A. I beg your pardon then; I misunderstood you.
Q. I will repeat that Kapt was a failure, wasn't he ? He tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the Republic ?
A. Kapt was a failure and a very stupid one at that, a very stupid Putsch he could never succeed.
Q. But after 1933 or 1934 Hitler was not a failure, was he ?
A. I shall have to state that Hitler, under Hindenburg's government, used legal means, namely, the majority of the people, as the leader of the strongest party to be called into the government. That was a perfectly democratic way in keeping with the constitution, and not by means of a Putsch.
Q. I am not concerned with the forms of democracy or anything like that. I was only asking you whether, after 1933-1934, it was plain that Hitler was not a failure; that was true, wasn't it ?
A. He had the majority of the people behind him
Q. That is an ascent to success which we pass on. Colenel General Reinhart has said that there was no single officer who did not back up Hitler in his extraordinary successes. Is that right ?
A. No.
Q. Von Blomberg, has said that you and your colleagues in the Army had at that time no reason to oppose Hitler because he produced the results you desired ? Do you disagree with that, too ?
A. That, in this conception is not correct. We did our duty because Hindenburg had made Hitler legally chancellor, had called on him legally, and because, after his death, he appeared as Fuehrer based on the Testament.
Q. Well, the answer is no, you don't agree with the Field Marshall.
A. I have never agreed with Field Marshall von Blomberg at any time.
Q. Have you ever at any time agreed with General Oberst Blaskowitz ?
A. How am I to understand that ? He was one of my subordinates; but who he has said in affidavits, I can not confirm that in that form.
Q. well, I am only putting to you the fact that when Hitler's power was assured and there was no more danger of his being a failure, the non-politic opponents began to disappear ?
A. No, we always remained non-political. Of course there were active National Socialists, like Reichenau and Blomberg, who were in the Army, but the bulk was politically quite indifferent.
Q. Surely it is common ground, isn't it, that there was a lot in common between Hitler's policy and the general aspirations of you and your colleagues immediately after 1933 ?
A. Yes; that is to say the quality aimed at by Hitler and achieved by him was greeted with favor by us and that there was something good in the National Socialist movement, as I have already emphasized, which was mostly taken over from old Prussian trains of thought, and that of course we always greeted with faver; but the excesses which I have mentioned earlier we all disapproved of, all the elder ones at any rate.
Q. When you say that there was a certain amount that was good in National Socialist ideas and that was taken over from the old Prussian times, are you not saying that Hitler revived the old Prussian policy of Nationalistic expansion and that you were glad about it ?
A. That had very little to do with politics as such. These were the principles : care for the worker, just as under Bismarck, social welfare, common welfare as more important than the work of the individual. That was what I understood by it.
Q. Now before the war did you and your colleagues, the heads of the Army, discuss the question of neutrality of Belgium, for instance ?
A. To my knowledge, no. We always believed -- or rather, we never thought of Belgium. We always believed as I said earlier today, that one day Poland would fall upon Germany.
Q. Didn't you say before the Commissioner that you used to have discussion about the neutrality of Belgium ?
A. No, that must be a mistake. Upon the question put by the American Prosecutor I only replied that a march through Belgium into the Ruhr was considered possibly by us.
Q. Well, I have here a copy of the transcript of what was said before the Commissioner.
I only need to read one sentence and it is at Page 1352 of the English version. According to what I have here you said that "The opinion concerning the neutrality of Beligum and the Netherlands was very much doubted within the higher military circles." New all I want to ask you about that if you discussed that question, was that not a political discussion ?
A. May I just put that right. This statement before the Commission was made in '39 when we had drawn up our troops to the West, and now the question arises, do Holland and Beligum remain neutral or not. In that connection my answer was given at the time.
Q. Very well. You have also said that you opposed or you fought Nazi totalitarian ideas; is that right ?
A. May I ask you to repeat that question to me please ?
Q. You have said, I believe, that you opposed Nazi totalitarian ideas ?
A. We could not put up any resistance. I opposed it, as so many of my comrades did.
Q. Well, wasn't that a political attitude, a political standpoint ?
A. Everybody, can have a political standpoint for himself but a soldier can have no political activities. That is what I understand on the political standpoint.
Q. A soldier then, in your view, has political views but may not express them; is that right ?
A. Yes, that could be applicable. Of course one could speak to a good friend about such questions and discuss them, but there was never a meeting or a Gremium which was called together during which political questions were discussed.
Q. Now I want to move on to the late 30's. When you say that all the generals -- I forget your exact words this morning, but most of the generals, you said, do maintain the old non-political attitude. I want to show you a document.
MR. CALVACORESSI: My Lord, this is 4060-PS and it will be USA 928 BY MR. CALVACORRESSI:
Q. Now this is a sketch of a speech which General Reinecke proposed to give in the autumn of 1938 to some of the up and coming military people.
General Reinecke held a very high post in the German Army, didn't he ?
A. At the end he was the supreme chairman of that National Socialist leadership training outfit; in '38 he must have been a junior staff officer a very low grade of staff officer.
Q. Well, he may have been a junior staff officer, but by the middle of the war he was one of the few people who were immediately subordinated to Keitel, wasn't he?
A. About that I can't give you any information.
Q But, anyhow, he was a Colonel. It is page 2.
AAbout this entire subject I can not give any testimony. I have never at any time had anything; to do with it. As I have mentioned, in November, '38, I was no longer active. About these training courses as Reinhardt was giving them, I can't give you any information. this document which I shall indicate to you and which, in my opinion, show that the extreme non-political attitude of the generals was not maintained at this time. make the armed forces National Socialist minded.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Calvacoressi, the witness has said that he was retired at the time and has never seen the document. You can put it in if it is a new document.
MR. CALVACORESSI: Shoult I read from this point or would it be more convenient at the end of the cross examination?
THE PRESIDENT: I think we can look at it ourselves.
MR. CALVACORESSI: If your Lordship pleases. My Lord, there is another document which bears on the same subject and which I shall also put in at this point. That is 4065-PS, and will be US Exhibit 929.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the PS?
MR. CALVACORESSI: 4065, My Lord. BY MR. CALVACORESSI:
Q. No, Field Marshal, I want to ask you a few questions about the rearmament of Germany. You have told us that the rearmament was purely defensive Do you maintain that?
A. I had said earlier that the measures against Poland were mentioned in Blomberg's affidavit. After 1936 Germany was still too weak to conduct an aggressive war against Poland and I still maintain my opinion that we are here still concerned with a defensive measure.
Q. Well, if you are defending yourself, you must be defending yourself against somebody, and you said before the Commission that you were, among other things, taking defensive measures against the Lithuanians.
A. Yes.
Q. Are you still asking the Tribunal to believe that you were concerned with the defensive measures against the Lithuanians?
A. May I start my answer? I called it, at the time, the basis for the various defensive measures of the war, because at that time there was only one, and later three, divisions. The Poles and Czechs added together were fully in a position to attack the entire East of German unoccupied territories, not mentioning that the French might have crossed the Rhine in the West. Those were the statements which I made, and which were the estimations of the possible course of the war, and how we were going to defend ourselves, whether from the East and West, or from the East alone or from the west alone.
Q. Well, now, we have already had that. You have never agreed with General Von Blomberg on any point, but in June, 1937 -- he was Marshal Von Blomberg then, and who was, after all, War Minister and Commander-in-Chief at that time -- he issued a directive in which he said that Germany need not consider an attack from any side.
The is already in evidence, My Lord. It is a quotation from Document C-175, US-69. Now, you said that you thought Germany was to act outside a war. Was it your opinion that Hitler was rearming too fast?
A. No, to the contrary.
Q. He wasn't arming fast enough?
A. He was rearming too quickly. That was what he accused Blomberg of, namely, that there was a thoroughly slow speed in rearming. Many divisional commanders adopted the same attitude. We could not keep pace with the rearmament program.
Q. Then it is fair to say that what you objected to about Hitler in this matter was his method?
A. That I do not understand. I do not understand what you mean.
Q. That aims did you and, your colleagues hope to gain through Hitler on question of rearmament if not through the methods Hitler himself was using?
A. The aim itself to be achieved by rearmament was in order to protect ourselves from an aggressive war, particularly coming from the East. This had been attempted earlier by General von Fritsch and Blomberg. Regarding the speed of the rearmament, I said, in answer to a question by the defense counsel that Hitler criticized the Generals. I myself have never discussed rearmament with Hitler from my point of view. An earlier stall had been attempted by peaceful means and through Geneva.
Q. Now, you knew, from reading the newspapers, didn't you, that Hitler was attempting, as I recall, a diplomatic offensive?
A. I do not know what you mean by that. He mentioned the diplomatic offensive which he put into effect at Munich and at Godesberg. Is that what you mean by it?
Q. Let me put it in a different way. That a strong military machine was essential was part of Hitler's general foreign policy, was it not?
A. I did not know it because after what Hitler had created, Germany could feel more secure and things which we had not succeeded in doing by peaceful means Hitler created from things on his own.-- that is, the rearmament program. And, as far as the attack on Poland, the 36 divisions were most useful.
Q. Now, it is your opinion that Schuschnigg would have turned down and given in to Hitler if he had now known that Hitler had a strong military machine?
A. That, I do not believe...
DR. LATERNSER: I object, Mr. President. This question is not permissible because the witness does not know what Schuschnigg thought at the moment and he cannot testify as to what was in the mind of Schuschnigg.
MR. CALVACORESSI: My Lord, I thought it was a question of common knowledge and that everyone discussed this matter at the time. I am not asking him what was in Schuschnigg's mind, but I am asking if, in his mind, he thought Hitler could achieve what he did if Schuschnigg did not know that Hitler had a strong military machine. He can give an answer to that question.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the Tribunal will be able to judge for itself.
MR. CALVACORESSI: If my Lord pleases. I do not want to go over ground that has already been covered, but I only want to bring out a few points which have not been brought out before in connection with this matter. My Lord, if the Tribunal wishes to refresh their minds on this point, in the record on page 6876 where the defendant Ribbentrop was cross examined on matters concerning these.
THE WITNESS: I am only too willing to answer the question. BY MR. CALVACORESSI:
Q. I do not think, witness, that the Tribunal is interested in having any more on this point. Now, the last point to which I want to turn is the question of the conduct of the war. You know, of course, about the commando order and it is not necessary for us to look at it again. You had said to me that it was never carried out in your area when you were in the field?
A. Yes.
Q. And you told the OKW in 1944 that it had been carried cut?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you please state, categorically, which of those statements is true because they cannot both be true.
A. They don't conflict because I told the defense counsel that the commando order was not carried out by us therefore it was ineffective. Since, however, it went to the Army from Hitler and had been announced in the Army bulletin one would have had to see it at the time. Why should anyone have said "I am not carrying out this order"? Why should he? I see no contradicts I have not added any explanation to it. At any rate, I beg you to believe me that it was not carried out.
is there, whether it was carried out or not and there is no doubt that it was issued through regular army and whatever may be the true picture of the number of men who may have lost their lives as a result of the issuance of this illegal order, it is clear, isn't it, that the mere issuing of this order through regular army channels shows that there was something wrong, something rotten with the military leadership of Germany ?
A There wasn't a single person in the West who lost their lives on the strength of that commando order.
Q He is well known for his discipline, is he not ?
Q And you wouldn't suggest, I suppose, that he is more able to commit excesses than any other soldier ?
A That didn't ever happen in this case. I want to again tell you that in the West not a single man lost his life or was killed through that commando order.
Q We are going to leave the commando order now. In general, supposing for the sake of argument that we find that the German soldier is a normally well-disciplined and normally well-behaved soldier, and he acted with unnecessary brutality, would you not feel compelled to look for some extraordinary outside motive ? such motive, would you not? in another theatre of war, and the commandoes in question or the unit in question acted in accordance with the Hitler order of which they had to assume from the point of view of international law they were justified. order any more. I am going to suggest to you that if this German soldier, for the sake of argument, behaved badly in Occupied Territory, a logical reason for it would be the knowledge by them that their commanders had a ruthless disregard and indifference for the sufferings of the population.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that it is too hypothetical a question to put to him.
MR. CALVACORESSI: Your Lordship, if you please BY MR. CALVACORESSI:
Q. You commanded the Army Group South in Russia in the autumn of 1941. did not you ?
A The Army Group South; not seven--South. Reichenau ? which Fieldmarshal von Reichenau issued to the 6th Army about how to behave in Russia ? that I had seen that order before--von Reichenau and I had repeatedly given orders which the Army Group never received and which didn't accept it either. The so-called hardship order there I do not recollect having seen but I do not think on the other hand that through some channels he reached my army group and probably got into the office and at any rate, my former first general staff officer who is also interned here in Nurnberg, cannot recollect either that we received that order or that we had at the time the information. It was a matter, of course, that one would not approve of that order particularly since it is in contradiction of the clear order. I take it from what you have been saying that you do now know of its existence. Are you saying that Reichenau was exceptional in these matters?
Q That he was exceptional ?
A That, considering Reichenau's entire attitude and his character, I assume to be the case. General von Mannstein, General Kleist, General von Schobert, General Stuelpnagel would never on their part have issued such an order. May I Go on ? Particularly General von Brachitsch has given the strictest orders that the conduct of the war in the East was to be carried out in the strictest soldierly manner and in accordance to the rules and regulations. of General Fieldmarshal von Mannstein which was strikingly a similar to the ""Runstedt" order. In some passages----
A The "Reichenau order, you mean.
THE PRESIDENT: You said the "Runstedt" order.
MR. CALVACORESSI: I beg your pardon, my Lord. BY MR. CALVACORESSI. in Army Group South? the---many years ago, we have recovered orders of this kind from two. I put it to you that any soldier of the 6th Army or 11th Army who received this order would be justified in assuming that his commanders in-chief were encouraging or at least tolerating excesses, and now, just to show you that these matters are not confined to one army group or even to one front, I want you to look at this signal, document No. 4067-PS, and it will be US 930.
My Lord, it is convenient at this point to put this in: I am not suggesting that the witness is himself personally concerned with it. This is a signal that was made to the panzer Army Africa in June 1942, and I will read it in full as it is very short:
"For Panzer Army Africa via German General with the Supreme Command of the Italian Armed Forces in Rome.--OKH/Quartermaster General for information--Supreme Command of the Air Force/Quartermaster General for information--OKW/WR for information. Top Secret, only to be transmitted via officers. According to information received, numerous German political refugees are supposed to be amongst the Free French Units in Africa. The Fuehrer has ordered that they are to be treated with the greatest severity. They are therefore to be disposed of without mercy in battle. Where this has not happened, they are to be shot retroactively on the command of the nearest German officer immediately and without further ado, as long as they do not have to be kept back for the time being for screening purposes. Written handing on this order is forbidden. Commanders are to be informed verbally." It is unsigned. criminality as appears quite clearly from the sentence: "The Fuehrer has ordered that they are to be treated with the greatest severity. The order which the army puts on that in sending it out is to kill. Do you remember the death of Fieldmarshal Rommel? that there was something suspicious about the death of Rommel; did you hear those rumors at that time ? have refused to act as a representative of the Fuhrer at the State Funeral for Fieldmarshal Rommel; otherwise it would have been an infamy beyond words. er , from the American papers, according to which Rommel's young son was supposed to have made the statement; namely, that his father took poison in order not to be hanged.
the death of Rommel up to the end of the war, that it was being generally said that Rommel had been "bumped off".
A No; it was merely said that he had been under suspicion.
M. CALVACORESSI: Your Lordship, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other cross examination ? Dr. Laternser. BY DR. LATERNSER: an affidavit No. 4, which comes from Fieldmarshal von Brauchitsch and is in a group of five. The prosecution attached value to this statement that, as it is stated in this affidavit, we are concerned with the personal visits from the Supreme Commanders and that the Supreme Commander would have to be in a position to get the advice of those other Supreme Commanders who were under him. What was the nature of such a condition; on which subject could it have been made and on which matters?
A The matter was not simple. Let me put it this way. If I am the Commander of a Regiment and give a talk to my commanders "You, do this or the or take this and that village", he does it, and then "How did you take it?", like that. Or if told to do something, he says, "I should rather like to do it to the left or further to the right", it is like on a higher level. Or I may be told by my superiors to do something, and he Trill say "von Runstedt" how are you going to do it?", and I might say, "I perhaps will need one more division." I say that, but I would never say to my superior "That you are doing or saying is wrong." When one gets a task, one does not, he does not discuss it with his superior or say it is wrong. I believe it is understand With Hitler, to argue, it is out of the question.
Q Now with reference to the affidavit number 5, of Col. General Blaskowitz. The prosecution has emphasized that offices of the Army group, and the Army, by means of telephone and wire, had been in contact and had been in a position to get a report from each other, on the situation. Are we not concerned with the ordinary daily communiques which every unit Commander would make?
A Yes, definitely, if I may say so. These situation reports were carried out once in the morning on what happened during the previous night, and once at night as to what happened during the day. If there was action which was of particular importance, then I would report once or twice or three times, as "How are things going?", "How are you doing?" and for the reason of clearing this statement, I shall read part of this to you now Affidavit of 10 November 1945. Then subsequently I shall ask you whether this is the correct version, as he has described it. I quote "The present affidavit's purpose is to make clear the restriction I made use of in my affidavit of 10th November 1934: (in their sphere' (meaning commanders at the front). What I state in today's supplementary declaration should be included in the restriction. There can be no thought of advice from a commander at the front coning within a "group" or an actual "advisory circle." Both expressions might be misunderstood; they should only designate a circle in which individual advisers could be heard by their superiors on matters affecting the individual's sphere." Would this supplement to this previous explanation correspond to the facts in the case as they occurred?
occurred before the opening of the Russian Campaign, between you and Field Marshal von Bock?
A That was not a misunderstanding between von Bock and myself. This was a plan laid down by the OKH, and I was commanding the Army South, I disagrees with this plan. That is why I disagreed. It was not a misunderstanding at all. That was a suggestion or improvement coming from me. We would just talk of it. take place later?
A They took place one after the other. First Bock had his turn. He did his arguing. Then I had my turn with my leaders. I was referred to the order that officers should not know about matters except what concerned them. Thatmeant that I was not supposed to know what Bock knew and he was not supposed to know what I knew. According in Hitler, it was not my information
Q That went then so far that you reported things separately?
Q An order had been submitted to you, #4067-PS. According to it, German citizens, as far as they were fighting for the Free French units in Africa, were to be shot. Did you ever hear of it?
A No, I don't know anything about the order.
Q You said before that you had never agreed with von Bock. In this affidavit, Field Marshal von Bock announces the opinion of what is called the "Group of German Staff Officers." Did Field Marshal von Bock have a particular close connection with the Officers?
A He was also a stranger to us. He was of another region. He was philosophical and no one could talk to him. He was a stranger. Once he was a subordinate of mine, before becoming Minister of War.
Q You have not answered the question. Did von Bock have a close contact with the Officers indicted here?
A That I can't say.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further question. Mr. President, in the event that Doctor Schriber is produced by the Russian prosecution, only for that case I should like to make application for yet another witness. He is to be questioned on this point, on which he can give the most exact information about that subject. Only this question.
THE PRESIDENT : Will you say what point you mean?
DR. LATERNSER: The Russian prosecution today, during the cross-examination of von Mannstein, had submitted a written statement regarding a special type of warfare.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but there are four points in that statement. Which one do you refer to? There is not only one. There are a number of points.
DR. LATERNSER: In the event the witness arrives, I would like to make application that I be given an opportunity to produce a Witness of mine, to be questioned about these points. Only an application made for an eventuality.
THE PRESIDENT: You must make the application new, Who is the witness?
DR. LATERNSER: If the witness appears here, I would like to call, to give evidence on this subject, Medical Officer Dr. Handloser, as a witness for the defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Is he in Nurnberg, or where?
DR. LATERNSER: I cannot live you the place where he is, Mr. President, but I will surely give every of effort to ascertain it.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal thinks the application should be made in writing, giving the reasons, why you think this doctor knows anything about the biological Warfare, and where you can find him. Have you concluded with your witness?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has now only the SA to consider. Will you call your witness for the SA?
DR. BOEHM: I should like to hear first, the first witness, Franz Bock, for the SA.
FRANZ BOCK, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me; I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath).
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
BY DR. BOEHN:
Q Witness, when did you join the SA?
Q What was your profession at the time?
Q what offices did you hold in the SA?
A From 1922 to 1929, I was an SA man - an SA private. From 1929 until 1932 I had the rank of Truppfuehrer; in 1930 I became a Sturmfuehrer; in 1931 I became a Sturmbannfuehrer. In 1932 when I became unemployed at that time and as a Sturmbannfuehrer, I joined the SA Group south-west as an adjutant, which then became my profession. In 1933 I was transferred to the SA Group in Bavaria east. In 1934 as Standartenfuehrer I was transferred to Trauntheim. From 1935 to 1937,. I Was Brigadefuehrer. In 1937 I became department chief and later chief of the loading department of the supreme staff of the SA. In 1940, I entered the military service. After being in action, toward the end of 1942, I came to Dusseldorf as the leader of the Lower Rhone. There, I remained until who collapse in 1945.
Q So you are one of the oldest SA leaders. You can therefore tell us why the SA was created and how it was organized, about 1920. Shortly Thereafter they were organized into a guard or protection organization as an order group. At that time, the SA consisted of young idealists and front soldiers and fighting men from the last war. It was not particularly well organized until approximately 1925. It was created in accordance with the local needs and necessities, assembly halls What was to be achieved by these means? at that time and there were mysterious objections from our opponents, who tried to fight against the party even with means of terror. From that a so-called protection organization arose and so called assembly block.
Q Why did the SA fight against those so-called opponents at that time?
A Every ambition for self preservation demands a fight. The realization of National Socialistic ideas, with the aim to achieve the power in the state, demanded a fight.
In the political pattern, it means a fight against the propaganda by spreading propaganda or by word of mouth. organization of the SA in 1931? in 1935 and organically speaking with the development of the entire party. It was closely connected with the party and merely had a few small differences on the part of the organization. In principle, it was wielded into one by the party. The party was growing at that time. The SA Was recognized by the different powers in the state and was allowed by them, just as all other political parties. For instance, the Reichsbanner or the Union of Storm Fighters, Who were the factions of the various organizations and parties of the time. in 1931? over the entire Reich did make it necessary, particularly at that time, in my opinion. This brought a closer cooperation and the bringing about of closer coordination on the part of the leadership of the SA. Furthermore, it was urgently necessary that when the party rallies, which took place every year when the SA was the main banner of the "March On" for these purposes of propaganda, the SA should have been closely organized within itself and sub-divided accordingly. to military factions? uniforms. First of all they had a green shirt and later on a brown shirt, but first of all they were civilian clothes. The SA had to have a certain uniform at that time to make a difference between the SA and the other organizations. If I remember correctly, the uniform at the time was not of a military character and that cannot be derived from it. we never thought at the time that this type of clothing showed any particular type of military character, nor was it supposed to have. of distinction indicating they were Units?
to ours and they were our typo of shirt uniform. I think that the shirt was grey-green or something like that. All organizations at the time were appearing in the uniforms typical of the organization.
Q Did the SA have arms and who was allowed to carry such arms? ordered. After 1933, the SA had the so-called "Dagger of Honor", which they received in 1933 or 1934. Later on, only a leader was allowed to carry a pistol and then only with an appropriate police order or a pass for same. The carrying of arms, particularly at that time, was supervised by the police and state and at the time when I was loading units, before every meeting and during every meeting or during our marches and demonstration, we were all searched by the police for arms. We had the strictest orders at the time not to carry arms, even if it was dangerous.
(A RECESS WAS TAKEN.)