alive. That is not shown by the chart, is it?
DR. LATERNSER: That will be seen from a later chart to which I will later refer. I was just saying that in the last period from February, 1943, onward, until the end of the war, an additional 69 military leaders have been placed in the position of coming under the indictment. With this document I should like to prove, first of all, that out of the 129 officers indicted, only 33, that is 25 per cent participated in the preparation of war, and were the only ones who could have done so. involved, cannot have participated in plans of aggression. the positions which are now under indictment when we were only concerned with the defense of our boundaries.
80 had formerly been members of the General Staff. However, 49 of them had net belonged to this party. I shall now turn to Document Mil. 8 which may be found on pages 41 to 18 of my document book Number 1. Through this document I should like to prove different and various things to the High Tribunal. First of all from the first three columns of list 3, which are found on pages 43 to 48, you will be able to see the number of dead, the number of those who are indicted individually or have been indicted, and you can see the number of those officers who were only charged with the leadership or the command of an army, and therefore, did not hold a position which exclusively falls under the indictment. The sum total of these three columns gives you the total figure of 56 which is set down on page 41, and in this way the number of 129 is reduced. And all the ramifications of a sentence could only concern itself with 73 people. who before the end of the war had been relieved of their positions either through an order, death, or because he was captured. figure of 129. And in this connection -
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it very much matters, but the last column which contains the reason does not seem to be in accord with the evidence which has been given us up to date. Perhaps it is a mis-translation. I do not know.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I shall explain these two columns further and tell the High Tribunal what is meant. I intend to put this explanation to the High Tribunal. I wanted to call the attention of the High Tribunal to the fact that we may see from the last two columns that 36 generals because of serious differences of opinion with Hitler and in part because of active resistance against Hitler were removed from their positions.
THE PRESIDENT: All I wish to say is that no such suggestion was made to Fieldmarshal von Braachitsch when he was in the witness box.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do believe that I can remember that serious differences of opinion between him and Hitler were mentioned by him.
THE PRESIDENT: It is an English word and it seems to be highly inappropriate. Go on.
DR. LATERNSER: In this figure, of 36 generals who were removed from their positions because of differences of opinion, as may be seen from the list, General-Oberst Hoeppner is found in the same list.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, I see that the same word is applied to the defendant Raeder, and my observation equally applies to him.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I please deal with this matter briefly once more after the recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Laternser. You can go on now.
DR. LATERNSER: I have just referred to the fact that in this list the name of General Hoeppner is mentioned, who, because of his participation on the 20th of July, had been sentenced to death. That may be seen from the last two columns, and I wanted to call the attention of the High Tribunal in this connection to the fact that this is the same general who, in the opinion of the author of Document 130, allegedly had a very close collaboration with Einsatzgruppe A. Pages 49 to 54 of the Document Book No, 1. I should like to refer only to the point that from this list we can see the names of those 31 officers who served less than six months in the positions which are included in the indictment. Most of these officers, as may be seen from this list as well, had not been appointed commanders in chief (Oberbefehlshaber), but they had been charged with the carrying on of affairs.
Now I shall turn to Document Mil 10. I should like to call the attention of the High Tribunal to this document. It rail be found on Pages 55 to 61 of Document Book NO. 1. From this document the High Tribunal will be in a position to see which ranks were held by the officers indicted at the time that various incidents took place, for instance, at the outbreak of the war. This compilation, therefore, permits of certain conclusions showing how far these officers had a decisive influence on the incidents.
The first column of List 5 on Pages 58 to 61 can be determined. The result will be found on Page 55 under Figure 1. On the 1st of September 1939 -- that is, at the beginning of the war -- of a total of 107 officers who rare still living, a total of 47 still had the rank of staff officers. They were majors or colonels, or thereabouts. A total of 48 were generals of a lower rank. And of this entire 107 who are involved in the indictment, only seven had the top ranks. Five were full generals, and there were two field marshals.
For five of them who are still alive we do not have any definite information. incidents figured out on Pages 66 to 73, I should like only to call to your attention to how this alleged group was composed. The permanent deputies of the Wehrmacht Staff, according to Affidavit No. 6 of Halder, USA 533, are all grouped together by the Prosecution. I should like to call your attention to the tasks and the significance of the decision of the cross-examination of Halder before the Commission on Page 3309 of the record. According to this, the incumbence of this position did not concern itself with the case in question and the deposition did not in any way correspond with the positions which are included in the indictment. In that way I shall have concluded my evidence dealing with the group as it was made up. consisted of a group in the nature of an organization. The affidavits submitted by the Prosecution to prove this point, No.1 of Colonel General Halder , USA Exhibit 531, and No.2, by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, USA Exhibit 532, did not have the meaning indicated to us by the Prosecution. In this connection, I should like to refer first of all to the cross-examination which I conducted of Colonel General Halder before the Commission, and I should like to ask the High Tribunal that one passage may be read by me from this record so that this point will be complete in the record.
On Page 3298 you will find the following statement:
"BY DR. LATERNSER:
"Q In Your affidavit No.1 you have used the word Group four times. Did this expression Group emanate from you?
"A No; it was contained in the text, which has been changed several times, in which I left this word.
"Q Had you used this expression 'Group' in a similar connection previously, in that you characterized the military leaders as a group?
"A No.
"Q What sense did you impute to this word 'Group' at the moment when you signed the statement?
"A When I used this word 'Group', I did not especially consider the concept of its being used for a number.
"Q You therefore mean several generals? Or did you mean a certain circle of people who had been grouped for a certain purpose?
"A A number of generals who perhaps night be characterized as leading generals.
"Q Subsequently the Prosecution is now interpreting this expression 'Group' as if an organization of military leaders existed. Was there an organization, or an organized group, like that?
"A No." Tribunal with regard to Affidavit No.2, about the fact that the front commander in chief were actually the consulting body for the High Command. The Prosecution has quoted USA Exhibit 537, affidavit No.5, by General Blaskowitz. I should did to refer to the affidavit which has been translated, General Staff No.55, in which Colonel General Blaskowitz, on my request, gives an interpretation of the affidavit. According to this affidavit which he gave me,the Oberbefehlshabers, the commanders-in-chief, were not a consultant body, but they were individual consultants in their own sphere, as is true in every army. The significance and the interpretation which the Prosecution gives to Affidavit No.5 is, according to that, not correct.
I further should like to refer to Affidavit No.1255,which also proves that the highest military centers did not form an organizationa-like group. I should like to have you give your special attention to Affidavits 1 to 4 which have been translated, but which I do not wish to quote. be seen from Affidavits Nos. 3145, 12 and 3097. Schniewind, Stumpf and Koller deposed these affidavits. And particularly from the affidavit No.3145 of Admiral Schniewind, the High Tribunal can see only these points which applied to the commanders-in-chief of the navy, and form an opinion of them. were heard before the Commission, who, to a man, all denied the existence of a group. And especially important, it seems to me,is the testimony of General von Butlar, which on Pages 11, 285 and 286 of the English text of the official record testified concerning how nominations were carried out to those positions which are covered by the indictment.
Mr. President, in this way I should like to conclude my evidence on the question of whether a group actually existed or not.
21 Aug M Marvin Keller 11-1 general attitude of the generals involved. given by Mr. Justice Jackson rests on rather unsure ground. Document 1947 was referred to by Mr. Jackson in this connection. This document, 1947-PS, which is of basic significance to his statement, an alleged letter of Colonel General von Fritsch is mentioned that he is supposed to have written on 11 December, 1938 to Bareness Schutzbar-Milching and in which he allegedly is supposed to have said that three battles would have to be won; first, against the workers; second, against the Catholics and third, against the Jews. a photostatic copy of this document. I was told that I would have access to it if and when it could be found. deposed by Baroness Schutzbar-Milchling, who in her affidavit states that the alleged letter by Colonel General von Fritsch was never received by her. of this proceeding -- I should like to emphasize it has not been submitted but it has been used up to now -- them, and this is something which I especially would like to apply for, that part of the opening speed, by Mr. Justice Jackson should be struck from the record, that is that part which refers to this document which after all has not been submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: If the document has not been proved the Tribunal will pay no attention to it. If it is not in evidence then it is quite unnecessary to produce the document denying its existence. We will take no notice of it.
What I understand you to be saying is that Mr. Justice Jackson referred to a letter. That letter has not been offered in evidence. If it has not been offered in evidence then the Tribunal takes no notice of anything Mr. Justice Jackson said 21 Aug M LJG 11-2 Karr about it in his speech and it is unnecessary for you to produce an affidavit denying the existence of the letter.
Is that clear?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but, Mr. President, it has been used. Mr. Justice Jackson -
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have pointed out to us new that it ought not to have been used because it is not in evidence. We wish to be strict in those matters and only to allow factual documents to be referred to which have been offered in evidence.
DR. LATERNSER: Dealing with the mistrust which Hitler brought to the military leadership, that is matter which has been stated and proven several times in this proceeding. deposed by Lt. General Engel, an officer who was in the closest proximity of Hitler and could observe the increasingly strong mistrust on the part of Hitler. I will not read from that affidavit. number 3182, deposed by General Warliment, who reproduces statements made by Hitler and in order to be brief I shall merely refer to these matters. party and its methods, I should like to refer only to affidavit 175, which has been translated and I would like to refer to it as an example. The officer who at that time was competent, Major General Seegers, describes the battle waged by the military against the removal of Jewish officers and I should further like to refer to the contents of the affidavits 160 to 177, from which many particulars dealing with the unpolitical attitude taken by the military leadership may be seen. refer to affidavit number 126, in which General Berlin testifies that the General Staff struck out matters dealing with heavy arti*lery, with the statement that Germany did not want to wage aggressive wars.