the resistance movement in France. what agencies were responsible for peace and order in the occupied territories in France? responsible. South France had a special general who worked closely with Petain. The resistance movement in southern France became stronger and it became a great threat for the troops fighting on the Mediterranean, In the winter of 1943 and 1944, the Commander-in-Chief was made responsible for the southern part of France. Thereupon I appointed a special general in Lyons. He was under the command of the Army Group Gustav at Toulon. He was responsible for creating order in the South of France.
Q Was the French Government and the French population warned? movement with all its strength, The warnings to the French People were always. submitted to the French Government for examination, first. When the invasion threatened, I, personally, asked the old gentleman to speak himself on the radio to warn his people not to do such things in his own interests. He promised to do so. Whether he did, I do not know.
Q Were these warnings observed?
A Unfortunately, no. Finally the French Police, whom we had armed better to combat the movement, even went over to the enemy, that is to the revolutionists.
AAs far as we could. For example, full bombs were never destroyed from the air. Single planes were sent against single places of resistance. Mass uses of artillery, tanks, did not take place. The excesses such as at Oradur, we regretted greatly. At that time, I immediately demanded a report since I could not order a judicial investigation. I reported this unfortunate occurrence to the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht.
Q Why could you not order a judicial investigation?
A The troop units of the SS were subordinate only to Himmler. I had no disciplinary power nor judicial power over them. I could not give them leaves or issue awards. I was responsible only for the technical employment of these divisions, much as I might use an Italian, Hungarian or Slovakian Division.
Q Was the legality of the resistance movement recognized?
A General Eisenhower and De Gaulle declared it by radio. We inquired of the High Commander of the Wehrmacht as to their attitude. Only after the allied troops had landed on the Mediterranean coast was it recognized.
Q What is your attitude toward illegal warfare? feeling: Behind the front of the enemy army, unregulated war is started which brings great misery on the population of the country in question. No army in the world can, in the long run, permit such a thing. In the interest of its own security and possibility of existence, it must take sharp energetic measures. My comrades and I sharply condemn that. We did not like to see the attempted German Weirwolf movement. If it had been carried out, it would have brought enormous misery on our Fatherland, unjustly. I would consider it good fortune for humanity if through international agreement for the future, such illegal wars were made impossible. That is my point of view. French population during the war?
A I can speak only briefly on that point. I cannot give many detail. Marshal Petain, with whom I had a very confidential relationship, did everything to help. I asked Hitler what position France was to have in the future Europe. I tried to create a new army form. Unfortunately it did not become more than a regiment. The French railroad men who were in charge of all our transports, I introduced measure to give them more food and I tried to get back their relatives who were prisoners of war. This was just after the Dieppe undertaking. It was approved. We did what we could to supply the city of Paris with coal and food, and a transportation situation which was almost unbearably poor for us Germans, militarily. These are the main points.
Q I should like, to ask one other question: In the last few days, a witness said that from 1944 on, the concentration camps were manned by soldiers from all branches of the Wehrmacht. How do you explain this?
A I know nothing about that. Himmler was Commander-in-Chief of the Replacement Army. He could issue such an order. If he did issue it, my feeling is that he wanted to charge the Army with all these incidents. offensive. Before or during this offence, was an order issued to shoot prisoners?
A Such an order was not given by Hitler. On the contrary, he considered it important to take as many prisoners as possible in the offensive. A subordinate military office is said to have issued such an order. I consider that impossible. That is contrary to our ideas.
Q Did you not oppose this offensive?
A I opposed the offensive for the following reasons: The operational ideas can almost be called a stroke of genius, but absolutely all condition for the possible success of an offensive were lacking. Field Marshal Mode and I suggested attacking the American troops cast of Aachen from several sides. Then one could think over what to do next. These suggestions were not listened to by anyone. We had inadequate forces on the ground and in the air. It was thought we could only fail.
Q Did you oppose Hitler on other occasions also?
A Not Hitler personally, because I had no opportunity to do so; but to his staff I repeatedly objected to measures ordered from above, especially in the case of the Normandy invasion and the Ardennes offensive after it failed and operations in Holland. All of those undertakings were in vain.
Q When did you consider the war lost?
A In my opinion the war could not be went after Stalingrad. I considered the war lost after the Allies succeeded in establishing a strong beachhead on French soil. Then it was finished. continuation of this war?
to change the conduct of the war or to put an end to it, especially for a change in the evacuation, a withdrawl on the front to the German border; and as could not otherwise be expected, these suggestions were not listened to. bringing about a violent overthrow?
A I would never have entertained such thoughts. That would have been absolute treachery, and could not have changed the facts. The army and the population still believed in Hitler at that time. Such an overthrow would not have been successful; and even if I, perhaps with the aid of the allies, had brought about an overthrow, the conditions of the German people, according to the statement of the Big Three, would have been exactly the same as it is now, and I would have been considered for all tire as a traitor to my fatherland.
Q You lost your position three times during the war. What were the reasons? above, which would have led to the destruction of the entire Kleist Panzer Army near Rostov. I objected to it, and asked for the recall of the order, because otherwise I would have considered that there would be no confidence in my leadership. I asked that another commander be selected. And thereupon in the light of my request as such, I was removed from my post on the 1st of February. That was the first case. letter, because of the state of my health, I was replaced by another commander.
The third case was on the 9th of March, 1945. I could not be expected, as an old general, to continue to perform the duties of the commander-in-chief.
Q And you found one of these cases against the will of Hitler?
A In the first case one could say so. But he did not hold it against me for in the following March I was made commander-in-chief in France.
Q Now I come to the last question. You know, Field Marshal, that the Prosecution has asked that the military leaders should be declared criminals. As a general officer of the German Army, you know the attitude of these leaders toward international law.
Please tell the Court about it briefly. Convention and the Hague Rules on Land Warfare were always binding on us older leaders. Their strict observance by the troops was demanded, and steps were taken against excesses which appear in war in all armies., The court-martial records of the various divisions can give information on this point. Property of the inhabitants was to be protected against plundering; strict punishments were given out to keep up discipline. Severe punishments were also declared against atrocities. war was done as far as possible. The wounded or conquered enemy was no longer considered such, but had a claim to decent treatment. Despite our effort to be chivalrous, We old officers who had lived through the cavalry, infantry and bayonet battles saw with regret the increasing mechanization of warfare. Today the greatest man is helpless against the force of material. All the more were we leaders of the opinion that while there was fighting on land, the old forms of battle should be maintained, and this had to be told to the troops again and again.
As senior soldier of the German Army, I will say this. We accused leaders were trained in the old tradition of the soldier, the old chivalrous traditions. We lived according to them, and endeavoured to pass then down to the younger officers. DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions. BY MR. CALVACORESSI: close touch, must he not, and know the opinions of his immediate subordinates, is that right?
A That is not necessary to that extent. My subordinates only had to know my operational and tactical, opinion. They were free as army leaders within their sphere. given by your former commander-in-chief. The translators already have it. It is on page 2 of Affidavit No.4:
"During operations, the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas with Army Groups by means of telephone, radio and code. The commander-in-chief of the army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the commanders of army groups, armies and lower echelons by means of personal visits to them."
Is that, generally speaking, correct?
A That is absolutely correct. And another thing concerning the conduct of the war -- that is, operations and tactical actions -- is that such an exchange also took place from the army groups to the commander-in-chief of the
Q I shall read you one more sentence. From the evidence that has been given by Colonel General Blaskowitz. He has said -- and I want you to tell me whether you agree with this -- that it was common practice that the commanders of army groups and of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of a situation, and for their recommendations, by telephone, teletype or wireless, as well as by personal records.
A It is not quite true that they had to. They could.
Q Now I have sons questions on the Russian campaign. You yourself at a conference with Hitler and your Army colleagues raised a question of a gap which existed between your army group and that of Field Marshal von Bock is that right? was shown as swamp land, it could be used by troops; and you therefore offered advice about the steps that should be taken to prevent its exploitation by the enemy? Russia, the Russians could operate unhampered in this swamp area, and for that reason it would be practical for German troops to be moved through this area. This suggestion was not listened to. As the operations later showed, the Russians had strong forces in the area, and from there they constantly threatened the left wing of my army.
Q Yes. I am not concerned with whether the advice was listened to or not. But you agree that you offered it?
Fuehrer in the description of the intended operation which occurred to me. But that war not advice. a certain amount, and that was the meeting which took place -- I think it was the house of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch -- May, 1938, when there was a question of seizing the Sudetenland. Is it not a fact that at that conference von Brauchitsch asked for the opinion of you and your fellow officers on the proposals which Hitler had laid before you? Staff von Beck had drawn up, which warned against a war over the Sudetenland. It was to be submitted to Hitler later by von Brquchitsch. We were asked for our opinion on this memorandum, and we were unanimously of the opinion that war should hot be waged. war that was likely to happen at that time, if Hitler had his way, should not be waged at that time in that way? to wage this war if France, England, and America would possibly be our enemies. That was the basic thought of the people. We could have dealt with Czechoslovakia but never if the countries just mentioned had turned to the aid of Czechoslovakia. And Hitler was to be warned against this. Beck to support himself in the objections which he proposed to make to Hitler, Brauchitsch assembled a circle of leading generals who were of the same opinion as himself? That strengthened his hand, did it not?
A Yes; one could say that. been given by Generaloberst Book?
THE PRESIDENT: Is this a convenient time to break off?
MR. CALVACORESS: Yes, My Lord.
(The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours of the same day.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 12 Aug. 1946) BY MR. CALVACORESSI: little or no knowledge of such moves as the occupation of the Rhineland and the seizure of the Sudetenland is that correct? knowledge; regarding the occupation of the Sudetenland in 1939, I had no previous knowledge, either. I was inactive at the time, retired. 1938 and the outbreak of the war in 1939? 31st of October, 1933, I was Supreme Commander of Group I, Berlin. And then I was retired. such time as you held the post, and when you received little or no information about what was going on, you were not a member of the indicted group, as defined in the indictment? that time active in a different theater of war, is that right? Supreme Commander of Army Group A stationed at Koblenz of the West. OKH; but of the OKW?
AAbout that I can't give you any information, whether it was a matter for the navy or a matter for the OKW.
Q Now, in general, before the war, you would say your picture is: the generals who left alone to occupy themselves with training exercises and the training of a relatively snail details and units. Is that a fair summary of the evidence you gave before the commission?
A That probably is a misunderstanding. The training exercises were a matter for the divisional commanders and commanding generals, and only Colonel General Von Fritsch asked the Supreme Commanders that they too should concern themselves with smaller details, as I lock at it. rapidly expanding, you say that the problem of defense came first in the minds of the military leadership of Germany?
A That I didn't quite understand. Did you say the borders of Germany were expanding? They didn't do that. It was only in 1938 through the Sudeten affair and until -the outbreak of the war with Poland? time were defensive exercises, defensive maneuvers? '36, I was pensioned. Whether and to what extent exercises were carried out in '38, '39, that I don't know. I understand it, you spoke of these as simply defensive exercises?
A Yes. These were the maneuvers in '36 and 1937. During the latter, myself, as an army commander, was leading a party against an enemy attack against Germany. held with stukas and other weapons at Groenika in Spain?
AAbout that, I can't give you any information because the rearmament in 1933 or '36 had been concluded; and in my opinion, after that the air force introduced stukas, that I don't know. At any rate, at that time any type of weapon was justified to my feeling within the rearmed Army.
Q We will pass on to another point. You told us that German officers were severely aloof from politics? the name of General von Segt?
A General Von Segt was taking; the greatest care in the Reichswehr that no officer was concerning himself with political matters. What he himself did politically, that is another chapter, and about that, I cannot give you any information. determined to keep the army out of politics is the fact that at the time when he took over there had just been the Kapt Putsch?
A That I don't believe. It is a very ancient Prussian tradition that an officer does not concern himself with politics. And Colonel General Von Segt was as loyal a man as possible both as far as the Reich Kapt Putsch as well as the left, as far as the Communists were concerned, and to the constitution supporting the weimar Government. That was cur general conception. you that this whole Prussian policy was revised and insisted upon by Von Segt because as a result of Kapt Putsch, he saw how important it was to keep the army out of entanglements with incompetent politicans?
A That is entirely my view. All the more since Hitler Putsch in 1923 placed the army in a very difficult position because the Bavarian division was commencing to detach itself from Segt.
Q Now, Rapt was a failure, wasn't he? He tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the republic?
A No. Segt never tried to overthrow the republic.
A. I beg your pardon then; I misunderstood you.
Q. I will repeat that Kapt was a failure, wasn't he ? He tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the Republic ?
A. Kapt was a failure and a very stupid one at that, a very stupid Putsch he could never succeed.
Q. But after 1933 or 1934 Hitler was not a failure, was he ?
A. I shall have to state that Hitler, under Hindenburg's government, used legal means, namely, the majority of the people, as the leader of the strongest party to be called into the government. That was a perfectly democratic way in keeping with the constitution, and not by means of a Putsch.
Q. I am not concerned with the forms of democracy or anything like that. I was only asking you whether, after 1933-1934, it was plain that Hitler was not a failure; that was true, wasn't it ?
A. He had the majority of the people behind him
Q. That is an ascent to success which we pass on. Colenel General Reinhart has said that there was no single officer who did not back up Hitler in his extraordinary successes. Is that right ?
A. No.
Q. Von Blomberg, has said that you and your colleagues in the Army had at that time no reason to oppose Hitler because he produced the results you desired ? Do you disagree with that, too ?
A. That, in this conception is not correct. We did our duty because Hindenburg had made Hitler legally chancellor, had called on him legally, and because, after his death, he appeared as Fuehrer based on the Testament.
Q. Well, the answer is no, you don't agree with the Field Marshall.
A. I have never agreed with Field Marshall von Blomberg at any time.
Q. Have you ever at any time agreed with General Oberst Blaskowitz ?
A. How am I to understand that ? He was one of my subordinates; but who he has said in affidavits, I can not confirm that in that form.
Q. well, I am only putting to you the fact that when Hitler's power was assured and there was no more danger of his being a failure, the non-politic opponents began to disappear ?
A. No, we always remained non-political. Of course there were active National Socialists, like Reichenau and Blomberg, who were in the Army, but the bulk was politically quite indifferent.
Q. Surely it is common ground, isn't it, that there was a lot in common between Hitler's policy and the general aspirations of you and your colleagues immediately after 1933 ?
A. Yes; that is to say the quality aimed at by Hitler and achieved by him was greeted with favor by us and that there was something good in the National Socialist movement, as I have already emphasized, which was mostly taken over from old Prussian trains of thought, and that of course we always greeted with faver; but the excesses which I have mentioned earlier we all disapproved of, all the elder ones at any rate.
Q. When you say that there was a certain amount that was good in National Socialist ideas and that was taken over from the old Prussian times, are you not saying that Hitler revived the old Prussian policy of Nationalistic expansion and that you were glad about it ?
A. That had very little to do with politics as such. These were the principles : care for the worker, just as under Bismarck, social welfare, common welfare as more important than the work of the individual. That was what I understood by it.
Q. Now before the war did you and your colleagues, the heads of the Army, discuss the question of neutrality of Belgium, for instance ?
A. To my knowledge, no. We always believed -- or rather, we never thought of Belgium. We always believed as I said earlier today, that one day Poland would fall upon Germany.
Q. Didn't you say before the Commissioner that you used to have discussion about the neutrality of Belgium ?
A. No, that must be a mistake. Upon the question put by the American Prosecutor I only replied that a march through Belgium into the Ruhr was considered possibly by us.
Q. Well, I have here a copy of the transcript of what was said before the Commissioner.
I only need to read one sentence and it is at Page 1352 of the English version. According to what I have here you said that "The opinion concerning the neutrality of Beligum and the Netherlands was very much doubted within the higher military circles." New all I want to ask you about that if you discussed that question, was that not a political discussion ?
A. May I just put that right. This statement before the Commission was made in '39 when we had drawn up our troops to the West, and now the question arises, do Holland and Beligum remain neutral or not. In that connection my answer was given at the time.
Q. Very well. You have also said that you opposed or you fought Nazi totalitarian ideas; is that right ?
A. May I ask you to repeat that question to me please ?
Q. You have said, I believe, that you opposed Nazi totalitarian ideas ?
A. We could not put up any resistance. I opposed it, as so many of my comrades did.
Q. Well, wasn't that a political attitude, a political standpoint ?
A. Everybody, can have a political standpoint for himself but a soldier can have no political activities. That is what I understand on the political standpoint.
Q. A soldier then, in your view, has political views but may not express them; is that right ?
A. Yes, that could be applicable. Of course one could speak to a good friend about such questions and discuss them, but there was never a meeting or a Gremium which was called together during which political questions were discussed.
Q. Now I want to move on to the late 30's. When you say that all the generals -- I forget your exact words this morning, but most of the generals, you said, do maintain the old non-political attitude. I want to show you a document.
MR. CALVACORESSI: My Lord, this is 4060-PS and it will be USA 928 BY MR. CALVACORRESSI:
Q. Now this is a sketch of a speech which General Reinecke proposed to give in the autumn of 1938 to some of the up and coming military people.
General Reinecke held a very high post in the German Army, didn't he ?
A. At the end he was the supreme chairman of that National Socialist leadership training outfit; in '38 he must have been a junior staff officer a very low grade of staff officer.
Q. Well, he may have been a junior staff officer, but by the middle of the war he was one of the few people who were immediately subordinated to Keitel, wasn't he?
A. About that I can't give you any information.
Q But, anyhow, he was a Colonel. It is page 2.
AAbout this entire subject I can not give any testimony. I have never at any time had anything; to do with it. As I have mentioned, in November, '38, I was no longer active. About these training courses as Reinhardt was giving them, I can't give you any information. this document which I shall indicate to you and which, in my opinion, show that the extreme non-political attitude of the generals was not maintained at this time. make the armed forces National Socialist minded.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Calvacoressi, the witness has said that he was retired at the time and has never seen the document. You can put it in if it is a new document.
MR. CALVACORESSI: Shoult I read from this point or would it be more convenient at the end of the cross examination?
THE PRESIDENT: I think we can look at it ourselves.
MR. CALVACORESSI: If your Lordship pleases. My Lord, there is another document which bears on the same subject and which I shall also put in at this point. That is 4065-PS, and will be US Exhibit 929.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the PS?
MR. CALVACORESSI: 4065, My Lord. BY MR. CALVACORESSI:
Q. No, Field Marshal, I want to ask you a few questions about the rearmament of Germany. You have told us that the rearmament was purely defensive Do you maintain that?
A. I had said earlier that the measures against Poland were mentioned in Blomberg's affidavit. After 1936 Germany was still too weak to conduct an aggressive war against Poland and I still maintain my opinion that we are here still concerned with a defensive measure.
Q. Well, if you are defending yourself, you must be defending yourself against somebody, and you said before the Commission that you were, among other things, taking defensive measures against the Lithuanians.
A. Yes.
Q. Are you still asking the Tribunal to believe that you were concerned with the defensive measures against the Lithuanians?
A. May I start my answer? I called it, at the time, the basis for the various defensive measures of the war, because at that time there was only one, and later three, divisions. The Poles and Czechs added together were fully in a position to attack the entire East of German unoccupied territories, not mentioning that the French might have crossed the Rhine in the West. Those were the statements which I made, and which were the estimations of the possible course of the war, and how we were going to defend ourselves, whether from the East and West, or from the East alone or from the west alone.
Q. Well, now, we have already had that. You have never agreed with General Von Blomberg on any point, but in June, 1937 -- he was Marshal Von Blomberg then, and who was, after all, War Minister and Commander-in-Chief at that time -- he issued a directive in which he said that Germany need not consider an attack from any side.
The is already in evidence, My Lord. It is a quotation from Document C-175, US-69. Now, you said that you thought Germany was to act outside a war. Was it your opinion that Hitler was rearming too fast?
A. No, to the contrary.
Q. He wasn't arming fast enough?
A. He was rearming too quickly. That was what he accused Blomberg of, namely, that there was a thoroughly slow speed in rearming. Many divisional commanders adopted the same attitude. We could not keep pace with the rearmament program.
Q. Then it is fair to say that what you objected to about Hitler in this matter was his method?
A. That I do not understand. I do not understand what you mean.
Q. That aims did you and, your colleagues hope to gain through Hitler on question of rearmament if not through the methods Hitler himself was using?
A. The aim itself to be achieved by rearmament was in order to protect ourselves from an aggressive war, particularly coming from the East. This had been attempted earlier by General von Fritsch and Blomberg. Regarding the speed of the rearmament, I said, in answer to a question by the defense counsel that Hitler criticized the Generals. I myself have never discussed rearmament with Hitler from my point of view. An earlier stall had been attempted by peaceful means and through Geneva.
Q. Now, you knew, from reading the newspapers, didn't you, that Hitler was attempting, as I recall, a diplomatic offensive?
A. I do not know what you mean by that. He mentioned the diplomatic offensive which he put into effect at Munich and at Godesberg. Is that what you mean by it?
Q. Let me put it in a different way. That a strong military machine was essential was part of Hitler's general foreign policy, was it not?
A. I did not know it because after what Hitler had created, Germany could feel more secure and things which we had not succeeded in doing by peaceful means Hitler created from things on his own.-- that is, the rearmament program. And, as far as the attack on Poland, the 36 divisions were most useful.
Q. Now, it is your opinion that Schuschnigg would have turned down and given in to Hitler if he had now known that Hitler had a strong military machine?
A. That, I do not believe...
DR. LATERNSER: I object, Mr. President. This question is not permissible because the witness does not know what Schuschnigg thought at the moment and he cannot testify as to what was in the mind of Schuschnigg.
MR. CALVACORESSI: My Lord, I thought it was a question of common knowledge and that everyone discussed this matter at the time. I am not asking him what was in Schuschnigg's mind, but I am asking if, in his mind, he thought Hitler could achieve what he did if Schuschnigg did not know that Hitler had a strong military machine. He can give an answer to that question.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the Tribunal will be able to judge for itself.
MR. CALVACORESSI: If my Lord pleases. I do not want to go over ground that has already been covered, but I only want to bring out a few points which have not been brought out before in connection with this matter. My Lord, if the Tribunal wishes to refresh their minds on this point, in the record on page 6876 where the defendant Ribbentrop was cross examined on matters concerning these.
THE WITNESS: I am only too willing to answer the question. BY MR. CALVACORESSI:
Q. I do not think, witness, that the Tribunal is interested in having any more on this point. Now, the last point to which I want to turn is the question of the conduct of the war. You know, of course, about the commando order and it is not necessary for us to look at it again. You had said to me that it was never carried out in your area when you were in the field?
A. Yes.
Q. And you told the OKW in 1944 that it had been carried cut?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you please state, categorically, which of those statements is true because they cannot both be true.
A. They don't conflict because I told the defense counsel that the commando order was not carried out by us therefore it was ineffective. Since, however, it went to the Army from Hitler and had been announced in the Army bulletin one would have had to see it at the time. Why should anyone have said "I am not carrying out this order"? Why should he? I see no contradicts I have not added any explanation to it. At any rate, I beg you to believe me that it was not carried out.
is there, whether it was carried out or not and there is no doubt that it was issued through regular army and whatever may be the true picture of the number of men who may have lost their lives as a result of the issuance of this illegal order, it is clear, isn't it, that the mere issuing of this order through regular army channels shows that there was something wrong, something rotten with the military leadership of Germany ?
A There wasn't a single person in the West who lost their lives on the strength of that commando order.
Q He is well known for his discipline, is he not ?
Q And you wouldn't suggest, I suppose, that he is more able to commit excesses than any other soldier ?
A That didn't ever happen in this case. I want to again tell you that in the West not a single man lost his life or was killed through that commando order.
Q We are going to leave the commando order now. In general, supposing for the sake of argument that we find that the German soldier is a normally well-disciplined and normally well-behaved soldier, and he acted with unnecessary brutality, would you not feel compelled to look for some extraordinary outside motive ? such motive, would you not? in another theatre of war, and the commandoes in question or the unit in question acted in accordance with the Hitler order of which they had to assume from the point of view of international law they were justified. order any more. I am going to suggest to you that if this German soldier, for the sake of argument, behaved badly in Occupied Territory, a logical reason for it would be the knowledge by them that their commanders had a ruthless disregard and indifference for the sufferings of the population.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that it is too hypothetical a question to put to him.
MR. CALVACORESSI: Your Lordship, if you please BY MR. CALVACORESSI:
Q. You commanded the Army Group South in Russia in the autumn of 1941. did not you ?
A The Army Group South; not seven--South. Reichenau ? which Fieldmarshal von Reichenau issued to the 6th Army about how to behave in Russia ? that I had seen that order before--von Reichenau and I had repeatedly given orders which the Army Group never received and which didn't accept it either. The so-called hardship order there I do not recollect having seen but I do not think on the other hand that through some channels he reached my army group and probably got into the office and at any rate, my former first general staff officer who is also interned here in Nurnberg, cannot recollect either that we received that order or that we had at the time the information. It was a matter, of course, that one would not approve of that order particularly since it is in contradiction of the clear order. I take it from what you have been saying that you do now know of its existence. Are you saying that Reichenau was exceptional in these matters?